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This work is a study of the totality of revolutionary 
warfare through the eyes of a general who waged it. Revolu­
tionary warfare during the French Revolution was a unique 
condition. In addition to the normal problems of strategy, 
tactics, and administration, it confronted its generals with 
stupendous problems of personnel, organization, logistics, 
and political control. Jean Baptiste Jourdan faced all of 
these problems throughout his difficult career as a general 
and an army commander during the conflicts of the French 
Revolution from 1792 to 1799. He assumed command of his 
first army at the height of the Terror when these problems 
were most acute, and while other generals buckled under the 
pressures of their commands to be arrested and often guillo­
tined, Jourdan led his army to a series of victories which 
saved the Revolution from extinction. He was integrally 
involved in the creation of the French revolutionary army 
and in the development of the new methods of waging war which 
enabled the Revolution to survive, and which later allowed 
Napoleon to conquer half of Europe. In short, Jourdan's 
career is a paradigm of the way other generals of the period 
dealt with the problems of revolutionary warfare. In re- 
iv
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searching this.work, the author has relied most heavily upon 
the resources of the French War Archives at the Chateau de 
Vincennes, and upon several printed document collections 
such as the Correspondence Generale de Carnot.
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INTRODUCTION
The purpose of this study is to investigate the 
career of a general of the French Revolution: Jean Bap­
tiste Jourdan. Jourdan's career as a soldier, politician 
and revolutionary is of importance and interest on a number 
of counts. He was a general officer throughout the con­
flicts of t^e Revolution from 1792 to 1799 a period of 
warfare unique in military history. War during the vast 
and earthshattering upheavals of the French Revolution in­
volved problems unparalleled in their newness and intensity. 
In addition to the normal difficulties of strategy and tac­
tics, administration and supply, the revolution confronted 
its commanders with stupendous problems of personnel, 
organization, logistics, and political control. A revolu­
tionary general such as Jourdan was obliged to be a singular 
type of commander; he had to be a front line minister of war 
as well as a battle captain. His task was to organize, 
staff, and maintain a brand new army employing an innovative 
and untried system of warfare under conditions of acute 
political and social turmoil at the same time he was attempt­
ing to defeat a competent and dangerous enemy. The Revolu­
tion had destroyed the traditional; Jourdan's task was to 
help create the modern.
Because Jourdan served as an officer, and usually 
as an army commander, during the long, difficult struggles 
vi
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of the Revolution, his career is an ideal paradigm of the 
way other generals of the period dealt with the problems 
of revolutionary warfare. He assumed command of his first 
army during the height of the Terror, and while other gene­
rals buckled under the extreme pressures of their commands 
to be arrested and often guillotined, Jourdan survived the 
pressure, led his army to vicLory— and kept his head. His 
triumphs at Wattignies and Fleurus enabled the Revolution to 
survive the attempts of the First Coalition to destroy it by 
military force. He was integrally involved in the creation 
of the French revolutionary army and in the development of 
the new methods of total war that caused the Revolution to 
survive, enabled Napoleon to conquer half of Europe —  and 
have influenced the waging of war to the present day. He 
was a key figure both as an army commander and a politician 
in the miasma of Directorial politics until Napoleon Bona­
parte liquidated the Directory in 1799. In short, he was 
an important individual militarily at every stage of the 
Revolution. Moreover, Jourdan was an extremely interesting 
person on his own merits.
Contemporaries of Jourdan varied greatly in their 
opinions of his character and abilities. Napoleon considered 
Jourdan a mediocre general and nicknamed him the "anvil" 
because he was always getting beaten in battle. Paul Bar- 
ras, one of France's Directors from 1795 to 1799 believed
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
Jourdan to be "vile, cowardly, and without talent".1 Louis 
Marie Le Revelliere-Lepeaux, one of Barras' colleagues on 
the Directory, was more specific: Jourdan was a man "of
small ability incapable of putting unity into his opera­
tions ... a fumbiQr, irresolute, losing his head at the first 
check and not knowing what to do except draw back, or rather 
fly in disorder;" his victories were due to "lucky accidents".2 
Yet those who worked closely with Jourdan during the revolu­
tion had a completely opposite view of his competence.
Lazare Carnot, the famous "Organizer of Victory" during the 
Terror, considered Jourdan an able commander and a "brave 
and honest .sanseculotte" .1 Pierre Garrau, government com­
missioner with the French armies in Germany, esteemed Jour­
dan as a good republican, a man possessing military talent,
"and that which is infinitely more precious ... the esteem 
and confidence of his brothers-in-arms".4 Garrau's colleague 
Louis Joubert, long an associate of Jourdan, echoed Garrau’s 
praise: Jourdan was both a good general and a man greatly
loved by his subordinates to whom he was "their friend".
1. Paul Barras, Memoires (New York, 1895; 4 vols.),
I, p. xlvii.
2. Louis La Revelliere-Lepeaux, Memoires, II, pp. 373- 
74; quoted in Ramsey Phipps, The Armies of the First French 
Republic (Oxford, 1929-36; 5 vols.), V, pp. 19-20.
3. Archives de Guerre, Carton no. Bl 21 (hereafter 
A .G. Bl 21), Carnot to the Committee of Public Safety, 
10/17/93.
4. A.G. Bl 64, Garrau to Carnot, 11/14/95.
viii
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Moreover, "his glory is only the secondary motivating force 
in his conduct;" love of country and of liberty were "the 
principles which essentially motivated him".  ^ Indeed Bona­
parte while on St. Helena revised his pejorative opinion 
of Jourdan, commenting to his followers that he had treated 
Jourdan harshly and unfairly - that Jourdan was a better 
man than Napoleon had b e l i e v e d . ^
Yet this study proposes to do more than merely 
establish definitively Jourdan's relative merit as a battle 
captain. It seeks, using Jourdan's career as a sort of 
barometer, to answer various questions about the problems 
of military command during the revolution. How did a gene­
ral keep his head, particularly during the Terror? Was it 
sufficient that he be a skilled commander, or were other 
qualifications necessary, and in the latter event what were 
those qualifications? What role did Jourdan play in the 
creation of history's first "peoples' army" and in the de­
velopment of the revolution's version of total war? What 
was the nature of his relations with the various revolution­
ary regimes - especially the Committee of Public Safety: 
what were his politics, his ideas, and his personal relations 
with leaders such as Barras and Carnot? What influence did 
economics and logistics have upon his operations, and how did
5. A.G. Bl 64, Joubert to the Directory, 11/21/95.
6. Joel Headley, Napoleon and his Marshals (New 
York, 1891; 2 vols.), II, p. 235.
ix
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this influence.change from regime to regime? In short, 
what was it like to be an army commander during history's 
most important political and social revolution?
To answer these questions the author has relied most 
heavily upon primary sources. The abundant resources of 
the French War Archives at the Chateau de Vincennes have proven 
to be especially valuable. These include the general day-to- 
day correspondence of the various armies which Jourdan led, 
his correspondence with the various governments and their 
officials "on mission" with the armies, his order registers 
and his unpublished memoires. In addition, there are seve­
ral published document collections and memoires written by 
Jourdan's contemporaries which have been quite helpful in 
researching his career.
The resulting work is not a mere narration of Jour- 
dari'S campaigns and battles, for such a work would ignore 
the problems of personnel, logistics, organization and poli­
tics which he spent most of his time facing. Rather, it is 
an investigation of the totality of revolutionary warfare 
through the eyes of a general who waged it.
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I. YOUTH AND EARLY CAREER
Unlike most members of the lower middle class who 
were born in eighteenth century France, Jean Baptiste 
Jourdan's date and place of birth are both known. He first 
saw the light of day in a small wooden house with a black 
facade in the old quarter of Limoges on April 29, 1762. His 
father, Roch Jourdan, was a surgeon, descended from a 
Provencal family with its roots in the rolling, wine-growing 
country near Aix-en-Provence. It seems that as a young man 
Roch Jourdan became acquainted with a master surgeon named 
Foreau. The Foreau family took a liking to Roch, and so 
they helped him start his own surgical practice in the 
Foreau's home town of Limoges. Roch repaid the favor by 
marrying Foreau's daughter, Jeanne. Shortly after the 
marriage Madame Jourdan gave birth to Jean Baptiste, the 
family's only surviving child.1
Contemporary sociologists would consider Jean 
Baptiste a disadvantaged child. There is nothing to indicate 
that his early years were anything but hard ones, complete 
with poverty and emotional trauma. When he was barely two 
years old his mother died in childbirth. Roch attempted to 
raise the boy alone for a few years, but evidently he believed 
himself unequal to the task. In spite of the fact that
1. A.G. Notice of birth in Jourdan's personal folder. 
Biographie Universelle (Michaud), XXI, p. 244.
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2there were other relatives living in Limoges, Roch decided 
to put his son under the care and tutelage of his brother, 
the cbbd Laurent Jourdan, who ran a small boarding school 
for boys in the tiny Provencal village of Beauregueil. How 
old Jean Baptiste was when this occurred is unknown; it is 
likely that he was still quite young. He scarcely had 
adjusted to his new life with the abbd when he suffered 
another blow. His father died. At the age of nine he 
became an impoverished orphan.^
Life as an orphan in a boarding school in a tiny 
agricultural village in the hills of Provence could not 
have been terribly pleasant, or secure. The abbe Jourdan 
was described as being a man "of strong personality doubled 
with a difficult character", unpleasant traits in a man 
dedicated to a religious calling. The abb6 doubtlessly did 
not leave Jean Baptiste much room for independent development. 
On the other hand, the abbd may well have instilled in him 
a respect for authority so crucial to his later career. It 
is argued that Roch Jourdan entrusted his son to the abbd to 
insure that Jean Baptiste received a good education. The 
education doubtlessly consisted of the basics: reading,
writing, arithmetic, plus the inevitable heavy doses of 
Catholic theology. Indeed the abbd considered Jean Baptiste 
a possible candidate for the priesthood. If so, either
2. Rene Valentin, Le Harechal Jourdan (Paris, 1956), 
pp. 25-29.
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3a lack of money or Jean Baptiste's resistence Jellied this 
idea. Instead, the abbd apprenticed him to another member 
of the family, Jean Francois Jourdan, a cloth merchant in 
Lyons. At fifteen, Jean Baptiste collected his meager 
belongings and moved to Lyons to work. There he served as 
an apprentice salesclerk. Laboring from dawn to dusk for 
a man who alledgedly was a hard taskmaster, he opened his 
uncle's shop in the morning, did stock and maintenance work, 
and showed customers his uncle's cloth. The hours were long, 
the work tedious, the punishments frequent, and the rewards 
few. 5
Jean Baptiste endured life as an apprentice shopkeeper 
for about a year. Then, some time in 1778, he fled his 
uncle's clothshop and enlisted in the Auxerrois regiment of 
the French Royal Army, then destined for service in America.^
Why did he reject shopkeeping and the priesthood for 
a career as a common infantryman in an old regime mercenary 
regiment? Possibly Jourdan was an unhappy young man, 
discontented with his position as a shopkeeper's apprentice 
because it was beneath his bourgeois heritage and education.5
3. Ibid, pp,25-31. Valentin's sketchy information on 
Jourdan's early years came from the Limoges archives, and a 
brief biography of Jourdan by Leonard Gay-Vernon, his fellow 
deputy from the Haute-Vienne in the Council of 500.
4. Ibid, pp. 32-4. A.G. Jourdan's service record.
5. Ibid. pp. 28-34.
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That Jourdan was discontented there can be no doubt; there 
had been little in his life to produce contentment. However 
the rest of this argument is open to debate. The assumption 
is that a person's heritage is the decisive factor in 
determining his social standing and his outlook on life.
But is this in fact the case? Are not a person’s experiences, 
as well as his actual wealth and economic standing within the 
community, more important? It is difficult to believe that 
Jean Baptiste, motherless at two, a virtual orphan at s;x, 
was ever conscious of himself as bourgeois. His position, 
as he saw it, was that of a propertyless orphan boy 
possessing a rudimentary education. In short, his class 
standing was similar to what the Revolution would call 
sans-culotte. Secondly, it is hard to conceive of a young 
man, conscious of himself as bourgeois, attempting to avoid 
a fall from that class by choosing a career as a lowly foot 
soldier. Jourdan1s motivation for joining the army was 
probably more basic; he was young, restless, disgusted with 
both his job and his master. The army offered him both an 
escape from the drudgery of the clothshop and the prospect 
of some adventure. He would not have been the first poor 
boy to run away from a boring existence to seek excitement 
in the military.
There is little evidence to indicate how Jourdan 
fared in the Royal army. He apparently was a good enough 
soldier; there were no black marks against him on his service
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
5record. He spent the rest of 1778 on the lie of Rhe where 
the Auxerrois regiment was encamped before it embarked for 
the war in America. The regiment's first duty was in the 
West Indies; Jourdan's first action was in the French capture 
of Grenada. in September, 1779, his regiment became part 
of the army of the Marquis d'Estaing, then deployed to 
besiege Savannah, Georgia. Jourdan doubtlessly participated 
in the bloody, unseccessful Franco-American assault on the 
town that terminated the siege in the favor of the defenders. 
In 1780 he found himself on St. Vincent aiding in its 
successful resistance against an army of 4,000 British 
attackers; in 1781 he fought in the French capture of Tobago. 
He missed most of the 1782 campaign beacuse of his health.
The official diagnosis was that he suffered from a hernia 
contracted while on duty; it is more probable that he fell 
victim to an intestinal disorder, an illness that the 
doctors misdiagnosed, and which plagued him off and on 
throughout his military career.^
Jourdan rejoined the army in November, 1782. The 
remainder of his career in the Royal army appears to have 
been uneventful. In June, 1784, he was demobilized at Verdun. 
For a while after he left the military, he apparently was at 
a loss as to what to do with himself. He wandered through 
Alsace, possibly seeking work. He later related that
6. Ibid, pp. 36-8. A.G. Jourdan's service record.
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during his wanderings he visited some friends from hii old 
unit; one, seeing his bedraggled appearance, exclaimed in
jest: "There is a poor devil of an infantryman who will never
wear the pants of a Marshal of France." At that time, 
nothing could have seemed more unlikely; he was twenty-two 
years old, penniless, experienced only in clothmaking and 
soldiering. Desperate, he attempted to get back with his 
uncle's clothshop. His uncle refused to rehire him, 
possibly out of pique because he had fled the shop before, 
possibly because the depressed state of the cloth industry 
in Lyons in the 1780's did not permit any more workers to 
be hired.^
Finally Jourdan returned to Limoges. There his 
relatives and some friends of his late father secured him 
a job with a cloth merchant named Michael Avanturier. If 
he felt any dislike at returning to the same sort of career 
which he had joined the arrny to escape, he did not show it.
Outwardly at least he accepted his lot. As an employee he
was described as "punctual, industrious, conscientious, 
honest:" in short, he was a worker upon whom one could 
completely rely. And life took a turn for the better. He 
fell in love with the sister of his boss, Jeanne Nicolas 
Avanturier, and eventually proposed marriage. There 
appears to have been some hesitation on the part of the
7. Ibid, pp. 38-9
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7part of the Avanturiers about permitting the marriage.
Jeanne was the elder by two years; moreover, at a time 
when rank and financial standing were all important,
Jourdan's background as an orphan and a common foot soldier 
did not exactly make him an ideal prospect. However things 
were worked out, and the two were married in a Catholic 
ceremony on January 22, 1788. The marriage appears to have 
been a good one, although the lack of any personal papers 
for Jourdan's private life makes it impossible to judge 
conclusively.8 The marriage endured until his death, and 
produced six children. There is one hint of a scandal; a 
general Decaen claimed that Jourdan kept a mistress, dressed 
as an aide-de-camp, with him on the campaign of 179 9, but 
the allegation is not supported by any other evidence.^
As for Jordan s physical appearance, curiously 
enough there is no detailed written description of him to 
be found. There does exist a portrait of him, painted at 
some time during the 1790's; he is wearing his uniform of a 
general of the revolution. The first thing that strikes one 
about the portrait is that Jourdan does not look like a 
soldier. Rather he has the appearance of an intellectual or 
a cleric. His features are sharp and rather delicate; he
8. Ibid, pp. 39-41.
9. Phipps, op cit, V, p. 59. Decaen claimed that the 
soldiers objected to Jourdan's having a mistress with him on 
the campaign; this statement in itself suffices to cast 
doubts on Decaen's veracity.
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seems younger than the thirty-some odd years of age which 
he must have been when the picture was painted. He appears 
to have been of no more than medium height, and on the 
slender side. His hair was light, s;tndy blond in color 
possibly, worn short and straight forward in the revolutionary 
style. Rather large and striking eyes stare out of the 
canvas at the viewer. His expression suggests that he was 
slightly amused by the whole exercise. There is none of the 
ruggedness in his features that one might expect of a man 
who was to lead armies under the intense pressures of the 
Terror; he appears to be anything but stolid or phlegmatic.
On the contrary, there is a refinement and sensitivity in 
his countenance that suggests that he would find those 
pressures far too intense to endure.
At the outset of the French Revolution Jourdan was 
enjoying a certain degree of security and prosperity for the 
first time in his life. His marriage had enabled him, 
thanks to the generosity of his wife's family, to open up 
his own dry goods shop in Limoges. He was the father of 
two young daughters. He was a respectable family man with 
a circle of relatives and friends. It it was hardly an 
idyllic existence, it certainly was superior to anything he 
had had before.
And yet he became an active revolutionary--an 
apparently irrational decision. Upon closer examination, 
however, it was not irrational at all. If there was a
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9common denominator in Jourdan's motivation during his early 
years, that denominator was frustrated ambition. Jourdan 
was discontented as an orphan, as an apprentice, and as a 
foot soldier. It is possible that he considered life as a 
Limoges shopkeeper not satisfying enough to compensate for 
the deprivations and sufferings of his earlier years. The 
revolution offered him the chance to climb the ladder of 
success a bit higher to a more prestigious position than 
that of a mere sans-culotte dry goods merchant. Secondly, 
he could have felt no loyalty towards the old regime; it 
had done nothing for him; indeed in some ways it had 
hindered his attempts at upwards mobility. Had he desired 
to make the army his career, for example, he could never 
have expected to rise to a rank higher than a non-commissioned 
officer due to his lowly heritage. Thirdly, he had been to 
America. Possibly his experiences there had instilled in 
him a taste for republican ideas. Certainly he remained a 
firm advocate of representative government throughout his 
life, and this preference may have taken root during the 
American Revolution. All things considered, then, Jourdan 
would have acted inconsistently if he had not joined the 
revolution.
In the summer of 1790 he became a member of the 
newly formed revolutionary club of Limoges, "Les Amis de la
10. Valentin, op cit, pp. 51-2.
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Constitution".' The club was mainly a respectable bourgeois 
affair, quite moderate in its politics. Jourdan's membership 
in such an organi nation is a bit surprising. It is a fact 
that at approximately the same time as the club's foundation, 
Jourdan was elected captain of the chasseur company of the 
Limoges national guard, probably because of his military 
experience. Perhaps protocol required an officer in the 
local national guard to be a member of the revolutionary 
society no matter how undistinguished his background.
Jourdan probably welcomed the chance to join the club and 
further his ambitions. At any rate, he became known as one 
of the society's "militants"; unfortunately we have no 
information as to what it was he was militant a b out.^
In the fall of 1791, the peaceful progress of the 
revolution in Limoges was interrupted by the threat of war. 
The Brissotin-Feu.illante coalition in the National Assembly, 
having become convinced that the counterrevolution in 
alliance with Austria and Prussia was planning a war against 
the revolution, decreed that 100,000 volunteers be mobilised 
to help meet the threat. The Assembly called upon the Haute 
Vienne to raise two volunteer battalions totaling 1,150 me.i 
as its contribution to the levee. The administration of the 
department named Jourdan as one of th :ee men entrusted with 
executing the levied. His task was not easy. Each volunteer
11. Ibid, pp. 52-4.
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was expected to provide his own clothing and equipment--a 
considerable expense. In addition the prospective volunteers, 
then as now, were not eager to leave their homes for the less 
comfortable and secure existence of the army. Nevertheless, 
Jourdan and his colleagues raised 1,125 of the 1,150 men 
requested. The second battalion of the department elected 
Jourdan second lieutenant-colonel— a testimony to his 
standing with the volunteers. Since many of them had been 
under his command during his tenure as national guard 
captain, it is obvious that to a large extent he had won 
their respect and trust."1'2
It was a promising beginning to his new military 
career. But it was a debut without immediate results. For 
the next year and a half, he was just one of many obscure 
lieutenant-colonels in one of many equally obscure volunteer 
battalions. The 2nd Haute Vienne was Sunt to the Nord 
in November, 1791, in spite of the protests of Jourdan and 
the battalion's commander that it was not yet adequately 
trained or equipped. There it became part of the army of 
Flanders under the leadership of Lafayette. To all 
indications Jourdan spent the spring and summer of 1792 with 
his battalion at Cambrai, in relative inactivity. He did 
not see action until September when the battalion was 
ordered south to join the army of General Dumouriez, then
12. Ibid, pp. 61-4.
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marching to co'nfiont the invading allied army of the Duke 
of Brunswick. His first action was inauspicious. His 
battalion took part in a rear-guard combat after Brunswick's 
forces had surprised a portion of Dumouriez1 on the upper 
Aisne river. The entire French force was routed— or what is 
more probable— simply broke and ran. Jourdan's role in the 
rout is not recorded. When Dumouriez marched to join 
Kellerman at Valmy, the 2nd Haute Vienne was detached some 
miles away. Jourdan consequently missed this famous "battle" 
that allowed the revolution a precious year to consolidate 
itself further. He was present at Jemappes; but because his 
battalion was part of Harville's division, whose mission it 
was to flank the enemy's positions rather than assault 
them directly, he again saw little action. He then took 
part in Dumouriez' pursuit of the defeated Austrian army—  
a pursuit that resulted in the temporary conquest of Belgium. 
He then participated in the siege of Namur. None of these 
operations resulted in any significant activity for the 2nd 
Haute Vienne; consequently there was little opportunity for 
Jourdan to distinguish himself.13
Nevertheless, it appears that he earned his pay 
during the winter and spring months of 1792-1793. In spite 
of a rather hard winter marked by bitter cold weather and
13. Phipps, op cit, I, pp. 119-21. Valentin, ibid, 
pp. 65-9. ------- ----
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supply difficulties of every kind, only eighty men deserted
from the 2nd Haute Vienne. This figure, compared with the
desertion rates of other volunteer battalions during the
same winter, was relatively low. Evidently he did an
excellent job training and discipling the battalion;
certainly when he first came to be noticed by the higher
echelons of the army, his reputation rested upon his
abilities as a disciplinarian. He also remained in touch
with the revolutionary society of Limoges, now a Jacobin
club; he wrote it several letters describing his experiences
in the army, and in one he requested that the society care
for the indigent mother of one of his men. And at some
point during the winter he became first lieutenant-colonel 
14
of his battalion.
What was the nature of Jourdan's duties as commander 
of the 2nd Haute Vienne? How did he go about turning 
peasant volunteers into soldiers? Unfortunately, due to 
the lack of documentation for this period of Jourdan1s 
career, one cannot answer these questions with certainty. 
Nonetheless, if one considers the experiences of other 
officers during this time, one can estimate many of the 
problems which he had to face and overcome. He first of 
all had to teach his men how to be soldiers. He had to see
14. Ibid. Information on Jourdan's career during these 
months is almost nonexistent. The extant correspondence of 
the Army of the Nord from 1792 to the summer of 1793 is very 
limited, and until August, 1793, Jourdan is hardly mentioned
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to it that they learned how to march and maneuver in 
formation, to load and fire a musket, to maintain proper 
discipline and hygiene in camp. To accomplish this, he had 
to develop a reliable cadre of officers and non-commissioned 
officers to assume the actual teaching duties. This was not 
easy; most of the officers were elected to their posts, and 
popularity rather than military ability often took precedence 
in these elections. An alarming number of the officers, 
many of them former line soldiers in the Royal army, could 
neither read nor write. Almost all had only a vague idea 
of their duties. Yet these were the men who had to bear 
the brunt of the responsibility of training and disciplining 
the peasant volunteers.
If Jourdan's experiences were typical, he had to 
instruct his officers in their most basic responsibilities: 
to remain at the head of their men during a march, to prevent 
straggling, not to take unauthorised absences from their 
units thereby leaving their troops unsupervised. Jourdan 
himself also had to see to it that the daily bread 
distributions took place on time and in order, and that his 
soldiers did not sell their rifles and equipment; those 
guilty of breaches of discipline had to receive swift, 
impartial judgment. Much of his time must have been spent 
in the day-to-day business of inspecting and adjusting the 
advanced posts of his battalion, a tiresome task that 
nonetheless demanded the constant attention of every officer.
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These duties were anything but glamourous; yet they had to 
be carried out if the 2nd Haute Vienne was to become something 
more than an armed mob. Judging by his subsequent ascent 
to high command in the revolutionary army, Jourdan must have 
acquitted thest- duties successfully.
In the spring of 1793 Jourdan's battalion was 
attached to the division of general Chapuis de Tourville. 
Tourville was entrusted with the defense of the fortress 
town of Maubeuge and the surrounding area. Consequently 
Jourdan was not involved in the confused fighting around 
Valenciennes.^ Instead he reamined occupied with the 
tedious chores of training his soldiers. In Tourville, he 
had a good master for this type of duty. Tourville was a 
ci-devant noble and former officer in the Royal army, a stern 
man allegedly with a severe and at times violent character.
To judge him from his orders he was a commander who preferred 
the trees to the forest— a meticulous organiser and 
disciplinarian and a stickler for detail. The Jacobin 
representative on mission to Maubeuge gave Tourville high 
marks for his organization of the defenses of the town, 
which, he wrote, were "capable of resisting 80,000 men". It 
is likely that Jourdan learned much about discipline and 
organization from this veteran old-regime officer. Tourville
15. A.G. B1 13 & B1 14, Tourville's orders of the day. 
A.G. Jourdan's service record. Phipps is wrong when he 
states that Jourdan took part in the fighting around 
Valenciennes.
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believed Jourdan capable; on June 26, he promoted him to 
General of Brigade and entrusted him with the garrison of 
Maubeuge. Jourdan in turn evidently respected Tourville's 
abilities. When Tourville was removed from command due to 
his aristocratic background and association with the 
arrested general Custine, Jourdan wrote a letter to the 
Committee of Public Safety in his behalf.16
Up to this point Jourdan's career had been strikingly 
unremarkable. He had won no battlefield distinction whatso­
ever. He had not made any friends among the powerful either 
in the army or in the government. His rate of promotion had 
been slow. He was unknown outside of Maubeuge. Yet from an 
unheralded colonel, he advanced in rank to become General of 
Brigade on June 26, General of Division on July 30, and 
commander of all French forces deployed around Lille on 
August 13— quite a rapid ascent up the ladder of promotion 
for a provincial colonel who had labored in obscurity until 
late June. He owed this sudden advancement mainly to force 
of circumstances. In the summer of 1793 the officer corps 
of the French army in Flanders was suffering rapid and
16. Arthur Chuquet, Hondschoote (Paris, n.d.), pp. 
135-140. Tourville survived the revolution. In 1798 Tour­
ville, then in retirement, asked Jourdan to intercede with 
the Minister of War and to help secure him a pension since 
he was in extreme poverty and the minister had been deaf to 
his requests. Jourdan did so, requesting that the minister 
alleviate the condition of the "old officer". A.G. B2* 260, 
Jourdan to the Minister of War, 11/6/98.
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unprecedented turnover. Shaken by the succession of defeats 
suffered by that army, as well as by the treason in April 
of its commander, Dumouriez, the government was trying to 
weed out all incompetent, unpatriotic, and aristocratic 
officers, and replace them with younger, more talented, more 
politically reliable personnel. The arrest in July of 
general Custine, commander-in-chief of the Army of the Nord, 
was followed by a wholesale purge of the top echelons of the 
army, as the Jacobins attempted to remove any officer who 
might have been associated with a general whom they now 
considered a traitor. As a result, the army stood in 
desperate need of officers who were both politically sound 
and militarily competent.
Jourdan was an ideal candidate for promotion. 
Politically he was a staunch republican with a genuine 
sans-culotte background; he was not in any way associated 
with Custine. Militarily he was gradually developing a 
reputation as a disciplinarian and an organizer? general 
Ilouchard was to call his division that "belle division" —  
testimony to Jourdan's ability in putting green troops into 
fighting trim. A republican officer who was both a sans­
culotte and a good disciplinarian was a rare commodity in an 
army which wanted both, even though that officer was 
without real distinction or experience commanding large 
bodies of troops.
Jourdan thus was one of the many young officers whom
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the Jacobins used as cannon fodder in their desperate 
struggle to build a revolutionary army overnight. Like so 
many of his fellow officers, he was thrown untried and 
unseasoned into the government’s battle to repair the damage 
done to the army by the mismanagement, betrayals, and 
defeats of the spring and summer. Jourdan happened to be 
equal to the occasion. He was lucky.
On August 13, Jourdan was put in charge of a force 
of some 13,000 soldiers concentrated around Lille. By 
mid-August, Lille had become a front line fortress. The 
Anglo-Dutch-Austrian forces under the overall command of 
the Prince of Coburg had spent the summer steadily driving 
the French out of Belgium. They had defeated the French 
fordes around Valenciennes in a series of actions, captured 
that fortress, and driven the French from several entrenched 
camps. The Austrian army on the upper Sambre and Escaut 
was poised like an arrow pointing at Paris ninety miles 
away. From the Sambre valley to the coast the French held 
a defensive cordon in which Lille was a key strongpoint. As 
Jourdan was taking command of Lille, the Allies, at the 
behest of the English government, had decided to capture the 
northern most link in the cordon— Dunkirk. To accomplish 
this objective, Coburg had dispatched an Anglo-Dutch army 
under the Duke of York to march northwest, virtually 
parallel to the French lines, to besiege the city.
General Jean Kouchard, the latest commander of the
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
19
Army of the Nord, heard about the Allies' operation. He 
sent Jourdan orders to observe the enemy's march when it 
reached the Lille area, and to determine if it was indeed 
directed towards the coast. "The intelligence and bravery 
of Jourdan are known," Houchard encouraged him, "and he 
will surely serve the Republic with the same zeal that he 
has shown during the course of the war. Accordingly
Jourdan and his second-in-command, general Beru, organized 
a reconnaissance in force to begin on August 18 towards the 
villages of Roubaix and Linselles rortheast of Lille. The 
force covering the march of York's army, under the Prince 
of Orange, was destined to pass quite close to the Lille 
defenses. Coincidentally Orange decided to launch an 
attack of his own against the French advanced posts near 
these villages, in order to provide better cover for the 
main advance. Thus the two offensive operations were 
destined to collide.18
The subsequent action, Jourdan's first as a general, 
is known as the combat of Linselles. It was a carbon copy 
of many similar engagements fought by the raw French troops 
uuring the course of the campaign. Orange's troops struck 
first, driving back the French advanced posts. At Lille,
17. Victor Dupuis, De Valenciennes a Hondschoote 
(Paris, 1907), pp. 201-207.
18. Chuquet, o£ cit, pp. 135-140.
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Jourdan waited to determine the exact direction of Orange's 
attack. Then he detached a brigade to Roubaix to check the 
enemy there, and marched with between 7,000 and 10,000 men 
to support general Beru near Linselles. At three P.M. Jourdan 
counterattacked. He initially met with complete success.
A column under general Macdonald surprised and routed the 
German regiment holding the nearby village of Blaton. Two 
other columns apparently led by Jourdan in person converged 
on Linselles, attacked the Dutch force holding the town, 
and after a sharp fight routed it inflicting over 1,000 
casualties. But as so often happened, the raw French troops, 
at the moment of victory, got completely out of hand. They 
dispersed through the village breaking into wine cellars 
and pillaging the houses; Jourdan and his officers were 
completely unable to rally them. The disorder of the French 
enabled the enemy to recover and take countermeasures.
General Lake with a brigade of English foot guards counter­
attacked Linselles in his turn. Jourdan must have succeeded 
in holding at least some of his men at their posts, for 
it took Lake three assaults to wrest the village from its 
defenders, who resisted from ditches and palisaded houses.
But when Lake's assaults at last succeeded, the fighting 
was over. The French ran all the way back to Lille in
spite of Jourdan's best efforts to rally them. "It was not
lq
a retreat, Jourdan reported laconically, "it was a rout."
19. Dupuis, op cit, pp. 212-16 (quote). Chuquet, ibid.
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Strategically the action of Linselles was unimportant; 
it changed nothing, it decided nothing. The Allies continued 
their march towards the coast, and the French retained their 
positions around Lille. Losses were about 1,200 soldiers 
killed, wounded, or missing for each side.20 The basic 
strategic issue— whether Dunkirk would fall to the Allies or 
be held by the French— remained undecided. Nevertheless, 
Linselles was an important milestone in Jourdan's career.
It was his first pitched battle as a general and the first 
action in which he exercised sole tactical control. It 
brought him face to face with the basic problems involved in 
leading peasant conscripts into battle. If he was able to 
deliver a deadly initial blow with them, he was unable, 
because of their lack of discipline and experience, to 
keep them under control long enough either to profit from 
the initial success, or to retain what was won in the face 
of a protracted enemy resistance. The fundamental weakness 
of the French revolutionary forces was that they possessed 
neither endurance nor cohesiveness in a combat of sustained 
duration.
This basic fact became the cornerpost around which 
much of Jourdan's subsequent activity as a general would 
revolve. To face the enemy on equal terms and defeat him, 
Jourdan would have to discover the means to overcome his
20. Dupuis, ibid.
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soldiers' deficiencies in discipline and endurance. 
Linselles was his initiation to the problem: it introduced
and typified the tactical difficulties which he would have 
to confront and to solve in future actions. As such, it 
proved to be a valuable object lesson in the art of 
leadership in a revolutionary army.
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II. THE REVOLUTIONARY ARMY IN 1793
I. The Beginnings of The Revolutionary Army.
Jean Baptiste Jourdan became a general, and 
ultimately an army commander, during a time when the French 
Revolution had unleashed forces which caused the traditional 
methods of making war to become unsuitable for the revolu­
tionaries. The slow, deliberate warfare of Old Regime Europe 
with its chess-match pace, its professional armies, its 
limited mercantilist goals, and its primitive technology 
and organization, did not mesh with a revolution that was 
trying to sever all ties with the past, and to do so 
overnight. As a result, the warfare waged by the 
revolutionaries was to be the first stage in the transforma­
tion of warfare from the traditional to the modern and from 
the limited to the total.
In 1793, however, this transformation had hardly 
begun. The warfare of the revolutionaries at this point 
was in limbo; it was no longer traditional, but neither was 
it modern, or even radically different from the traditional. 
Old Regime Methods were mixed with revolutionary innovations 
in much the same way as former noble officers were inter­
mingled with improvised sans-culotte generals. As is 
common to the initial stages of any great change, the 
conditions in which the revolutionaries operated in 1793 
were puzzling, difficult, and often painful. Jourdan 
embarked upon his career as a general under especially 
trying circumstances, at a time when the traditional 
23
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problems of military leadership were being replaced by new 
difficulties— difficulties for which no manuals had yet been 
written. Military leadership in 179 3 was to be leadership 
over largely uncharted ground.
It is, and has been, easy to view this change 
simplir''cally. The differences between Old Regime warfare 
and revolutionary warfare in its refined stage--as conducted 
by Napoleon for example— seem so striking that it is easy 
to forget that the transition from the former to the latter 
did not occur either smoothly or instantaneously. The new 
did not immediately replace the old, partly because the old 
still had much to recommend it, partly because it was far 
from clear to the revolutionaries what the new form of 
warfare was to be, and partly because any major change 
necessarily takes time.
Old Regime warfare had become cordon warfare by 
the second half of the 18th century. This manner of con­
ducting war possessed all the flaws for which its critics 
have condemned it. It was slow, cumbersome, and indecisive. 
Mercenary soldiers were kept in the ranks by the stick of 
vicious, merciless discipline and the carrot of compensation 
in the form of loot and pay. To attempt rapid movements 
with such men was inadvisable; rapid movement frequently 
involved a relaxation of discipline, and a relaxation of 
discipline could well lead to chaos. To attempt to push 
such soldiers beyond their normal limits of endurance was
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impossible. Their compensation was insufficient to evoke 
an extreme effort and,if such an effort was demanded, the 
average mercenary might well desert or go over to the enemy. 
The officers were nobles, ill-educated in the ramifications 
of military leadership, and consequently ill-equipped to 
bring a campaign or a battle to a decisive conclusion. The 
strategy of the cordon involved extending one's army in a 
line covering as wide an expanse of territory as possible, 
and engaging in a war of small actions and sieges. The 
brief flirtation with massed armies and major battles by 
Marlborough and Eugene of Savoy had been rejected by the 
men of the Enlightenment as too costly and too brutal; even 
Frederick the Great preferred maneuvers over battles as the 
best way to attain one's objectives.'*'
This style of warfare suited 18th century conditions. 
The small scale of its battles prevented the mercenary 
soldiers, who were quite expensive and difficult to replace, 
from becoming casualties in great numbers. Its deliberate 
pace dovetailed with the primitive roads and communications 
of the age. The dispersal of its forces facilitated supply; 
the provision magazines could be located close to the front 
while drawing their resources from a greater expanse of 
territory— an important consideration in a primitive
1. See Robert Quimby, The Background of Napoleonic 
Warfare (New York, 1967); Jay Luvaas, Frederick the Great on 
the Art of War (New York, 196 6); Gunther Rothenberg, The Art 
of Warfare in the Age of Napoleon (Indiana U, 1978).
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agricultural economy. The long fronts of the cordons better 
allowed the generals to achieve the limited objectives of 
their masters, these being the capture of as much of the 
enemy's territory and resources as possible. Cordon warfare 
well served the limited ends of the dynastic and mercantile 
conflicts of the 18th century, as well as the primitive 
nature of the era's economics, organization and technology.
What the strategy of the cordon could not do was 
bring a conflict to a rapid, decisive conclusion. Total 
victory required that the armies involved have the capacity 
to defeat decisively, even to destroy, their foes. Old 
Regime armies operating in cordon did not have this capacity. 
Their unmotivated mercenaries would not march fast enough or 
fight hard enough. Their aristocratic officers were not 
skilled enough. Their primitive weaponry was not destructive 
enough. The need to keep one's army close to its supply 
line limited its ability to maneuver rapidly enough. The 
rigid linear tactics prevented large scale destructive 
battles, while the limited nature of the objectives made 
such battles unnecessary and undesirable.
Revolutionary war, in theory, rejected cordon warfare 
outright. Ideally revolutionary war was more rapid, more 
destructive, more decisive, more innovative. In place of 
robot-like mercenary "slaves" led by their aristocratic 
masters, the Revolution employed a people in arms. In place 
of limited mercantilistic objectives, the Revolution sought
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uncompromising goals such as liberty, equality and fraternity. 
Instead of the deliberate tactics of maneuver, cordon and 
siege, it employed tactics of mass, shock, and constant 
offensive. The Revolutionary army did not tie itself to 
magazines and supply lines; it mobilized the country's 
resources, and it lived at the expense of the resources of 
the enemy. Revolutionary strategy sought to overcome the 
structural and organizational shortcomings of a preindustrial 
society to achieve total victory. Revolutionary warfare 
thus seemed to be a complete departure from traditional 
war. As St Just trenchantly observed, "Everything that is 
not new in a tirne of change is harmful. The military art 
of the monarchy no longer suits us...If the French nation 
is motivated in this war by all strong and generous passions: 
love of country, hatred of tyrants and oppression; if on 
the other hand its enemies are mercenary slaves, automatons 
without passions, the system of war of the French armies
2
ought to be the order of the charge." For how, after all, 
could unmotivated mercenaries and outdated aristocrats 
contend against a patriotic people in arms, employing new 
modes of warfare, committed to a conception of war 
outrance"? How could the obsolete contend against the 
modern, the limited against the unrestricted?
2. Quoted by Albert Soboul, Les Soldats de l'an II 
(Paris, 1970) , p. 203.
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Such was, and is, the theory. The reality was 
otherwise. The French army in 1793 was not yet a true 
peoples' army. It was a "ramassis", part professional, 
part volunteer, part conscript. First, it contained the 
veteran line soldiers of the Royal army who had not emigrated. 
Secondly it contained the volunteers of 1791 and 1792, those 
men who patriotically responded to the call of the 
Legislative Assembly for soldiers to defend the revolution. 
Finally it contained the first arrivals of the Girondin 
lev£e of 300,000 men of February, 1793. But these three 
types of soldiers did not comprise an entire nation armed 
against its invaders. In fact, the suspicion was that their 
numbers were insufficient to withstand the rapidly growing 
might of the Coalition. The veterans and the volunteers 
had been suffering casualties steadily ever since Valmy—  
losses which additional volunteers were not making good.
The enthusiasm of 1791 had worn off. As a result, at the 
beginning of 1793, the army may have numbered as few as
175,000 men.3
The Girondin levd'e of 300,000 men was designed to 
provide the manpower which the volunteering system was not 
supplying. Unfortunately, as with so many of the Girondins* 
measures, if the concept was sound, the implementation was
3. S. F. Scott, "Les Soldats de ligne en 1793," 
Annales historique de la revolution francaise (hereafter 
A.H.R.F.), XLIV, 210, Nov. 1972, pp. 496-97.
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faulty. The levde was widely resisted. The Girondins
unwisely left the carrying out of the levde to the
individual departments; each one was to fill an assigned
quota of conscripts using whatever means that it found
most suitable. The lack of uniform guidelines caused a
wealth of abuses to mar the levde. Many areas chose to
select their conscripts by scrutin de liste. The local
majority often used this method to draft all of its political
foes. One commune lost all of its cultivators as a result.
In some areas the majority chose only the feeble minded and
the physically unfit; in other areas those hostile to the
central government put all the local patriots on the list.
C. A. Prieur (de la Cote d'Or) then on mission to help
execute the levde, wrote that the levde was "a vexation and
a crying injustice" in these cases "because the majority,
which wants the scrutin, makes all the weight of the
conscription fall upon the minority who oppose it." An
additional defect was the provision that allowed a conscript
to purchase a substitute if he so desired; the substitutes
were frequently of poor stamina and poorer character. In
many places department administrations hostile to the levde
simply refused to fill their quotas, allowing the passive
resistance of their citizens to go unchecked. In the Vendde
4
it was resisted by force of arms.
4. Quoted by Georges Bouchard, Prieur de la Cote d 'Or 
(Paris, 1946), p. 152. Marcel Reinhard, Le Grand Carnot 
(Paris, 1954; 2 vols.) II, pp. 43-4.
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By the summer of 1793 the defects of this levde 
were so manifest that it was becoming increasingly obvious 
that something more was needed. The consensus held that 
all Frenchmen must rise up and fight the invader in fact as 
well as in theory. The demand for a levee-en-masse in which 
everyone would be put at the service of the revolution 
came from a number of sources. Carnot argued for such a 
measure as early as 1792. The popular societies, by way of 
pamphlets, speeches, and demonstrations, agitated for it with 
increasing vehemence as the year wore on. On the other side 
of the social spectrum, ci-devant noble representatives 
Bellegarde and Dubois-Dubais saw the need for a general 
levee in early 1793. The Girondins opposed a lev6e-en-masse, 
ironically enough with the aid of Robespierre, who believed 
the measure well-intended but impractical. But after their 
fall in June, and with the military si.tuation growing 
increasingly grim, the levde-en-masse came closer to becoming 
reality. But in mid-summer, 1793, it was not yet real, nor 
would it be until August 23. Its beneficial effects were 
not to be felt until later still.5
If the French army was not yet a true people's army, 
neither was it a homogeneous force. Its units varied in 
composition, strength, uniforms, and pay. In the Army of the
5. Soboul, o£ cit, pp. 114-15. Edmund Bonnal de Ganges, 
Les Representants en mission pres les armees (Paris, 1898;
4 vols.), I, pp. 150-62.
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Nord there were battalions of veterans of the Royal army, 
volunteer battalions like the 2nd Haute Vienne raised in 
1791 and 1792, Federde battalions, special light infantry or 
chasseur units, national guard units, legions of Belgian 
"republicans, plus the conscript battalions of the first 
levee. All these units were differently clad, paid, and led. 
The wholesale emigration of the largely noble cadres of the 
old army had left the revolution with a serious officer 
shortage. While those Royalist officers who remained were 
competent enough, most of the rest had attained their ranks 
through election by their men. The variety of quality in 
these elected officers can be imagined; some were totally 
inept. The Girondins declared that two thirds of all 
generals were to be selected by the Counseil Executif; but 
since there was no means for the Conseil to become acquainted 
with the better officers, this measure only marginally 
improved the situation. As a result there was no clear and 
effective way to provide the army with qualified, competent 
officers.
The differences in the personnel, pay, and leadership 
of the various units led to serious friction among their 
officers and men. The regulars disliked the volunteers 
because the latter were better paid and less harshly discip­
lined. The volunteers disliked the conscripts, considering 
them bad patriots and reluctant soldiers; one angry volunteer 
wrote that the levde units were comprised of men who sold
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themselves to the army as one sells pigs.^ Both volunteers 
and conscripts.suspected the regulars of royalism and worse.
The differing uniforms— white for the regulars, blue for the 
volunteers and conscripts— were a visible manifestation of 
the very real divisions which existed within the army.
The embrigadement law of February 21, 1793, only 
touched the edges of the problem.. It did abolish the visible 
signs of the divisions in the army. It made promotion 
regulations and pay uniform for all units. It also decreed 
that henceforth the blue uniform of the volunteers and the 
conscripts was to be the standard dress for all republican 
soldiers. It officially established the demi-brigade as the 
largest basic unit and decreed that each demi-brigade was to 
be composed of two battalions of conscript-volunteers 
and one of veterans. It ordered that one third of all 
officers promoted would be promoted by seniority, while the 
remaining two thirds would continue to advance by election.
But the embrigadement law said nothing about the added 
conscripts rapidly accumulating in new units under untried 
officers behind the front. It did nothing substantial to 
improve the quality of the officer corps. Since two thirds 
of all officers continued to be elected, popularity rather 
txian skill continued t.j be the prime consideration in 
advancement in the army hierarchy. Worse, the law was only
5. F. X. Joliclerc, Joliclerc; Voluntaire aux armees 
de la revolution, ses lettres; 1793-96" (Paris, 1905), 
pp. 51-3.
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halfheartedly -enforced. The Girondins had opposed the law 
on various grounds, and while they continued to share power 
in the Convention, they made little effort to see to its 
execution. As a result the confusing assorment of differing 
smaller units remained, and the summer saw entire battalions 
of French regulars still fighting in their white uniforms. 
Embrigadement was not amalgamation. The fighting qualities 
of the individual battalions, be they volunteer, conscript, 
Feder£e or whatever, continued to vary greatly. If the 
regulars and most of the volunteers could be counted on to 
do their duty, the others could be counted on to turn and 
run at the first opportunity. The army, in short, did not 
yet have a uniform level of performance from all of its 
units.^
The strategy and tactics used in the summer of 1793 
were not yet standardized. Ideally, revolutionary warfare 
was to be warfare of mass, rather than warfare of the rigid 
linear formations of the professional armies of monarchical 
Europe. Translated into tactics, war of mass meant the 
deployment of one's soldiers in columns rather than lines—  
columns twenty to thirty men wide and fifty or more ranks 
deep. The revolutionaries used columns for some very 
practical reasons. First, columns made it easier for the
7. Soboul, o£ cit, pp. 171-72.
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French generals to close rapidly with the enemy forces and 
employ shock tactics with their ill-trained recruits. To 
wage a war of mass made it necessary "to strike briskly with 
bayonet thrusts without dreaming either of opening fire or 
of making maneuvers which the French troops are neither 
trained nor prepared to make." The column was ideally 
designed to achieve shock; it was useless for anything else. 
Secondly, the few officers available to the revolutionaries 
could control the men better when they were packed tightly 
together in columns than when they were dispersed in lines. 
In line the recruit felt more exposed, and had more 
opportunity to flee; in column only those on the outside 
were in a position to desert. In column the herd instinct 
took over as the massed conscripts sprinted yelling and 
singing at their foes. Finer tactical considerations as to 
the relative merits of column vs. line— a favorite topic 
of debate among Enlightenment military theorists such as 
Folard and Guibert— played little part in causing the 
revolutionaries to adopt the column. At Jemappes Dumouriez 
began the battle by deploying in the traditional three 
lines of Old Regime warfare. By mid-day his raw troops were 
in such disorder that his officers were massing them in 
columns merely to be able to send them forward again in 
some kind of order.®
8. Reinhard, 0 £  cit, II, p. 106. John Lynn, "Esquisse 
sur la tactique de l'infanterie des armees de la Republique," 
A.H.R.F. XLIV, 210, Nov. 1972, pp. 549-50.
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The tactical issue at Jemappes, as in other 
engagements at this time, was simply how best to win battles 
with masses of untried, undisciplined recruits. To solve 
this problem the revolutionaries were prepared to be quite 
pragmatic. Their practice of sending clouds of skirmishers 
ahead of the attacking columns to harrass the enemy was a 
case in point. So many men habitually broke ranks during 
the assaults, took cover, and skirmished with the enemy on 
their own, that the revolutionaries believed it better to 
institutionalize an accepted practice than to attempt to 
abolish it. However,, in the summer of 1793 these tactical 
innovations were the exception rather than the rule. The 
older theories of war-making still dominated the thinking of 
most of the French commanders. Strategically they continued 
to deploy their forces in cordons and to base their operations 
on the seizure or retention of fortresses. The operations 
around Valenciennes in May and June were conducted by both 
sides in classic cordon fashion. As a tactical formation 
the column was not yet in full use everywhere; the Army of 
the Moselle continued to employ linear formations throughout 
the year. The other tactical usages typical of 19th century 
warfare— the square, fieldworks, the use of massed batteries 
of artillery, the doctrinaire dependence upon the attack—  
were still to come in 1793.9
9. Lynn, ibid. Stephan Ross, Quest For Victory 
(New Jersey, 1973), pp. 55-58.
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The actual soldiers of the republican army presented 
the revolutionary generals with their greatest problem. If 
the average French infantryman was neither an automaton nor 
a slave without motivation, neither was he, as yet, a real 
soldier, nor was he necessarily motivated by the strong and 
generous passions that St Just confidently expected every 
soldier of the revolution to possess. The evidence over­
whelmingly suggests that the revolutionary army in the summer 
of 1793— -with the exception of the older line regiments— was 
little better than an armed mob of untrained militia, often 
more dangerous to their own officers than to the enemy.
The average republican soldier was young, usually 
below the age of twenty-five. He was commonly of peasant 
background, which meant that he came from a village of
2,000 persons or less. He normally possessed little or no 
education, and virtually no military experience at all.'*'®
The majority of these young soldiers were away from home for 
the first time in their lives. In the case of the draftees, 
they were frequently in the army reluctantly. All of these 
factors— youth, rustic background, newness of surroundings, 
unfamiliarity with a military environment, and reluctance 
to serve— combined to make the average defender of the 
revolution a disciplinary problem of alarming proportions.
10. Sixty-three percent of the line soldiers were 
under 25 years of age; the average age of the conscripts 
probably was the same, if not younger. See S. F. Scott, 
op cit, p. 512.
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Volunteers and' conscripts alike drank to excess, fought 
with each other, went absent without leave or simply 
deserted, and generally resisted military regimentation to 
the best of their abilities. Like most young men at the 
time they consumed wine and brandy in excessive quantities; 
one volunteer argued that drinking had never dishonored 
him, that he had more honor than most water drinkers, and 
thus drinking was a right which properly belonged to him.'*'1 
Many recruits sold their uniforms and equipment as soon 
as they were issued. Others looted and pillaged at every 
opportunity. Carnot disgustedly described these soldiers 
as "scourages" to the civilian population in their 
vicinity; he added that the prostitutes whom the soldiers 
were bringing into camp were destroying more of them with 
social disease than were being destroyed in combat. In 
action they were completely untrustworthy. They easily 
panicked, and they tended to fall into confusion during 
any combat of sustained duration. Jourdan's experience at 
Linselles exemplified the republican soldiers' inability 
to sustain combat for any length of time. During the 
fighting around Valenciennes a battalion was forced to 
retreat when the troops of the battalion in second line 
fired into their backs. On other occasions different 
units fought with each other under the impression that
11. Joliclerc, o£ cit, pp. 165-67.
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12they were fighting the enemy.
Because most of the officers were as inexperienced 
as their men, they were ill-equipped to furnish the army 
with the discipline and tactical leadership it so 
desperately needed. General officers often had to instruct 
subordinates in their most basic responsibilities; as late 
as the fall of 1793, Jourdan had to issue detailed 
instructions to his officers on how to hold the daily bread 
distribution without conl.usion and disruption. Many of 
the lower ranking officers could neither read nor write, 
and an alarming number of supply officials suffered from 
the same deficiency. Such men were hardly competent to 
furnish effective leadership on a day-to-day basis. In 
action such officers made blood-chilling mistakes. One 
officer ordered a French battalion to occupy a certain 
redoubt. The soldiers were en route to do so when 
another officer caught up with them and informed them 
that the redoubt was already occupied by masses of the enemy. 
Had the battalion attempted to carry out the order, it would 
have been annihilated. The occasional instances of French 
units firing on one another were not always brought about 
solely by the conscripts; inept officers sometimes were 
responsible. During the battle of Famars, some officers
12. Louis Bricard, Journal (Paris, 1891), pp. 63-4. 
Arthur Chuquet, Valenciennes, pp. 13-4. Reinhard, op cit, 
II, pp. 43-4.
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remained in bed three hours after the battle began while 
others dallied in the shops in town while their men fought, 
so that some soldiers never saw their officers and 
consequently did not know who, or what, to obey.3-3
This is not to say that the mere presence of 
competent leadership insured good conduct among the 
troops. In May, 1793, Carnot and Ernest Duquesnoy, then 
on mission with the Army of the Nord, led a raid along the 
coast. The conscripts succeeded in taking the town of 
Furnes, but then proceeded to get out of hand. They dispersed 
to pillage the town, breaking into wine cellars and bars, and 
getting roaring drunk. Carnot and Duquesnoy harangued them, 
appealing to their patriotism and threatening them with 
immediate execution in an effort to persuade them to return 
to duty; it did no good. When shots were heard on the 
outskirts of Furnas, the drunken soldiers panicked and 
scattered in every direction. During the ensuing night 
Furnes was looted from top to bottom, one soldier going 
so far as to cut off a woman's ear to get at her earring.
When Carnot and Duquesnoy tried to renew the advance the 
next morning, they were faced with their hungover troops 
vomiting and passing out along the road, obviously incapable 
of offering the slightest resistance to an enemy attack.
13. Chuquet, ibid, pp. 97-8. Bricard, ibid, pp. 71-2.
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The commanders- were forced to order a retreat. During the 
withdrawal a recruit accidentally shot and killed himself 
while looting a house; his comrades blamed the inhabitants 
and burned down their village. Throughout this episode it 
is clear that Carnot and Duquesnoy were helpless, utterly 
incapable of controling the unruly men. Yet generals like 
Jourdan were expected to succeed where Carnot had failed.-^
Certainly the will to defend the revolution— the love 
of liberty and country and hatred of tyrants and oppression 
that St Just spoke of— existed among the French forces.
They may have been unwilling soldiers; most were not 
unwilling patriots. During the difficult months of 1793, 
they gave ample evidence of their spirit and heroism: a
drummer at Wattignies, while his unit wavered, stood fast 
and beat the charge until he was killed; a volunteer was 
wounded twenty-three times, but nonetheless remained in 
the army, ultimately to be promoted to captain; a cavalry 
officer rode into a company of enemy hussars by mistake, 
and then had the wits about him to cry that the French 
cavalry were attacking until he frightened the enemy into 
retreating; and a foot soldier offered the 3,000 francs he 
had taken from an enemy officer to the nation. Men who 
while gravely wounded shouted that it was unimportant 
whether they lived or died as long as the revolution triumphed
14. Chuquet, ibid, pp. 105-07.
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were not indifferent to the outcome of the war, and they 
were ready to support their commitment with action. But 
commitment without discipline was useless; to fight the 
professional soldiers of the Coalition, the republicans 
needed something more than good faith. This is why officers 
who were capable disciplinarians like Jourdan were worth 
their weight in gold. This is why they rose so rapidly 
through the military hierarchy as the government gradually 
recognized the true nature of the problem.15
If the revolutionary army was still in a period of 
painful transition, so were the institutions and means 
necessary for its guidance and maintenance. Its inexperienced 
officers needed sensible, sound strategic direction from 
the government. The lev^e and embrigadement both required 
efficient organization to succeed. The problem of 
discipline demanded an effective system of military justice. 
Above all, the ever-growing masses of conscripts required 
food, clothing, weapons and equipment; and this in turn 
demanded an expanded logistical system. The French needed 
the machinery to build their peoples' army and to maintain 
it once its construction was complete.
But this machinery was as yet lacking. The 
Feuillantes and the Girondins had shown themselves inexcusably 
lax in this regard. Both allowed thp> war ministry to sink
15. Bonnal de Ganges, 0 £  cit, III, pp. 33-36.
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into inefficiency and confusion. They neglected to replace 
those bureaucrats who had emigrated with men of equal 
energy and ability. They played a game of musical chairs 
with a succession of mediocre war ministers: Servan, Pache,
Beurnonville, and Bouchotte. The rapid rotation of ministers 
added to the ministry's instability, because each new 
appointee would purge his predecessor's personnel and 
replace them with his own. No sooner did the new bureaucrats 
begin to learn their duties than a new minister entered and 
the entire learning process had to be repeated. Nor did 
any of these ministers demonstrate real ability. The 
Girondins feared entrusting one minister with so much power, 
and so they wished to subdivide the ministry into six 
separate bureaus under the direction of a legislative 
committee. This project fortunately never became reality, 
but the Girondins did succeed in physically dispersing the 
war ministry into different buildings in Paris. The 
arrangement only added to the ministry's inefficiency.
When complaints about its inability either to direct or to 
supply the army properly increased, the Girondins formed a 
fact-finding committee headed by the abbd Sifeyes to study 
the problem. This committee eventually presented the 
Convention with a largely abstract treatise on how a war 
ministry ideally should operate. Nothing concrete, however,
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was done.16
The Girondins instead decided to rely on deputies 
of the Convention "on mission" to the armies to afford 
immediate direction to the generals and to supervise the 
armies' supply personnel. The decrees establishing the 
deputies on mission seemed to graht . them sufficient 
authority to see to the proper construction and operation 
of the new army. They could suspend and replace any general 
or bureaucrat whom they believed incompetent or unpatriotic. 
They were to oversee the provisioning and equipping of the 
army and to respond to the needs and complaints of the 
soldiers. Finally they were to "take all measures and 
employ every means" with generals and administrators alike 
to insure that everything necessary was done for the safety 
of the Republic.1^
Unfortunately, as with the levde, the execution of 
these decrees left much to be desired. For the duration of 
the Girondins' domination of the Convention the deputies on 
mission to the Army of the Nord failed to exercise the
16. For a good discussion of the war ministry under the 
Gironde, see Auguste Herlaut, Le Colonel Bouchotte; ministie 
de la guerre en 1'an II . (Paris, 1946; 2 vols.).
17. Decree of the Committee of Public Safety of 
8/11/92, A. Aulard ed., Recueil des Actes de la Comite de 
Salut Public (28 vols. Paris, 1898-1951), (Hereafter 
Recueil), I, pp. lix-lxi.
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authority gran-ted them. The first group of deputies sent 
to the 'Nord'— a group which included Georges Danton and 
several of his colleagues--took only a passing interest in 
the military and logistical affairs of the army. Instead, 
they devoted most of their time to organizing French control 
over Belgium, while writing enthusiastic letters on how this 
and that Belgian commune wished to be united with France. 
When General Miranda desired them to check the state of 
his provisions and the conduct of his provisioning chief, 
he had to request that they assist in his investigation.
They agreed to help although they believed their presence 
"unnecessary".18 When Dumouriez began to suffer defeats, 
they deliberately misled the Convention as to the state of 
affairs, reporting the truth only to the Committee of 
Defense. As the French army reeled back across Belgium in 
a state of near collapse, Delacroix devoted the bulk of the 
report on his mission to a discussion on how to confiscate 
emigre" property in that country. Worse, they failed 
completely to recognize Dumouriez' increasing hostility 
towards the government; thus when he tried to turn the 
army against the Republic in early April, they were caught
18. The Commissaires in Belgium to the Convention and 
the Committee of Defense, 3/9/93, 3/11/93, Recueil, III, 
pp. 318-20, 335-37.
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completely unaware.
Not until the establishment of the Committee of 
Public Safety in early April, 1793, did this state of affairs 
begin to change. Realizing that the representatives on 
mission were not satisfactorily carrying out their duties, 
the Committee took steps to reinforce and broaden their 
authority, instructing them to execute their tasks 
"rigorously". To assist them, the government invested them 
with "unlimited" power and granted them unlimited funds.
In a subsequent decree the Committee, recognizing the 
critical importance of the Army of the North to the defense 
of the country, assigned it twelve representatives instead 
of the normal three, and instructed them to work with the 
generals in the promotion of officers and to carry on 
propaganda work with the rank and file.20 But the govern­
ment's most effective measure was tc replace the incumbent 
deputies with more energetic and ruthless men drawn from the 
Montagnard faction in the Convention. Men such as Carnot, 
Charles Cochon, Pierre Delbrel and Ernest Duquesnoy, among 
others, did not wait to be invited by the military to take 
a hand in affairs.
19. For the nature of the activity— or lack of 
activity— of Danton and his associates while in Belgium, see 
their correspondence with the Committee in the Recueil des 
Actes, I & II.
20. Decrees of 4/9/93 & 4/°6/93, Recueil, III, 
pp. 171-73.
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By the- early summer these representatives were
involving themselves in a wide range of responsibilities.
But, however much they accomplished, that much more remained
to be done. When deputy Rend Levasseur arrived at the front,
he was told by the commander of -the Army of the Nord that
the discipline of the troops was so bad, and the control of
the officers over their men so unsure, that he could not 
21
guarantee Levasseur's safety. Delbrel compalined that the 
supply agents were worthless; yet so small was the number of 
qualified replacements that he had to ask that no more 
agents be dismissed no matter how bad they were. Carnot 
complained of food shortages so severe that he ordered 
soldiers to carry out house-to-house searches for food in 
order to feed the troops; he added that the levde should 
be slowed down because the unarmed, untrained recruits were 
eating food that was needed for the front line soldiers. 
Similar complaints poured in to the govenment almost daily. 
Indeed the picture suggested by the representatives' letters 
is one of an army on the verge of utter chaos.22
Such was the revolutionary army in 1793. So far from
21. Rene Levasseur, Memoires (4 vols. Paris, 1829-31), 
II, pp. 23-26.
22. See for example, Carnot to the Committee of Public 
Safety, 7/30/93, Correspondence generate de Carnot, E. 
Charavay e d., (4 vols., Paris, 1897-1908), (hereafter Corr.), 
II, pp. 436-39. Delbrel to the Committee, 8/25/93, Recueil, 
VI, pp. 222-3.
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
47
being tne salvation of the Republic, it was not yet 
truly revolutionary; indeed in some ways it was not really 
an army. It was "an enormous and inarticulate mass, where 
flourished individualism and gregariousness, patriotism and 
desertion, heroism and anarchy. Commanded by officers so 
diverse that former aristocrats rubbed elbows with improvised 
sans-culotte officers, the administration of which was a 
stupefying masterpiece of corruption and incompetence, this 
army was a monster. Moreover, it was expected to
implement a theory of war as intangible and incomplete as 
it was itself. This army was not yet a match for the 
professional soldiers of the coalition, much less their 
superior. The Habsburg Archduke Charles later argued that 
France was initially able to defend herself against the 
onslaught of all Europe, mainly because she had worked to 
organize the defenses of her frontiers since the era of 
Louis XIV and Vauban. As a result, the Allies were confronted 
with a formidable network of fortresses, outposts, 
magazines and communications as they advanced. It is
24
difficult not to agree with the Archduke's assertion.
23. Reinhard, 0£  cit, II, p. 91.
24. The Archduke Karl Habsburg, Le Campagne de 1796 
en Allemagne, (Vienna, 1817), p. 40.
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
II. Jourdan's Predecessors; The Hondschoote Campaign
The generals of the Republican army were thus con­
fronted with a frighteningly complex and brutally difficult 
task. It was not enough that they be skilled strategists 
and tacticians; they were facing more than the thrusts and 
maneuvers of the enemy. They also had to be prepared to 
take on the vast and baffling problems which the creation of 
the new army involved. They had to be capable of instilling 
discipline into raw, unruly troops, and of getting along 
with the various agents of the government who were working 
with the army, in particular the deputies on mission. They 
needed knowledge of logistical problems and the energy to 
tackle them. They had to be politically— and socially—  
acceptable as well as militarily competent. Then they had 
to go out and win victories.
The commanders of the Army of the Nord labored under 
additional pressures peculiar to their command. Firstly, 
the Army of the Nord defended the most important and 
vulnerable front on the periphery of France. Should it 
suffer defeat the enemy was a mere ninety miles from Paris, 
and the fall of the capital would in all likelihood mean the 
extinction of the revolution. The commanders of this army 
at all costs had to avoid defeat. Secondly, the generals of 
the 'Nord' worked amid the aftereffects of the Dumouriez 
conspiracy. The sudden treason of the most powerful general 
of the Republic had shaken the government greatly. To men
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such as Robespierre and St Just, who had been weaned on the
classics and the tales of military usurpers such as Sulla
and Julius Caesar, all generals became objects of suspicion.
Since classical history displayed a multitude of usurpers
all fatal to democracy, there might be other traitors lying
in wait among the army's hierarchy. The regime's paranoia
about its generals was unmistakable; it lay at the roots
of its decision to fragment the Republic's forces into
eleven smallish armies, each with an independent commander.
Because the 'Nord' had been Dumouriez' army, its officers
fell under particular scrutiny. The representatives with
the 'Nord' were issued specific instructions to root out any
25
who might have been Dumouriez' accomplices. In such an 
atmosphere honest mistakes could easily be misconstrued as 
treasonous acts, and treasonous acts could bring execution 
to those who committed them. Finally, the generals of the 
'Nord' faced the very serious pressure of the victorious 
Allied offensive across Flanders. As the military situation 
deteriorated, the danger grew greater; as hard-line politicians 
replaced less ruthless men on ". - tmittee of Public Safety,
the government became less to.let. at of failure and more 
inclined to make immediate and sweeping changes when things 
went wrong.
25. Decree of 4/9/93, Recueil, III, pp. 171-73.
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To survive as commander of the Army of the Nord a 
general had to be able to handle all of these pressures. 
Those who could not faced quick and summary dismissal; 
frequently they also faced arrest, and sometimes they faced 
the guillotine. It is a popular misconception that the 
Committee of Public Safety executed all of its unsuccessful 
generals pour encourager les autres; the Committee was too 
coldly rational and pragmatic to be so needlessly ruthless. 
Nonetheless the penalties for failure were harsh enough, and 
with the popular societies howling for the blood of those 
who failed, it could well be punished by death. The four 
generals who succeeded Dumouriez as commander-in-chief of 
the 'Nord' failed to overcome the pressures of their job 
and to achieve victory. Three of them paid for the 
deficiencies with their lives— two on the scaffold. The 
fifth commander of the army, Jourdan, successfully met the 
challenge; or (to put it more accurately) he improved the 
situation in the Nord enough to avoid arrest or execution.
To understand why Jourdan was able to handle the command, it 
is necessary to discover why his predecessors were unable to 
do so, to discover what qualities they lacked that he 
demonstrated, and what mistakes they committed that he 
avoided.
Dumouriez1 first successor as commander of the Army 
of the Nord was the Marquis Auguste de Dampierre. Dampierre 
was a brave, dashing, somewhat erratic ex-noble officer who
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had served in the Royal army. As a divisional commander he
had repeatedly distinguished himself, even drawing the
notice of Carnot who recommended him for the command. His
patriotism was beyond doubt; it was so fervent as to be
almost romantic. In the initial weeks after he assumed his
post he tackled the army's problems with energy and 
26application.
But as the situation slowly continued to deteriorate, 
Dampierre's flaws gradually began to show themselves. He 
failed in his efforts to prevent the enemy from besieging 
the important French fortress of Valenciennes. He scheduled 
a counterattack and then could not decide whether or not to 
go through with it. When he asked the representatives for 
advice, they told him that they could not advise him on 
matters of strategy. Dampierre postponed the attack, 
rescheduled it, and then called a council of war to arrive 
at a final decision. Meanwhile he encountered problems with 
two of the representatives who complained that he forbade 
them to say a single word about the conduct of operations.
And he failed completely to do anything to improve the army's 
discipline and organization. Dampierre was a front line 
commander, excellent in leading a charge, inept administrating 
an army. And he knew it.27 He began to complain to the
26. Chuquet, ojd cit, pp. 5-6. Hippolyte Carnot,
Memoires sur Carnot (2 vols., Paris, 1861-63), I, p. 312.
27. Chuquet, o£ cit, pp. 55-66.
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the government that he felt himself unqualified to deal with 
the multiple problems of the army and suggested that he be 
replaced. When the government failed to replace him, he 
grew increasingly despondent, confessing his inability to 
his colleagues and saying that the only way he could escape 
his present dilemma was to get himself killed in battle.
By mid-May his complaints and lack of success had caused 
his stock to fall dangerously low with the government. He 
was a noble who was failing to win victories and, worse, who 
was failing to show a positive attitude towards his duties. 
The evidence suggests that his dismissal was not far off 
when he succeeded in escaping his overtaxing responsibilites. 
As he hoped, he was killed in action.^®
The government decided to replace Dampierre with the 
best man available, the Marquis Adam de Custine, then 
commanding the Army of the Rhine. Like Dampierre, Custine 
was a ci-devant and a veteran of the Royal army. His 
reputation as commander of the 'Rhine' stood high, and he 
reputedly was an excellent disciplinarian. Custine's 
drawbacks were not of a military nature; they arose from 
his personality and his politics. He was personally cutting, 
arrogant, and harsh, intolerant of others especially when 
they disagreed with him. While he was a doctrinaire 
republican, he did not like the government; he considered
28. Ibid.
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the Mountain a' faction of demagogues and anarchists 
dangerous to order. He believed that his task was to 
portect the army from the machinations of such men; thus he 
developed an exalted sense of his own importance to the 
Republic. He surrounded himself with former members of 
Dumouriez' staff, in spite of the prevalent suspicion of 
such officers. In a letter to the government he stated that 
he ought to "pass above all the decisions of the Executive 
Council;" to a friend he confided that "when a decree of
29
the Convention does not suit me, I throw it into the fire."
In a period of crisis such an attitude could hardly 
endear him to a revolutionary regime which, suspicious of 
all generals on principle, demanded first and foremost 
their unquestioning subordination. And Custine did not 
limit himself to merely showing his distaste for the regime.
He engaged in a bitter feud with the minister of war, 
Bouchotte. Bouchotte belonged to the radical wing of the 
Mountain; he was a parvenu of low birth, and his support 
came from radical journalists like Hebert who criticized 
Custine mercilessly. Moreover, the ministry under Bouchotte's 
direction had not improved in its logistical support of the 
army. Custine hated Bouchotte for all of these reasons. He 
treated him with open insubordination, obeying his orders
29. Chuquet, Valenciennes, contains an excellent 
character sketch of Custine, as well as a fine discussion of 
his tenure at the head of the 'Nord1. See also Herlaut, op 
cit, I, pp. 221-255.
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with a condescending insolence and viciously criticizing his 
directives. Custine complained to the Committee of the 
"ridiculous" conduct of Bouchotte, and on one occasion stated 
that he was incompetent and corrupt, a "malevolent being" 
and an "enemy of honor" who deserved death because his 
"criminal stupidity" was preventing success.^ Custine was 
equally cutting in his direct correspondence with Bouchotte. 
Finally, he even challenged Bouchotte*s authority. In spite 
of orders to the contrary, he forbade the distribution of 
Hebert's Le Pere Duchesne to the soldiers, and he also 
disobeyed a directive concerning the dispostion of the Lille 
garrison. To colleagues he broadly hinted that he would 
like to see Bouchotte replaced by his own favorite and 
fellow ex-noble, General La Marliere.^
For a former noble to attack a cabinet minister in 
an anti-aristocratic revolutionary regime in such a fashion 
was extremely ill-advised. For Custine then to put himself 
above the government's authority by disobeying direct orders 
was sucidal. In mid-June he was recalled to Paris to 
explain his conduct. There he fell victim to the rage of
30. Herlaut, ibid. See especially Custine's letters 
to the Committee of 7/1/9 3 & 7/2/9 3.
31. Ibid. Chuquet, o£ cit, is more sympathetic to 
Custine, blaming much of the problem on the extremist 
journalists who were so slanderously attacking Custine in 
their journals.
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of the extremists, who caused him to be arrested. Although 
guilty only of insubordination— and of stupidity— Custine 
was tried for treason, convicted, and guillotined.
Custine had commanded the army a little over two 
months. His successor, General Charles Jennings de 
Kilmaine, lasted three weeks. Of Irish extraction, Kilmaine 
was a veteran cavalry officer of the Royal army. He possessed 
all the virtues and vices of a cavalryman: he was bluff,
agressive, brave to a fault, and proud of how his hussars had 
named him the "lucky colonel"; unfortunately he also 
possessed only limited operational ability. Like Dampierre 
he was primarily a front line general, and like Dampierre 
he soon wilted under the intense pressure of his command. 
Almost immediately after arriving at his post, he was 
writing the government about the unbearable burdens he 
had to shoulder. He confessed to representative Levasseur 
that he did not believe that he could control his soldiers, 
many of whom were outraged over the arrest of Custine.
When the Allies resumed their advance, he successfully 
avoided an attempt to double-envelop his army. Nevertheless, 
he was compelled to make another retreat during which part 
of the army panicked yet again. In addition, thr rumor 
spread that the brain behind the operation was not Kilmaine's, 
but that of his chief of staff, Simon Gay-Vernon. None of 
this chould have persuaded either the government or the 
representatives to have any confidence in his abilities.
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When Kilmaine demonstrated increased bewilderment and dis­
couragement, the Committee dismissed him, replaicng him with 
General Jean Nicholas Houchard.22
Houchard seemed to be the classic victim of the 
ruthlessness and unreasonableness of the Jacobin dictator­
ship towards the generals who served it. Unlike his 
predecessors, who were all ci-devants, Houchard was a genuine 
sans-culotte— the first to lead an army. He was also the 
first commander of the 'Nord' to win a pitched battle since 
Dumouriez' victory at Jemappes in 1792. Nonetheless he 
ended his career, like Custine, on the scaffold. For these 
reasons it is necessary to examine his month-long tenure as 
commander of the 'Nord' with particular care.
Houchard was of humble birth and education. He 
had made his career as a common soldier in the Roayl army, 
and he had risen through the ranks to become a captain of 
dragoons. His military experience, his sans-culotte 
background, the patronage of Custine, and the revolution's 
desperate need for qualified officers combined to enable 
him to advance rapidly to army command. He served briefly, 
and not without some merit, as the commander of the Army 
of the Moselle, and was with this army when the government 
summoned him to take command of the 'Nord'. Tall, rough
32. Chuquet, Hondschoote, (Paris, n.d.), pp. 57-60. 
Ramsey Phipps, The Armies of the First French Republic,
I, pp. 191-92; 207-08.
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
57
hewn, physically brave, Houchard bore the scars of his 
career all over his body— he had three ugly sabre cuts on 
his face alone. Both the deputies on mission and the 
commissaires of the war ministry spoke enthusiastically of 
his courage and patriotism.
But Houchard had flaws— flaws which were noticed 
not only by the representatives, but also by fellow sans­
culottes such as Ronsin and Brune. Intellectually he was 
extemely limited. Ronsin described him as "facile and 
a little slow". While Ronsin judged him incapable of 
corruption, he wondered if the new commander would know 
how to use all the means for success that might be at 
hand and if he would waste time arriving at plans of attack 
and defense. Ronsin urged that aggressive revolutionaries 
be put beside Houchard to prod him into action if 
necessary.^ Brune wrote that "his manners and his language 
announce his frankness... He will not turn traitor, he will 
fight well, he will move briskly, but he is too nice a 
person not to be fooled by an adroit man." In short, the 
suspicion was that he might not be smart enoi.gh to handle 
the brutally complex problems of his command. In addition, 
Houchard, like Dampierre and Kilmaine, commanded only 
reluctantly. He freely admitted that he felt himself
33. Report of Citizen Ronsin upon the condition of 
the Army of the North, 8/17/93, Corr., III, pp. 9-20.
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inadequate to cope with the tasks facing him; he accepted his
post hesitantly, requested that he be replaced as soon as
possible, and complained that it would be unjust to force
him to remain as the army's leader. This was hardly the
kind of zeal and aggressiveness that the Mountain was seeking.
Nevertheless, the government apparently decided that with
the officer shortage as bad as it was, Houchard's merits
34outweighed his defects. It kept him in command.
When Houchard took charge in mid-August, the 
strategic situation in Flanders had worsened still further.
The Allied army, now over 100,000 men strong, was deployed 
in a long convex cordon extending from the Lille area on 
their right to the Sambre valley near Charleroi on their left. 
The point of this cordon was thrust well inside the French 
fortress barrier built by Vauban 100 years earlier; its 
shadow hung over Paris, a mere 90 miles away, like an 
ominous thunderhead. Military opinion has generally held 
that the proper strategy for the Allies was to pierce the 
fortress barrier with the bulk of their army, and to march 
directly on Paris. If the unfinished rag-tag French army 
attempted to fight, so much the better. But political and 
mercantile considerations intervened to block this strategy. 
The British government decided that it wanted Dunkirk as
34. Herlaut, o£ cit, I, pp. 293-94. Victor Dupuis, 
De Valenciennes a Hondschoote, pp. 59-65.
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remuneration for its particiaption in the war; it demanded 
that the Allied army capture Dunkirk before it undertook any 
further offensive operations. The possession of this 
coastal fortress would offer Britain a number of strategic 
and economic advantages. The Austrian commander of the 
Allied army, the Prince of Coburg, vainly protested that 
the capture of Dunkirk would divert valuable men from the 
more important advance through the barrier fortresses.
The British government stood firm. Consequently in mid- 
August the Allies divided their forces. While the Duke 
of York marched north with between 35,000 and 40,000 
soldiers to beleaguer Dunkirk, Coburg maintained his cordon 
with the remainder and simultaneously advanced to place the 
French fortress of Le Quesnoy under siege.
The loss of Le Quesnoy, not to mention that of 
Dunkirk, would have left irreparable breaches in the fortress 
barrier. Houchard's first priority thus was to prevent 
their fall at all costs. This task indeed was to take 
precedence over solving the vexing personnel and logistical 
problems of the army. Houchard1s first step was to determine 
if the Allies had in fact divided their forces. Hence he 
ordered Jourdan to launch a reconaissance towards the enemy 
troops reported marching towards the coast in the Lille 
area; Jourdan's action at Linselles was a result of this 
order. Linselles confirmed the fact that the Allies had 
indeed split their army. By doing so they presented Houchard
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with a rare opportunity to turn the tide of the campaign by 
attacking their separate forces and defeating them in detail.
Houchard, his staff, and the representatives on 
mission all began to work out a plan of campaign. At this 
point the initiative in deciding the proper strategy to 
follow was entirely theirs. Houchard's first idea was to 
assemble 36,000 men to attack Coburg. However part of the 
troops that he wished to use— Jourdan's division— had already 
been sent towards Dunkirk to oppose the Duke of York. Next, 
he toyed with the idea of gathering a strike force near 
Menin and piercing the enemy cordon there, while at the 
same time advancing south to attack Coburg near Le Quesnoy. 
This plan was beyond the strength and capacity of the 
army; it was fortunate that it was not adopted. Unsure of 
what to do, Houchard convened a council of war on August 25. 
Mainly on the initiative of his staff, notably Gay-Vernon 
and Berthelmy, the council decided to try to envolop the 
Anglo-Dutch army before Dunkirk. Gay-Vernon proposed that 
the French assault the enemy forces at Menin, and having 
defeated them turn north and cut behind York's army. The 
Allies, their communications interdicted, would then be 
at a severe disadvantage. Houchard liked this plan, but 
representative Duquesnoy did not. Duquesnoy believed it 
too risky; moreover, he distrusted its originator, Gay- 
Vernon, a ci-devant and former associate of Custine who 
while active and knowledgeable, "has eyes which do not
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please me."3^ ' But the others evidently overruled Duquesnoy, 
because the first step in Gay-Vernon's plan, the assault on 
Menin, was agreed to. Both generals and representatives 
then informed the Committee of their plans and decisions.^ 
Houchard attacked the allied forces deployed south 
of Menin on August 28. A success would, he hoped, "check the 
impetuosity of the English." But the attack did not succeed. 
Houchard attacked with insufficient forces--under 20,000 men-- 
in three separate columns in doctrinaire cordon fashion.
The two flank columns were quickly repulsed. The center 
column carried Turcoing village in spite of "terrible fire" 
from its Dutch defenders; however, when Houchard tried to 
continue the advance, his troops fell into confusion. They 
looted Turcoing and the nearby villages in spite of the 
best efforts of Houchard and the representatives to control 
them. Then two platoons of enemy cavalry caused one entire 
demi-brigade to panic. It was yet another example of the 
indiscipline and lack of cohesion which was crippling the 
army. Houchard ordered a retreat.^
The French planners had to begin again. Houchard
35. Duquesnoy to the Committee, 8/26/93, Corr., III, 
pp. 48-9.
36. Dupuis, o£ cit, pp. 377-78. Chuquet, 0£  cit, 
pp. 164-65. Archives de Guerre, carton B1 17, (hereafter 
A . G . Bl 17), Berthelmy to the Committee, 8/26/93.
37. Houchard to the Committee, 8/29/93, Corr.,
III, pp. 61-64. Chuquet, ibid.
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called another council of war. He still favored the Menin 
operation, but the failure of the attack, and possibly some 
opposition from members of the council, caused him to choose 
a less roundabout route via Ypres to the rear of the enemy 
army. Thus Gay-Vernon's plan remained the basis for the 
army's planned offensive. Indetd, it had found favor with 
the Committee. Carnot approved it, urging Houchard to 
forget once and for all about Coburg and concentrate upon 
the Duke of York. Should the French destroy the Anglo- 
Dutch, "the most total revolution is inevitable in England."3® 
Houchard thus had a plan and approval from the government 
to employ it. Yet four days later he changed his mind.
In a long and rambling letter to the Committee, he enumer­
ated the vast, crippling shortcomings of the army: 
undisciplined troops, insufficient cadres, logistical chaos.
In addition, the nature of the terrain— marshes and canals 
with only a few roads and bridges all covered by enemy 
strongpcints— made the envoloping march behind the allied 
army too long and dangerous. Therefore, he had decided to 
abandon Gay-Vernon's plan. Instead, the French were to 
march via Cassel directly against the enemy covering force 
south of Dunkirk and to attack it. This new operation was 
more direct and swift and thus less risky.3®
38. A.G. B1 17, The mmittee to Houchard, 8/29/93.
39. Houchard to the Committee, 9/3/93, Corr., III, 
pp. 82-83. This is the letter paraphrased by R. R. Palmer 
in Twelve Who Ruled, ch. IV.
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Why did he change plans? Were the tactical con­
siderations mentioned the primary reason? Possibly. Did 
the representatives persuade him to change his plan as some 
historians suggest? Probably not. The government had 
officially approved the first plan, and the representatives 
followed the government's lead. It is more likely that he 
allowed himself to be swayed by the pressure from both the 
government and the popular societies that he relieve Dunkirk 
as soon as possible. The pressure was admittedly heavy. 
Carnot had written that should the French lose Dunkirk, "the 
most frightful discouragement among us will be the inevitable 
result"; other letters spoke of the necessity of putting an 
end to the barbarous crimes of the enemy. So Houchard opted 
for the strategy that would get his army to Dunkirk in the 
least amount of time with the least amount of risk. The 
Committee was not overjoyed with his decision. "We see ,/ith 
pain that you have abandoned the project to envelop the 
enemies who are before Dunkirk and Bergues. In striking 
this great blow the war could perhaps be ended, but if you 
have thought that success would be doubtful, we can only 
approve the resolution that you have taken."40
The strain of command was quite obviously wearing 
down Houchard, weighing ever more heavily upon his shoulders,
40. The Committee to Houchard, 9/5/93, Corr., III, 
pp. 86-87.
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creating ever more doubts in his mind. He requested more 
specific directives from the government, until Bouchotte was 
compelled to tell him that the Committee did not think it 
advisable to prescribe rigidly "such and such an operation, 
or such and such a means of executing it...thus it has 
decided that it will only send you some reflexions leaving 
you total latitude in your operations." But total latitude 
in the choice of strategies meant total responsibility for 
their success or failure, and this Houchard did not want. 
Writing on the eve of Hondschoote, he again attempted to 
shift the burden of responsibility from his shoulders. 
Because the government had ordered him to lift the siege of 
Dunkirk, he would obey. But success depended upon the 
fighting qualities of the troops; and because the army 
was in such bad condition, their fighting qualities were 
low. Thus success was doubtful. And the army's defects, 
he concluded, weie the responsibility of the government. In 
effect he was arguing that should he lose the battle, it was 
the government's fault. Here he was repeating the defeatism 
of Dampierre and Kilmaine. One can sympathize with his 
dilemma. He did not want the command; he was unqualified to 
handle it; and he had inherited an army whose shortcomings 
were not of his doing. But it was unwise to blame the 
situation on a revolutionary regime in the midst of an 
emergency, especially when that regime was the Committee
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of Public Safety.^
While Houchard was struggling with his difficulties, 
Jourdan was following the Duke of York towards the coast as 
ordered. He was to assist general Barthel, the French 
commander in the Dunkirk sector, in halting the Duke's 
offensive. On August 23, he reached Cassel with his 
division. As he continued his march, he collided with a 
part of the allied covering force under the Dutch general, 
Freytag, near the village of Wormhout. The ensuing action 
was almost a carbon copy of Linselles. Jourdan assaulted 
and took the village, only to have his troops fall into 
disorder immediately afterwards. Then his division was 
nearly attacked by French troops under general Leclaire, 
whom representatives Billaud-Varenne and Duquesnoy had sent 
to attack Wormhout from a different direction. In the 
resulting confusion with French soldiers firing at one 
another, the enemy rallied, counterattacked, and recaptured 
their positions. Nevertheless, Duquesnoy was happy with the 
action. He decided that Barthel, who although a good 
patriot, possessed neither the intelligence nor the energy 
to command the left wing of the French army, and chose 
Jourdan to replace him, an.appointment immediately approved
41. A.G. B1 18, Bouchotte to Houchard, 9/3/93; 
Houchard to the Committee, 9/5/9 3. Dupuis, o£ cit, 
pp. 410-14.
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42by Houchard.
Jourdan now bore the immediate responsibility for
the defense of Dunkirk and its surrounding environs, in
collaboration with representative Ernest Duquesnoy. In
Duquesnoy he did not have an easy colleague. Duquesnoy was,
by far, one of the most radical and ruthless of the deputies
on mission. He was "rude and singular", a man not inclined
to be a second to anyone. On mission he dressed like a
peasant and drank heavily, sometimes arriving at headquarters
dead drunk. He was utterly merciless towards officers whom
he judged even slightly incompetent or unpatriotic, and he
dismissed them without the least hesitation. He was totally
committed to the revolution; in 1795 after the abortive coup
of Prarial, when convicted of "treason" by the Thermidorians, 
4 3
he cut his own throat. This is the deputy with whom 
Jourdan was to be most closely associated during tne next 
four months. Amazingly this violent, fanatical ex-priest, 
so hostile to most of the army's officers, was to become 
Jourdan's staunchest supporter. At their first meeting on 
August 26, he instructed Jourdan to send reinforcements to 
both Dunkirk and Bergues, to hold the locks of the Gravelines 
canal, and to place his own division, now under Leclaire,
42. A .G. B1 17, Houchard to the Committee, 8/26/93. 
Dupuis, 0£  cit, pp. 341-42. Chuquet, Hondschoote, pp. 149-51.
43. Reinhard, 0£  cit, II, p. 42.
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close to Dunkirk. Houchard may have recalled Jourdan to
Lille on the following day to help in planning the offensive.
If he was summoned, there is nothing to indicate that he
ever left the area of his command. Instead he remained
with Duquesnoy to take further measures for the defense of 
4 4Dunkirk.
Dunkirk was causing the government extreme anxiety.
When its commandant, general Joseph Souham, pessimistically 
informed Paris that the defenses were so dilapidated that 
the city could not survive a serious attack for longer than 
five days, the government had arrested him for defeatism.
But it had also ordered immediate measures to strengthen 
the defenses and the defenders. Berthelmy passed on the 
Committee's instruction to Souham's successor, colonel 
Lazare Hoche, ordering him to defend Dunkirk to the last 
extremity. "No quarter with tyrants, no capitualation," 
Berthelmy dramatically added. "It is not necessary to 
to survive shame; one is better off to die a million times. 
Blood and always blood." He also ordered Jourdan to throw 
yet more reinforcements into Dunkirk, and to go there 
himself to inspect the defenses. "It is absolutely necessary,"
44. Duquesnoy to the Committee, 8/26/93, Corr., III, 
pp. 48-9. Chuquet, Hondschoote, pp. 149-51. Phipps argues 
that Jourdan returned to Houchard's headquarters at this 
time. The correspondence of Duquesnoy and Levasseur prove 
conclusively that he was at Dunkirk until at least Sept. 3.
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Berthelmy stipulated, "to hold out another eight days." 
Jourdan had anticipated this order, accompanying Duquesnoy, 
Collombel and Hentz into Dunkirk on August 31. For the 
next few days they inspected the defenses and arrested all 
suspects and shirkers.46
Jourdan did not remain there long. Already his 
services were being demanded elsewhere. On September 3, 
Bouchotte asked if Houchard could send him to take command 
of the fortress of Maubeuge, then menaced by the enemy.
But Houchard had him reserved for another task. The army 
commander recalled him to his own force to take command of 
its largest division, as his troops deployed south of the 
Yser river to attack the Anglo-Dutch army.46
Be September 5, Houchard had concentrated 45,000 men 
v/ithin striking distance of the enemy army, some 38,000 
strong. The Allies had deployed some 18,000 soldiers along 
the Yser as a covering force under Freytag; the rest were 
actually besieging Dunkirk. There was an additional small 
detachment at Ypres to the southeast. Houchard regarded the 
upcoming battle with gloomy anticipation. Levasseur claimed 
that he had to persuade him to stay with the planned assault 
by telling him that the enemy had not had time to prepare
45. A.G. B1 17, Berthelmy to Hoche, 8/29/03; Berthelmy 
to Jourdan, 8/31/93. A.G. B1 18, Levasseur to the Committee, 
9/1/93.
46. A.G. Bl 18, Bouchotte to Houchard, 9/3/93. Dupuis, 
op cit, pp. 375-85.
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themselves. Houchard had heard of Custine's execution, and
this had frightened him. "There is a regular determination
to guillotine the generals," he exclaimed, and Levasseur
unsympathetically replied, "and you too if you betray us."
41
With grim foreboding Houchard organized the attack.
His strategy called for an offensive in typical
cordon fashion, six columns of attack scattered along a
nineteen-mile front. Jourdan, with 13,000 soldiers, was
to make the main assault, in the center; he was to cross
the Yser near Herzeele and attack northward towards
Hondschoote and the Dunkirk-Furnes road— the Allies' main
line of supply and retreat. To Jourdan's left a 6,000-man
column under Landrin was to assault Wormhout, and a second
column under Leclaire was to assail the enemy near Bergues.
To Jourdan's right two additional columns were to make
attacks against the enemy left, and a sixth column, 9,000
strong, was to make a useless advance on Ypres to contain
48
the small Dutch garrison there. In launching this attack, 
the French possessed two definite advantages: they out­
numbered the enemy and the Allies had problems of their own. 
The morale of the Dutch soldiers was low. The quality of 
some of the English units was bad. The men had recently 
been recruited out of the slums and prisons of England;
47. Levasseur, Memoires, II, pp. 76-7.
48. See map #2.
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they were ill-trained, ill-supplied, and frequently led by 
diletantish noble officers whose sole qualification for 
command was the possession of enough money to recruit their 
regiments. Only the German element in the army was soundly 
professional.^
A cynic might argue that the French possessed a 
third advantage. From the outset of the fighting, Houchard 
did not have full control over the tactical conduct of the 
battle.
On the morning of September 6 the French army 
advanced to the Yser where the crossing was defended by 
additional enemy forces in the village of Bambecq, the bridge 
being covered by a "fleche" with abattis and a battery. It
was a difficult position to take, and, with a rainstorm 
drenching the troops and their gunpowder, Jourdan requested 
a delay before attacking. Berthelmy heroically replied that 
there always was the bayonet-attack: at the head of his
troops, sword in hand, Jourdan attacked. He stormed the vil­
lage, was thrown out by an enemy counterattack, assaulted it 
a second time, and seized it for good. By now it was six 
P.M. and the French conscripts were showing signs of wear. 
Houchard proposed a halt despite the fact that his forces 
had not yet penetrated the enemy defenses as deeply as
49. Dupuis, o£ cit, pp. 420-25. Sir John Fortescue,
A History of the British Army (13 vols., London, 1915), IV, 
pp. 295-300.
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
71
planned. Representative Nicholas Hentz, a man every bit as 
violent as Duquesnoy and with less mental balance, over­
ruled him, saying that free men were never too tired to 
fight the slaves of tyrants. Houchard ordered the advance 
to continue. By nightfall Jourdan had captured Rexpoede 
where his tired soldiers dispersed to spend the night in the 
houses and barns.
The offensive had begun well, but only where 
Jourdan had attacked. Of the other columns, only Leclaire's 
had done any substantial fighting, and it had been repulsed. 
The others had made only minor advances.51 Worse was to 
follow. Jourdan had penetrated far enough to put a sizable 
portion of Freytag's force in a pocket between himself and 
the French around Bergues. Freytag ordered his troops to 
break out eastward through Rexpoede lest they be cut off 
completely from the rest of the army. The fighting had 
just ceased. Houchard, Jordan, Delbrel, and their staffs 
were sitting down to dinner when the first wave of Freytag's 
men struck. Surprisingly Jourdan1s soldiers did not 
immediately panic. They held firm in the village until a 
squadron of French cavalry overran the center of the 
attacking force, routing them and capturing Freytag. But
50. Houchard to the Committee, 9.11.93, Corr., III, 
pp. 128-32. Dupuis, op cit, pp. 430-35.
51. Dupuis, ibid.
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while this wa& occurring, a second enemy column had
approached Rexpoede from a different direction undetected,
and now it attacked. In an instant all was confusion. The
enemy ripped through the French defenders and entered the
village before Houchard and Delbrel had time to mount their
horses. Attackers and defenders engaged in a wild house-to-
house struggle. "In the most profound darkness the
battalions collided with each other before recognizing each
other. The [French] musketry and artillery had only the
flashes of the enemy musketry and artillery as a point of
aim. Lucky if in that tumult the shot and steel of the
French might strike the English [sic] forces." In the dark
the advantage lay with the attackers. The French could not
organize their troops. "We did everything to control them;
they heard our voices, but sure of not being recognized they
fled with all the haste that...the muddy roads permitted."
The French stumbled back from Rexpoede through the wet
night in total disorder. Houchard and Delbrel were lucky 
52to escape with their lives.
Jourdan had joined his troops when the allied attack 
first struck. When his men broke before the second 
o n s l a u g h t ,  he stayed in Rexpoede vainly trying to rally them.
52. The description of the fighting is from Delbrel's 
memoires, quoted in Dupuis, ibid. See also Houchard to the 
Committee, 9/11/93, Corr., III, pp. 128-32. Phipps, op cit
I, pp. 230-32.
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Without information, without any of his staff, he personally 
sought Houchard, who ordered him to retreat. When he 
returned to Rexpoede to attempt to collect his men and pull 
them back, he was met by a hail of musketry. His men had 
fled. When he finally found the fugitives, he discovered that 
he had been reported killed. Even so it was probably due 
to his vigor that there were troops left to rally after 
the wholesale confusion of the night.53
Morning found much of the army in a state of near 
anarchy, its units hopelessly mixed up, with orders arriving 
late or not at all. The logistics were in a shambles. The 
officers had forgotten to ensure that their men had properly 
filled their knapsacks and cartridge boxes before the 
battle; as a result, until additional supplies trickled into 
the fightii j area, Jourdan's men were without food, brandy 
and ammunition, and thus incapable of combat. Houchard 
was as confused as his army. While he allowed Jourdan's 
division to rest, regroup, and resupply, he ordered the 
other columns to continue their movements. Because Jourdan1s 
13,000 men represented the cutting edge of the French thrust, 
one wonders why he ordered the others to advance. Of the 
others only Leclaire and a demi-brigade under Vandamme from 
the right encountered the enemy. They followed the Anglo- 
Dutch to Hondschoote; then seeing themselves unsupported,
53. Dupuis, ibid, pp. 444-51.
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they retired to Bergues.
There was no question but that the battle had to 
be renewed on the 8th. The Duke of York had not lifted the 
siege; his units stood intact before the city. Freytag's 
force, now under general Walmoden, had taken up a new 
position covering the Dunkirk-Furnes road around Hond- 
schoote, its right on a hillock with a battery of artillery, 
its left strengthened by redoubts. Hedges and water- 
filled ditches covered its front, and the Allies had 
further strengthened the position by erecting earthworks 
near the village. Walmoden had nearly 20,000 soldiers; he 
had commanded about 18,000 when the battle began, and York had 
more than replaced his losses with a substantial reinforce­
ment from the besieging elements. In resuming the attack, 
Houchard repeated his error of the 6th and compounded it.
Not only did he again scatter his forces, but he also 
ordered one column to march from the right clear across the 
rear of the army to Bergues, while the division already in 
that area went to reinforce Dunkirk--a useless maneauver 
since neither place needed assistance. For the crucial 
fighting at Hondschoote he retained only 22-25,000 men—
Jourdan's troops, Leclaire's division, and two brigades 
54
under Vandamme and Colaud.
54. Ibid, pp. 461-62. See maps #2 & #3.
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It was- mid-morning before the French engaged the 
enemy. Leclaire arrived late, and Houchard did not want to 
begin the attack without him. When he believed everyone to 
be in position, he ordered the attack to commence. Jourdan 
assaulted Hondschoote, his men falling out of the ranks by 
the score to disperse through the hedges and ditches and 
fight as skirmishers. For some reason neither the right nor 
the left supported Jourdan's assault; he was repulsed.
Houchard ordered a second attack, this time getting 
Colaud's brigade into the fray. Again heavy enemy resistance 
halted the French, driving many to ground where they engaged 
in a firefight with the defenders. Then a counterattack by 
a brigade of Hanoverian grenadiers down the Rexpoede road 
threw Jourdan back once more. The French conscripts were 
badly shaken. Jourdan scattered cavalry behind the lines 
to round up fugitives, and having mustered his last reserves, 
he massed them into a column in preparation for yet a third 
attack, relying on herd instinct to compensate for the lack 
of discipline.^
Exactly what happened next is not clear. As the 
French recoiled from their second unsuccessful assault, 
apparently Houchard nearly lost his nerve. Dismayed by the 
enemy resistance and the shaken appearance of many of his 
units, he wanted to break off the battle. The representatives,
55. Ibid, pp. 467-72. Phipps, 0£  cit, I, pp. 233-35.
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
76
and possibly his staff, set out to dissuade him while his 
troops remained stationary, trembling under the artillery 
fire of the Allies. Delbrel decided to take matters into 
his own hands. He went to the firing line and found Jourdan 
herding together his conscripts. Delbrel ordered him to re­
new the attack. Jourdan demurred; he had not received at 
attack order from Houchard; if he should obey Delbrel, 
attack, and fail, he would then be responsible for the loss 
of the battle. According to Delbrel, the rest of the 
conversation went as follows:
Delbrel: Do you fear the responsibility?
Jourdan: Yes.
Delbrel: All right, I'll assume it...I give you a
formal order to muster everyone in your division to 
attack as soon as possible. My authority is superior 
to that of the general-in-chief.
And Delbrel then offered to serve as Jourdan's aide for the 
remainder of the battle.56
Jourdan obeyed. It was a sensible decision. 
Technically Delbrel's authority was superior to Houchard's; 
he, after all, was the government. Also, Jourdan realized 
the danger of keeping raw troops stationary under fire; it 
was a question of sending them forward again, or watching
56. Delbrel's memoires, quoted in Dupuis, op cit, 
pp. 467-72.
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them slowly melt away. As Jourdan led the third attack, 
he was struck in the chest by a musket ball. Bleeding 
heavily he was carried to the rear. Lavasseur claimed that 
he encountered Jourdan on his way to the doctors, and that 
Jourdan angrily criticised Houchard for not having sent any 
orders, crying "What will become of us with such a chief?" 
When Levasseur asked what he thought ought to be done,
Jourdan urged that the army end its inaction, beat the 
charge, and rush Hondschoote with fixed bayonets.
But Houchard had already bowed to the repeated 
urging of his subordinates and the representatives; he 
ordered a third attack with fixed bayonets. The French 
surged forward, at full strength for the first time, 
because Leclaire had finally joined the struggle. Houchard, 
Delbrel, and Levasseur all personally participated in the 
charge. This time they triumphed. Leclaire's men, wading 
across a canal under fire knee deep in water, broke the 
Allies' right flank and unhinged their entire position.
French infantry fought their way into Hondschoote from every 
direction. The Allies retreated in confusion to Furnes. The 
Duke of York, having occupied himself for most of the day
57. Levasseur, Memoires, II, pp. 78-81. This is 
assuming that Levasseur!s memory of Hondschoote was correct; 
he is not the most reliable of memoirists, especially 
regarding conversations which took place 3 5 years previously. 
He further stated that Jourdan suggested that he personally 
lead the assault since the troops had confidence in him.
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repulsing sorties from Dunkirk, hastily raised the siege 
and withdrew. The French, at last, had a victory.^
It was not, truthfully, Houchard's victory. Indeed, 
if he had been left on his own, the battle might not have 
been a victory but a defeat. Hondschoote was won by a 
collective effort on the part of staff officers, divisional 
generals, representatives, and soldiers, as well as by 
Houchard. Nevertheless the representatives duly praised him 
in their letters to the Committee announcing the victory.
For the moment, at least, he was saved from disgrace. He 
was not to remain so for long.
Hondschoote had not seriously damaged the enemy 
army. Houchard missed his best chance of wrecking it when 
he neglected to launch a pursuit after the battle. Had he 
done so he would have caught York's force escaping across his 
front, strung out in no position to deploy effectively. But 
he did not think it advisable to order a pursuit. He 
believed the allied army to be stronger than his own and 
feared that the troops at Ypres might take him in reverse. 
Moreover, he thought the marshes north of Hondschoote 
impassable. Although a good half of his army had hardly
58. Dupuis, o£ cit, pp. 474-80. Exact losses are 
impossible to estimate. Both Dupuis and Phipps set them at 
a little less than 3,000 on each side; but both writers 
tend to understate the casualty figures. Quite possibly 
they were considerably higher.
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fired a shot all day, he claimed that his men were too tired 
and disorganized to continue the action. When Levasseur 
urged him to press on, he refused, snapping, "You are not a 
soldier." All of Houchard1s fears were largely without 
basis. Nor had he forced the Allies to give up their 
slow offensive through the French fortress barrier. The 
Duke of York believed his defeat to be heavier than it 
actually was, and he loudly clamored for reinforcements.
But Coburg rightly considered his complaints "exaggerated", 
and only sent him 7,000 men under Beaulieu. Coburg, for 
his part, went ahead with the siege of Le Quesnoy.59
The government allowed Houchard no time to rest on 
his laurels. The Committee congratulated him on his victory, 
but also wrote that it regretted that the plan to envelop 
and destroy the "English" had not been carried out; be that 
as it may "it is necessary to profit from the moment of 
enthusiasm and hasten to raise the siege of Quesnoy." If 
Houchard thought that his task was finished, the government 
believed that he had only begun to complete it. Forced to 
resume operations, he decided to move against the Dutch 
force at Menin with 15,000 men from his Hondschoote army—
59. A.G. B1 18, Levasseur to the Committee, 9/9/93. 
A.G. B1 19, Houchard's official report of the battle, 
9/29/93. Victor Dupuis, De Hondschoote a Wattignies 
(Paris, 1907), pp. 5-10.
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those who had done little or no fighting— plus 11,000 men 
from Lille under General Beru. If he could capture Menin, 
he could sever all communications between York and Coburg. 
Next, he planned to strike south against Coburg and relieve 
Le Quesnoy. On the whole, this was a fairly understandable 
strategy. Nevertheless it was essentially a cordon 
operation with limited means and goals, and it immobilized 
two thirds of the Hondschoote army in a useless observation 
of York's retreating army. Houchard could well have marched 
on Menin with twice the soldiers that he actually did.60
The French struck Menin on September 13 from north 
and south as planned. The Dutch fought feebly, misplacing 
reserves and losing strong positions. After 3,000 men fell, 
they fled in disorder towards Courtrai, while the French 
soldiers, as usual, celebrated their triumph by scattering 
to plunder Menin.61 But from this point on, it appeared that 
Houchard once again lost control of the situation. He 
hesitated after Menin; then he dispersed most of his force 
in a cordon along the Lys river, retaining only 15,000 men 
for his march against Coburg. Worse, he compromised his own 
plan when, possibly at the insistence of Collombel, he 
ordered generals Gudin at Maubeuge and Declaye at Cambrai to
60. A.G. B1 18, Carnot to Houchard, 9/13/93. Dupuis, 
ibid, pp. 10-13.
61. Dupuis, ibid, pp. 13-15. Menin is the one victory 
that can legitimately be attributed to Houchard alone.
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advance to relieve Le Quesnoy without waiting for him to 
join them. If he indeed was solely responsible for this 
order, it was a grievous mistake; Gudin and Declaye alone 
were no match for Coburg.
On September 14 and 15, disaster struck. A French 
brigade following the enemy east of Menin was surprised 
and routed by Beaulieu, newly arrived on the scene with the 
reinforcements. As the French fled, closely pursued by Beau­
lieu, they involved more units in the panic. By the end of 
the day Beaulieu had recaptured Menin and ruined the entire 
French position along the Lys. To the south Declaye, after 
rashly announcing his advance in the local newspapers, 
marched into a well prepared ambush and was cut to pieces.
Gudin was also forced to retreat. Thus in two short days 
the French had lost the initiative and most of the 
advantages gained as a result of Hondschoote. Houchard 
excused himself for these defeats by blaming them on his 
subordinates. "I had given the orders...; I could not be 
everywhere;" and "I can not be responsible for the faults 
of others." This was not an excuse; it was self incrimination.
62. A.G. B1 18, Bouchotte to Houchard, 9/11/93; 
Houchard to Bouchotte, 9/13/93; Collombel to the Committee, 
9/11/93, 9/13/93. From the wording of Collombel's letters 
there is some reason to suspect that he may have ordered the 
offensive from Cambrai and Maubeuge on his own, thereby 
forcing Houchard's hand. However Houchard in his letters 
stated that he had ordered the attack.
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He had indeed given the orders which led to these unfortunate 
actions. And if a commander was not, technically, responsible 
for the actions of his subordinates, what was he responsible 
for?63
The sudden reversal of the campaign— the dashing of 
the high hopes raised by Hondschoote— provoked a rash of 
complaints by the representatives about the terrible state 
of the army. Levasseur and Bentabole co-authored a long 
resumd of its logistical and organizational deficiencies. 
Delbrel echoed their compalints, and added that the army 
was suffering defeat because its generals were too defensive- 
minded. Isore, Bar, and Drouet denounced the generals of 
the right wing of the army as incompetent. Lacoste and 
Peyssard wrote of indiscipline and disorder and denounced 
Houchard's staff and several of his divisional generals for 
royalism and incompetence. They described the defeats as 
the "system of Lafayette reappeari; on the scene." They 
urged that the generals responsible for the Menin disaster 
be immediately dismissed. Levasseur criticized Houchard's 
failure to pursue the enemy energetically after Hondschoote. 
Clearly Houchard and his staff had lost the confidence of the 
representatives. Nevertheless, they did not throw him to the
63. Dupuis, De Hondschoote a Wattignies, pp. 18-21. 
A.G. Bl 18, Lacoste & Peyssard to the Committee, 9/15/93. 
A.G. Bl 19, Houchard's official report, 9/29/93.
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wolves on the 'Committee as so many writers have claimed.
They were well aware of the immensity of the problems 
which he faced, as well as his honest limitations in facing 
them. Only the extremist Hentz denounced Houchard directly 
as an incompetent, a possible traitor, and a friend of 
"Custinites" like his staff officers Gay-Vernon and 
Berthelmy.64
The government was placed in a quandry. It was 
clear that changes had to be made; at the same time it 
seemed that the Committee was not eager to begin yet another 
purge of the 'Nord's' officer corps. The impetus for 
action came from the radicals. Bouchotte arrested Gay-Vernon 
as a suspected royalist. For the unfortunate, overwrought 
Houchard, this was the last straw. He threatened to resign 
unless Gay-Vernon was restored to duty to assist him in his 
"painful functions...His assistance is so necessary to me 
both in my correspondence and in his local and military 
knowledge that I cannot continue to command the army. It 
is beyond my strength and ability." Gay-Vernon was his 
operational brain and he knew it. The government could 
hesitate no longer. Here was the defeatism of Dampierre and 
Kilmaine all over again. Here was a general whose abilities 
and talents were highly suspect to all frankly admitting 
his own failings. The Committee ordered his dismissal and
64. See cartons Bl 18 and Bl 19 for the representatives' 
letters concerning the multiple problems of the army of the 
North following the setbacks of the 14th & 15th.
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arrest on September 21, along with that of Berthelmy and 
several other of the army's generals. It was not the 
sacrifice of a scapegoat; the commanders of two other armies 
were purged the same day. The Committee once again was 
trying to weed out the incompetent. In a letter to the 
representatives about the dismissals, Carnot's tone was 
almost desperate: "Collect all the information you can
acquire about the talent and civi sme of men who can be 
promoted to higher rank in the army."65
Houchard was brought back to Paris a prisoner. His
fate was unnecessary, unjust, and tragic. He was denounced
by the extremists in the journals, in the clubs, and in 
the Convention, as a traitor. The government put him on 
trial. The discovery of some correspondence with the 
enemy on some routine matters sealed his doom; this 
seemed to offer proof positive of his treason. On November 
16, he was guillotined. His only sin had been to be
unqualified for the position to which he was promoted. Yet
his tragic end should not blind one to the fact that his 
dismissal was both necessary and inevitable.
Jourdan had spent less than a week recuperating 
from his chest wound— a minor graze which did not prove 
to be serious. He already was marked for another promotion;
65. Carnot to Trullard & Berlier, 9/21/93, Corr., III, 
pp. 178-79. Dupuis, op cit, pp. 45-7.
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on September 8", Bouchotte recommended him for the command 
of the Army of the Ardennes. Ke took command on the 14th.
The Ardennes was a small force largely composed of ill- 
trained conscripts and scattered garrisons along the Ardennes 
frontier. For the next seven days Jourdan vainly tried to 
get Bouchotte to tell him what units were under his command, 
what was their strength, where were they positioned, and 
what was their task. He was still awaiting an answer when 
he was informed that he was appointed provisional commander 
of the armies of the North and the Ardennes.6® The decision 
to promote him was probably aicollective one. Carnot's son 
claimed that Carnot recommended him. Bouchotte certainly 
esteemed him, since he recommended him for the command of 
the Ardennes. Representatives Bar, Drouet, and Isore had 
praised him earlier in requesting that he be sent to command 
at Maubeuge: "He is very well known and in general esteemed
by this army which burns to see him arrive. We desire his 
arrival with so much impatience..." He was known as a 
staunch republican and a sans-culotte. But an examination 
of the officer corps at this time reveals what was probably 
the decisive reason. There was no one else.67
66. A.G. Bl 18 & Bl 19, Jourdan to Bouchotte, 9/14/93, 
9/19/93; Bouchotte to Jourdan, 9/22/93.
67. Hippolyte Carnot, 0£  cit, I, pp. 401-02. A.G. Bl 
19, Isore, Bar, & Drouet to the Committee, 9/18/93.
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At first he tried to refuse the appointment. When 
several cf the representatives announced it to him, he tried 
to decline, arguing that "not having either the talent or the 
experience that go with a command so important, it was his 
duty to refuse." But the representatives retorted that 
anyone who refused any employment to which the government 
had called him was subject to arrest. Jourdan was an 
obedient soldier; he felt that he had no choice. He 
accepted. He could not have had many illusions about the 
task facing him. It had resulted in the treason of one 
general, the death of a second, the dismissal of a third, 
and the arrest and execution of a fourth, soon to be joined 
by a fifth. Jourdan was noticably reticent in his memoires 
about his personal feelings, almost always understating or 
concealing his true state of mind. The impression conveyed 
by his account of his learning of his promotion is that he 
was utterly surprised. One wonders what really went 
through his m i n d . ^
68. A.G. memoires historiques #608-l(hereafter m.r. 
608-1) / Jourdan1s Memoires de la campagne de 1793.
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.III. TERROR AND GENERALSHIP
"Inferior in number to the Allies, especially in 
cavalry, the army indeed was in a pitiful condition,"
Jourdan recalled of the command that he assumed. "The 
generals and superior officers, having risen in rank in but 
a few months from the subaltern ranks to higher grades, 
possessed only their zeal and their courage. The troops 
were denuded of equipment and clothing [and here he might 
have added food], and the arsenals were lacking arms and 
munitions...The older regiments, not having received any 
recruits for a long time, were reduced to half their 
strenght...The greatest number [of the conscripts] were only 
furnished with sticks and pikes. Nonetheless, as they 
judged the state of affairs, the Committee of the government, 
which based the strength of the Republic upon the multitude, 
believed that it [the army] could accomplish the greatest 
things." And Jourdan, inexperienced in army command, was 
resoonsible for leading this near rabble to the greatness 
the Committee expected.1
In his bleak evaluation of the situation he was not 
exaggerating; if anything he was understanding its gravity. 
The reports which the representatives were sending to the 
government echoed Jourdan's complaints point by point, 
elaborated on them, and also described problems which
1. A.G. mr 608-1, J. B. Jourdan, Memoires militaires 
de la campagne de 1793, (unpublished manuscript).
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Jourdan had not mentioned. In a multi-page report,
Levasseur and Bentabole discussed in detail the defects
of the army: a lack of qualified officers and supply
officials, severe shortages in clothing and weapons, and
insufficient manpower. The levde was not providing the
help that they had hoped; the conscripts were "incapable
of being employed immediately" owing to their lack of
training and equipment. Subsistence for the army "always
causes the greatest embarrasment." The departments which
were supposed to supply the army with the provisions it
needed were not doing so, and they believed that government
agents should be sent into each obstreperous department. In
an oral report delivered to the Convention, Delbrel repeated
virtually all of Levasseur's and Bentabole's complaints.
The passive resistance of the departments was hindering
the provisioning of the army. Great abuses existed in the
furnishing of horses and the lack of horses caused the
shortage of cavalry which was crippling the army. The
frontier fortresses needed to be stjcngthen^d, and the army
required more offensive-minded officers. And then, of course,
2
the still undefeated enemy was but ninety miles from Paris.
The Army of the North ran, as Marcel Reinhard wrote, 
the dual risk of perishing from either consumption or
2. A.G. Bl 19, Levasseur & Bentabole to the Committee, 
9/21/93; Report of citizen Delbrel on his mission to the 
Army of the North, 9/2 3/9 3.
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presumption. Jourdan's task was to alleviate the situation 
before either of these fates proved lethal to it. He had to 
reconstruct it into a capable fighting force, and he had to 
lead it to victory. If he failed, the army would die, 
either consumed by its uncured diseases or pushed to the point 
of no return by those who presumed that it was capable of 
the greatest achievements. Jourdan had to carry out his 
task, moreover, under the lash of a revolutionary regime 
growing increasingly suspicious of the loyalty and energy of 
its generals— a regime becoming more radical and intolerant 
of failure due to its own indigestable diet of successive 
problems and crises, and popular pressure for it to do 
something about every one of them.
Jourdan did not undertake this task alone. Had this 
been necessary,: he would have had t.o become a veritable 
superleader combining strategic ability, political expertise, 
administrative and managerial competence, economic knowledge, 
plus a talent for propaganda and public relations. Jourdan 
was no superman. He tackled the construction of the Army 
of the Nord as part of a group effort. He acted in con­
junction with his superiors on the Committee of Public 
Safety and in the Ministry of War, with his political 
colleagues on mission to the army from the Convention, and 
with the vast multitude of officers and soldiers, officials 
and bureaucrats, which made up the military. Some of the 
efforts of these various persons were, as will be seen, more
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harmful than beneficial, interference rather than assistance. 
But on the whole Jourdan could not have pulled the army out 
of its incomplete stage unaided; this required the teamwork 
of large numbers.
In selecting Jourdan for the command of the 'Nord! 
the government could not have made a more fortunate choice.
Ke was, above all, a team man. -.e possessed none of the 
arrogance, pride, and intolerance that would have prevented 
him from working harmoniously with others, be they politicians, 
generals, or common soldiers. He was a warm and sympathetic 
person, evidently with an easy personality and an ability 
not only to suffer opposing points of view but also to 
defer to them when necessary. He yielded gracefully to 
orders even when they proved vexing or difficult. The fact 
that he took orders from civilians did not trouble him; he 
possessed none of the soldier's traditional hostility towards 
the meddling of civilian politicians in matters which he 
believed should be reserved for the military expert. When 
offering advice, he did so with almost painful diffidence.
'I submit these considerations to you because I think them 
to be in the best interests of the Republic', he would so 
often write, but 'be assured that whatever course of action 
you decide upon I will obediently carry out'. Then as an 
added precaution he would reassure his superiors of his 
loyalty and devotion to the regime. Jourdan was very 
careful not to repeat Custine's mistake and cause the govern­
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ment to suspect his patriotism. Like everyone, he had a 
point at which unreasonable superiors or incompetent 
subordinates would exhaust his patience. Fortunately, given 
the circumstances, he had a high threshold of tolerance.
Jourdan's ability to work with others was not 
limited to his superiors. He also got along well with his 
subordinates, be they generals or privates. The continuing 
loyalty of the officers who served under him in the 'Nord' 
and in the Sambre et Meuse and the affection that the 
common soldiers always had for him even in the most dire 
of circumstances were mute testimony to his ability to deal 
with his men with understanding, tact and humanity. His 
long years of privation and his experiences in the ranks 
of the Royal army enabled him to empathize with the average 
man in the ranks. At the same time he had doubtlessly 
served with malingerers and chronic discipline problems, and 
he well knew that the only way to deal with such persons was 
with tough, unrelenting discipline. Additionally, he 
possessed the ability always to display what one might call 
a positive attitude. If he doubted his ability to cope with 
the army's problems, he did not show it. He did not duplicate 
Houchard's mistake of criticizing himself in his dispatches 
in an effort to persuade the government to shift the 
responsibilities of his command from his shoulders. Only 
once did he commit this error. During the appalling hard­
ships of the November offensive, he became so disgusted that
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he threatened to resign his post; the government very nearly 
dismissed and arrested him, and he never made the mistake 
again.
At the head of the team entrusted with the 
reconstitution of the revolutionary army--the team on which 
Jourdan was now so important a member— stood the Committee 
of Public Safety. The Committee was the executive organ 
of the Jacobin dictatorship and, as such, Jourdan's commander- 
in-chief. His immediate superior was Lazare Carnot, the 
stern, disciplined, tireless and energetic military 
specialist of the Committee.3 Carnot was responsible for 
the construction of the army as well as the strategic direc­
tion of the war. His duties included the supervision of 
the commanders, staffs, officers, fortress commandants, 
and commissaire-ordonnateurs of the Republic's eleven combat 
armies. He also was responsible for the activities of the 
ministry of war and its various agents. He dealt directly 
with the army commanders and the representatives with each 
army in his direction of operations. That a ruthless, 
all-out prosectution of the war was absolutely necessary
3. The best study of Carnot's life and career is by 
far: Marcel Reinhard, Le Grand Carnot (Paris, 1952, 2 vols.).
It contains an excellent analysis of his role in the collective 
organization of the revolutionary military effort. The two 
studies of Carnot in English: Huntly Dupre, Carnot (Oxford
Ohio, 1940), and S. J. Watson, Carnot. (London, 1954), are 
far less useful.
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Carnot fully believed; in this he was as one with the rest 
of the Committee. He felt that the Terror was essential 
for reasons of state; in a revolution the state must 
pulverise its enemies or be annihilated by them. Any dis­
play of weakness was fatal. As for war, it was "a violent 
condition; one had to fight it to the limit or go home."
He subscribed to Barfere's dictum that only dead enemies did 
not return. It is a myth that he was merely a technician 
secluded "in his bureau" with his maps and directives.
Where the safety of the revolution was concerned, he was 
4
a convinced terrorist.
Regarding Carnot's direction of the war and 
construction of the army, several points must be made. He 
was not the creator of total war; he was rather the clearing 
house of ideas for the new "guerre a outrance". His military 
conceptions developed as a result of suggestions and ex­
changes of information with advisors, generals, representatives 
and popular societies. Generals Hoche and Berthelmy, 
representative Delbrel, Committee member Louis Prieur, and 
some of the Parisian popular societies all called for a 
national strategy of constant offensives eii masse beifore 
Carnot incorporated such an idea into his directives. France 
has 200,000 men in garrison, they clamored; she should take 
the offensive! To attack best suits the nature of the
4. Reinhard, o£ cit, II, pp. 39, 107-08.
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French character! The idea for organizing the army into 
divisions came from Berthelmy, and the complete amalgame 
of veterans and conscripts into the same units was urged by 
Jourdan.^ Carnot's genius thus lay in his capacity to be 
receptive to new ideas and to choose those which worked. 
Secondly, his views on the new methods of warfare were by 
no means completely formulated in the fall of 1793. He too 
was searching for the proper combinations which would bring 
victory. Indeed, throughout his career a substantial gap 
remained between his theories of warfare and their actual 
practice. He often allowed traditional strategic con­
siderations to color his plans, so that at times Old Regime 
military ideas were juxtaposed with revolutionary concepts 
in the same directive. Finally, in 1793 he was by no means 
in sole control of the war effort. He was as yet a very 
junior member of the Committee, and his colleagues, most 
notably St Just, also took an active interest in the 
conduct of the war. Carnot shared operational direction 
of the war with the rest of the Committee. And if the other 
members deferred to his expertise on most occasions, there 
were important instances when they did not— when they allowed 
political considerations, or their own ideological biases, 
to override the technical proposals of Carnot. The govern-
5. A.G. B1 17-19, see e.g. letters to the Committee of 
Bentabole, 8/13/93; Delbrel, 8/23/93; Berthelmy's letters 
of Aug. 17, 25, & 29/9 3; Arthur Chuquet, Hondschoote, pp. 
155-57.
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ment was not unified on the specific direction that the 
war should take.6
Jourdan's relationship with Carnot was correct and 
professional. They got along with a minimum of friction.
The fact that both men shared similar strategic and tactical 
preferences helped. Carnot issued his orders in the form of 
decrees which spelled out the general strategic objectives, 
while they left Jourdan a good deal of latitude to choose 
his own means of attaining them. Carnot had no intention 
of trying to instruct his generals on everything, as 
Houchard had found out to his dismay. Jourdan's greatest 
difficulty with him arose out of Carnot's tendency to mix 
the rhetoric of the new war of mass with more conservative 
tactical instructions. For example, on one occasion he 
wrote Jourdan that "it is always necessary to stay ready to 
profit from circumstances and to fall in force upon all 
the enemy's weaker corps...because it is primarily his 
extermination which we must bring about." Yet this same 
directive ordered Jourdan to remain on the defensive.7 The 
contradiction in this order is evident. Jourdan nonetheless 
took every care to execute Carnot's directives as literally 
as possible, for he well knew how the Committee felt about 
disobedient generals. However it is not true that Carnot
6. Reinhard, o£ cit, II, ch's 3-10.
7. A.G. B1 37, Carnot to the representatives with the 
Sambre et Meuse, 8/13/94.
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allowed his generals little or no room to change or inter­
pret his orders.8 In Jourdan's case, he did not hesitate 
to suggest alternative courses of action if he disagreed with 
a proposed operation or change in personnel. Moreover,
Carnot frequently took Jourdan's advice, sometimes adjusting 
his plans to act upon Jourdan's suggestions.
If their working relationship was a good one, there 
is no indication th.it it went beyond this to friendship. 
Carnot later admitted that he had "never been either the 
personal friend nor enemy of any of the generals-in-chief 
of the Republic." Those he "esteemed as skillful" he sought 
out and employed; those who were unfortunate he dismissed.9 
Carnot assisted and supported Jourdan when he could because 
he respected his military abilities. Jourdan, Carnot 
believed, was a brave and honest sans-culotte. Jourdan's 
feeling towards Carnot are harder to define. There is some 
reason to believe that he identified Carnot with the 
"sanguinary" excesses of the Terror and with the intense 
pressure on him from the government to accomplish the nearly 
impossible. On the other hand, Jourdan obviously esteemed 
Carnot's talents and did not shrink from asking his advice 
and using him as an ally against the radicals on occasion.
If Carnot was not a friend, he was an important and powerful
8. Albert Soboul, Les Soldats de 1'an I I , p. 197.
9. Hippolyte Carnot, Memoires sur Carnot, I, p. 390.
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patron within the government. Jourdan1s ability to work with 
him was a key factor in enabling him to keep his command—  
and his head.
The second most important man in the team was the 
minister of war, Jean Bouchotte. Before the Revolution 
Bouchotte had been a career soldier, a captain in the Royal 
army. He had been appointed minister of war to replace 
Beurnonville in April, 1793, even though he was still only 
a colonel. Theoretically he was the head of the Republican 
armies, for he controlled all strategic decisions, the 
nomination and promotion of all high ranking officers, and 
the dismissal of those judged inept. In practice he did 
none of these things independently of the Committee. His 
chief function was to manage the logistics of the Republic's 
armies. In acquitting this task, he left much to be 
desired. Bouchotte was a well-meaning but mediocre minister; 
he remained in office mainly because of the support of the 
radicals in the Parisian popular societies whom the govern­
ment could not afford to offend. In return for their support, 
Bouchotte awarded them jobs in the war ministry and in the 
administration of the armies. Ultimately he fell completely 
under their domination— a circumstance which had dire effects 
upon the war effort. On a personal level Jourdan's relations 
with Bouchotte were smooth enough. He corresponded with him 
regarding the operational and logistical problems of the army, 
and Bouchotte in turn passed on to Jourdan the government's
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
98
10
instructions.
Jourdan's immediate civil superiors were the 
representatives on mission. These were the men with whom 
it was necessary, above all else, to maintain amicable 
relations. They were more than government agents; they 
were the actual extension of the regime's authority over the 
military. They occupied positions analagous to those of 
the army intendants of the Old Regime; they were at once 
administrators, quartermasters, propagandists, and political 
watchdogs. Traditionally they have been pejoratively 
viewed by historians, especially by military historians who 
see them as commissars with the sole function of spying on 
the unfortunate generals, interfering in their operations, 
and denouncing them as traitors when things went wrong. In 
the usual assessment, they were "jealous of all authority 
except their own." A general who became popular with his 
troops became an object of their suspicion, and if an officer 
complained of the supply personnel or the agents of the war 
ministry, he was denounced as a bad patriot. "Once in 
command a general saw how much his will was limited by the
10. For a discussion of Bouchotte's career, see Auguste 
Herlaut, Le Colonel Bouchotte; ministre de la guerre de 1'a n '
II (Paris, 1946, 2 vols.). Herlaut, as well as Soboul, 
Albert Mathiez & R. R. Palmer all view Bouchotte favorably. 
For the minority view, to which I wholeheartedly subscribe, 
see Marcel Reinhard, o£ cit, II pp. 66-67. Reinhard 
questions Bouchotte's ability, suggesting that much of the 
army's logistical difficulty lay at his door.
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interference of the representatives...death if he halted to 
reshape his forces, death if he was attacked and defeated, 
whilst, as Houchard found, even victory might not save him."11
In Jourdan's case— and his was typical of the situ­
ations of the other commanders— the truth of the matter was 
exactly the contrary. Without the work of the representatives, 
the reorganization of the ’Nord' would have been indefinitely 
delayed, if ever completed at all. The representatives 
grappled with a bewildering variety of organizational and 
logistical problems which were simply beyond Jourdan's 
resources to handle. They saw to the feeding and equipping 
of the army, the supervising of the supply personnel, and 
the discipling of foot-dragging departments which were 
not sending the army their assigned food quotas. They 
worked to execute the levde, and they helped to implement 
the amalgame. They consulted with Jourdan in the hiring and 
firing of officers and supply officials, and repaired and 
provisioned fortresses. In a given week one representative 
might discover a planned night assault betrayed to the enemy 
by a traitor who lit a telltale bonfire; another might purge 
the municipality of a front-line commune of aristocrats, 
malingerers, and other suspects; and a third might urge the 
government to deliver the back pay of the personnel of a 
certain administration. Like all administrators they made
11. Ramsey Phipps, The Armies of the First French 
Republic, I, pp. 20-2S. Phipps is a typical critic of the 
representatives.
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mistakes and committed abuses. Some were too quick to 
dismiss an officer for failures which were beyond the latter1s 
ability to avoid. But on the whole their account sheet shows 
an overwhelming balance on the credit side of the ledger.
Jourdan did not hesitate to work with the
representatives. The assertion of one historian that he
survived their arbitrariness by manipulating "tame” ones
is nonsense. He cooperated with them because they were
agents of the government and because they were quite useful.
In deferring to their judgments, he did so not from fear of
the Terror; Jourdan was no sycophant. On the contrary, he
firmly believed that the foremost duty of any general was
to carry out the orders of his government to the best of
his ability. The general could advise and remonstrate,
but once the civilian authorities had made their decision,
12
that decision had to be obeyed. Secondly, he well knew the 
realities of generalship under the Jacobin dictatorship, 
and he was aware that, as St Just later decreed, the time for 
disobedience had passed. The revolution had demanded total 
subordination of the military to the civilian authority, and 
the civilian authority included the representatives. Finally, 
he worked willingly with them because their lack of experience 
in military matters did not prevent them from being effective 
supplemental quartermasters for his army as well as trans­
12. A.G. mr 608-1, preface to Jourdan's memoires de 1793.
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mitters of his' complaints about the shortcomings of his 
forces to the Committee. The representatives could press 
the Committee for action in a certain area with far more 
vigor than could Jourdan, and they could shift some of the 
intense responsibility from the general's shoulders to their 
own. As they labored among the troops, they came to realize 
the extent and gravity of their problems as well as did 
the generals. In the struggle against disorganization, 
indiscipline, and the presumption of the extremists, men 
like Delbrel, Duquesnoy and Levasseur were Jourdan's most 
valuable allies;1^
The representatives were not the only civilians 
with whom Jourdan had to deal. There were also the 
"commissaires" of the war ministry. These men were a 
different matter altogether from the representatives. They 
were appointed and controlled by Bouchotte, who was a key 
member of the extemist faction in the regime. As a result, 
they were often sans-culottes from the Parisian popular 
societies, men who burned with patriotic zeal and determina­
tion but who possessed little real expertise. In theory, 
they, like the representatives, were to assist in the recon­
13. No adequate study of the representatives exists. 
The work by Henri Wallo.n is biased; that by Edmund Bonnal de 
Ganges is hopelessly incoherent. Their ample correspondence 
is contained in the "B" series of the Archives de Guerre, as 
well as in the Recueil des Actes.
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struction of the army. In practice, they spent as much of 
their time acting as the "eyes of the minister", overseeing 
the generals and doing propaganda work among the rank and 
file. In addition they rivaled the representatives for 
control of the army. The commissaires believed the repre­
sentatives establishment types who were hindering the 
revolutionizing of the army. The representatives in turn 
believed the commissaires to be enragds who were disorganizing 
the army. "The majority of these agents were men with 
swelled heads, animated with hateful passions, seeing 
nothing but plots and conspiracies." Carnot believed that 
their interference had mainly been harmful; "without them the 
(levde) would have been accomplished by now."'*'4
The conflict ^etween the representatives and the 
commissaires reflected the more deep and serious division 
between the moderates and the radicals--the "men of mass" as 
Jourdan called them--over how the war should be waged. In 
the Army of the Nord the attitudes of the two groups 
towards the officer corps was the basic point of difference. 
The commissaires felt, as did the extremists, that revolu­
tionary fervor alone sufficed to achieve victory. Given
14. A.G. B1 19, Levasseur to the Committee, 9/16/93; 
Reinhard, o£ cit, pp. 43, 74-5. During the Sambre offensive 
in late October, the Allies shifted their artillery from one 
position to another. The commissaires enthusiastically 
reported this minor adjustment as the first step in the 
complete retreat of the entire Allied army. Celliez et al. 
to Bouchotte, 10/24/93.
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enough armed, patriotic sans-culottes, the revolution could 
sweep the slaves of tyrants out of France by sheer weight of 
numbers and revolutionary ferocity. When operations went 
wrong, it was obviously due to the treachery or ineptness 
of those who led. "The soldiers of the Republic," wrote 
commissaire Varin, "burn with the need to measure them­
selves against the enemy; and if we have any reverses...we 
must attribute them only to those who command" [my italics]. 
Most would agree with the sentiments of Bouchotte's second, 
the enrag£ Francois Vincent, that most of the officers 
"deserved a thousand deaths since they have arrested the 
valor of our armies." At times their officer-phobia was 
almost pathological. One wanted the immediate purge of all 
staff officers, while another demanded that any officer 
who gave a subordinate leave should be shot. And all 
distrusted talented, assertive officers whom they believed 
to be dangerous to liberty.15
And yet the commissaires did not feel and say any­
thing that was not felt or said by certain high-ranking 
members of the government. St Just had observed that 
generals were without sympathy in the nation, and that 
generalships still belonged to the "nature of monarchy". 
Bouchotte stated that in command of the Republic's armies
15. A.G., B1 20, Varin to Bouchotte, 10/3/9 3. Reinhard,
op cit, II, pp. 74-5, 356n.
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he wanted true-sans-culottes, "not these so-called men of 
talent". Small wonder that the war ministry frequently did 
not take notice of the representatives' recommendations on 
the selection of generals. The latter desired experts rather 
than zealots.
To Jourdan the commissaires were more of a hindrance 
than a help. They forced him and the representatives to 
dismiss more officers and administrators than they desired.
As a result the desparate shortage of qualified officers 
and specialists— the men most needed for the reorganization 
of the army— became worse. The commissaires placed Jourdan 
in a ticklish position, because too much cooperation with 
their rivals, the representatives, might provoke the charge 
that he was a tepid patriot. Worse of all they greatly 
increased the pressure upon him in his direction of opera­
tions. So great was the commissaires1 distrust and distaste 
for generals that his first mistake might induce them to 
denounce him as a traitor "arresting the valor of the sol­
diers," and to call for his arrest— a call which would soon 
echo among the commissaires1 comrades and the Parisian popular 
societies. Here was the source of the pressure that forced 
the generals of the Republic to fight with a guillotine sus­
pended over their heads.
16. Soboul, op cit, p. 197. A . G . B1 17, Bouchotte 
to Berthelmy, 8/19/93.
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This, then, was the team with which Jourdan had to 
work to rectify the 'pitiful condition* of the Army of the 
Nord. It is now necessary to consider how the general and 
his associates approached their difficult task.
The first problem was to find enough qualified 
officers to train and to discipline the masses of raw 
recruits, and then to lead them into battle properly. Most 
of the officers upon whom Jourdan had to rely were mediocre; 
he was constantly forced to instruct them in the most rudi­
mentary duties of their profession. He advised General 
Fromentin not to send out his flankers too far lest they 
get tired or even desert. He reminded General Beauregard to 
make sure that his troops always marched in good order. He 
ordered his chief of artillery not to let soldiers ride 
astride the cannons while they were dn motion. He instructed 
other officers to be sure to entrench each n i g h t . ^  There 
were still others who were unable to carry out the daily 
bread distribution without confusion and unrest. The 
shortage of competent officers was aggrevated by the Jacobins' 
determination to weed out all former noble officers even 
though such men were often the best qualified and most loyal 
to the Republic. Bouchotte's often repeated missive to his 
agents was for them to "verify if the men for whom you demand
17. See A.G. Bl* 223 for a good sampling of Jourdan's 
detailed and repetitive instructions to his generals.
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
106
promotion are not noble".1®
Jourdan and his colleagues could not afford to wait 
until such officers developed qualities of leadership. Good 
men had to be found and promoted immediately; those who 
proved wanting had to be ruthlessly dismissed to make room 
for the more promising candidates. Some have argued that 
political reasons lay behind most of the Jacobins' dismissals; 
in reality those denounced were denounced for obvious inept­
ness. General Declaye was arrested after he proclaimed a 
planned advance in the local newspapers and then fled the 
battlefield when the forewarned enemy ambushed his force 
and cut it to pieces. Representative Isore arrested General 
Landrin when he found the general dead drunk at the head of 
his disorderly soldiers. Carnot and Jourdan had the chief 
of staff of the garrison of Maubeuge arrested because he
failed to obey a direct order to sortie during the battle
19
of Wattingnies; he was later guillotined. Many of the 
lower ranking officers were equally lax. Some took two 
months to take over the command of units to which they were 
assigned. "The officers promoted by seniority can be the 
most honest of men, but often incapable of command, and often 
timid or inept." Then there were the cowards— "the most
18. Herlaut, 0£  cit, I, pp. 295-96.
19. A.G. B1 19, Lacoste & Peyssard to the Committee,
9/16/93. Recueil des Actes, Isore to the Committee,
9/15/9 3. A.G. B1 21, Carnot & Duquesnoy to the Committee,
10/17/93.
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dangerous of all." The representatives recommended that all 
officers who abandoned tl .-ir units or cannon without orders 
should be shot on the spot.20
Yet with all the dismissals, arrests, and executions, 
the fact remains that more officers were promoted than 
purged. But to find the good young officers —  men like Ney, 
Bernadotte, Hoche and Soult, all apprentices in the 'Nord1 
officer corps —  took time. For such men to obtain sufficient 
maturity and experience to improve the army's cadres took 
still more time. In the interim, the problem remained.
Jourdan was more reluctant to dismiss generals of 
questionable ability than were his teammates. He retained 
General Fromentin although it is obvious from his corres­
pondence that he distrusted the latter's ability. When the 
former noble General Beru was relieved of his command,
Jourdan defended him, writing that "his conduct and sentiments 
are irreproachable, his opinion is that of a confirmed 
republican; he has always shown a heroic courage defending 
the Republic." When General Ransonnet suffered a 
reverse, Jourdan urged him not to get discouraged by the 
check but instead to redouble his vigilance and later take 
revenge. The same day he asked Isore not to dismiss 
Ransonnet because there were no other officers to replace
20. Corr., III, pp. 40-1, Delbrel, Chales, and 
Letourner to the Committee, 8/2 5/93,
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him. For this- was the crux of the problem; if a bad officer 
be dismissed, there often was no better man to succeed h i m . ^
A second problem was the incomplete amalgame. The
embrigadement law had ended the official distinctions
between veterans and levies, but it had done nothing to
incorporate them into the same units. As casualties reduced
the veteran contingents until many were below half strength,
the conscripts accumulated behind the lines in new units
commanded by recently elected, untried officers. Jourdan
was forced to send these conscript units to his largest base
at Guise, where general Alexandre Belair saw to their
training and equipping, until they could be used at the front.
In addition there were still a multitude of special legions
and Federde units, most under strength, and all with crowds
of inexperienced officers. Indeed, the very numbers of units
22
involved hindered the embrigadement.
Jourdan1s solution to this difficulty was simple.
The troops of the new levde had to be incorporated directly 
into the veteran units instead of being allowed to form units 
of their own. The veteran battalions would then benefit 
from the additional manpower, the recruits would benefit 
from the veterans' experience, and the army would benefit
21. V. Dupuis, De^  Hondschoote a Wattingnies, p. 118. 
Corr., IV, pp. 1-3, Jourdan to Ransonnet, 11/1/93, Jourdan 
to Isore, 11/1/93.
22. Dupuis, 0£  cit, p. 51.
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by being substantially reinforced. In mid-October Jourdan 
suggested that the government adopt this measure, arguing 
that the army could not achieve any significant success until 
veterans and conscripts were amalgamated. He continued to 
agitate for it thereafter. He told Bouchotte that he 
believed that they could double the size of the army by 
incorporating the conscripts into the older cadres. "I 
believe this measure necessary... If it is not acted upon, 
some way must be found to complete our battalions." He 
wholeheartedly approved the government's decision at the 
beginning of December to complete the amalgame along the 
lines which he had suggested, and added that he felt the 
demi-brigade ought to become the basic formation of the 
army. Nevertheless the war ministry took its time about 
sending agents to the 'Nord' to execute the amalgame, and 
resistance from those untried officers who stood to lose their 
positions slowed it still further. Jourdan and the represen­
tatives complained continually about the delay in implementa­
tion. On December 12, Laurent wrote that the amalgame was 
not taking place; Jourdan had not yet received either the 
official laws or instructions relative to it. On December 
3, Bar relayed Jourdan's complaint that the agents whom
Bouchotte was supposed to send to assist with the incorpora- 
2 3tion had still not arrived.
23. A.G. Bl* 223, Jourdan to Bouchotte, 11/23/93, 12/4/93; 
mr 608-1, Memoires de 179 3 . Recueil des Actes, IX, Laurent to 
Committee, 12/13/93, p. 357; Bar to the Committee, 12/23/93, 
pp. 606-07.
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Discipline too remained a problem. The Army of the 
Nord was an untrustworthy as ever in the field, and it was 
not much better in camp. A major reason was that the army's 
system of military justice was still geared to a professional 
army. Breaches of discipline were handled by the old 
process of lengthy court-martials or by the local civilian 
courts. These were totally unfit to dispense justice and 
punishment efficiently in the torrexit of cases which came 
their way; they were too slow and too few and the numbers of 
lawbreaking conscripts too large. The agents of the war 
ministry helped somewhat, but these men were mainly concerned 
with crimes committed within the supply system. One result 
was that many, if not most, of the lawbreakers went unpunished. 
The future Marshal Soult recalled that "never was the army 
in a more shameful state of disorganization."24
Jourdan worked tirelessly to reduce the indiscipline, 
issuing orders against various offenses on a daily basis.
The wide range of abuses attacked in these orders testify to 
the bewildering variety of offenses which his conscripts 
were capable of committing. He ordered that soldiers who 
disrupted the bread distribution be arrested, as well as 
soldiers who stole from the army magazines. Quartermaster- 
treasurers were to be present at each pay distribution so 
that these would take place "with the greatest regularity."
24. Dupuis, De Valenciennes a Hondschoote, pp. 66-7.
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Officers and sergeants who absented themselves from their
units without permission were to be arrested. (This order
was repeated on four consecutive days.) Since his commands
seemed to have but little effect, Jourdan toughened the
punishments. He decreed that any battalion or squadron
("once and for all"), which abandoned itself to shameful
flight, was to be disarmed on the spot and sent to a
citadel to be judged and punished according to the full
rigors of the law. When cases of sentries and officers
of the advanced posts sleeping on duty persisted, he
ordered that any officer who allowed his post to be surprised
by the enemy was to be dismissed, arrested, and sent to the
interior to be judged as a criminal of the nation— and if 
25
so judged, to be executed.
Nonetheless all of his efforts would have achieved 
only slow and modest progress had not the representatives 
assisted him by establishing revolutionary tribunals directly 
behind the front. The purpose of these tribunals was to try 
and punish— especially punish— -swiftly and ruthlessly those 
offenders whom Jourdan's tougher disciplinary measures were
25. See e.g. A.G. Bl* 223, orders of 10/10-13/93; A.G. 
B1 21, orders of 10/27/93 & 10/29/93. So meticulous was 
Jourdan that on one occasion he issued an official order 
prohibiting the sale of the manure left by the horses of the 
artillery on the village commons by his soldiers. It was to 
be left to the inhabitants as fertilizer in payment for the 
use of their commons.
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bringing to justice, without the lengthy process of a 
court-martial. As Jourdan later observed, the best way to 
improve discipline was to mete out swift, merciless 
punishment to the worst offenders in order to deter their 
colleagues from imitating their crimes. The revolutionary 
tribunals provided such justice with a vengeance.^
The most serious and important problem that Jourdan 
and his teammates had to solve was the inadequacy of logis­
tics. The problem, simply stated, was to supply the army 
with sufficient food and materiel, subsistence and habilement 
in the language of the representatives, to exist. It was 
a problem of incredible difficulty. In the Army of the 
North logistics rather than terror were the order of the 
day; if the soldiers were unfed, unclothed and unarmed, 
they could not fight. They had to have warm uniforms, 
shoes, blankets.- functioning muskets, and adequate ammunition. 
Above all, they had to be fed.
The source of the army's dearth of subsistence is a 
subject of debate. Its manifestation was obvious; there was 
not enough food available for the increasing number of 
soldiers, especially during the winter months. Why this was 
so is not so obvious. One argument holds that the problem 
was structural— a combination of static or even decreased 
supply and increased demand. France's primitive agriculture
26. A.G. B1 61, Jourdan to the Committee, 9/9/95.
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suddenly had t-o provide food for eleven armies; the 
Republican soldiers, argued one historian, were the greatest 
consumers of meat in all of French history. The fact that 
parts of France, such as the Vendde, had been devastated 
added to the problem. Then there was the difficulty of 
transporting huge shipments of food to the front, some of 
them from remote areas of France, over primitive roads.
Both Jourdan and Laurent complained that the roads in Flanders 
were so "impassable" from bad weather in the winter that the 
food convoys could hardly reach the f ront.^ A second 
opinion holds that the subsistence problem was caused 
mainly by the difficulty in mobilizing the economy to 
support the war effort. Thus there were insufficient 
bureaucrats to handle the provisioning of the army. Insuf­
ficient patriotism caused some administrators to be negligent 
or corrupt and some farmers— accapareurs— to hoard food from 
the soldiers in order to drive up its p r i c e . ^
Whatever the cause, the subsistence shortage 
crippled the army. Subsistence, the representatives com­
plained, always causes us the greatest embarrassment. It 
hindered, slowed, and sometimes obstructed completely the
27. A.G. B1 23, Laurent to the Committee, 12/16/93; 
order of 12/17/93. Soboul, 0£  cit.
28. Armand Montier, Robert Lindet, (Paris, 1899), 
argues that the dearth of food was structural. The opposing 
view is held by A. Soboul, o£ cit.
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army's operations. The 'Nord' wasted an entire day at
Hondschoote owing to the difficulty of getting provisions
and brandy to the famished soldiers. Food shortages
increased the indiscipline because they caused the hungry
men to pillage and even to disrupt the food distributions.
The evidence for the continuous dearth of subsistence is
overwhelming. "The army lives from day to day, and in
spite of the lively complaints which I employ with the
administrators, Maubeuge, and the division which surrounds
it, have at this moment no more than six days of food left."
On November 1, Isore wrote that soldiers were actually 
29
starving to death. During the autumn offensive an 
adjutant reported to Jourdan that in spite of orders to 
provide bread to the army for three days, there was only 
bread enough for one day; he blamed the transportation and 
supply officials "whose administrations are in a frightful 
disorder." Four days later Jourdan ordered a retreat with 
the words, "it is absolutely necessary to leave this country; 
one runs the risk of dying of hunger." Conscripts awaiting 
arms and equipment were sent home to work the harvest. The 
Committee, aware of the gravity of the problem, urged the 
representatives to do their utmost to rectify the situation; 
as they wrote to two, "the provisioning of the Army of the
29. Recueil des Actes, IX, pp. 606-07, Bar to the 
Committee, 12/23/93. A.G. Bl 22, Isore to the Committee, 
11/1/93.
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Nord is too important not to command your zeal.""*®
The Jacobins attempted to obtain the needed 
subsistence by ordering the departments, usually those 
closest to the army in question, to furnish an assigned quota 
of food. The local administrators then had the task of 
fixing the national price of the foodstuffs and seeing to 
it that their citizens sold them the assigned amount. Local 
officials and private citizens, for a salary, were then to 
transport the food to the army magazines. For a numer of 
reasons— greed, fear of inflation, localism— the local 
authorities neither fixed the prices, filled their quotas, 
nor prevented hoarding by their farmers. During August, a 
time of relative plenty, Delbrel ordered 200,000 quintals 
of wheat from all the departments of French Flanders. A 
month later only one fourth of that amount had been 
obtained.31 Faced with such obstruction the representatives 
gradually resorted to force. In August Carnot, then on 
mission to the Nord, wrote that ten hussars making 
"domiciliary visits" had, in twenty four hours, turned up 
more food than all the quotas of the last three months. In 
September the representatives decreed that those communes
30. A. G . B1 21 & 22, Unnamed adjutant general to 
Jourdan, 10/30/93; Jourdan to general Duquesnoy, 11/3/93. 
The Committee to unnamed Representatives, 8/30/93, Recueil 
des Actes, VI, pp. 188-89.
31. Dupuis, De Hondscnoute a Wattignies, pp. 127-28. 
A. G . B1 19, Report of Citizen Delbrel, 9/23/93.
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which did not meet their quotas would have the balance taken 
by force. As the dearth of provisions continued, such 
requisition decrees became more common, until the represen­
tatives were openly sending out parties of troops to take 
what they needed from the populace, because "the war 
administration is not getting sufficient fourrage to the 
troops...and there is fourrage available in the surrounding 
communes."
Habilement also was in short supply. Carnot's 
first letter to the Committee when he visited Jourdan in 
October requested shoes and bayonets. The endless complaints 
of the representatives tell the story. Eighty thousand 
greatcoats ordered for the army had not arrived. Promised 
tents and blanket had not been sent either. The average 
soldier wore out one pair of boots a month, so the number 
of boots sent was not sufficient. The supply inspectors were 
so inefficient, that, when they unpacked the supplies to 
examine them, they failed to repack them. Some soldiers 
were walking around half naked due to the lack of uniforms. 
Members of the new levde were "armed" with sticks. A 
letter of representative Jean Bar sharply depicted the 
effects of these shortages. Shoes, clothing, and blankets 
all were lacking, he wrote, and "the rigors of the season
32. Ibid. Corr. , II, p. 443,. Carnot to the Committee, 
8/4/93. A.G. B1 23, Decree of representative Bar, 12/18/93.
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each day send a great number of sick to the hospital. I 
have addressed myself to all parts to obtain that which 
the army lacks: to the bureau of military effects and to
the civil administrations. They promise, they announce 
forthcoming supplies, but nothing arrives. The result is 
the great evils of denument (lack of clothing): sickness
and death, discouragement and desertion for the defenders 
of the Republic."3"3
Again the question is: why the shortages?
Certainly the primitive artisanal nature of the economy and 
the lack of a centralized, mobilized production of the 
necessary materials were major causes. But sheer inefficiency 
in the collection and distribution of these articles may 
have been equally important. Certainly the revolutionaries 
believed this to be the primary cause.
Clothing was the concern mainly of the second 
division of the war ministry. Unfortunately the second 
division was a bureaucratic nightmare, a jigsaw puzzle of 
illogic and incompetence. Under the guidance of Bouchotte, 
the war ministry had become "the refuge of those without 
work in Paris." All that was required of these men by way 
of qualifications was that "they demonstrated markedly 
revolutionary sentiments... and possessed an eloquent certifi­
33. A.G. Bl 21, Bar to the Committee, 10/27/93. A.G. 
B1 23, Bar to the Committee, 12/8/93; Laurent to the 
Committee, 12/10/93.
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cate of civisme." Many of these men were totally unfit for 
their duties. Some were unable to sign their names. Others 
"sell positions, giving jobs to their creatures at prices 
ruinous to the Republic and confide the administrations to 
some chiefs and employers no less corrupt than their 
employees." The direction of the second division was 
entrusted to Charles Ronsi.n, a noted enragd, who filled the 
entire bureau with his friends and spent more time engaging 
in politics than supervising his employees. The inefficiency 
became so alarming that by December both representatives 
and generals were protesting Bouchotte's hiring practices. 
Duquesnoy told Bouchotte that "you may be an honest man, but 
your bureaus are encumbered with intriguers and incompetents." 
He urged the minister to clean out his administration. But 
this he could not do. His base of support was the Parisian 
popular societies, and by firing the incompetents he would 
be firing the very men who were helping to keep him in 
office.34
That real corruption and incompetence existed there 
was no doubt. Pockets of it were scattered from the bureaus 
in Paris through the supply lines leading to the front. Bar 
suspected the supply personnel of stealing the supplies. The 
shoes sent to the troops at Maubeuge had already been rejected 
by the administrators in Paris as defective, and one 
volunteer wore out three pairs of boots in a month. Laurent
34. Herlaut, 0 £  cit, II, pp. 83, 97-8. A.G. Bl 23, Vezu 
to Bouchotte, 12/2/93; Duquesnoy to Bouchotte, 12/17/93.
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complained that the depot guards were selling the army's 
fodder to the peasants. The transport personnel in charge 
of the food convoys disobeyed orders, took their own routes 
to the front, and got lost; "their insubordination makes me 
afraid that at every instant the army will find itself 
destitute."36 Delbrel raged that all the quartermasters 
and supply agents were "thieves", and the opinions of 
Jourdan and his officers were as hostile. The representatives 
established draconian punishments for corrupt supply 
personnel, so bad did they believe the problem to be. On 
October 4, they decreed that because "the efforts of 
malevolents" have been hindering the provisioning of the 
army for a long time, and because "the quartermaster corps... 
contains only incompetents who all cause shortages, who blame 
each other for the errors committed in provisioning various 
bodies of troops," a five-man military tribunal would try 
all cases of "graft" and "negligence" and that a mere 
majority would convict. Those found guilty were to be put 
to death within 24 hours.36 Jourdan1s orders of the day 
prove that such punishments were indeed carried out. Never­
theless the sheer extent of the problem was such that abuses 
continued to occur.
Jourdan's role in the struggle against the army's
35. A.G. B1 20 & 21, Laurent to the Committee, 10/5/93;
Bar to the Committee, 10/27/93. Joliclerc, Lettres, pp. 151-52.
36. Decree of Lacoste, Peyssard, & Duquesnoy, 10/4/9 3,
A.G. B1 20. .
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supply problems was an indirect one. Theoretically all 
supply difficulties were to be handled by the commissaire- 
ordonnateur (the quartermaster-general) of the army. The 
divisional and brigade generals were supposed to address 
their requirements in food, clothing, and munitions to him.
In practice, when certain supplies were not forthcoming, 
the generals complained to Jourdan, and he passed on their 
complaints to the quartermaster. The latter, however, was 
often unable to furnish the requested materiel. When this 
occurred, Jourdan described the difficulty to the represen­
tatives and requested that they take action. On one such 
occasion, he complained that the artillery park needed 250 
more horses, without which it would be impossible to move the 
guns. He had ordered the quartermaster-general to secure the 
horses; however, unless the representatives came to his
assistance and requisitioned the animals, the quartermaster 
37would be helpless.
That Jourdan actively struggled against the army's 
shortages is certain. Many of the representatives' com­
plaints to the government of shortages were based upon 
information which he afforded them. On one occasion he 
personally wrote to Bouchotte complaining of insufficient 
ammunition, and even suggested that a workshop be constructed
37. A.G. Bl* 223, Jourdan to the representatives at 
Arras, 10/3/93; Jourdan to Fromentin, 11/5/93.
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near the front for the manufacture of cartidges, muskets, 
and bullets. The government acted upon his suggestion and 
ordered such workshops established. He remained in close 
contact with his quartermaster, at times prodding him to 
increase his efforts. "In spite of the fact that I have 
communicated to you my anxieties about subsistence several 
times, I see wxth the greatest distress that bread has not 
ceased to lack for two or three days...I do not know how to 
keep silent about the existence in the administration of 
malevolents who have resolved to ruin the Republic. Do not 
delay a single instant to take every measure so that our 
troops do not suffer any further needs, and then to discover 
the culprits."38 Nevertheless, although Jourdan issued such 
orders endlessly, in truth he could have accomplished 
nothing without the representatives. The latter could root 
out incompetent supply agents, coerce obstructive department 
authorities into furnishing provisions, and generally cut 
through bureaucratic red tape to move supplies to the front; 
in short they could use their power to get things done in a 
way that Jourdan could not. Hence his willingness to work 
with them; he realized that without their help he was 
relatively powerless.
38. A.G. B1 21 & 22, Jourdan to Bouchotte, 10/19/93; 
the Committee to Jourdan, 11/20/93. Corr., IV, p. 4, 
Jourdan to commissaire-ordonnateur Pinthon, 11/1/93.
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Jourdan and his teammates faced one final obstacle 
in their efforts to build a new army that could wage the 
war of mass and constant offensive action demanded by the 
revolution. This obstacle was the influence of the communes 
and popular societies in the departments at or near the 
front.
The influence of the communes and popular societies 
of the Nord was directed towards one end: they wanted
protection from the raids, depredations, and outrages of the 
enemy army, regardless of how this affected the overall 
strategic situation. When the army was unable to provide 
them with the protection they expected, they denounced its 
generals to the government and to their fellow popular 
societies in Paris. The logic of their position was simple 
and irrefutable. The war was being fought to liberate all 
Frenchmen from tyranny and oppression; it was, after all, a 
peoples' war. Yet they, far from being liberated, were now 
oppressed by the arson, pillage, and murders of the foreign 
agents of tyranny. Why, they howled, did not the revolution 
afford them liberty in fact as well as in theory— in short 
why did the revolution not free them from the atrocities of 
the Allied Army?
What the Nord's popular societies and district 
councils wanted for each of their towns and localities were 
substantial garrisons to repel the real, or imagined, threats 
of the enemy. For this they unceasingly agitated, bombarding
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the government' and the Parisian Jacobin clubs with their
complaints. The society of Vervins demanded a garrison to
protect them from the rape, pillage, and arson of the enemy.
The citizens of the hamlet of Candy desired an infantry
battalion and 100 horsemen to protect them from enemy raids.
The council of Laon decreed that the town required additional
39
soldiers, cavalry, and artillery. The popular societies
of the larger cities, such as Lille and Cambrai, were just as
vociferous, frequently, as did the society of Cambrai in
40
mid-September, exaggerating their difficulties.
Because the government depended heavily upon the 
support of the popular societies for its power base and 
because the clubs of the Nord were in constant touch with the 
more powerful and proximate societies in Paris, the govern­
ment took their complaints far more seriously than it should 
have. Both Lille and Cambrai received increments of men and 
materiel disproportionate to the actual danger they faced.
A complaint from the village of Noyen resulted in Bouchotte 
personally sending it a battalion. Usually Bouchotte passed 
on the complaints to Jourdan, ordering him to reinforce the
39. A.G. B1 19 & 20, letters to the Committee from the 
citizens of Vervins, 9/17/93; Candy, 9/26/93; and Laon, 
10/2/93.
40. See A.G. B1 19 & 20 for the correspondence between 
the popular societies of these two cities and the government, 
and in particular, for the panic that resulted in Cambrai 
after general Declaye's defeat in mid-September.
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the town or commune in question, as he did, for example, on
November 25 after the complaint by the popular society of
Candy. Even the Committee of Public Safety occasionally
responded to these complaints. On November 25, having
received complaints from St Quentin about an enemy incursion,
it ordered Jourdan to "hasten to send towards that gap
sufficient forces" to close it, regardless of whether such
a detachment might be harmful to the overall deployment 
41of the army.
When the requested assistance was insufficient or
slow to arrive, the communes denounced to the government
the generals they believed responsible as traitors. ihe
popular society of Montreuil wrote Jourdan, threatening to
denounce him to the Committee as without talent and a
traitor because he had not chased the enemy from the Forest
of Mormal near the village. Jourdan felt obligated to
mention the letter to the Committee lest the society go
through with the threat, writing that "Jourdan may be a
fool", but never a traitor. The fact that he felt obliged
to answer such a charge at all is mute testimony to how the
communes and Jacobin societies of the Nord had the ear of 
42
the government.
41. A.G. B1 19, Bouchotte to Jourdan, 9/26/93, 9/28/93. 
A.G. B1 22, The Committee to Jourdan, 11/25/93.
42. A.G. B1 22, the procureur of the Commune of 
Montreuil to Jourdan, 11/2 3/93; Jourdan to the Committee, 
11/23/93.
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This is not to say that the popular societies of 
the Nord played no role other than to hinder the war effort. 
In some ways they were of great assistance. Their corres­
pondence and propaganda helped keep the army's morale and 
patriotism high. They helped in provisioning the army and 
uncovering accapereurs. They recommended officers whom they 
liked for promotion and went to the aid of other officers 
who might have fallen afoul of the government. The popular 
society of Dunkirk raised such a storm at the arrest of 
general Scuham that the Committee restored him to duty two 
weeks later. At times they aided the army by seeing to 
their own defense. The citizens of the hamlets of Elincourt 
and Montigny, armed only with pikes, scythes, and pitchforks, 
took on Austrian foraging parties, causing the general in
charge of this sector to write that he wished all the 
43
communes were as energetic.
But total war called for Jourdan to mass his troops 
and send them forward to overwhelm the enemy at critical 
points in his defenses, and to do so until the automatons 
of the counterrevolution had been driven from the land of 
liberty. The demands for garrisons by the communes of 
French Flanders, although perfectly understandable, could 
only hinder this type of warfare. By coercing the government 
to grant their requests for troops, local interests compelled
43. A.G. B1 23, general Chapuis to the Committee, 
12/19/93.
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Jourdan to dispatch thousands of soldiers in scattered 
garrisons--4,000 in Lille alone— and to detach hundreds more 
in useless pursuits of enemy raiding parties and patrols.
This diminished the number of troops available for the war 
of mass desired by the Jacobins; it also caused the govern­
ment to call for a strategy of mass, audacity, and agres- 
siveness on one hand, and to issue orders for defensive 
measures on the other. When Houchard was about to launch his 
attack at Hondschoote, Bouchotte instructed him to organize 
attacks in the Cambrai-Landrecies area to cut off enemy 
raiders there and to construct and garrison a fortified camp 
in the Peronne area to protect that sector more effectively. 
Then, when Houchard was unable to accomplish his divergent 
tasks, the local societies and their extremist allies in 
Paris wondered why— and demanded the luckless Houchard1s 
head.44
Well could Jourdan excuse himself for leaving so many 
troops in a defensive posture across French Flanders during 
the autumn campaign. If he had left the frontier without 
defenders "open to the incursions of the Duke of York, the 
general-in-chief would have been accused of treason by all 
the popular societies. Victory would not have preserved him 
from the result always produced by the numerous denunciations
44. A.G. B1 19, Bouchotte to Houchard, 9/6/93.
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building up in the midst of the Jacobin society in Paris."
When he wished to use the 5,000 or so troops in the Givet
area in the offensive which led to the battle of Wattignies,
he first had to survive an angry complaint by the commune of 
Givet that he had no business taking these troops elsewhere: 
it would leave Givet without a garrison. Revolutionary 
war required a strategy of constant offensives en masse; 
what the communes and popular societies of the Nord desired 
was cordon warfare.45
Jourdan could not have assumed command of his first
army at a worse time. He was a young and inexperi.enced
officer taking charge of an inexperienced, disorganized, and 
indeed incomplete army. He and his associates had to 
rapidly rebuild this army into a capable fighting force under 
the lash of a revolutionary regime which, under intense 
pressure itself, could not tolerate anything less than 
success, for anything less meant its own extermination. He 
and his colleagues had to train, discipline, staff, amalgamate, 
feed and equip the unruly conscripts who comprised their army, 
and they had to lead them to quick victory. If they did not, 
the result would probably be the total extinction of the 
revolution.
What Jourdan thus had to do was wage war at a pace 
distinctly modern, completely removed from the deliberate
45. A.G. B1 20, the Commune of Givet to the Committee, 
10/14/93. A.G. mr 608-1, Memoires de 1793.
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pace of Old Regime warfare. He had to work at a rhythm 
designed to bring about immediate and constant action, and 
overnight success. Yet he was expected to do this with 
essentially 18th century means. He was required to mass 
his forces swiftly and continuously, maneuver, assault, and 
overwhelm the enemy with ill-trained peasants led by 
inexperienced cadres, with primitive communications, a 
disorganized logistics system, and the insufficient 
resources of an underdeveloped agricultural economy. In 
short, he was required to overcome the structural deficiencies 
of his society. The price of failure was his life and those 
of his subordinate commanders. Well might Jourdan have 
taken the assignment with deep misgivings; he was under­
taking a task which might have intimidated a far more 
experienced and secure officer than a sans-culotte orphan boy 
turned parvenu army commander.
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IV. COMMANDER IN CHIEF OF THE ARMY OF THE NORD 
I. Wattignies
Jourdan was not allowed the luxury of a period of 
orientation when he first assumed command of the Army of 
the Nord. From his first day at his post he was assailed by 
the assortment of untreated ailments plaguing the army. So 
disorganized was the army's paperwork that he did not know 
who his generals were, or how many men were under his command. 
The government believed that he had about a quarter of a 
million men, but this number existed on paper only. Of 
this total a third were immobilized in garrisons, and of 
these some 3 9,000 men were beyond Jourdan's control under 
the direct orders of the Minister of War. An additional
27,000 men were either sick or "absent". So Jourdan al­
legedly had some 138,000 men of all arms to put into the 
field. Yet he did not believe that he commanded even this 
many; he initially estimated that the army contained 
some 50,000 men from Dunkirk to Douai, and another 50,000 
from Douai to Maubeuge. After the Committee ordered an 
official headcount, he estimated that he led between 104,000 
and 108,000 effectives.1 If this figure is correct, he did 
not even possess a numerical superiority with which to launch 
the war of mass that the Jacobins wanted.
No sooner had Jourdan settled into his headquarters
1. Marcel Reinhard, Le Grand Carnot, II, pp. 98-100.
A.G. B1 19, Jourdan to BoucHotte," 9/2/33. A.G. Bl* 223, 
Jourdan to the Committee, 11/25/93.
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than he was visited by Carnot. The government sent Carnot 
to the 'Nord' following Houchard's arrest so that he could 
work out, with Jourdan, a plan of campaign for the rest of 
the year. Exactly what was said and what was decided in 
this first recorded meeting between the two men is unknown; 
they left no record of their conference. It seems that they 
decided, in principle, to make the defeat of the Allied forces 
of the Prince of Coburg, which were then advancing on 
Maubeuge, the primary objective of the campaign. Carnot’s 
personal visit to Jourdan testified to the Committee's 
anxiety over the situation on the northern border and to 
their determination to bring the campaign there to a success­
ful conclusion. The Committee wanted no more bungled 
victories like Hondschoote, nor any more Custines or 
Houchards commanding the 'Nord'. It is likely that Carnot 
visited the army to see its new commander for himself— to 
talk to him, size him up, judge his abilities, and reassure
himself that Jourdan possessed none of the defects that had
2
proven so fatal to his predecessors.
Jourdan went to work. Over the course of the next 
week and a half he sent a torrent of requests to Bouchotte, 
demanding everything from senior officers to oats. The 
army, he reported, was short of qualified generals and 
brigade commanders— some larger units were actually without
2. Reinhard, ibid, pp. 76-7. Corr., III, pp. 210-11, 
Jourdan to general Beru, 9/26/93.
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officers. It needed immediate shipments of shoes and 
clothing, especially trousers. As the specific shortages in 
clothing and equipment became clearer, Jourdan repeated 
his requests on an almost daily basis: three days after his
initial letter, he asked Bouchotte for additional shoes, 
shirts, pants, vests, and "habits". If there was enough 
grain there was not enough oats. He complained three 
times of his weakness in cavalry, which required more horses 
and more fodder for the horses which it did have. The 
chief of artillery needed 800 horses for his park, 4,000 six- 
pounder shells, and additional powder. Jourdan also demanded
50,000 livres for "extraordinary expenses", which in this 
case meant spies. "I demand, and it is of the utmost im­
portance," he urged, "that you make an effort to procure 
for me and throw into the army everything that is in the 
interior."^
At the same time he began to tackle the personnel 
and logistical problems himself. He wrote the representatives, 
repeating most of the requests which he made to Bouchotte.
In one case he announced that he had ordered his quarter­
master to obtain additional horses for the artillery; unless 
the representatives come to his quartermaster's aid, however, 
the latter would not be able to carry out Jourdan's order.
3. See the letters from Jourdan to Bouchotte of 
9/26/93 through 10/4/93 in A.G. Bl* 223.
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He informed the representatives at Maubeuge that the enemy 
was advancing on them and asked them to put that fortress 
in a state of defense. Because its commander, Gudin, was 
"old and sick", and of the next two senior generals one was 
incapacitated and the other had been arrested, he asked 
Bouchotte to appoint a new commander. He recommended a 
General Vezu for promotion to command of a brigade, and 
complained about the ineptness of General Beauregard. A few 
days later he ordered Gudin's successor, General Ferrand, to 
entrench his advanced posts more securely so that they could 
put up a stiffer resistance if attacked. He threw additional 
troops into Bouchain to protect a "treasury" and a convoy 
of fodder there, and appointed a new commander for that 
place. He ordered his quartermaster to use utmost diligence 
in provisioning Cambrai and Bouchain, having learned that 
both places were poorly supplied. He ordered his artillery 
chief to send more powder and shells to Cambrai and 
Landrecies. He issued the first of many decrees against 
negligence, corruption and theft among his supply personnel 
in his orders of the day. Duquesnoy's draconian decree of 
October 4 against dishonest supply agents was probably 
issued partially at Jourdan's urging. Jourdan also took a 
tentative step towards full amalgamation; he informed 
Bouchotte that he intended to mix some of the new levdes
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
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with some of the "anciennes" in the fortresses.4
On August 29, a mere three days after assuming 
command, Jourdan submitted his proposed plan of campaign to 
the Committee. How much of it was Jourdan's, and how much 
Carnot's, is impossible to determine. The plan made Coburg's 
army, then advancing on Maubeuge in the upper Sambre valley, 
the 'Nord's' primary objective. To defeat and destroy this 
force, the plan called for the favorite maneuver of both 
men, a double envelopment. Jourdan was to command two 
armies, each 60,000 strong. One was to advance from the 
Arras-Cambrai area, seize the Allies' entrenched camp at 
Cysoing, and assail Coburg from the west. The other force 
was to advance from the south into the Sambre valley east 
of Maubeuge and envelop the enemy from that direction; if 
Coburg halted his offensive, this force was to cross the 
Sambre and attack him in the flank north of the river. If 
successful, this double envelopment would not only trap 
Coburg's army between two fires, exposing it to utter ruin, 
but it would also drive the Allies entirely from French 
soil— a goal very dear to the government's heart owing to 
the propaganda value it would have in the popular societies. 
To assemble the needed force of 120,000 soldiers Jourdan 
proposed that the government send him an additional 15,000 
men, mainly cavalry, and that he be allowed to denude the
4. A.G. Bl* 223, Jourdan to the representatives at 
Maubeuge, 9/29/93; Jourdan to Merenvue, 9/30/9 3; Joudan to 
ordonnateur Pinthon, 9/30/93; Jourdan to Bouchotte, 9/28/93.
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frontier by adding all troops save the newest levdes to his 
field forces. If this plan was too "audacieux", or beyond 
the government's means to implement, he proposed to remain 
on the defensive and concentrate as many men as possible to 
defeat the enemy thrust at Maubeuge.^
Two things should be mentioned regarding this plan. 
One is that it reflects the transitional stage through 
which the strategic theories of the revolutionaries were 
moving. In the spirit of total war it had as its objective 
the destruction of the enemy army. At the same time it 
sought to destroy him by an essentially traditional strategy. 
To turn both flanks of the enemy was a basic maneuver in 
cordon warfare, although it was usually aimed at disrupting 
his communications rather than at destroying his army. 
Secondly, this is essentially the same strategy which Carnot 
was to employ in 1794. Thus Jourdan must be accorded at 
least a portion of the credit for having devised the opera­
tion which was to drive the Allies completely out of the Low 
Countries and across the Rhine.6
As events turned out, the plan was deferred for the 
time being. The Prince of Coburg had not allowed Houchard's
Corr. r H I /  pp. 221-23, Jourdan to Bouchotte,
9/29/93.
6. Victor Dupuis, De Hondschoote a Wattignies, p. 57, 
argues that it is impossible to determine whether Carnot or 
Jourdan was the dominant influence at their meeting.
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
135
abortive offensive to deter him from continuing his penet­
ration of the French fortress barrier; the latter’s uncoordi­
nated attacks had merely confused Coburg about the true aim 
of his foes. After taking Le Quesnoy, he advanced upon 
Maubeuge with 40,000 men. His immediate obstacle was not 
the French, but his own allies, the Dutch. "The greatest 
part of our difficulties came from the Hague, without even 
including the detestable organization of their military 
system which permits neither speed nor energy." On this 
occasion, for a variety of reasons, they refused to reinforce 
Coburg or to help him undertake the siege until he promised 
their commander, the Prince of Orange, personal command 
of the beleaguering forces. Once Coburg had mustered enough 
soldiers, his operation went quite smoothly. At the end of 
September he deployed his army into several columns and 
struck the French defenses outside Maubeuge. The French 
offered only the feeblest resistance. They shredded like 
wet tissue paper— three whole battalions fleeing without 
firing a shot— and collapsed into Maubeuge. There they shut 
themselves in while Coburg's army coiled around the city.^ 
Coburg's quick thrust, plus the news of the weak 
resistance of the French forces at Maubeuge, caused Jourdan 
to abandon his planned double-envelopment. He advised the 
government that it ought to be postponed and that he should
7. Ibid., pp. 38-9; 105-110.
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instead march to the immediate relief of Maubeuge. To form 
the relief army, he demanded that 10,000 men be taken from 
the Dunkirk sector along with 12,000 from Menin,. and that 
these combine with the elements assembled in the Lille- 
Cambrai area to comprise a strike force of 45,000. Given 
these troops he would march immediately. He also requested 
additional reinforcements from the Army of the Ardennes. 
Unquestionably the solution was conservative; it bore 
striking resemblance to Bouchard's strategy preceding 
Hondschoote. On the other hand, Jourdan had received no 
guarantees that he would ever get the troops necessary for 
the original operation. In addition, he was worried about 
Maubeuge's capacity to offer sustained resistance. As he 
wrote a fellow officer, "should I allow this boulevard into 
the Republic [sic]taken"? He believed he could not, so 
he adopted the tried and true strategy of marching directly 
to its succor. The government thought as he did. It 
approved his changed strategy without comment, giving him 
carte-blanche.with the troops of the Ardennes. Then they 
took an additional step that Jourdan had not requested: they
decided to send Carnot back once again to the 'Nord'.®
Carnot reached the front on October 6. The sorry 
condition of the troops bothered him; "we are so pressed...
8. A.G. B1 20 & Bl* 223, Jourdan to Bouchotte, 10/1/93, 
10/3/93; The Committee to Jourdan, 10/3/93; Jourdan to 
D'Avaisne, 10/5/93.
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by the most essential needs," he wrote. The army needed
15,000 bayonets, and three-fourths of the men were barefoot. 
"Luckily the weather is still good." Most of the new 
conscripts were useless; "they do not even have sticks in
g
their hands." Nonetheless he and Jourdan estimated that, 
notwithstanding all the difficulties, they could attack on
October 12 or 13 at the latest.
The Committee was cheered by the news. It sent the 
army a decree that typified the revolutionary fervor and 
rhetoric of the time, as well as the philosophy of the new 
total war, with its vicious condemnation of the enemy, its 
command to exterminate him, and its demand for a complete and 
rapid success beyond the capacity of the attackers to 
achieve. "Victory belongs to courage. It is yours. Strike, 
exterminate the satellites of tyrants. The cowards! They 
have never known how to conquer by valor and force, they 
have only bought it through treason. They are covered with
your blood and that of our wives and children. Strike, let
none escape your just vengeance... In several more days the 
tyrants will exist no more, and the Republic will owe you 
its goodwill and glory.
But thanks to a supply breakdown typical of the 
confused logistics of the army, Jourdan had to wait a few
9. Corr., III, pp. 271-72, Carnot to the Committee, 
10/9/93.
10. A.G. B1 20, the Committee to the Army of the North, 
10/11/93.
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moredays to strike. Ey October 8 he had concentrated his
45.000 men at Guise; by October 10 the force was marching 
southeast towards Avesnes. But on the same day it was 
discovered that the artillery possessed insufficient ammuni­
tion for a major battle, despite the fact that the chief of 
artillery, General Merenvue, had promised that enough 
supplies were on hand. Who or what caused this blunder is 
unknown. Carnot and Duquesnoy blamed Merenvue and put him 
under arrest for suspected treason; that same evening he 
committed suicide in his cell. The French had to wait until 
the necessary ammunition was brought up, and in doing so 
they lost four precious days.'1'1
The French were lucky that the delay did not cost 
them more dearly than it did. Coburg was unable to take 
advantage of the extra time, either to strengthen his 
positions significantly or to capture Maubeuge. He had 
learned of Jourdan’s advance, but he could not determine 
whether the French would attack him north or south of the 
Sambre. Hence he deployed his army in a long cordon west 
and south of the city, placing 15,000 men on the north bank,
22.000 men on the opposite bank facing south. The cordon 
was too long; neither force could cross the river and 
afford the other immediate support. Meanwhile Coburg's
11. A.G. B1 20, Jourdan to Bouchotte, 10/6/93; 
Jourdan to Lacoste & Peyssard, 10/10/93; Decree of Carnot 
& Duquesnoy, 10/10/93.
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efforts to press the siege had met with frustration. He
wished to combine his Dutch and Austrian troops to storm the
French entrenched camp on the south bank outside Maubeuge.
However, the Dutch, in a bizarre political ploy, refused to
allow their soldiers to cross the Sambre unless promises of
additional territorial compensation after the war were made.
This was mercantile warfare at its sharpest; it also was
outright extortion. Coburg was forced to sit by and fume,
because his Austrians were not numerous enough to launch 
12
the assault alone.
Coburg did not possess the dynamism to overcome 
such obstacles. He was a modest, mild-mannered, fifty-six- 
year-old general who never lived up to the expectations of 
his contemporaries. "Placid, heavy, phlegmatic, he seemed 
to arrest events, such was his air of calmness." Like all 
the allied commanders he was slow and wedded to the cordon 
system; however, he was hardly the incompetent that some 
writers have suggested. The Russian warrior, Suvorov, thought 
highly of him, and Suvorov was no mean judge of talent.^
Even so, Coburg had his limitations. His sole use of the 
additional time alloted him by the French was to move his
22,000 soldiers south of the river to a line further removed
12. Dupuis, o£ cit, pp. 109-10.
13. Arthur Chuquet, Valenciennes, pp. 84-5. There is 
no evidence to support the accusation by the English that the 
mastermind of the Allied army was not Coburg, but his chief-of- 
staff, Mack. Coburg's leadership in 1794--after Mack had left 
the army— was consistent with that of 1793; furthermore, Mack 
was a borderline incompetent as the Ulm campaign in 1805 showed.
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from Maubeuge.- This line, running along a ridge of low
hills from Berlaimont to Wattignies, was stronger and put the
14
covering force out of reach of a sortie by the garrison.
By October 14, Jourdan had deployed his army on 
either side of the Avesnes road immediately south of Maubeuge. 
He had divided his makeshift force into five ad hoc divisions 
under largely untried generals. Of the five, only Joseph 
Duquesnoy, the brother of the representative, demonstrated 
even modest ability. The others were at best average, 
and one, General Beauregard--who was described as a "vile 
intriguer who puts his entire division into disorder"— had 
already been dismissed and reinstated once. Of the galaxy 
of talent which would one day orbit around Napoleon, only 
Ney, Mortier, and Ebld were in this army. Jourdan could 
not count on his subordinates. He also believed that he 
was outnumbered, having erroneously estimated Coburg's 
army at 64,000 infantry and 25,000 cavalry— a figure which 
probably included all the allied soldiers in southern 
Flanders. Actually the enemy numbered 6 3,000 of all arms, 
of whom 26,000 were tied down besieging Maubeuge. Against
14. Dupuis, 0 £  cit, pp. 109-13. Jourdan later argued 
that Coburg erred in not deploying his forces further south ' 
around Avesnes. Here he wouldvhave possessed a nearly 
impregnable position, and he would have interdicted the 
roads to such an extent that Jourdan would have had to 
take a long, roundabout route to get at him. Meanwhile, 
Maubeuge might have surrendered. A.G. mr 608-1, Jourdan's 
memoires de 1793.
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these, the French mustered 62,000 including 17,000 in the 
garrison of Maubeuge. Yet at the all important point of 
attack, Coburg had only the 22,000 men south of the Sambre 
to oppose Jourdan's 45,000 men.
In spite of the enemy's possible superiority,
Jourdan fully intended to attack. He reported to Bouchotte 
that he was probably outnumbered, but that he counted upon 
the courage of the brave republicans whom he commanded to 
achieve victory. "One [republican soldier]" he wrote,
"ought to be worth two of the enemy." He would fall "with 
the most decided audacity on this horde which is only 
encouraged by the little resistance opposed previously to 
their tsic]efforts due to the perfidy of the [sic]leaders...
I only have time to tell you that my country will be 
triumphant, or I shall perish in defending it."16
He and Carnot planned to defeat Coburg by employing 
their favorite tactic: attacks on both of the enemy's flanks
with secondary pressure against his center. Duquesnoy's 
division, aided by Beauregard's, was to assault the enemy 
left near the villages of Dimont and Dimechaux, and to turn 
it towards Wattignies. Fromentin with two divisions was to 
attack the Austrian right in the woods near St Aubin and
15. Ramsey Phipps, The Armies of the First French 
Republic, I, pp. 250-56. Dupuis, 0£  cit, pp. 145-160.
16. A.G. Bl* 223, Jourdan to Bouchotte, 10/13/93.
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St Waast. Balland's division was to launch diversionary 
attacks against the enemy center and convert them into a 
serious effort when Duquesnoy and Fromentin had successfully 
flanked the enemy. Jourdan ordered General Belair at 
Guise to take four battalions, some cavalry, and some of the 
new conscripts, and make an important diversion towards 
Cateau in order to pin the 15,000 Austrians north of the 
Sambre in their positions. If Coburg felt himself unmolested 
there, he might shift these troops to the point of combat 
and counter the French numerical superiority. Additionally, 
he instructed general Elie with 5,000 men from the Ardennes 
to demonstrate towards Beaumont; Isore at Lille, and General 
d'Avaisne a>t Cassel were to make diversions on their fronts, 
while the garrison of Maubeuge was to sortie against the 
enemy rear. This plan has generally been condemned by 
military historians who judge that Jourdan should have 
attacked on one flank rather than on both.17
Despite the fiery confidence expressed in his letter 
to Bouchotte, Jourdan must have awaited the battle with 
deep misgivings. The government clearly expected complete 
victory. Victory belonged to the courageous, and surely 
the republican soldiers possessed courage. Yet victory also
17. A.G. Bl* 223, Jourdan's orders to his generals, 
10/14/93. Military historians have failed to assign the 
order to Belair the importance that it deserves.
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belonged to the well-led and the disciplined, and Jourdan's 
soldiers were neither. Jourdan and Carnot both realized that, 
with the raw troops they commanded, success was far from 
certain. Because failure was attributable "only to those 
who command", if they failed they would have to assume 
full blame and the resulting consequence: the execution of
both by guillotine. Carnot quite candidly admitted this to 
his colleagues on the Committee after the battle. "The success 
was necessary to him [Jourdan] ; he was lost if he had failed; 
they would have denounced him immediately as a traitor and 
me also for having taken the garrisons from the towns to 
join the army.: In spite of the fierce rhetoric of Jourdan's
letter, the mood at headquarters was probably not one of 
confidence; it was more likely one of brooding uncertainty 
and anxiety.18
The French opened the attack at 7 A.M. on October
15. From the very first shot of the battle, virtually 
everything went frighteningly wrong.
Fromentin's advance began well enough. His forces 
cleared the woods of the enemy and seized the villages of 
Leval and St Waast. Apparently Jourdan had given him verbal 
instructions not to venture out onto the flat open ground 
beyond the woods without taking precautions first, but 
Fromentin did so with his inexperienced troops. The Austrian
18. Corr., III, pp. 328-29, Carnot to the Committee, 
10/17/93. The italics are the author's.
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cavalry of General Bellegarde promptly swirled around his 
infantry who, unfamiliar with the tactics to halt cavalry, 
were routed and chased back to their starting point. On the 
right, Duquesnoy did not fare much better. His columns of 
infantry stormed Dimont and Dimechaux in heavy fighting, but 
when they tried to continue the attack towards Wattignies they 
were checked by the enemy. All communication broke down 
between Duquesnoy and Beauregard. The latter took up a 
position on Duquesnoy's outer flank and did nothing to offer 
him even the slightest assistance.19
Carnot, Jourdan, and representative Duquesnoy were 
directing the battle from a position on the Avesnes road 
near the center of the army. As the roar of the fighting 
grew louder on each flank, Carnot urged Jourdan to send 
Balland in a full scale assault against the Austrian center. 
Jourdan objected, pleading that his wings had not advanced 
far enough and the enemy had not detached any of his forces 
from the center to his flanks— the time was not yet right.
But "Carnot persisted in his opinion, spoke of energy and 
audacity, and claimed that prudence would allow the victory 
to escape them." Jourdan was not about to refuse the advice 
of a member of the Committee of Public Safety; he consented 
to the attack, "yielding" as he put it "to the sentiment of
19. A.G. mr 608-1, Memoires de 1793. Dupuis, 0£  cit, 
pp. 160-64.
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eagerness and fierceness of his age." He placed himself at 
the head of Balland's troops and led them forward.20
The soldiers, massed in columns, had to cross low 
ground and ascend a gentle slope devoid of cover under enemy 
fire before they struck the enemy positions on the ridge 
around Dourleurs. Two assaults were repulsed. The third 
succeeded in the face of determined resistance; Dourleurs and 
the high ground were both taken. The French then tried to 
cross a ravine to get at the Austrian second line of defense. 
Here the enemy's plunging fire from their second line turned 
the assault into bloody, murderous confusion. "The greatest 
efforts to cross [the ravine] were useless. The first batta­
lions which debouched were overwhelmed by cannon fire and 
musketry, and a company of light artillery had its horses 
and a great portion of its gunners killed before it un­
limbered. " Austrian cavalry from the neighboring heights 
slashed at the struggling troops. In spite of Jourdan's 
best efforts to lead his men forward, they began to yield, 
but only after every effort had failed did Carnot consent to 
a retreat. The French left 1,500 casualties on the field. 
Jourdan believed that had Coburg counterattacked while
Balland's men were struggling in the ravine, the latter would 
21
have been annihilated.
20. Ibid. Phipps, o£ cit, pp. 252-56. Historians are 
generally agreed that the impetus for the premature assault in 
center came from Carnot, not Jourdan.
21. Ibid. Dupuis, o£ cit, pp. 164-67.
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One can only imagine the mood at headquarters that 
night. The day's fighting had been an utter failure, and the 
leaders all knew what the price of failure could be. While 
the army licked its wounds and rested for the morrow, its 
leaders held a council of war. The limited evidence leaves 
the impression that the plans for the next day's fighting 
were made amid calm discussion; they may well have been 
devised amid tumultuous argument. Carnot and Jourdan 
disagreed on the best strategy to employ. According to 
Hippolyte Carnot, Jourdan wanted to shift troops to his left 
and make the main attack there. This would strengthen the 
army's weak point, Fromentin; it would better protect its 
communications with the base at Guise, and it would 
concentrate the mass of maneuver on one wing rather than 
two. Carnot disagreed. He desired to attack on the right 
wing instead of the left. He wanted to take advantage of 
the momentum generated by the only half-successful French 
attack of the day, Duquesnoy's; and he wanted to take 
Wattignies because he thought it was the key to the enemy 
position. How long and how heatedly they argued we do not 
know. Ultimately Jourdan deferred to Carnot's authority.
They would make the attack on the right.22
In his memoires Jourdan was reticent about the 
events of the evening, merely stating that after some
22. Hippolyte Carnot, Memoires sur Carnot, I, pp. 406-07.
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discussion it vas agreed that the main attack be directed 
at Wattignies. Because he is generally frank in his memoires, 
perhaps the disagreement was not all that sharp. In any 
case, there was one thing that both men firmly agreed upon.
The attack had to be resumed the next day and if necessary 
the day after that. Neither even considered calling off the 
offensive. That evening Jourdan wrote laconically to 
Bouchotte, "we have fought today...from nine in the morning 
until night. We have had some success on our right but our 
left has not done what I desired, to the extent that we will 
start over tomorrow." Garnot wrote in a similar vein to 
the Committee. ^
There could have been little sleep for either army. 
Both were up making preparations for the following day. 
Jourdan issued his orders, instructing Duquesnoy to prepare 
for a second advance on Wattignies and Balland and Fromentin 
to begin shifting troops to the right by two A.M. These 
forces assembled at headquarters at four A.M., at which time 
Jourdan told them their destination. He did this to prevent 
deserters from prematurely alerting the enemy as to the point 
of attack. He instructed Belair to demonstrate again in his 
area and Elie to do the same towards Beaumont. Coburg, for 
his part, anticipated a continuation of the attack on both
23. A.G. B1 20, Jourdan to Bouchotte, 10.15/93; Carnot 
to the Committee, 10/15/93.
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flanks. Hence he reinforced his left with three battalions 
and h:_s right with four battalions of troops drawn from 
the siege lines and from his center. He did not, however,
summon the 15,000 men north of the river to his aid;
24Belair's diversion had achieved its goal.
The village of Wattignies was a typical peasant 
community situated atop a gentle ridge with slopes falling 
away to the south and east. The ground undulated to the 
south towards Dimont and was covered with briar patches; to 
the east the slope was more uniform, but the fields there 
were intersected with t'hick hedges. The Austrians had 
fortified the village and placed a powerful battery nearby. 
The elevation, plus the clear field of fire which the 
defenders had, made it a formidable position. Jourdan 
planned to assail it from the front and both sides. The 
center and right-hand columns were Duquesnoy's troops; while 
the left column consisted of the reinforcements. To 
Duquesnoy's right Beauregard was again supposed to help him 
turn the enemy flank. Carnot, Jourdan, representative 
Duquesnoy, and Carnot's brother Feulint, all stationed 
themselves with the attackers. As the 16th dawned, they 
set their direction on the clock tower of Wattignies and
24. A.G. Bl* 223, Jourdan's orders, night of 10/15- 
16/93. Dupuis, o£ cit, pp. 172-72, 176-77. Elie's levies 
were routed the following day near Beaumont by an Austrian 
detachment.
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25advanced.
At first it seemed as if they were reliving the 
bloody repulses of the first day all over again. The 
different columns apparently mistimed their attacks; Jourdan 
claimed that the inexperienced Duquesnoy assaulted with the 
center column before the flank columns were fairly in range 
of the enemy. Each column attacked separately and was
hurled back by the murderous fire of the enemy. Jourdan,
Carnot, and the others exposed themselves recklessly, 
setting heroic examples of personal bravery to keep their 
green soldiers from breaking and running. After the second 
repulse, Carnot-Feulint found one battalion huddled behind 
a swell in the ground "like chickens frightened by a bird of
prey." Feulint took the commander by the collar and dragged
him alongside his horse towards the enemy, thereby inducing 
the rest of the battalion to follow.2*’
Ultimately the superior numbers of the French pre­
vailed. By one P.M. the left-hand column had fought its way 
into the village. Even then, however, the defenders were 
not beaten. Jourdan claimed that Wattignies was taken and 
retaken three times in bitter fighting. Only after he had 
brough up a battery of light artillery which fired point
25. For the topography of the battlefield see Dupuis, 
op cit, pp. 179-81.
26. Ibid. A .G. mr 608-1, Memoires de 1793. A . G . Bl 20, 
Jourdan to Bouchotte, 10/17/93.
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blank at the defenders, almost entirely destroying three
Austrian grenadier regiments and killing their commander,
was Wattignies secured. Then the French had to survive a
counterassault by Austrian cavalry. The conscripts were
wavering before the enemy sabres when Jourdan and Duquesnoy
2 7rallied them to drive off their assailants.
But the battle was not yet won. On the far right 
Beauregard had been routed near Obrechies by a cavalry 
attack which surprised him just as his troops seized the 
village. Moreover, the Austrians still held the heights 
around and behind Dourleurs, their lines stretching 
north towards Maubeuge and covering the main road. The 
woods and high ground around the village of Clarge now had 
to be stormed. The tired recruits advanced across the fields 
to attack once more. The Austrians held fast, and, in the 
face of the heavy enemy fire, a brigade of conscripts under 
General Gratien panicked and fled to the rear. Carnot and 
Duquesnoy dismissed and arrested Gratien on the spot. Carnot 
personally rallied the fugitives, seizing one recruit 
bodily, placing a musket in his hands, and shoving him for­
ward. Then taking a musket from a wounded man, he led the 
conscripts forward again. Finally the French overwhelmed 
their foes. Clarge and its woods were cleared of Austrians. 
Near Wattignies, the Austrians who had routed Beauregard were
27. Ibid. Phipps, 0 £  cit, I, pp. 152-56.
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repulsed by some of Duquesnoy's men who had been left to hold 
28the village.
Only now when the French were practically astride his 
main line of retreat did Coburg order a withdrawal. Covered 
by a heavy ranstorm which dampened ammunition and turned 
the battlefield into a quagmire, Coburg raised the siege 
and safely retreated behind the Sambre. When they saw the 
enemy retreating and realized that the battle was won, 
Jourdan, Carnot, and Duquesnoy— sans-culotte general, 
bourgeois dictator, and alcoholic ex-priest— reportedly met 
in Clarge and threw themselves into each other's arms.29
At first Jourdan may have doubted that the fighting 
was entirely over. He wrote Belair that "we have taken 
today some excellent positions from these tyrants," but he 
then suggested that they still had to finish the enemy off.
He tentatively announced a victory to Bouchotte, but added 
"I do not have the time to give you more complete details.
At this moment it is more essential to fight than eat."30 
But by the evening it was clear that the battle was over. 
Coburg's army had suffered too heavily to renew the
28. Dupuis, o£ cit, pp. 179-83. H. Carnot, op cit, 
I, pp. 407-09.
29. Dupuis, ibid.
30. A.G. Bl 20, Jourdan to Belair, 10/16/93; Jourdan 
to Bouchotte, 10/16/93.
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i 31 struggle.
Wattignies was one of the most decisive battles of
the revolution, even though it did not usher in a new era
of total victory, as Jourdan enthusiastically reported to
the Convention. "The valor of our soldiers fortells of
other successes for the armies of the Republic, and soon the
land of liberty will be afflicted with these brigands no
more...Our triumph is certain despite the traitors and the
cowards. Terror has seized our enemies, and I believe that
it will be impossible for these slaves to sustain courageous
32efforts against our brave Republicans." Jourdan's
prophecy of total success was premature. Much blood would 
have to be shed before events were to turn out as he 
predicted. In a more sober evaluation of the battle's 
importance in his memoires, he was closer to the truth. 
Wattignies was decisive because it halted the Allies' 
offensive long enough for the French to complete the con­
struction of the revolutionary army. It provided the precious 
time necessary to train the conscripts, promote new talented 
cadres, and solve the multiple logistical problems. It was
31. Exact casualties for the battle will probably 
never be known. Jourdan's early figures of under 2,000 
French casualties as opposed to 6,000 enemy casualties was 
inaccurate. Both armies, especially the French, exaggerated 
to maximize the losses of the enemy, while minimizing their 
own; inexact body counts did not originate in Vietnam. 
Dupuis' (and Phipps') method of striking a compromise 
figure— here 3,000 for both sides— is hopelessly inexact.
32. Corr., III, p. 311, Jsurdan to the president of 
the National Convention, 10/17/9 3.
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also decisive for another reason: it allowed two of the most
important figures in the organization of victory— Carnot 
and Jourdan— to keep their heads.
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II. The Aftermath of Wattignies; Dismissal.
The government gave Jourdan no time to rest on his 
laurels. Scarcely had it decreed that he and his army 
deserved well of their country, than it was urging him to 
resume the offensive. A mere two days after the battle 
the Committee wrote the representatives with the army that 
"here indeed is a victory over the Austrians, but it is 
not enough...The enemy must be chased completely from the 
Republic and the campaign should be the last. The 
Committee of Public Safety applauds the army's efforts, but 
it still awaits a complete victory."^  The author of this 
note did not consider the fact that generals and soldiers 
might need a few days of rest. The government demanded of 
Jourdan continuing progress in his operations, totally unlike 
the more deliberate movement of traditional warfare. The 
soldiers in the ranks felt the pressure as much as the gene­
rals did. One wrote that "since the 6th of this month when 
we arrived in the Army of the North, we have not ceased to 
fight every day...I have already found myself in four 
battles...It is here that one can say when one gets up 
in the morning, I may not be able to see the evening." Here 
was the reality of the new, relentless pace of war demanded
33. A.G. Bl 21, The Committee to the representatives, 
10/18/93. The letter is unsigned, but the handwriting 
appears to be that of Collot d'Herbois.
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34by the Jacobins.
Jourdan had been unable to follow up his victory 
immediately. The rain had slowed the pursuit of his tired 
troops. In addition, his men had shot away almost all their 
ammunition, and, as Carnot admitted, the victory had dis­
organized the French forces as much as defeat had disrupted 
the enemy. With Coburg's army safely away, Jourdan wanted 
to stand on the defensive for as long as the enemy allowed 
him a respite. He saw the need to rest and reorganize the 
army, and he wished to incorporate the new levdes into the 
veteran units. He still believed that he was outnumbered. 
Carnot, perhaps at the insistence of his colleagues on the 
Committee, wished on the contrary to resume the offensive.
No final decision was reached before Carnot left for Paris, 
except that Jourdan vas to remain stationary and await 
further orders. He was not overjoyed to see Carnot go. 
Although he admitted that they had disagreed, he added that 
Carnot's advice had been "infinitely useful. I tell you 
frankly that, seeing myself reduced to my own resources, I 
doubt my talents." With Carnot gone, he could see the 
burden of responsibility coming to rest entirely on his own 
shoulders.^
34. F. X. Joliclerc, Lettres, letter of 9/25/93, pp. 121-
26.
35. A.G. Bl* 223, Jourdan to Bouchotte, 10/19/93 & 
10/20/93. Carnot to the Committee, 10/17/93, Corr., Ill, 
pp. 318-24.
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On October 22, a few days after Carnot's departure, 
Jourdan received his orders. The Committee's directive was 
a surreal masterpiece of revolutionary rhetoric and confused 
aggressiveness in the guise of a strategic directive. It 
has been condemned as incoherent, and rightly so.36 Jourdan 
was ordered to strike a decisive blow and chase the enemy 
from the Republic, in order to bolster public spirit and be­
cause "it is intolerable for a free people to rest while 
tyrants occupy its territory." He was to cross the Sambre 
in any one of three places, "hem the enemy in, envolop him, 
trap him in that portion of the territory that he had invaded, 
cut his communications with his own country..." Yet, after 
exhorting Jourdan to total and relentless offensive war, 
the decree instructed him only to act with prudence. The 
French army must "hug the border as close as it can [whatever 
that meant], while maintaining secure communications with 
its places." It was to wage a war of posts and to engage the 
enemy "only as soon as the occasion is offered to fight with 
advantage." In addition to all this, Jourdan was to "defeat 
the enemy's projects," persuade the enemy that the French 
possessed immense forces, seize his depots, and attempt to 
capture both Namur and Le Quesnoy. Finally the decree
36. See for example Gunther Rothenberg, The Art of 
Warefare in the Age of Napoleon (Indiana U., 1978), p. 110. 
Reinhard, ojd cit, II, p. 80-1. Jomini and Phipps also 
severely criticized this directive.
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ordered Jourdan to pursue a variation of his original 
strategy of envelopment in the upper Sambre valley by attack­
ing from the west and the south towards Mons and endeavoring 
encircle the Allies at this point. "The general will hold 
his force in mass, and threaten him [the enemy] at several 
point in order to cause him to divide his forces..."37
This decree offers irrefutable proof that most of 
the government did not understand what their new 'total 
war' really was, that for many la guerre a outrance was 
rhetoric signifying fiery energy and fervent patriotism 
rather than any clear system of warfare. Simply stated, the 
directive ordered Jourdan to accomplish everything, and at 
the same time. It was shot through with contradictions. 
Jourdan was supposed to attack and destroy the enemy, and 
he was to act with prudence; he was to envolop the enemy in 
the field, and he was to destroy magazines and besiege 
fortresses; he was to chase the enemy from France, and wage 
a small war of posts. The provision which instructed him 
to act in mass while threatening the enemy at several points 
reflects the double-vision of the government; on cannot 
threaten the enemy at several points without dividing his 
forces! Nowhere was the Jacobins' confusion about how 
precisely to conduct their war more evident than here.
37. Decree of the Committee to General Jourdan, 
10/22/93, Recueil des Actes, pp. 563-65.
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So confused and confusing was this directive that 
Carnot felt compelled to send a personal note to Jourdan to 
interpret it. lie admitted that the operations called for 
were "delicate". He instructed Jourdan not to advance too 
far into Belgium; "to expel the satellites of despots by 
the surest and shortest means is all that is demanded."
Carnot then suggested that Jourdan make his main thrusts 
by way of Landrecies and Mons in order to pinch Coburg's 
army. What Carnot was broadly hinting at— albeit not very 
well— was the Jourdan not follow the decree literally, 
but that he limit himself to its last provision only. 
Unfortunately Carnot could not explicitly instruct Jourdan 
to disobey a government directive of which he was one of 
the signitaries.38
Jourdan was appalled by "this decree where so many 
incoherent dispositions are concentrated." For him it 
was not only confusing but dangerous as well. "The general 
saw in it his death warrant. How could he justify himself 
in case of misfortune before the revolutionary tribunal, 
which could find in that ridiculous piece a motive for 
condemnation no matter how the operations had been directed?"3^
38. Corr., III, pp. 374-75, Carnot to Jourdan, 10/22/93. 
This letter proves Reinhard's assertion that Carnot did not 
have a free hand in the direction of the war. Quite clearly 
the decree was the work of other Committee members besides him.
39. A.G. mr 608-1, Memoires de 1793.
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He could not obey certain provisions without disobeying
others. Carnot's attempt to translate the instructions
into some kind of meaningful strategy did not help much, and
in any event Jourdan was bound to obey the entire Committee,
not merely Carnot. He asked Bouchotte for additional,
clearer orders on how to proceed. Apparently Bouchotte
understood the decree no better than did Jourdan, or perhaps
he understood that it was mainly meant as rhetoric. He
wrote back restating the government's motives for issuing it,
and observed that the Committee had left Jourdan "enough
leeway to make use of his talents and energy." In other
words, in order to strengthen the regime vis-h-vis the
rest of Europe, as well as its own unruly people, Jourdan
was to achieve some sort of further success. How precisely
4 0he went about it was not that important.
Jourdan was not mollified. He did not desire rhetoric, 
but clear, precise strategic direction. Apparently he gave 
vent to his frustration at the decree in the privacy of 
headquarters; two of Bouchotte's agents with the army 
reported that the general felt frustrated and "enchained" in 
his direction of operations. Carnot realized that Jourdan 
was still confused. On October 24, he suggested that one 
prong of the pincers— the one via Landrecies— be eliminated, 
this approach being too difficult. Jourdan should concentrate
40. Corr., III, pp. 383-84, Bouchotte to Jourdan, 
10/24/93.
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the weight of Tiis army to make one major effort in the Sambre
valley. By advancing from here towards Mons, he could
threaten Coburg's communications and obtain provisions
by placing the country between the Sambre and the Meuse
under requisition. On the following day Carnot added that
Jourdan's situation was very similar to one posed by the
British Enlightenment strategist, Lloyd. Lloyd believed, as
did Carnot, that the best way to defeat an enemy force in
southern Flanders was to attack him in flank further to the
east by crossing the Sambre and threatening his communications.
In both letters Carnot stressed the overriding concern of
the Committee: For political reasons the Allies could not
41be allowed to remain on French soil.
Obediently Jourdan did his best to renew the offensive. 
Realizing that most of the Allied forces were concentrated 
under Coburg in the Landrecies-Maubeuge area, he earlier 
had instructed General d'Avaisne to attack in Maritime 
Flanders in an effort to divert some of Coburg's troops 
back to this sector. On October 24, he ordered an advance 
all along the front from Dunkirk to Beaumont with language 
which was a poor imitation of the rhetoric of the government.
To encourage his officers he claimed that the enemy's spirits 
were sagging and that the French were victorious all over
41. A.G. Bl 21, Carnot to Jourdan, 10/24/93, 10/25/93; 
Celliez & Berton to Bouchotte, 10/26/93.
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Flanders. To the north different sections of the French
cordon did indeed report successes: a brigade under
Vandamme captured Furnes and Souham's troops at Lille won a
small engagement. On the upper Sambre Jourdan massed three
divisions near Beaumont with another in supporting distance,
and prepared to advance across the river once Coburg had
responded to d'Avaisne's attacks by detaching troops to 
42
Maritime Flanders.
But the offensive was dispersed over too great a 
distance, and, as might have been expected, it soon bogged 
down. The Allied regrouped, counterattacked, and defeated 
the French at several points. Jourdan had trouble with 
d'Avaisne, whom he rightly suspected of dragging his heels. 
At one point he ordered d'Avaisne to reinforce the weak • 
division of Ransonnet, to concentrate troops from Dunkirk 
with Souham's division at Lille, and with this mass to make 
a concentric attack against the enemy's positions at 
Cysoing. D'Avaisne hesitated, requested further orders (as 
was his habit), and left his troops strung out near Ypres. 
When Ransonnet suffered a sharp reverse as a result, Jourdan 
lost his patience. To Isore he wrote that he was "as angry 
as you, citizen representative, to see general d'Avaisne 
deliberating over the order that I have given him...His
42. A.G. Bl* 223, see Jourdan's various orders to his 
generals of 10/24/93? Jourdan to d'Avaisne', 10/29/93. Henri 
Jomini, Histoire Critique et Militaire, IV, pp. 144-45.
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conduct has offered proof that he is not in a condition
to lead an operation as important as the one which he was
entrusted with." He recommended that d'Avaisne be dismissed;
the representatives complied, replacing him with general 
43
Souham. But d'Avaisne1s dismissal did not get the offensive 
moving again, nor did the attacks in northern Flanders induce 
Coburg to detach any units there. Coburg kept his forces 
concentrated and fortified the banks of the Sambre with 
fieldworks and batteries. Worse, the weather had finally 
broken. The heavy late autumn rains pelted down, innundating 
all of the Pays Bas and turning the area's primitive roads 
into stretches of bottomless mud.
Jourdan unleased a torrent of complaints. To 
Bouchotte he wrote that his position was delicate, that the 
Allies were strongly entrenched and in full force: "the roads
are so impracticable between the Sambre and the Meuse that 
subsistence cannot reach the army."44 If he crossed the 
Sambre the enemy could flank him from the Namur area. He 
repeated his complaints to Carnot, and requested that his 
superior come in person and assist in the operations; "you 
will be more useful to the Republic here than anywhere else."
43. A.G. Bl 21, Jourdan to d'Avaisne, 10/24/93;
Jourdan to Isore, 10/29/93. For d'Avaisne's lack of ability 
see Souham to Bouchotte, 10/25/93.
44. A.G. Bl* 223, Jourdan to Bouchotte, 10/29/93, 
11/1/93.
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Nevertheless, he assured Carnot that he would attack as
45
ordered in spite of his difficulties. Representative
Duquesnoy too was complaining. In daily letters he
emphasized the army's supply difficulties and the miserable
weather which was causing many of them. Were it not for
the pouring rain and the impassable roads, he wrote, the
46
army would be at grips with the enemy by now.
Clearly both men were doubtful about the prospects 
of the offensive at this point; Jourdan probably wanted it 
postponed indefinitely. But since the decree remained in 
effect, the offensive had to be carried out. Jourdan 
scheduled the advance across the river for November 3. He 
planned to send three divisions— those of Duquesnoy, Balland, 
and Desjardins— across the river at Thuin as the main 
attack. Two more divisions were to cover their right and 
seize Charleroi while the rest of the army was to demonstrate 
along the upper Sambre. But before the attack, Jourdan took 
Duquesnoy on a reconnaissance of the enemy positions.
Through cold, drenching rain with mud up to their horses knees, 
they rode along the river, and Jourdan showed Duquesnoy what 
the army was up against. Duquesnoy was suitably impressed.
He agreed to go to Paris to plead the case for a suspension 
of the offensive before the Committee. As it happened,
45. A.G. Bl* 223, Jourdan to Carnot, 10/29/93.
46. See Duquesnoy1s letters to the Committee from 10/28/93 
to 11/2/93 in the Recueil des Actes, VIII.
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weather made the offensive impossible. Rain pelted down on
the shivering troops as they tried to cross the flooded
Sambre valley on the 3rd. Artillery, horses, ammunition and
supply wagons were engulfed by the mud, and after an all day
struggle one division advanced a bare two miles. In such
conditions further operations were impossible. Jourdan
47called off the attack the same evening.
For him this dreary fiasco was too much. The next 
day he vented his frustration in letters to Carnot and 
Bouchotte. To advance across the flooded Sambre valley with 
the army in its present state was impossible, he wrote. He 
described the conditions which made it impossible: constant
rain, mud, and impassable roads which prevented the pro­
vision wagons from reaching the front. Soldiers in certain 
divisions had been without bread for three days, and yet the 
army was expected to cross a river against the enemy's 
fortified defenses. The army, he concluded, would risk 
perishing from hunger if the advance were continued. " I 
cannot bear the heart-breaking sight of an army destroyed 
without fighting," he wrote Carnot. I render justice to 
the brave soldiers who compose it; not the least murmer has 
escaped them although they are half-naked and shoeless, 
exposed to all the effects of the weather." To Bouchotte 
he was more blunt: "I will not conceal it...that if the
47. A.G. mr 608-1, Memoires de 1793. Jomini, op cit, 
IV, pp. 145-46.
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Committee of Public Safety absolutely insists upon the 
carrying out of the expedition between the Sambre and Meuse,
I will see myself constrained to hand in my resignation." 
Again he repeated "I cannot endure the heart-rending 
spectacle of seeing an army destroyed without fighting." To 
members of his staff he confessed that he was so disgusted 
with the way things were going that he was considering asking 
for a leave of absence to "recover his health".48
But the government had already decided that its
planned offensive was impossible to execute. Convinced
perhaps by Jourdan's and Duquesnoy's earlier complaints, the
Committee decreed on November 3 that the operation was
provisionally suspended. It gave as the official reason the
failure of d'Avaisne to obey orders and attack in Maritime
Flanders. Jourdan was, however, to continue operations on
49the south bank of the Sambre towards Namur. Even this 
seemed too much for Jourdan, who complained anew that the 
army could not proceed— the rain was proving a thousand times 
more ruinous than a battle. Yet the government felt that 
public opinion demanded that some kind of offensive operation 
be continued. On November 6, the Committee ordered Jourdan
48. Corr., IV, pp. 26-9, Jourdan to Carnot, 11/4/93; 
Jourdan to Bouchotte, 11/4/93. A.G. B1 22, Celliez & 
berton to Bouchotte, 11/4/93.
49. Corr., IV, pp. 19-20, 24-5, The Committee to 
Jourdan, 11/3/93; Carnot to Jourdan, 11/4/93.
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to come to Paris to discuss ways of "executing our decree".^ 
This sudden recall caused Jourdan great concern. For 
one thing he was now convinced that the Committee had changed 
its mind and decided not to call off the offensive after all. 
Then too he had proposed putting the army into winter quarters 
to rest and regroup and this had displeased the Committee:
"to give the signal for winter quarters will favor the 
system of the enemy which consists of reorganizing and making 
another campaign." But Jourdan also feared hor himself. A 
summons to Paris was an ominous sign; the Committee did 
not request discussions with its generals as a matter of 
course. And the Committee had expressed even more dis­
quieting sentiments. "We are afflicted to see a republican 
general speak of resignation if the Committee insists 
upon the execution of its decree; the defender of the liberty 
of his country can find nothing impossible!"^ Jourdan 
was suspect as a defeatist. A general did not threaten to 
abandon his post in the middle of a crisis; such a general 
might well be a lukewarm patriot like Kilmaine, or even a 
'traitor' like Houchard! Both Carnot and Bouchotte took 
pains to reassure him that his summons to Paris was not the
50. A.G. Bl*223, Jourdan to the Committee, 11/6/93.
A.G. B1 22, The Committee to Jourdan, 11/6/93.
51. Ibid. A.G. mr 608-1, Memoires de 1793.
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prelude to his arrest; they emphasized that he was being
recalled only to discuss the strategic situation, and they
52
both expressed full confidence in his abilities.
There might well have been another motive for his 
recall. Carnot and several of the representatives were 
being denounced by the extremists. The latter were accusing 
both Carnot and Duquesnoy of nepotism in the advancement of 
their brothers. In addition, Hebert was loudly condemning 
the government's handling of the war in the Nord, claiming 
that the campaign was going badly because Jourdan was sub­
mitting to the harmful influence of the representatives, 
allowing himself to be "enchained" by them. At the 
Jacobin club Hebert openly accused Duquesnoy of forcing 
Jourdan to make unwise tactical decisions. The sources 
for Hebert's accusations were unquestionably Bouchotte's 
agents with the army. In the letter in which they reported 
Jourdan's disenchantment with the decree of October 22, they 
interpreted his complaints to mean that he felt hindered 
specifically by the representatives. They argued that 
Jourdan favored General Duquesnoy too much because of the 
influence of his brother, and they could not understand 
why Jourdan deferred to Carnot and Duquesnoy at times during 
Wattignies! Here the latent hostility between radical and
52. Corr., IV, pp. 37-40, Carnot to Jourdan, 11/6/93; 
Bouchotte to Jourdan, 11/6//93.
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moderate over the progress of the war was bubbling to the 
surface.53
What were Jourdan's true sentiments in early 
November? Certainly he did not feel hindered by the 
representatives; indeed, his correspondence indicates that 
he felt just the opposite. On the other hand, he may well 
have been as disgusted by the regime's handling of the war 
as Bouchotte's agents claimed. In a rather interesting 
letter to Hebert, he, Duquesnoy, and his chief of staff 
Ernouf poured out their frustration and anger at the disas­
trous course of the fall offensive. "Behold the labyrinth 
in which we are lost from false plans; you may well believe 
they come from false patriots; we have spoken to you of 
the man..." And then a postscript, apparently written by 
Jourdan personally: "I am in a rage, I too. Fuck, the
army wants everything. Bougres, who have their feet warm 
want to make the infantry march without shoes, the cavalry 
without fourrage and the artillery without horses..."^4
53. A. Aulard, La Societie des Jacobins (Paris, 1895;
5 vols.), V, pp. 499-508. Reinhard, o£ cit, II, pp. 84-5. 
Reinhard erroneously believes that Duquesnoy was on the 
extremists' side in the dispute.
54. This letter is cited by Paul Barras in his Memoirs' 
(II, pp. 278-80). Both Ramsey Phipps and Hippolyte Carnot 
believed it to be genuine; Hippolyte believed that Jourdan 
corresponded regularly with Hebert, although he cited no 
evidence for this assertion. Because Barras quoted the 
letter verbatim, and because his factual evidence is 
usually sound, I am inclined to believe that it was authentic.
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This letter raises some interesting questions about Jourdan1s 
true feelings towards the Jacobin dictatorship. Was he some­
thing other than the loyal, obedient general that history 
has made him out to be, or did he co-author this letter at a 
moment of intense frustration at the mud, starvation, 
nakedness and misery at the front? Who was the "man" referred 
to in the letter? Were there other letters written to Hebert, 
and if so, was Jourdan naive enough to believe that he could 
use Hebert as a spokesman against the "men of mass" who 
Jourdan believed were disrupting the campaign? In any 
case, with so many complaints and accusations flying around, 
with real discontent with the state of affairs in the Nord 
prevalent, the Committee evidently wished to iron out what­
ever difficulties existed regarding the leadership of the 
Army of the North. Thus they summoned Jourdan to Paris.
On the morning of November 9, Jourdan and Duquesnoy 
nervously confronted the Committee. According to Jourdan's 
account a portion of the Committee--the "men of mass"—  
still desired that he continue the offensive. Jourdan and 
Duquesnoy pleaded their case; they cited the terrible 
privations of the troops, the numerous supply problems and 
argued that before the army could make use of its numerical 
superiority, the new levies would have to be amalgamated into 
the veteran units. "The truth of these propositions was 
appreciated by Carnot, and even by several of his colleagues 
who were not entirely strangers to the art of war; but those
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who believed that the people could overcome everything by 
mass alone, did not understand how such a different organization 
was necessary...," and wished to continue attacking until the 
enemy had been chased from France. It must have been a 
nerve-wracking meeting, for it was only after the greatest of 
difficulty that Jourdan and Duquesnoy convinced the 
Committee that the army was in no condition to continue to 
advance. But in the end all were persuaded, even the "men 
of mass" who perhaps were not as unreasonable as Jourdan 
would have us believe.^5
Apparently it was also agreed that the government 
would present a united front against the criticism of Hebert 
and his fellow extremists. That evening Duquesnoy rebutted 
Hebert at the Jacobin society. He argued that far from being 
a hindrance to Jourdan, he was in fact "his best friend. I 
am here only on his account, because in reality they are 
enchaining him. I have come to request for him carte-blanche.
I have obtained it. I bring it to him." Almost certainly the 
"they" in his speech were the extremists. Robespierre then 
supported Duquesnoy, denouncing Hebert's criticism of the 
regime's direction of the war. Two nights later Jourdan 
appeared at the society with both Duquesnoy and Robespierre. 
After Jourdan had briefly explained that the purpose of his 
trip to Paris was to deliberate with the Committee on the
55. A.G. mr 608-1, Memoires de 1793. Reinhard, op cit, 
II, pp. 85-8. 7
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means most appropriate to employ to hasten the fall of
tyrants, Hebert publically apologized, and amid load applause
gave Duquesnoy a "fraternal kiss". The government, outwardly
at least, had demonstrated its solidarity.^
One is tempted to think that Jourdan may have been
overstating his difficulties in view of Hoche's successful
campaign in the Vosges that same autumn. But if Jourdan were
exaggerating, so were his subordinate officers. In a letter
to General Duquesnoy, General Balland portrayed with stark
realism the desperate state of the army:
I warn you, general, that the area which we occupy 
cannot furnish the army with any more fourrage. In 
four days here we will be reduced to seeing our 
horses die of hunger in mud up to their stomachs. 
Those of the light artillery are already in a sad 
state. The roads are covered with wagons broken 
while bringing provisions to the battalions, and it 
is to be feared that in a few days the soldier will 
not be able to receive his bread and meat. The army 
is in a condition to make one tremble; they are in 
mud up to the calves of their legs. Sickness is 
reducing our army to half its number. If we remain 
here another ten days, each day at least fifteen 
men per battaliton [will go] to the hospital.
Troops in such distress could hardly fight off a simple raid,
much less launch a major attack. Jourdan realized, as Sir
Douglas Haig did not realize until the useless expenditure of
300,000 casualties in 1917 convinced him, that offensive
operations in Flanders during the rainy autumn season were
next to impossible. The primitive technology, communications,
56. Aulard, o£ cit, V, pp. 499-508.
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and logistics of the French army prevented them from being 
able to overcome the flooded Sambre valley, and all the
revolutionary fervor in the world could not change that
c . 5 7  fact.
With the Committee's decision to suspend the 
offensive, serious operations in Flanders virtually ceased.
The Army of the North settled down in a line of defenses 
running from the coast at Dunkirk, south through Lille,
Cambrai and Landrecies, then east down the Sambre valley to 
the vicinity of Charleroi. Jourdan described his dispositions 
as adequate to protect the entire front and at the same time 
to allow leeway for foraging. He constructed three fortified 
camps behind the lines at Guise, St Quentin, and Peronne.
These were to serve as points of support in case of a 
serious reverse on any front, while also serving as training 
camps for the new levies. Jourdan kept his headquarters 
behind the Sambre front, leaving general Souham in unofficial 
command of the front; from Cambrai to Dunkirk. While he 
intended to raid and harass the enemy--and he did instruct 
Souham to launch minor attacks in his secotr--Jourdan1s 
strategy for the winter was essentially defensive.58
Life at the front settled down into a tedious routine
57. A.G. Bl 22, Balland to Duquesnoy, 11/11/93.
58. A.G. Bl 22, Jourdan to the Committee, 11/8/93; Jourdan 
to Souham, 11/15/93.
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in which handling minor problems and details, instead of
launching major offensives, became the order of the day. On
a typical day, general Ferrand reported an enemy probe against
Sedan which was driven off with a few cannon shots, Belair
announced a skirmish in which French cavalry took thirty six
prisoners, and the garrison of Landrecies repulsed an enemy
raid on the town. General Balland described the excellent
morale shown by his men despite their hardships, and general
Souham expressed concern that some of his volunteers believed
their term of service to be finished and wanted to return
home. Probably remembering Houchard1s fate, Jourdan
complained the Committee about having to handle prisoner-of-
war matters because it involved corresponding with the 
59
enemy. Much of his time was spent adjusting and readjusting 
his defensive dispositions. In a typical instance, he wrote 
General Fromentin that, apparently, Fromentin had not thrown 
his cantonments far enough to the left. "I warn you that the 
enemy occupies Cati]Ion...and as a result this is the side 
to which you are to direct your emplacements." Then after 
furnishing him a list of places to occupy, he continued:
"Now that you have a position where it is possible to rest 
your troops for several days, you can shoe and restore to 
health your horses...Address yourself to your commissalre to
59. Corr., IV, pp. 221-23, various letters of the Army 
of the Nord of 11/30/93.
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obtain shoes and whatever else is necessary for your division; 
there is a magazine at the park at Maubeuge."^
Yet even amid such routine tasks Jourdan felt the 
ominous shadow of the Terror menacing him. When Souham 
experienced some difficulties in his sector and requested a 
personal meeting with Jourdan, the general replied, "I wish 
I were able to authorize you to meet me here for a moment 
as you desire, but you know very well that, if during your 
absence, your division received a check, you and I would be 
responsible, and perhpas we would be suspected of treason.
The true enemy now became dearth— dearth of virtually 
every necessity from food to footwear. Jourdan had inordinate 
trouble procuring boots for his soldiers, and troops in 
Fromentin's division were wrapping their feet in straw.
Jourdan asked the representatives at Arras to hasten a 
direct requisition of shoes which they were carrying out 
there. Carnot admitted that all the depots were empty of 
footwear and suggested that the men wear wooden clogs. There 
were periodic food shortages, caused as often by the awful 
roads as by an actual lack of provisions. Even so, Jourdan 
reported that 60,000 rations of bread arrived spoiled and 
that fourrage was so scarce that he did not know how his
60. A.G. Bl* 223, Jourdan to Fromentin, 11/5/93.
61. Corr., IV, pp. 188-89, Jourdan to Souham, 11/27/93.
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horses would survive the winter. The representatives re­
peatedly complained of the lack of subsistence as they 
attempted to provision the fortresses along the front. There 
were still shortages of such items as uniforms, blankets, and 
muskets. Denument was so bad that both Balland's and 
Duquesnoy's division had 2,500 out of 12,000 sick in the 
hospitals.
Jourdan, like the government, blamed the shortages 
on the supply administrations. He wrote that he would very 
much like to meet those responsible for provisioning the army. 
However, he had to work through his commissaire-ordonnateur, 
for he was the one to whom he and the representatives sent 
their complaints about distribution problems and he was the 
one who dealt with the supply agents of the war ministry. 
Jourdan thus had to depend upon him to get food and supplies 
to the men as efficiently as possible. Of course the 
quartermaster, in turn, had to depend upon his own underlings, 
as well as the various agents of the war ministry, and it was 
among them that the problems lay. Carnot too believed that 
the supply personnel, rather i ,an any real lack of food and 
materiel, were causing the shortages. "The true cause of our 
misfortune is not because not enough is being sent to the
62. A.G. Bl* 223, Jourdan to the Committee, 1.1/16/93; 
Jourdan to Bouchotte, 11/2 3/9 3; Jourdan to the representatives 
at Arras, 11/23/93. Corr., IV, pp. 130-31, Carnot to 
Duquesnoy, 11/19/93.
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the magazines; it is corruption." He then added that the 
reason the representatives were at the front was to "attend 
to the needs of the army by way of local resources, to 
prevent the corruption, and to chase the squanderers and 
traitors of every k i n d . " ^
Jourdan also had difficulty getting the government 
to execute his most cherished project--the amalgame. At the 
end of November the Committee had finally decreed that the 
new conscripts were to be incorporated into the understrength 
veteran units as Jourdan desired. But incorporation was the 
task of the war ministry, and the latter proved incapable 
of carrying it out with any kind of dispatch. In mid-December 
the official laws and instructions regarding the amalgame, 
as well as the personnel who were to carry it out, had not 
arrived. Lists of the specific cadres slated to staff those 
conscript units destined for incorporation had not been 
drawn up. Some conscripts who were marked for amalgamation 
were going home on the pretext that they were going to 
receive their transfer orders. In defense of the war ministry, 
this was one operation in which slowness was excusable owing 
to the sheer number of units involved. Nevertheless Jourdan 
continually pressured Bouchotte to speed it up, occasionally
63. A.G. Bl* 223, Jourdan to Laurent, 11/26/93. Corr., 
IV, pp. 173-74, Carnot to Jourdan, 11/25/93.
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urged the ministry personnel handling the amalgame to hasten, 
and frequently gave them advice on how to proceed.
But for all the problems with subsistence, habilement, 
and the amalgame, Jourdan's most severe trouble was caused 
by the popular societies of the Nord. Their constant com­
plaints were to prove to be his eventual undoing.
By December their incessant criticism about the 
army's failure to protect them from the real, and imaginary, 
depredations of the enemy had reached a crescendo. The 
commune of Vervins complained to Jourdan that it was menaced 
by 2,000 Austrians and that it needed more soldiers immediately. 
After looking into the matter, Jourdan replied that what the 
commune believed to be 2,000 Austrians was in reality a mere 
picket. He urged them not to take such rumors so seriously.
Then he softened his tone and announced that he was sending 
them the 5th hussars, advising the commune to invite the sol­
diers into their popular society and enlighten them as to the 
true religion of a free and reasonable people. Unfortunately 
most complaints were not so successfully handled. When one 
Lambert, a notable in the Maubeuge commune, denounced the 
generals for allowing their advanced posts to permit an 
enemy raid to reach the outskirts of the city, Bouchotte 
nagged Jourdan and his subordinates not to allow their
64. Recueil des Actes, IX, pp. 606-07, Bar to the 
Committee, 12/23/93. A.G. Bl 23, Laurent to the Committee, 
12/18/93. A.G. Bl* 223, Jourdan to Citizen Jaiquer, 1/1/94.
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advanced posts to be negligent. The popular society of St 
Quentin was so vociferous about enemy incursions that it 
provoked Belair to write to Jourdan that St Quentin's fears 
of enemy attacks were groundless, and its requests for more 
soldiers needless: would Jourdan please convince the
Committee not to take all their reports of enemy incursions 
seriously. Nevertheless the Committee demanded to know 
whether Jourdan had adequately garrisoned the St Quentin 
area, so that Jourdan had to add a fourth regiment of cavalry 
to the three regiments already patrolling that sector.65
It was in vain that he explained to Bouchotte that 
such complaints came from "malevolents" and "timid citizens", 
that his dispositions were basically sound, and that to dis­
perse the army to protect more territory would not only be 
useless, but dangerous. A more extended front with the 
available manpower, he argued, would thin their defensive 
cordon to the breaking point; it would not halt enemy 
incursions into French territory. He then felt compelled to 
add that his conduct had always been that of a sans-culotte. 
The issue was not so much whether the fears of the local 
municipalities were real or imaginary. The issue was that 
Jourdan simply did not have enough men to erect a steel
65. A.G. Bl 23, Jourdan to the Committee of correspon­
dence of Vervins, 12/9/93; Lambert to Bouchotte, 12/21/93; 
Bouchotte to Jourdan, 12/21/93; Belair to Jourdan, 12/1/93. 
Correspondence about the St Quentin situation took place 
almost on a daily basis.
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curtain of protection along the entire border from Dunkirk to 
Namur. To cover the 150 miles of front he had no more than
140,000 men, and, according to his own calculations he only 
had 108,000, the balance being useless garrison troops and 
untrained conscripts. In the all-important cavalry arm he was 
woefully weak. But this was something that the local 
communes could not understand. And the men of mass in the 
Parisian clubs, in the war ministry, and on the Committee 
itself were all hostile to the "men of talent" in the army 
hierarchy and among the representatives and chose not to 
understand it.6®
So the clamor for garrisons and better protection 
continued— as Carnot wrote to Jourdan, "always new complaints 
from the communes...," and he again urged him to do his best 
to guard the frontier.®7 But when the enemy raids persisted, 
the communes' disenchantment and that of their allies in 
Paris with Jourdan and his officers increased.
In mid-December this problem was aggravated. While 
on one of his periodic inspections of the front, Jourdan 
found Landrecies in the midst of chaos. The garrison 
commander Courtois, a Parisian appointee of Bouchotte, had
66. A.G. Bl* 223, Jourdan to Bouchotte, 12/24/93. The 
popular societies of the Nord also complained to their fellow 
sans-ci1 ottes in the Parisian clubs, possibly with a more 
virulant ink than they used in writing to the government.
67. A.G. Bl 23, Carnot to Jourdan, 12/2/93.
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hopelessly bungled a sortie against an enemy raid so that when 
Jourdan arrived, the garrison was in total disorder and 
Courtois was running through the streets screaming curses at 
everyone he saw. Jourdan arrested him on the spot. Courtois 
immediately denounced him as a part of a "Machiavellian 
conspiracy" to ruin him and all "true republicans", and then 
listed all his unpatriotic political enemies whom he wanted 
guillotined. A few days later a popular society denounced 
general Belair because he allegedly seduced the wife of one 
of its members. Two of Bouchotte's agents supported the 
denunciation. Belair was inaccessible to patriots, he slept 
late, took long suppers, and once kept one of Jourdan's 
aides waiting. Moreover, he had dined with an aristocratic 
prisoner and was involved in a pay dispute with some workers 
who had passed on their grievance to the Jacobin club in 
Paris. Belair, the agents noted, was a close associate of 
Jourdan. Belair denied the accusations, but Bouchotte 
ordered him to Paris anyway. Here the extremists were 
striking too close to home; Belair may have been Jourdan's 
most valuable officer since he was performing indispensable 
work training the new levdes at Guise. Jourdan accordingly 
took Belair's side in the ensuing dispute.6®
68. A.G. mr 283, Memoires...des evenements qui ont 
procede, accompagne, et suivi le siege de Landrecies (sans 
nom de 1'auteur). A.G. Bl 23, Courtois to Bouchotte, 12/9/93; 
Celliez & Berton to Bouchotte, 12/15/9 3; Belair to Bouchotte, 
12/16/93.
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Trouble was brewing also between the representatives 
and the war ministry. Laurent complained of the inexplicable 
sloth of the ministry in responding to his requests for 
supplies, and he also reported that he had to arrest a 
ministry agent who tried to go over to the enemy. When 
Duquesnoy compJained about incompetents in the war bureauc­
racy, Bouchotte angrily demanded that he name names. The 
popular society of Maubeuge began to feud with Bar who was 
then working in that fortress-town, and Bouchotte took the 
side of the popular society in that dispute. Guiot complained 
that Ronsin's so-called "revolutionary a r m y " ^  was receiving 
preferential treatment regarding clothing and equipment, 
being treated like a "spoiled child" while the troops at 
the front lacked essentials. When the "revolutionary army" 
operating in the Nord was suppressed, the Parisian clubs 
howled in protest. Even Jourdan, always deferential and 
comradely in his letters to Bouchotte, was writing with a 
sharper quill. Complaining about the frightful shortages 
in the army he wrote: "It seems like they conspire against
69. The so-called "revolutionary army" was a motley 
collection of sans-culotte 'feoldiers", more or less under 
military discipline, sent out to 'pacify the countryside'. 
Under the leadership of the extremist, Ronsin, it roamed 
through the countryside, devoting most of its efforts to 
requisitioning— or stealing— food which the peasants were 
supposedly hoarding from the army and the cities. The 
extemists believed that the "revolutionary army" was doing 
valuable work; the representatives felt that it was an 
undisciplined rabble causing more harm than good.
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the Army of the North. I tell you formally, if this disette 
does not cease, we run the greatest risks and the greatest 
dangers.
The result of all this was a sharp increase in the 
tension between Jourdan, his officers, and the representatives 
on mission on one hand, and the extremists in the war 
ministry, the Parisian clubs, and indeed the government on the 
other. Fueling the flames of this conflict were the dis­
contented popular societies of the Nord. Thus Jourdan 
gradually fell into increasing disfavor with the extremists. 
Because the regime depended upon the popular societies for 
much of its support, and because there were men of mass on 
the Committee— certainly Billaud-Varenne and Collot d'Herbois 
qualify as such— the security of Jourdan's position was 
growing progressively more uncertain.
At the end of December the Committee sent C. A.
Prieur (de la Cote d'Or) on an inspection tour of the Nord in 
company with Nicholas Hentz, the most ruthless and extreme 
deputy on mission to that area. The reason for their trip 
was almost certainly the problem of the unguarded border.
The two men visited Jourdan, who had recently responded
70. A.G. Bl 26, Jourdan to Bouchotte, 1/1/94. There 
was a dramatic increase in hostility between representatives 
and war ministry during December. One wonders if this pattern 
occurred in other armies, and if this conflict contributed 
to the final break between the extremists and the government 
in March, 1794.
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to criticism from Bouchotte by suggesting that the minister 
himself position the troops if he did not like the way the 
frontier was guarded. The two men left, evidently uncon­
vinced that more could not be done to halt the enemy 
incursions. Consequently Jourdan issued a general 'shape 
up' order to his generals. He emphasized that they must 
drill their soldiers daily and inspect their positions 
frequently, that the brigade commanders must visit their 
front-line troops, and that the advanced posts must 
improve their surveillance. All this was clearly aimed at 
tightening up the border defenses. His reference to the 
advanced posts was especially significant since a favorite 
complaint of the communes was that these posts were not 
doing their duty.71
It was not enough. Matters boiled to a head over 
the "gap" in the St Quentin area. An Austrian emissary with 
three uhlans had ridden into St Quentin without being 
challenged by he advanced posts. The commune screamed that 
these Austrians could have been spies and that there still 
were no soldiers around to prevent the enemy from attacking 
them. Why had the government not done anything about this? 
Bouchotte wrote a sharp note to Jourdan, criticizing him for
71. A.G. Bl 23, Bouchotte to Jourdan, 12/23/93. A.G. 
Bl* 223, Circular to Generals Souham, Ferrand, and Drut, 
1/4/94. Georges Bouchard, Prieur de la Cote d'Or, p. 198.
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continuing to allow the enemy to raid into French territory 
and ordering him to construct defenses in the St Quentin 
area. This note obviously upset Jourdan. His reply was 
long, rambling, and clearly written under duress. He had 
done everything he could, he wrote, to stop the enemy raids: 
inspections, frequent patrols, counterraids. He suggested 
that one of Bouchotte's agents accompany him on his inspec­
tions to judge for himself if he was telling the truth. But 
the one thing he would not do is move his defenses any further 
forward, or extend them and wider. "I am not in favor of 
spreading them any further because I would be compromising 
their security." It was better to keep the troops concentrated 
in their cantonments where they could adequately subsist than 
disperse them further in a dragnet which would still have 
numerous holes for the enemy to slip through. When the new 
levdes were ready, he could extend himself further, "but before 
that takes place I would be compromising the army" by doing 
so, without stopping the pillage of the enemy.
But Bouchotte had not awaited Jourdan's reply. On 
January 6, he announced to the Committee that the Allies were 
penetrating the frontiers of the Nord, burning, pillaging,
72. A.G. Bl 26, Bouchotte to Jourdan, 1/4/94; Jourdan 
to Bouchotte, 1/7/94. The St Quentin area was vulnerable to 
enemy raids because to the east lay the vast Forest of 
Mormal. From its reaches the enemy could raid and then 
retire virtually unmolested by the cavalry-less French 
army (map #5).
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and committing all sorts of atrocities. The invaders, he 
added, had been left in peace for far too long; they should 
be repulsed at once. This letter was unfair, exaggerated, and 
inaccurate; it overstated the problem and said nothing about 
the difficulties of solving it. Nevertheless it convinced the 
Committee— or at least a majority of its members— that Jourdan 
had to be dismissed. Robespierre already considered him 
suspect "due to his inactivity"— evidently in halting the 
enemy incursions— and due to his "correspondence."^ Perhaps 
some of the others felt they could no longer ignore the 
complaints of the popular societies. The Committee made its 
decision the same day. Bouchotte immediately ordered Jourdan 
to return to Paris to "confer" with the Committee. On the
7th the Committee decreed the arrest of Jourdan and Ernouf;
74no reason was given.
The sudden, unexpected recall order caught Jourdan 
completely unaware. He immediately feared for his life. He 
did not know what to do. At one point he seriously considered 
fleeing and seeking safety with the enemy. But ultimately he 
shrank from taking such a step. Not only had he no inclination 
to seek protection from the counterrevolution, but he also
73. A.G. Bl 26, Bouchotte to the Committee, 1/6/94.
Reinhard, 0£  cit, II, p. 119.
74. A.G. Bl 26, Bouchotte to Jourdan, 1/6/94; Decree
of the Committee, 1/7/94.
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realized that running would justify the extremists' 
suspicion that he was a tra.itor. After agonized deliberation 
he decided to face his accusers. He determined to obey the 
order and return to Pa r i s . ^
It proved to be the correct decision. What happened 
when he again confronted the Committee we do not know. 
Allegedly the session grew heated. Carnot asked Jourdan why 
he had not acted more energetically; Jourdan defended himself 
with the active support of Duquesnoy; accusations and denials 
flew back and forth amid bitter language, with Duquesnoy 
angrily pounding an inkwell on the table and Carnot at one 
point weeping with frustration. Finally, when asked to 
vouch for Jourdan's patriotism, Duquesnoy vowed to answer for 
it with his head. Perhaps this swayed the Committee, or 
perhaps the validity of Jourdan's arguments convinced them.
In any case, the Committee decided merely to pension him off 
and send him home. Carnot drew up the decree rescinding the 
arrest and recommending him for the pension.^
There is an amazing number of explanations for his 
dismissal, perhaps because there seemed to be no logical 
reason for it. He had not lost a battle. He had not defied 
the government as had Custine, nor shown himself defeatist as 
had Kilmaine. He had not lost the confidence of the
75. A.G. mr 608-1, Memoires de 1793.
76. Phipps, op cit, I, pp. 272-7 3. Reinhard, op cit, 
II, p. 119. .
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representatives' as had Houchard, for the representatives wrote
77letters in his behalf to the Committee. Representative
Levasseur believed that Jourdan had lost Carnot's confidence.
Hippolyte Carnot suggested that he was corresponding with
the extremists, and thus was dismissed for his politics.
Jomini believed that he fell victim to the hostility of
Robespierre and St Just who wished to replace him with their
favorite, General Charles Pichegru--an opinion also held by
R. R. Palmer. Collot d'Herbois, the only one of the Twelve
to have expressed himself on the subject, claimed that his
removal was a group decision, but Collot may have been
minimizing his own role, for he almost certainly was one of
Jourdan's c r i t i c s . O f f i c i a l y  the government stated that
Jourdan was dismissed because he had not sufficiently
exploited his successes and had shown insufficient "intensity"
and "audacity" to overcome "normal obstacles" and achieve 
79
victory.
There is a certain amount of truth in most of these 
explanations, although the first two seem without foundation. 
But if the government believed that he had demonstrated 
insufficient energy and "intensity", it believed so because
77. Jomini, 0£  cit, IV, p. 147.
78. Phipps, 0£  cit, I, pp. 272-73. H. Carnot, 0£  cit,
I, p. 365. Jomini, ibid. R. R. Palmer, Twelve Who Ruled, p. 105 
Reinhard, 0£  cit, II, p. 119.
79. Archives Parliamentaires, LXXXIV, pp. 338-39.
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he had not interdicted the frontier to enemy incursions 
thoroughly enough to satisfy the popular societies of the 
Nord, or the radicals in Paris. This judgment was far from 
correct. On the contrary, so active were the French 
patrols and counterraids in West Flanders that throughout 
early January the Allies were convinced that the French 
movements there were the prelude to a major offensive. ^
As for his inability to halt the enemy raids, he simply did 
not have enough men. It is understandable that the local 
popular societies could not grasp this. That the extemists 
in the government refused to grasp it was inexcusable.
80. See A.G. Bl* 169, Enemy Correspondence, January, 1794.
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
JACOBIN GENERAL? JEAN BAPTISTE JOURDAN 
AND THE FRENCH REVOLUTION; 1792 - 1799
VOLUME II
A Dissertation
Submitted to the Graduate Faculty of the 
Louisiana State University and Agricultural 
and Mechanical College in partial fulfillment 
of the requirements for the degree of 
Doctor of Philosophy
in
The Department of History
by
Lawrence Joseph Fischer
B.S., Loyola College of Baltimore, 1969 
M.A., University of Delaware, 1974 
August 1978
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
V. THE YEAR OF VICTORY; 1794
I. Fleurus.
Following his dismissal from command of the 
Army of the North, Jourdan returned to his home in Limoges. 
He was hardly treated like a man judged inadequate to 
command one of the armies of the Republic, for he received 
a hero's welcome. The Limoges popular society, now 
entitled "Les Amis de la liberte et de la egalite," 
greeted him upon his arrival, welcomed him back into the 
club, and loyally parroted the official Jacobin line as 
to the reason for his dismissal. "These two officers 
(Jourdan and Ernouf) are considered excellent citizens; 
therefore Jourdan was recalled only because circ\imstances 
required a more active citizen at the head of the army," 
announced the president of the society. Jourdan thanked 
the club for his warm welcome, saying how pleased he was 
to be back among his brothers. Like a true citizen-soldier, 
he returned to his life as a small town shopkeeper. He 
took up operation of his dry goods business and resumed 
activity in the popular society. Duquesnoy sent two letters 
to the club denying current rumors that he had been hostile 
to Jourdan during the controversy surrounding his removal 
from command. Such was his popularity that he was elected 
president of the club. Supposedly he accepted his fall 
from power without regret or rancor; nevertheless, it is 
189
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alleged that he hung his uniform and his sword in a prominent 
place in his store.1
He did not remain a shopkeeper for long. On 
March 10, 1794, the Committee decided to relieve General 
Lazare Hoche from command of the Army of the Moselle.
Its choice as his successor was none other than Jourdan. 
Apparently the Committee had forgotten that it earlier had 
judged him insufficiently energetic, intense, and audacious. 
Perhaps, as an obedient soldier, he considered it to be 
his duty to do so; perhaps, he wished to prove to the govern­
ment that its previous assessment of his abilities was 
2erroneous.*
As Jourdan assumed command of the Moselle, Carnot 
issued his famous "General Method of the military operations 
of the next campaign." These instructions contained the 
first cohesive summary of the new total warfare waged by 
the revolutionaries. The "General Method" rejected 
cordon tactics, "since these cause one's forces to be 
scattered, and the campaign will end ... with several 
successes which will not put the enemy 'hors d'etat' of 
recommencing the fighting the following year."
1. Rene Valentin, L<s Marechal Jourdan, pp. 110-11.
2. Ibid. A.G. mr 608-2, J.R. Jourdan, Memoires 
militaires de la_ campagne de 1.794.
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Instead, the French were to seek out the enemy's armies, 
attack them en masse, and destroy them. Territory and 
fortresses no longer were important; constant aggressiveness 
rather than thrust and maneuver became the order of the day. 
It emphasized discipline, minimum garrisons for strongpoints, 
frequent inspections and rotation of officers. The army 
was to engage the enemy with the bayonet and "pursue them 
to death." In employing this new warfare, Carnot decided 
that the decisive front was the Nord. Here the French must 
launch their biggest offensive in order to envelop the 
mass of the Allied army in the upper Sambre valley, a 
left pincer striking eastward from the Lille area, and 
a rrght hand pincer advancing north across the Sambre towards 
Mons. This operation was essentially the same as the one 
proposed by Jourdan in October, 1793.3
While Carnot's "General Method" has met with almost 
universal praise for ushering in a new age of warfare, 
his (or Jourdan's) strategy for defeating the Allied army 
has generally been condemned. It violated, the critics 
argue, the very principle of mass proposed in the general 
method. By dividing the Army of the North into two 
separate wings, each operating againsl the enemy's flanks, 
Carnot allowed the Allies the ability to mass their own
3. "General Method of the Military Operations of the 
Next Campaign," Corr., IV, pp. 279-8 3. Jourdan to Bouchotte, 
9/29/93. Corr., Ill, pp. 221-23.
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forces in a central position and to use interior lines to 
defeat the French pincers in detail. Instead, Carnot 
should have concentrated most of his 225,000 soldiers in 
the Sambre valley to strike at the Allies' left flank and 
force their army back towards the sea.4 This alternate 
strategy is open to criticism on two counts. It ignored 
the structural difficulties of launching such an operation. 
The French possessed neither the logistics nor the commu­
nications to march 150,000 or more men across the Allies' 
front and throw them en masse against his flank. It is 
very doubtful that Carnot could have supplied such a huge 
number of soldiers in so confined an area. Besides, such 
an operation would have left Paris open to an Allied 
counteroffensive, and this was politically unacceptable.
The Army of the Moselle's role in Carnot's plan 
of campaign was a secondary one. It was to take up a strong 
position near Arlon in the Ardennes, cut all communications 
between the enemy forces in Belgium and those in the Rhine 
valley, contain the Prussian army near Treves, and attack 
the 20,000-man force under General Jean Pierre Beaulieu 
which was operating near Arlon. At the very least it was 
to prevent Beaulieu from marching to the aid of the Allied 
forces in the Sambre valley.5
4. Henri Jomini, Histoire Critique et Militaire, VI, 
pp. 306-07.
5. A.G. mr 608-2, Memoire§ de 1794.
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Jourdaji encountered the predictable logistical 
difficulties when he assumed command of the army on March 
19. His newest conscripts had not yet been issued rifles, 
bayonets, and shoes, and the division of General Rene 
Moreaux needed clothing and camping equipment. Jourdan 
complained to his quartermaster that it was "hard to see 
some shoes in the magazines and see the soldiers bare-foot." 
Getting the shoes to the soldiers, he reminded him, was 
his task, not that of the representatives. When it rained 
"frightfully" for four days in early April, there was a 
food shortage during which the troops were entirely without 
bread, because the wagons were finding it difficult to nego­
tiate the muddy roads.® However, Jourdan also inherited 
an invaluable colleague in representative Rene Gillet, 
then on mission to the 'Moselle.' Gillet proved to be 
a more than adequate successor to Duquesnoy: he possessed
the latter's virtues without any of the accompanying defects. 
Gillet was young (thirty-two in 1794), energetic, tireless, 
a man who saw the logistical difficulties of the army as 
his primary concern. While a convinced Jacobin, he did 
not posses either Duquesnoy's fanaticism or his extreme 
ruthlessness. Like Duquesnoy, Gillet frequently operated 
right out of Jourdan's headquarters where he was in a 
position to collaborate closely with Jourdan in the 
maintenance and administration of the army.
6. A.G. mr 608-2, Jourdan'to the Committee, 3/24/94, 
4/4/94; Jourdan to the Commissaire-Ordonnateur, 4/9/94.
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Jourdan commanded under 70,000 men. Since he had 
to watch the Prussian army near Treves, he at first left 
the defeat of Beaulieu up to General J. Hatry with three 
divisions, 22,000 men. Hatry apparently bungled the operation. 
He advanced slowly, erroneously claiming that he was 
outnumbered; then, as he was about to attack, Beaulieu struck 
first and drove back one of his divisions. Hatry reported 
his defeat and strongly hinted that he would not be able
7
to handle Beaulieu without additional troops.
While this was occurring, General Pichegru with 
the Army of the Nord had suffered a series of defeats in 
Belgium, losing the key fortress of Landrecies to the 
Allies while completely failing to get his own offensive 
under way. His failures forced Carnot to adjust his strategy. 
In order to insure victory in the decisive Nord theater he 
decided to send Jourdan with a portion of his army north 
into Belgium against Liege and Namur. This would compel 
the enemy to detach troops from French Flanders to defend 
these two important bases, which in turn would weaken the 
forces facing Pichegru and make it easier for him to 
advance. On April 30, Carnot ordered Jourdan to leave 
a minimum force to cover the Moselle valley and march 
north on Namur with the rest. He was to recapture Arlon,
7. A.G. mr 608-2, see Hatry's letters to Jourdan 
during the second and third weeks of April, 1794.
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lost to Beaulieu by Hatry, and drive Beaulieu away from 
the Namur area. Carnot did not want to unite Jourdan with 
the right wing of the Army of the North in the Sambre 
valley at this point; the Moselle was to operate 
separately. Only gradually, as Jourdan marched north and 
neared the Sambre, did Carnot consider concentrating all 
the French forces between the Sambre and the Meuse into 
one great mass.®
As Jourdan approached Arlon, he suggested that they 
trap Beaulieu between his own army and a strong force 
from the Army of the Ardennes. Carnot liked the idea 
and instructed Pichegru to detach some 30,000 men from his 
right wing to help envelop Beaulieu. But Pichegru refused, 
evidently suggesting that Carnot get the 30,000 from 
somewhere else. Since Pichegru was accomplishing nothing 
in Belgium, Carnot was justifiably angry. "We have not 
received your decision on this last point (the 30,000 men). 
It has been several days since Jourdan received the order 
to march on Brabant, but what can he do if he is not 
seconded? Where will we get the 30,000 ... if not from 
the Army of the North? See if you, without losing a minute, 
instead of remaining stuck ... cause that force to 
debouch into the country between the Sambre and the Meuse."
8. Corr., IV, pp. 333-345, Carnot to Jourdan, 
4/27/94, 4/30/94, 5/3/94.
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Yet Pichegru never did send the troops, and his disobedience 
went unchallenged. It is difficult to explain Carnot's 
strange inability to force Pichegru to follow orders.
Perhaps Pichegru did have powerful connections on the Committee 
which put him beyond Carnot's ability to coerce.9
Pichegru's uncooperativeness made it impossible 
for Jourdan to envelop Beaulieu and force him to fight.
The Austrian general brushed aside the small force that 
Pichegru did send near Sedan. Jourdan momentarily caught 
up with him and defeated him in a minor engagement, but 
Beaulieu retreated oefore the action became general and 
succeeded in escaping northward. Carnot, still hopeful 
of catching Beaulieu, then ordered Jourdan to make a wide 
enveloping march via Bastogne through the Ardennes to get 
around his eastern flank and cut him off from Belgium.
Jourdan wrote back, suggesting that the army would be 
better concentrated if it took the shorter direct after 
Beaulieu via Neufchateau. That way it would also be able 
to reach the Sambre and to assist Pichegru sooner. Once 
again Carnot consented to Jourdan's proposal.
While Jourdan pursued Beaulieu through the
9. Corr., IV, pp. 340-51, Carnot to Jourdan, 5/6/94; 
Carnot to representatives Richard & Choudieu, 5/5/94.
10. A.G. mr 608-2, Jourdan to the Committee, 5/21/94; 
the Committee to Jourdan, 5/23/94.
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Ardennes, Pichegru failed miserably to fulfill Carnot's 
strategy in Belgium. Not until Jourdan's former subordinate, 
Souham, repulsed a major Allied attack in a confused battle 
near Turcoing did Pichegru's offensive make any progress 
at all. The right wing of his forces in the Sambre valley 
were putting heavy pressure on the Allies, but they were 
accomplishing little more. Pichegru had decided that this 
wing of the army be directed by a council of war consisting 
of four generals, the representatives, and St. Just, on 
special mission to the Nord from the Committee. Pichegru 
allowed the council to operate as it saw fit, as long as 
its forces attacked across the Sambre in accordance with 
the overall plan. There is every reason to believe that 
St. Just talked Pichegru into setting up this unwieldy 
command structure. St. Just was able to bend the council 
to his will, as he probably had anticipated, and he believed 
that the decisions taken by the council were good ones.11
But if the council satisfied St. Just, it did not 
win any victories. Throughout the month of May it sent 
the right wing across the Sambre in attack after relentless 
attack. Unfortunately, each time the army succeeded in
11. A.G. G1 32, Order of Pichegru, 5/17/94; St. Just 
to the Committee 5/22/94. For Pichegru's mishandling of the 
spring campaign see Jomini, o£ ci t , V. That Pichegru was 
a borderline incompetent there is little doubt. Represen­
tatives Baudot and Lacoste described him as possessing 
"neither the talent, the activity, nor the bearing of a 
general ... No talent to make a plan, no energy to carry 
out the plan of another."
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crossing the river, the council deployed the troops badly, 
usually dispersing them over too great a distance. Twice 
the Austrians found a weak point in the French lines, broke 
through it, and forced a retreat. Instead of stopping to 
analyze its failures, the council returned to the assault 
again and again, usually within a day or two of the last 
repulse. St. Just dismissed several generals, and 
threatened the others with immediate execution if they 
left their troops unordered. On May 29, the fourth attack 
momentarily seemed to be on the verge of success. The 
French invested Charleroi, but unfortunately they again 
deployed their units in a cordon that was too long and too 
thin. Three days later, after some confused fighting, 
the Austrians once again gained the upper hand and sent 
the Franch scuttling back to the safety of the south bank 
of the Sambre.^2
These repeated failures finally convinced Carnot 
that if the right wing of the Army of the North was ever 
to fight its way successfully across the Sambre, it would 
need the help of the Army of the Moselle. Yet as late 
as May 27 he had not decided whether to mass Jourdan's 
force with St. Just's —  the very decision for which military 
historians have praised him most. His orders to Jourdan 
on that day were curiously indecisive. Jourdan was to
12. Jomini, oj> cit, V, pp. 75-79, 106-07.
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take Namur if it could be done quickly. If it could not 
be, he was to blockade the city with half his force and cover 
the right flank of St. Just's army with the other half.
Then Carnot appeared to change his mind. If there were no 
serious enemy forces around Namur, Jourdan was to mask the 
city with as few troops as possible and with the bulk 
of his army to assist St. Just's force attacking across 
the river. Carnot encouraged Jourdan to bring the enemy 
to a general engagement: "it is better to employ your
forces in fighting the enemy in open country than in making
i 13 sieges."
Carnot thus massed close to 100,000 soldiers in 
the Sambre valley to batter their way across the river.
The problem was: who should command this huge force? The 
council was the logical choice, except that it was not working 
effectively. There was frequent disagreement among the 
members. Its two senior generals, Charbonnier, the 
commander of the Ardennes, and Desjardins, were mediocrities. 
The army's logistics had become so confused that represen­
tative Laurent was, in effect, forced to act as its quarter­
master. It seemed that St. Just and representatives 
Guyton and Levasseur were the true commanders, at times 
overruling the generals in the council, at times ordering 
attacks against the latters' wishes. The failure of their
13. A.G. mr 608-2, the Committee to Jourdan, 5/27/94; 
Corr., IV, Carnot to Jourdan, 5/27/94.
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operations had left them baffled. "I was desolate,"
Levasseur recalled. "I did not know who to reproach for 
3 4
operations so badly executed."
Now Jourdan was about to arrive with 40,000 more 
men. Was he also to become enmeshed in the dissensions and 
difficulties of the council? Levasseur did not think so.
In a meeting with the other council members he suggested that 
Jourdan be given sole command over all the French forces 
along the Sambre. St. Just allegedly objected. He feared 
putting so many men under the control of one general; 
the Committee would never approve such a decision since 
it would "be giving a soldier power very dangerous to 
liberty." This story is open to question, for the evidence 
suggests that St. Just was in Paris when the meeting took 
p l a c e . I n  any case, Levasseur carried the day. He 
then informed Jourdan of the decision, apparently at a 
second meeting. Jourdan typically demurred at first, being 
unfamiliar with the army and its officer corps, he feared 
that the Committee would not approve. But Levasseur
14. A.G. B1 32, St. Just to the Committee, 5/22/94.
Rene Levasseur, Memoires, II, pp. 245-47. Even after four 
consecutive defeats none of the generals on the council
had either been dismissed or arrested —  a sure indication • 
that St. Just and company were the ones making the decisions.
15. Levasseur, ibid, pp. 252-55. E. M. Curtis,
St. Just (N.Y. 1935), pp. 256-57, shows conclusively that 
St. Just was in Paris when Levasseur gave Jourdan the command. 
On the other hand, Levasseur may have first broached the 
subject of a unified command before St. Just left for Paris.
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persuaded him to take command at least until the government 
declared itself on the issue. To the Committee Levasseur 
wrote that "convinced that this day would have been more 
glorious if there had been more coordination in the 
operations, we judged it urgent to call a single general 
to direct operations."1^
The Committee did not act upon Levasseur's 
proposal until five days later. Perhaps certain Committee 
members did object to turning all of the soldiers in the 
Sambre valley over to Jourdan. On June 8, however, the 
Committee finally decreed that everyone between the Sambre 
and the Meuse rivers was under Jourdan's command. The 
same day Carnot notified the representatives accompanying 
Pichegru, reminded them that Jourdan was under Pichegru's 
overall authority and suggested that they rest assured about 
the competence of the leadership on the right. With this 
decision the famous Army of the Sambre et Meuse was born.
Its and Jourdan's fortunes were to be inseparable for the 
next three years.17
This time Jourdan took command of an army under 
slightly more favorable conditions than in 1793. He alone 
was not responsible for the operations of all the French 
forces in the Low Countries as he had been in 1793, for
16. A.G. Bl 33, the Representatives ... to the 
Committee, 6/3/94. The letter was written by Levasseur. 
Levasseur, ibid.
17. A.G. Bl 33, Carnot to Jourdan, 6/8/94; Carnot to 
Richard and Choudieu, 6/8/94.
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Pichegru now bore the lion's share of that responsibility 
He was not leading a half-completed army whose most 
noticeable characteristic was its unreliability. To be 
sure, the army of the Sambre et Meuse was basically the 
same kind of force as the Army of the North. It was an 
army of peasant conscripts, more distinguished fcr their 
indiscipline than for their military prowess, commanded 
by young, inexperienced officers. It was an army with 
a logistical system that would have sent an efficiency 
expert screaming to a psychiatrist. And yet it was not 
the untested, unstable force that the 'Nord' had been. A 
year's campaigning had served to take much of the rawness 
of the French soldiers. Experience had made them less 
inclined to disorder and indiscipline, more inclined to 
steadiness, toughness and endurance, especially on the 
battlefield. They had developed some of the 
cohesiveness which earlier they had so sadly lacked. 
Furthermore, the Sambre et Meuse did not suffer from the 
cadre problem that had made Jourdan's task so difficult 
in 1793. The Fromentins, d'Avaisnes and Beauregards had 
largely disappeared, and in their places were some of the 
most promising young officers in Europe; future army 
commanders like Kleber, Championnet, Bernadotte and Ney. 
For the first time, Jourdan could depend upon his cadres.
18. Phipps, 0 £  cit, II, pp. 150-60.
out
18
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
203
One condition, however, remained the same: the 
pressure. For the second time Jourdan had a member of the 
Committee peering watchfully over his shoulder, but this 
time the man was not Carnot but St. Just. Louis Antoine 
St. Just was different from Carnot altogether. Carnot 
was a realist, St. Just a utopian dreamer; Carnot was 
coldly pragmatic, St. Just a rigid ideologue; Carnot recognized 
the failings in humans and took them into account, St. Just 
believed that a free, virtuous people could do no wrong;
Carnot was a moderate, St. Just was a fanatic. His 
merciless hatred of royalists, traitors, and even "the 
indifferent" had earned him the nickname "The Angel of 
Death." He was not the kind of man who would tolerate any 
failures, especially by a general. Most importantly, where 
Carnot possessed a degree of military experience and 
expertise, St. Just possessed none at all. Yet, as long 
as he remained at the front, he made every effort to 
influence the direction of operations. Indeed, it is 
likely that by June he had developed such a taste for his 
role as a soldier-proconsul, that it was only with the 
greatest difficulty that Robespierre succeeded in dragging 
him away from the front to the less inspiring and less 
exciting political arena in Paris. St. Just was easily 
Jourdan's most difficult teammate; it took all of his team 
spirit to move matters forward while associated with this 
young terrorist.
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St, Just, in short, was one of the men of mass whom
Jourdan so distrusted, at least when it was a question of
strategy or tactics. Their association might have been
doomed, except for one consideration. For all his
imperiousness and fanaticism, St. Just was more fearsome 
19in word than in deed.
On the eve of Jourdan's first attempt to renew the 
offensive, St. Just outlined what he expected of him during 
the forthcoming operations. It was the Committee's intention 
that Jourdan attack without cease, since the enemy was 
inferior to him in numbers. He was to endeavor to advance 
every day, and constantly push the enemy off balance.
"Your triumphant and rapid march from Arlon has made us 
hope that offensive warfare will be to your taste. We will 
watch the administrators ... you only have to conquer.
No self-doubts, nothing else in your heart, be sensitive 
only to the glory of the Republic! Maintain the enthusiasm 
of the army by continuous successes and by audacity.
The struggle for liberty should be waged with ferocity.
You will never be 'repris' for having acted with ardor."
19. See R.R. Palmer, Twelve Who Ruled, for St. Just's 
lack of ruthlessness during his mission to Alsace. During the 
Fleurus campaign, Levasseur claims that he came upon 
St. Just playing with a pistol. The gun went off accidentally, 
the ball nearly hitting Levasseur. St. Just went white, 
nearly fainted, and collapsed on Levasseur's shoulder, 
apologizing profusely for the near disaster —  not the 
expected behavior of a merciless terrorist.
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And with an epigram typical of him, he concluded, "The enemy 
can only temporize with an army that itself temporizes."20 
Jourdan's primary assignment thus was to put unceasing 
pressure upon the enemy via relentless offensive activity 
until they cracked. In principle this seemed easy enough.
In practice, to overcome the tactical and logistical 
problems involved and to advance literally every day was 
extremely difficult.
It was difficult, in addition, because Pichegru 
was hindering rather than helping matters. Pichegru 
apparently was not happy with the government's decision 
to place half his army under Jourdan's command. While 
Pichegru nominally remained in charge, it was clear that 
Jourdan would exercise full tactical control over his 
forces. No sooner had he assumed his post than it was 
discovered that his force was not receiving its fair share 
of the supplies. Pichegru's quartermaster controlled the 
supplying of all the French troops in Belgium and he, evidently 
with Pichegru's consent, was favoring the half of the army 
in West Flanders at the expense of Jourdan's force. Carnot 
had to order this to cease, warning the representatives 
with Pichegru about the "particular passions which were 
troubling the concert which should reign in the operations 
of the right and the left," and which were slowing down
20. A.G. Bl 33, St. Just to Jourdan, 6/14/94.
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the offensive.- Nor were Pichegru's instructions to Jourdan 
especially helpful. He ordered him to cross the Sambre and 
take Charleroi. This done, he thought it would be "interesting" 
if Jourdan "swept" the Sambre valley clear of enemy soldiers 
as far as Maubeuge in order to disengage that place "from 
the daily insults to which it is exposed —  thence all 
forces towards Mons." This directive was hardly in the 
spirit of Carnot's strategy. It made Charleroi rather 
than the enemy army the objective, and it ordered Jourdan 
tc clear the banks of the Sambre rather than pursue the 
enemy to the death.21
On June 12, Jourdan commenced his offensive, the 
fifth attempt by the French to cross the Sambre and stay 
there. Five divisions had participated in the fourth 
offensive with additional divisions left to guard the upper 
Sambre. Jourdan attacked with nine. He wished to add 
one or two more from the Maubeuge area but St. Just 
prevented him from doing so. The French crossed at 
Chatelet and Marchiennes above and below Charleroi. They 
encountered only light resistance. By the following day 
Jourdan had deployed the army in a long semi-circle north 
of Charleroi while one of his divisions besieged the city.
21. A.G. Bl 33, Pichegru to Jourdan, 6/3/94; Carnot 
to Richard & Choudieu, 6/8/94.
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Military analysts have unanimously criticized 
Jourdan's position as being too extended. It was. On 
the other hand, peculiarities in the communications and 
topography of the area forced him to adopt his dispositions. 
His only two lines of retreat across, the river —  the 
bridges at Chatelet and Marchiennes —  were behind each 
of his flanks, separated by Charleroi. He thus had to 
lengthen his defenses far enough to cover both bridges, 
because his 70,000 men could not have retreated safely over 
only one in a crisis. Moreover, the environs of Charleroi 
were heavily wooded. To afford his men clear vision of 
the enemy and clear fields of fire, Jourdan had to deploy 
them north of the woods, a considerable distance from the 
city (map No. f>) . Finally, the Allies were scattered 
across his front: Beaulieu with 20,000 men at Namur, the 
Prince of Orange with a large force upstream, and additional 
troops due north of Charleroi. Jourdan knew that their 
usual custom was to attack from every direction at once.
So he placed two divisions under General Jean Kleber on 
his left to face Orange, two more divisions under General 
Francois Marceau downstream to face Beaulieu, and three 
more divisions north of the city to cover that sector.
At the time he was optimistic about his position, perhaps 
overly so. He reported to the Committee that his dispositions 
were advantageous, that the army was in good order and 
good spirits, and that it would take a major effort by
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the enemy to compel them to retreat.22
But his position was not put to the test. Under 
pressure from St. Just, Jourdan ordered a general advance 
for June 16, its objective to seek out and attack the 
various "gruppes"23 of the Allies. Since these were stretched 
out in a cordon, Jourdan planned to attack and occupy each 
one. His intention was for Kleber to attack Orange on the 
French left, Marceau to attack Beaulieu on the right, 
while the three divisions of the center overwhelmed what 
he believed to be the weakest gruppe of the enemy near 
Quatre Bras. Coincidentally the Allied too had decided 
to advance, albeit with numbers inferior to those of the 
French. Their lines of advance all were aimed at Charleroi, 
and thus were destined to collide with Jourdan's troops.24
Dawn of the 16th found both armies groping their way 
forward through a thunderstorm so intense that the troops 
could scarcely see fifteen paces in front of them through 
the driving rain. So poor was the visibility that the
22. A.G. Bl 33 and B 34, Jourdan to the Committee, 
6/12/94, 6/14/94; Ernouf to the Committee, 6/26/94. A.G. 
mr 608-2, Memoires de 1794.
23. The Allies, and especially the Austrians, had no 
permanent units larger than brigades in 1794. Any temporary 
grouping of soldiers larger than a brigade was ad h o c , 
usually with a temporary commander. Since the German word 
for such a formation is "gruppe," I have decided to adopt it.
24. A.G. mr 608-2, Memoires de 1794. Phipps, op cit,
II, pp. 153-54.
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advancing soldiers literally bumped into each other and 
began to fight at that point. At the initial shock, the 
advantage went to the Allies, their professionals keeping 
their discipline and alignment more successfully than did 
the less experienced French. On the left Kleber's troops 
fell into confusion and he had to redeploy them while 
in the center the Austrian gruppe of Alvinzi stormed the 
village of Miqueloup on the Brussels road and drove the 
French back. But by mid-morning the rain had slackened, 
visibility had improved, and the French had collected 
themselves. The three divisions in the center halted 
Alvinzi's attack in the Heppignies wood. Kleber, checked 
by strong resistance in the village of Trazignies, shifted 
troops to the left of the village and attacked the 
defenders in flank. The attack succeeded. Orange's 
troops fled in confusion from Trazignies, and had not a 
French cavalry charge gone astray, Kleber may well have 
turned Orange's retreat into a rout. When Jourdan heard 
of Kleber's success around noon, he adjusted his strategy. 
Kleber was to march east along the old Ronum road and 
take Alvinzi's force in the flanl, while Jourdan renewed 
the attacks on Alvinzi frontally: they hoped to catch him 
between two f i r e s . ^ 5
25. A.G. Bl 34, Jourdan's report of the battle, 
6/17/94; Kleber to Jourdan, 6/17/94. Jean Championnet, 
Souvenirs (Paris, no date), pp. 54-57.
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At first the maneuver succeeded. While General 
Jean Championnet repulsed sporadic enemy attacks in the woods, 
Jourdan reinforced General Morlot's division with the cavalry 
reserve and counterattacked along the Brussels road. Morlot 
took, lost, and then retook Miqueloup with 600 prisoners 
in severe fighting. When the Austrian cavalry charged 
to retake the village, the French cavalry hurled them back. 
Alvinzi's gruppe was in severe difficulty. Kleber was 
within view behind the Austrians' flank, and they were 
yielding to the heavy pressure in front. But with victory 
in sight, the army's logistical inadequacies intervened.
While fighting Beaulieu to the right of the Heppignies wood, 
Lefebvre's division ran completely out of ammunition.
"I used up everything," he reported. "I should still 
occupy the Campinaire position if the ammunition had not 
failed ... Nothing is so disheartening as to see oneself 
obliged to abandon the combat having nothing left with which 
to return the enemy's fire." What, or who, caused the 
shortage is unknown. Jourdan later suggested that certain 
blundering supply officials were the culprits. Regardless 
of who was at fault, Lefebvre had to fall back.2**
At once Jourdan's entire position was compromised.
The Austrians poured through the gap left by Lefebvre,
26. Ibid. A.G. Bl 34, Lefebvre to Jourdan, 6/17/94. 
A.G. mr 608-2, Memoires de 1794.
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forcing the troops on either side to retreat as well.
A daring commander might have attempted to hang on and 
complete the defeat of the enemy's center, but Jourdan 
was prudent. He ordered a retreat. Kleber and Marceau 
got back across the river without difficulty, but the troops 
of the center were cut off by swarms of enemy cavalry. 
Cmapionnet, ordered to retreat by way of Chatelet, found 
his path blocked, and had to change direction and fight his 
way through the Allied cavalry to the bridge at Marchiennes. 
Several of Lefebvre's battalions had to form squares cmd 
repulse cavalry assaults all the way back to the river, 
exhibiting a bravery that the old soldier Lefebvre had 
never witnessed before. Under the circumstances it is 
a wonder thcit the Sambre et Meuse did not suffer more 
severely than it did. But by nightfall it was safe on the 
south bank of the Sambre, having lost between 3,000 and
4,000 men. Its casualties easily could have been high* r.27
Jourdan1s meeting with St. Just that night could 
not have been terribly pleasant. Although he promised the 
Committee that the army would take its revenge, a defeat 
was a defeat. Typically St. Just wanted to resume the 
offensive the very next day. Jourdan wished to rest the 
army for a few days, allowing them to replenish their 
provisions and ammunition. He also wished to attack
27. Ibid. The casualty figures are estimates only.
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elsewhere, because he was not happy with the tactical 
problems involved in besieging Charleroi. While he was 
ready to renew the offensive immediately as St. Just 
desired, he wrote that they "could do so more advantageously 
at another point." He promised to confer with St. Just and 
the other representatives to decide what to do. But St.
Just and his colleagues were determined to continue to 
attack in the Charleroi sector. They granted Jourdan 
twenty-four hours to rest the army, and then the offensive 
was to recommence. Interestingly enough, two days later 
Carnot agreed to Jourdan's suggestion. While he 
reemphasized that since the French outnumbered the enemy, 
they must attack without respite and allow the enemy 
"no repose," yet they could, if Jourdan thought it best, 
attack elsewhere while masking Charleroi. By the time 
Carnot's letter arrived, however, the army, due to St.
Just's impatience, had already recrossed the Sambre and 
reinvested Charleroi.^8
With a mere one day of rest the Sambre et Meuse 
reapplied its unrelenting pressure on the Allies. It 
repeated its crossing of the Sambre of June 12, reinvested 
Charleroi, and redeployed in its overly long cordon from 
Chatelet to Marchiennes. The Allies, unprepared for such 
a rapid renewal of the offensive, offered no resistance. On
28. A. G. Bl 34, Jourdan to the Committee, 6/16/94. 
Corr., IV, pp. 436-37, Carnot to St. Just, 6/20/94.
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the eve of the- advance, Jourdan tried his hand at revolu­
tionary rhetoric in an effort to bolster spirits. "Republicans, 
victory has slipped through our fingers at the moment when 
we were about to triumph," he proclaimed. "I do not 
seek at this moment the causes of this event, which must 
be as depressing to you as it is to me. It is necessary to 
repair it; the slaves of tyrants have achieved a victory 
over free men, you tremble with indignation! You are the 
soldiers who tore them to pieces at Hondschoote [misspelled], 
Maubeuge, and Landau ... Hold yourselves ready; we will 
conquer or we will all p e r i s h . A s  this proclamation 
reveals, arousing men's emotions with stirring words was 
not one of Jourdan's talents. Perhaps he believed the 
reality of the situation too grim to be able to elevate it 
to the level of a glorious undertaking.
Jourdan's task now was to capture Charleroi before 
the Allies returned and attempted to relieve it a second 
time. Following his victory of June 16, Coburg had detached 
a sizeable portion of his army to West Flanders to halt 
Pichegru's offensive in this sector. Until he recalled 
these troops, Coburg could not hope to relieve Charleroi.
The French pressed the siege vigorously. Under the able 
direction of Jourdan's chief of engineers, Marescot, the 
French had the city completely invested and under heavy
29. A.G. Bl 34, Order of the day, 6/17/94.
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bombardment in. but a few days. Throughout these operations 
St. Just was at his most imperious. He cashiered and 
arrested all the officers of one battalion which had fled 
on the 16th on the grounds that the soldiers would not 
have panicked if their officers had trained them properly. 
There were other arrests besides t h e s e . H e  wandered through 
the trenches, harrassing Marescot and uttering dire threats 
against slackers and incompetents. fie threatened with 
guillotining one artillery captain who was constructing 
a gun emplacement if he did not complete the work by the 
following morning. The evidence reveals that much of this 
was threat only; the artillery captain, for example, was 
never guillotined.3-*- Nevertheless it must have increased 
the already intense pressure upon the officers, and especially 
upon Jourdan. St. Just, in his fanatical determination to 
finish the campaign overnight, only made matters more 
difficult; instead of inspiring his generals to greater 
efforts, he only increased their nervousness.
Worse, he interfered with Jourdan's tactical 
direction of the army. When reconnaissance failed to turn 
up any serious enemy resistance in the immediate area and
30. A.G. B1 34, Decree of St. Just, Gillet, and 
Guyton, 6/18/94.
31. Phipps, o£ cit, II, pp. 157-58, on the basis of 
Soult's memoirs, claims that St. Just guillotined the luckless 
captain. Such punishments were announced in each order of 
the day; no such execution, or even arrest, of any artillery 
captain was ever announced, either before or after Fleurus.
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when information reached headquarters that Coburg was 
detaching sizeable reinforcements to West Flanders, St.
Just jumped to the conclusion that the Allies had decided 
to yield Charleroi. By sitting before the city, the 
Sambre et Meuse was failing in its express duty to attack 
the enemy every day. On June 23 St. Just decided to send 
a corps of 36,000 soldiers up the Sambre valley towards 
Mons to "harrass this movement" of Allied reinforcements 
to West Flanders. For an army to weaken itself by close 
to half its strength in the middle of a siege and in the 
face of the enemy violated every principle of military 
common sense. Several sources indicate that this order was 
never issued, either because Jourdan talked St. Just out of 
it or because St. Just never seriously intended to carry 
out the project. Both opinions are erroneous. Doubtlessly 
Jourdan protested against dividing the army in so dangerous 
a fashion. Nonetheless St. Just did force him to detach 
the 36,000 men and orders were issued to Kleber to begin 
the movement c-n the morning of June 25.32
Meanwhile Coburg decided to recall his troops from 
West Flanders and make another effort to save Charleroi. 
Coburg was baffled by the relentless French pressure on both
32. A. G. B1 34, Jourdan to the Committee, 6/23/94; the 
Representatives to the Committee, 6/23/94. The handwriting 
of the second letter is St. Just's. Curtis argues uncon­
vincingly that St. Just never seriously intended to send 
Kleber towards Mons. Jourdan's letter of the 23rd shows that 
St. Just was serious, and that he had agreed to execute 
St. Just's movement.
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his flanks. He had been switching troops back and forth 
from one flank to the other in vain efforts to halt conclusively 
the Republican offensive. What he did not do was shift enough 
troops to one wing to enable him to gain a numerical 
superiority over one of the French arms and defeat it decisive­
ly. Now he faced for the sixth time a recently repulsed 
French army back again on the north short of the Sambre.
The pressure was taking its toll. British officers reported 
that the Austrians were "profoundly discouraged" by the 
endless French assaults, causing over half the officer 
corps to request permission to retire. One judged the 
Austrian army "incapable of further action." Such an 
evaluation was premature, as the events of June 26 were 
to show. Even so, when Coburg concentrated his forces 
and made an all-out effort to crush Jourdan, his advance 
was hardly crisp or rapid. He moved slowly, giving the 
French early warning of his approach. ^
Thus at the eleventh hour, Jourdan managed to get 
the project sending Kleber towards Mons cancelled. Thanks 
to the intelligence about Coburg's approach coming from the 
advanced posts, he was able to convince St. Just that a 
major battle was imminent. Nothing could have been more
33. Sir John Fortescue, A History of the British Army, 
IV, pp. 276-79.
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fortunate. Had St. Just remained adamant about dispatching 
the corps, or had Coburg delayed his advance several days, 
Jourdan would have had to fight with 40,000 soldiers instead 
of 76,000, and Fleurus might have been a defeat instead 
of a decisive victory.^
As the Allies threatened, their advance units 
driving in the French outposts, St. Just made another mistake. 
On June 25, the Austrian commandant of Charleroi sent 
an emissary to French headquarters proposing a surrender on 
terms. It was very important that the French take Charleroi 
before Coburg attacked. Jourdan needed the 8,000 men 
conducting the siege as a reserve for his overextended 
defenses. He also needed the city's bridges, since they 
would give him a surer retreat route, and enable him to 
shorten his lines which would no longer have to cover both 
Chatelet and Marchiennes. However, upon receipt of the 
surrender proposal St. Just drew himself up and imperiously 
announced that "it's the place we want, not a scrap of 
paper." He then told the astonished emissary that if the 
garrison did not surrender unconditionally within the hour, 
they would be annihilated. Jourdan and his staff were 
appalled. It was not the place they wanted so much as 
Hatry’s 8,000 men and Charleroi's bridges; granting the 
garrison lenient terms was a small price to pay. They
34. A.G. B1 34, Kleber to Duhesme, 6/24/94; Ferrand 
to Favereau, 6/24/94; Bernadotte to Kleber, 6/24/94.
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hastily began to remonstrate with St. Just as time passed, 
as the garrison refused to surrender, and as Coburg's 
army came menacingly nearer. But fortune smiled upon 
the French. Charleroi's commandant bowed to St. Just's 
ruthlessness and agreed to surrender at his discretion. Thus 
Jourdan obtained his bridges and his precious reserve of
8,000 men, but if the Austrian commandant had not lost his 
nerve, Jourdan would have had to fight Fleurus with neither.35
One wonders how strained relations between Jourdan 
and St. Just had become by the eve of Fleurus. Certainly 
the constant friction over the conduct of operations had not 
facilitated their cooperation. Jourdan claimed in his memoirs 
that he once again felt as if he were fighting with a 
guillotine suspended over his head; one failure would 
cause the blade to fall. Undoubtedly he felt interfered with; 
he wrote no letters to the Committee after Fleurus praising 
St. Just's aid as he had after Wattignies praising Carnot's.
St. Just's feelings towards Jourdan are more difficult to 
penetrate. At no point did he actually complain about Jourdan's 
generalship, indicating that perhaps their disagreements 
had not disturbed him as much as they had disturbed Jourdan.
On the other hand, the future marshal Jean Soult claimed 
that St. Just had prepared a proscription list which 
included Jourdan and several other generals, and that only
35. A.G. B1 34, Ernouf to the Committee, 6/26/94. A .G. 
mr 608-2, Memoires de 1794.
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the victory of Fleurus saved their leads. However, Soult 
is the sole authority for this, and he generally must be 
handled with some skepticism. Furthermore, St. Just was 
on excellent terms with Rene Gillet. It is unlikely that 
he would have been so friendly with such a close colleague 
of Jourdan if he had Jourdan marked for death. Even so it 
is hard to predict what would have occurred had he been 
defeated. St. Just might not have shown compassion for a 
general who had disagreed with him repeatedly, and who had 
compounded his sin by losing a b a ttle.^
Charleroi's surrender allowed Jourdan to place 
Hatry's troops in the rear of his perimeter as a general 
reserve. He wished to pull Kleber's two and a half divisions 
in closer behind the Pieton stream to shorten his line, 
since he no longer needed the bridge at Marchiennes, but 
the presence of the enemy caused him to leave Kleber 
where he was. The French positions were essentially the 
same as on June 16; they ran from Marchiennes on the left, 
through the heights of Courcelles, Gosselies, Campinaire and 
Lambusart, to Chatelet (map No. 6). This time, however, 
they were strengthened at various points with fieldworks.
The perimeter was not continuous, for Kleber was really
36. A.G. mr 608-2, Memoires de 1794. Soult casts 
doubt upon his claim by arguing that he too was on St. 
Just's list. Why St. Just would have proscribed him, a 
lowly brigadier, he did not say. See Phipps, 0 £  cit, II, 
pp. 150-60.
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separate from the rest of the army on the west bank of 
the Pieton. Coburg planned his attack in the traditional 
manner: five columns striking the semi-circle at various 
points, the strongest columns being those on the flanks.
The gruppe of the Prince of Orange was to attack Kleber 
and seize Marchiennes; that of Quasdonovitch was to assault 
Gosselies; and that of Kaunitz was to attack on the 
latter's left. Meanwhile, the Archduke Karl was to seize 
Campinaire, and Beaulieu was to break the French right and 
march on Charleroi. Coburg was unaware that the city had
fallen. He had slightly under 60,000 men. He was outnumbered;
3 7Jourdan awaited him with 76,000.
At three a.m. on the 26th, Coburg began bombarding 
the French positions as he sent his army forward. Neither 
the cannonade nor the fighting was to cease for fifteen 
hours. Of all the struggles of the revolution, Fleurus 
was the longest and the most murderous.
By mid-morning, after several hours of fighting, 
neither side had gained any advantage. On the left Orange 
had captured Trazignies, but Kleber's sector was otherwise 
secure. In the center Championnet had repulsed Kaunitz's 
first assault; Lefebvre had abandoned Fleurus but was holding 
the Austrian advance at his main line of defense. On
37. Phipps, ibid. Jomini, op cit, V, p. 152. Stephan 
Ross, Quest For Victory, pp. 75-80, gives Coburg 70,000.
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the right Marceau battled Beaulieu for the village of 
Lambusart. Over the battlefield floated history's first 
observation balloon manned by French observers. It provoked 
Coburg to complain that there was nothing that "those 
scoundrels" would not invent, but it did little damage since 
the information it sent down was quite useless.^®
The French obtained their first victory on the left. 
There Orange's troops had succeeded in pushing back one of 
Kleber's divisions, but instead of continuing the attack, 
Orange bypassed Kleber's position on the heights of Courcelles 
and marched straight for Marchiennes and its bridge. Mar­
chiennes was strongly defended by a French brigade, and 
as the Allies vainly attempted to storm it, Kleber saw 
his chance. He debouched from the heights, and with 
Bernadotte's brigade leading he launched a bayonet charge 
into the rear of Orange's men. Caught between two fires 
they crumbled, and Orange lost his nerve and prematurely 
ordered a retreat. By mid-afternoon Kleber was so free 
of the enemy that Jourdan 01 dered him to send reinforcements 
to other sectors of the front. In the center things were 
also going well. The French were holding firm behind
earthworks in the Heppignies wood, repulsing the sporadic
39assaults of the Allies' three center columns.
38. A.G. B2* 260, Jourdan to the Minister of War, 
12/7/98.
39. A.G. B1 34, Kleber's report of the battle, 6/27/94. 
A.G. mr 608-2., Memoires de 1794.
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But on- the right the battle had entered a crisis. 
There Marceau had checked the initial enemy assault, but 
Beaulieu had lost no time in renewing the attack. Marceau's 
units were from the rag-tag Army of the Ardennes, the most 
ill-trained and badly led men in the army. Several regiments 
panicked before a cavalry charge. The 54th demi-brigade 
changed front to halt the attackers, but, assailed on all 
sides, it lost 300 of 400 men before being routed. Another 
demi-brigade suffered a similar fate, and suddenly Marceau's 
entire force was streaming back across the river in hopeless 
rout. Soult found the 24-year-old Marceau in black despair, 
threatening suicide. Soult claimed that he talked Marceau 
out of it, and the two began rallying what men they could 
to make a stand along the riverbank. Meanwhile the Austrians 
poured through the gap, stormed Lambusart, and assailed 
the flank of Lefebvre's entrenched division at Campinaire.^ 
General Francois Lefebvre now became the key to 
the battle. If he lost his earthworks, the entire French 
line would come unhinged. Both sides realized it and 
redoubled their efforts. Jourdan moved Hatry's reserve 
forward to Lefebvre's support, and Lefebvre shifted some 
of his troops to his own right behind Lambusart. Here the 
fighting became ferocious. The combined forces of Beaulieu
40. Ibid. A. G. B1 34, Marceau's report, 6-27-94. 
Phipps, op cit, II, pp. 160-61.
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and the Archduke repeatedly stormed Lefebvre's position, 
and each time the French threw them back with volleys at 
point-blank range. At each repulse French cavalry sallied 
out and slashed at the retreating enemy. Lefebvre called 
the gunfire "volcanic," and he had two horses killed under 
him. Some buildings in the vicinity caught fire. When the 
blaze spread to the wheat fields, the soldiers found themselves 
fighting amid smoke and flames, the wounded and dying 
trapped where they fell in the burning wheat. All the while 
Jourdan kept his men fighting, riding along the firing 
line chanting "no retreat today," until the troops themselves 
took up th • chant. There was no retreat. The French 
held on, repulsing the Austrians; by nightfall they had 
even recaptured Lambusart.^
There was one last crisis. As Lefebvre sent men 
from his left to his hard-pressed right, he left a gap 
between himself and Championnet. The latter and Morlot 
already had enemy troops infiltrating around their left, 
and they now faced envelopment on their right as well. 
Championnet had actually begun to fall back to avoid 
encirclement when he and Jourdan learned cf the enemy's final 
defeat at Campinaire. Jourdan thus threw in his last
41. Ibid. A. G. Bl 34, Official report of the 
battle of Fleurus by the chief-of-staff of the Austrian 
Army; Lefebvre's report, 6/2 7/94.
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reserves, including some of Kleber's men, and with 
representatives Gillet and Guyton leading the troops, the 
French counterattacked one last time. By six P**U Championnet 
had recaptured his former positions and his assailants 
were in full retreat. The battle was over.42
It had been the most punishing day of the war.
The generals on the right freely admitted that had the 
fighting lasted an hour longer, their soldiers would have 
been too exhausted to resist further. The French lost
7,000 men, their highest casualties until the battle of the 
Trebbia in 1799. The Allies lost 10,000 men, the battle, 
and (although it was not evident at the time) all of the 
Low Countries, and in a sense the war.43
For Fleurus was the decisive battle of the 
revolution. It so broke the resistance of the Allied army 
that never again did the counterrevolution threaten to inarch 
on Paris and extinguish the revolution. Fleurus forced the 
Allies to evacuate all of the Low Countries, and thus opened 
up the fertile provinces of Brabant and Hainault to French 
requisitions at a time when the resources of French 
Flanders were virtually exhausted. Fleurus thereby saved 
the French armies from a major subsistence crisis. Before
42. Ibid. Championnet, Souvenirs, pp. 160-65.
43. Ross, op cit, p. 80.
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the year was out, the French would conquer everything west 
of the Rhine River from their weakened adversaries. The 
victory established the revolutionary army with its new 
methods of total war as the dominant military force in 
Europe. It would not be long before Napoleon would take 
advantage of the military superiority which he had inherited 
from the Jacobins to conquer half of the continent. Most 
importantly, Fleurus directly affected the course of domestic 
policy. The Allies' defeat meant in essence that the country 
was no longer in danger. The internal threat had been 
eliminated over the course of the winter by the crushing 
of the Vendeans and the liquidation of the extremist opposition 
in Paris; Fleurus extinguished the external threat.
The defeat of the Allies' most dangerous army meant that 
the emergency was over, and because it was, Robespierre's 
Prarial policies became all the more unnecessary —  and 
detested. Fleurus thus helped bring about the 9th of 
Thermidor. By winning for the Jacobin dictatorship the 
decisive victory for which it had worked so long, Jourdan 
paradoxically helped bring about its downfall.
II. The Completion of the Revolutionary Army.
Jourdan did not win the battle of Fleurus simply 
because he outgeneraled his opponent. He was victorious 
because the Jacobin dictatorship had largely eradicated 
the vexing problems that had crippled the army's performance
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in 179 3. His army no longer suffered from units of unruly, 
undisciplined, unamalgamated draftees incapable of fighting 
a serious campaign; nor did it suffer from the kind of shortages 
that cau; ed soldiers to wade barefoot through mud and slush 
after having gone three and four days without bread. The 
Sambre et Meuse was far from being the perfected, polished 
army that Napoleon was to lead in the 1800's, but it 
was far superior to anything Jourdan had led previously.
The most striking and important change was the 
improvement in the army's discipline. No longer did the 
officer corps have to fear that their men would take to 
their heels at the first opportunity. The improvement was 
partly due to the greater experience of the soldiers.
By 1794 most of them had become accustomed to military 
regimentation as well as to the hardships of the front; 
consequently they did not resist discipline so strongly. The 
spectacle of entire ranks of their comrades slaughtered 
around them by volleys of musketry and blasts of grapeshot 
was not nearly so shocking at Fleurus as it had been in 
their first actions in 179 3. The young French peasants 
had become hardened to war, and as a result they were able to 
endure fifteen hours of combat without caving in before 
their foes. But the improvement was also partly due to 
the generals and the representatives who succeeded in 
establishing a system of swift, no-nonsense military justice. 
Potential offenders, faced with the near certainty that
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if caught they would be hauled before a revolutionary
tribunal or military tribunal and perhaps executed within
twenty-four hours, tended not to go through with whatever
breach of discipline they had planned. The new, get-tough
policy of the Terror was indeed felt within the ranks.
Gunner Louis Bricard in his diary recorded much disorder
in 1793, and very little done about suppressing it. In
1794 for the first time he reported many cases of the actual
execution of deserters and pillagers. In one instance
two drummer boys who had robbed an old lady were, in spite
of their youth, shot by firing squad much to Bricard's 
44dismay.
A further reason for the improved discipline was 
the increased number of talented, competent leaders within 
the army. The Jacobins gradually realized that the policy 
of allowing the soldiers to elect two thirds of their 
officers was simply allowing more and more incompetents 
to reach positions of authority. In November, 1793, the 
Committee began to reverse this policy. It decreed that 
the Convention —  i.e., its deputies on mission —  
henceforth had the responsibility of selecting one third 
of all officers promoted. In December, the representatives 
acquired the power to make whatever promotions they deemed
44. Louis Bricard, Journal, pp. 100-16.
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necessary. In- theory, one third of the officers were still 
to advance via election, two third via seniority. In 
practice the representatives, upon the recommendations of 
Jourdan and his senior generals, made all the important 
promotions in the army.45 Thus the selection of officers 
was taken away from the rank and file and returned to those 
most qualified to judge the capabilities of a candidate for 
promotion —  the officer corps. Indeed, the Cormittee 
decreed that it was the duty of the commanders and staff 
of each unit to collect information on all officers in the 
unit and to evaluate it to see if they merited promotion. 
Candidates were evaluated on the basis of education, 
experience, past performance, and any battlefield distinction 
they might have won. In another decree, the Committee 
required the cadre of each unit, in the case of the 
dismissal or death of a fellow officer, to furnish several 
qualified candidates for the vacancy within twenty-four 
hours.46
The results were striking. By mid-June, 1794, 
the Sambre et Meuse included within its officer corps one 
future king (Bernadotte, later Charles XIV of Sweden); two 
future was ministers (Petiet and Scherer); seven future
45. J. P. Bertaud, "Recruitment and Advancement of the 
Officers of the Revolution," A.H.R.F., 44: 210, November, 1972, 
pp. 524-27.
46. See A.G. cartons B1 33 through Bl 38 for the 
Committee's various decrees to the Armies of the North and 
the Sambre et. Meuse regarding promotions.
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marshals, among them Jourdan himself and the Napoleonic 
heroes Ney and Soult; three army commanders, Championnet, 
Kleber, and Marceau (who would have become marshals had 
they lived); Napoleon's future chief of artillery, Eble; 
and countless officers who later became corps and divisional 
leaders during the Empire. These were men whose talents 
Jourdan recognized and whom he allowed such leeway that 
he was later accused of losing effective control over them. 
Generals like Kleber recommended younger men like Soult and 
Ney for promotion, and Jourdan, trusting their judgment, 
endorsed the recommendations to the government. At the 
same time, the incompetents were weeded out. General 
Fromentin, who had plagued Jourdan at Wattignies, was 
cashiered, along with a.brigadier general, for drunkenness 
during the fourth crossing of the Sambre. St. Just ordered 
a military tribunal to investigate the conduct of several 
officers who had shown slackness during the same operation. 
By the autumn, generals and deputies had done their job 
so thoroughly that the problem had become a surplus of 
qualified officers rather than a deficiency. Carnot 
complained that too many generals were being commissioned, 
that "favoritism" wus at work, and that the "scandalous" 
multiplicity of staff officers had to cease.
47. A.G. Bl 32, Decree of St. Just, 5/27/94. A. G. 
Bl 33, Decree of Levasseur & Guyton, 6/3/94. Reinhard,
Le Grand Carnot, II, pp. 94-95.
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By May the lev^e was functioning smoothly and the 
amalgame was nearly completed. Thanks to the unrelenting 
efforts of the representatives in the departments, the lev^e 
sent conscript after conscript to the army, until there were 
over 1,000,000 men in the ranks. The magnitude of this 
achievement can be appreciated when one notes that the most 
numerous army in Europe up to that time had been around 300,000 
men. Tie agitation of Jourdan and others had stimulated 
the government into stepping up the pace of the amalgame.
Carnot became a firm convert to incorporation, and on 
January 8, 1794, he persuaded the Committee to pass a 
decree authorizing amalgamation at the company level, 
with 4 0 conscripts and 20 veterans to each unit. This was 
within a day at most of Jourdan's second meeting with the 
Committee, and because he was one of the loudest critics 
of slowness of incorporation, it is possible that the two 
incidents were related. When the amalgame continued to 
progress more slowly than desired, representative Gillet 
assembled the men of one demi-brigade and briskly declared 
its existing units abolished. He then proceeded at random 
to mix the veterans and conscripts, and to form new units 
with new officers, until the entire demi-brigade was more 
or less amalgamated. Gillet's action eliminated the 
time-consuming process of matching up groups of recruits with 
designated veteran units and cadres, and the Jacobins lost 
no time in adopting it. By the summer most French units
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fought the enemy with a well-integrated mixture of draftees 
and veterans, youth and experience, for the first time in 
the war.48
Jourdan also benefited from the defeat of the 
extremists by Carnot and his allies on the Committee.
The military aspect of the conflict reached its climax on 
March 4, when Hebert denounced Carnot as a royalist and 
accused him of plotting to remove Bouchotte from the war 
ministry in order to place his brother in Bouchotte's place. 
Carnot probably wanted Bouchotte removed, but not for the 
reason Hebert stated. The Committee moved against the 
most militant of the extremists nine days later. Of those 
arrested, Vincent, Ronsin, Mazuel, Dubuisson and Bourgeois 
were all highly-placed officials in the war bureaucracy, 
Vincent being second only to Bouchotte. The fall of the 
extremists allowed Carnot to carry out his long-awaited 
reform of the war ministry. Its six divisions were 
replaced by twelve "commissions," each staffed partly by 
specialists some of whom were ex-nobles,and each directly 
subordinated to Carnot. Bouchotte was qud ;tly fired in 
early April and not replaced. His agents were recalled and 
replaced by personnel directed by the new commissions.
Carnot became, in effect, the nation's minister of defense.
48. Reinhard, ibid. A. Soboul, Les Soldats de l'an II, 
pp. 173-74.
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Thus the dissension and conflict between representatives
and commissaires and between moderates and extremists,
which had so marred the progress of the war, were largely 
49eliminated.
As the Jacobins mobilized the economy into an 
all-out effort directed at war production, the equipment 
and munitions shortages diminished. By the early spring 
the Committee, or more specifically Prieur de la Cote d'Or, 
had organized a national armaments industry. Prieur placed 
all weapons manufacturing under government control, and 
started twelve new plants in Paris which turned out 600 
muskets a day. Other shops were built for the production 
of bayonets, cannon, gun carriages, and so on. Prieur 
started additional workshops in the departments which 
operated under the supervision of the representatives. He 
also initiated a saltpeter mining campaign, encouraging 
citizens throughout France to extract this important component 
of gunpowder wherever they could find it and placing the 
actual mining of the resource under a government agency. 
Discipline among the workers and quality control over the 
products were maintained in military fashion. Work was car­
ried on for fourteen hours a day, strikes were forbidden, 
and attendance at work was obligatory under pain of arrest. 
Defective products were paid for by the agents responsible,
49. Reinhard, ibid, pp. 126-28.
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and repeated eases of negligence were punished by imprisonment. 
The Jacobins organized the production of habilement 
in a similar manner. The clothing and leather workshops 
in Paris were placed under government regulation. In the 
case of shoes, all cobblers were placed in requisition, and 
all worked for the army selling their products at a fixed 
price. Thos who worked independently were fined and 
imprisoned, as were those who violated the maximum. Agents 
of the war ministry and popular society members served as 
quality inspectors and warehouse chiefs.^®
Because was production was still basically artisanal 
in nature, the Jacobins never entirely eliminated the periodic 
shortages of one commodity or another. They lacked the 
technology to turn the country into a gigantic arsenal. 
Shortages of ammunition, such as the one which caused 
Jourdan to lose the battle of June 16, continued to occur.
Nor vras corruption and ineptness completely eliminated 
from the logistics system. On August 30, 1794, Carnot 
complained yet again about the blundering and malevolence 
within the supply services, and ordered all quartermaster- 
generals to "declare with impartiality your opinion on 
the patriotism, morality, aptitude and talent of these
50. For an excellent discussion of the Jacobins' 
creation of the national armaments industry see Georges 
Bouchard, Prieur de la Cote d'Or, pp. 215-223.
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diverse functionaries." Bureaucratic dysfunction was one 
problem which the revolution never quite solved, although 
the tribunals of the Terror came the closest to doing so.
The frequent and severe penalties which were handed down 
against offending supply personnel certainly diminished the 
amount of corruption and negligence, even if they did not 
eradicate it altogether.5'*'
The Jacobins also solved, or at least improved, 
the subsistence problem. They had, at first, mobilized 
France's agriculture, directing its produce towards the front. 
But it soon was obvious that this was not enough. However 
much they crushed the resistance of the local authorities to 
their quotas, still the episodic food shortages continued 
to occur. France's primitive agriculture could not feed 
over a million soldiers indefinitely, not without 
a degree of coercion that the government could not perpetuate. 
Carnot realized this by early 1794. "No one should know 
better than ourselves ... " he wrote, "the unbelievable 
difficulties which hindered all kinds of provisioning; no one 
is more persuaded that it would be most unjust to attribute 
to negligence those things which are by their natuie 
insurmountable. We are doing our utmost for you, but it
51. Soboul, 0 £  cit, pp. 156-59. Corr., IV, pp. 627-28, 
Carnot to the Quartermaster-generals of the armies, 8/30/94. 
See Jourdan's orders of the day for 1794 for the frequent 
convictions and punishments meted out to delinquent supply 
personnel; A.G. cartons Bi 32-B1 39.
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must not be concealed from you that we are lost if you do 
not quickly enter enemy territory to obtain subsistence 
and effects of every kind, because France cannot sustain 
for a long time the state of force that she is exerting at 
this moment ... " Carnot's solution to this dilemma 
was simple and direct: "It is necessary to live at the 
enemy's expense or perish."52
To live at the enemy's expense now became the policy 
of the revolutionaries. It was a policy out of step with 
the forward-looking programs of nationalization and mobi­
lization that marked the Terror; it was a measure straight 
out of the Thirty Years' War. And yet if the Terror "did 
not doubt its right to draft 1,200,000 men to expose their 
lives each day to fight (its) enemies," it should not 
doubt that "we have the right to requisition the property 
of the foreigner."53 Thus did Robert Lindet justify 
this policy. Not that requisitioning needed much justifica­
tion under the circumstances. It was consistent with the 
Republic's program of war on the chateaus, peace to the 
cottages in foreign lands. It was implicit in the Jacobins' 
whole conception of total war.
Gradually generals and representatives realized
52. Corr., IV, pp. 298-99, Carnot to th representatives 
with the Army of the North, 4/1/94.
53. Amand Montier, Robert Lindet, p. 229.
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that if the supply system was unable to feed the army, 
requisitions could and did. Isore reported that in one 
expedition soldiers had requisitioned 108 head of cattle, 
several horses, and a number of carts filled with hay.
This capture was not extraordinary, "for a month this
has occurred several times --- Our brothers now know that
it is now necessary to live at the expense of the enemy."
Gunner Bricard recorded the seizure of substantial quantities 
of provisions as the result of requisitioning expeditions, 
including 12 0 carts of grain on one occasion and a large 
quantity of grain and animals on another. Bricard implied 
that these requisitions enabled his unit to survive the 
winter.54
By the summer of 1794, requisitioning had become 
systematized. Either Jourdan or the representatives 
authorized the quartermaster-general of the army to 
requisition from a designated area whatever foodstuffs the 
army needed. The quartermaster then ordered the administration 
of that district or commune to see to it that all shopkeepers, 
merchants, and farmers made declarations of everything 
they owned which might be useful to the French army.
Then, usually within twenty-four hours, he issued his requisi­
tion decree. The requisitions were not light. From the
54. Recueil des Actes, IX, p. 472, Isore to the Committee, 
12/17/93. Bricard, o£ cit, pp. 85-100.
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commune of Mons the quartermaster demanded 100 pipes of 
brandy, 20,000 quintals of flour, 3,000 quintals of oatmeal,
600,000 bales of hay, 900 head of cattle and 3,000 head of 
sheep.55 The actual foodstuffs were collected by 
supply agents protected by detachments of gendarmerie 
and cavalry, then taken to depots behind the lines where 
other supply officials saw to their distribution to the 
various units of the army. Those municipal officials who 
failed to deliver the quantities of provisions requisitioned 
were put under arrest until all the provisions were collected.5  ^
There is little doubt that the requisitions were 
both essential and effective. As they increased the flow 
of subsistence to the army, complaints against the supply 
personnel diminished. In mid-August the Sambre et Meuse's 
quartermaster reported that due to the ample resources of 
Brabant, then just overrun by the army, subsistence for 
both men and animals was assured for six months. This was 
fortunate because the army had completely exhausted the 
resources of West Flanders. When the Brabanters proved 
dilatory in responding to the requisition decrees, the 
quartermaster suggested that the army take hostages
55. A.G. Bl 35, Decree of Quartermaster-General 
Vaillant to the Commune of Mons, 7/3/94.
56. A.G. Bl 33, requisition decrees of 6/1/94, 
6/7/94. Ibid.
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
238
until the decrees were fulfilled. He then admitted that
so exhausted was French Flanders that the army could not
57
survive without these requisitions from Brabant.
Jourdan had no objection to living at the expense 
of the enemy; indeed in the fall of 1795 he was to suggest 
a broadening and expansion of this policy. He believed 
that the welfare of his soldiers came first, and if this 
meant that; the enemy had to suffer, so much the worse for 
them. His only concern was that the requisitions be carried 
out in an orderly and efficient manner without confusion 
or theft. Thus he and Gillet, with whom he worked closely 
throughout 1794, decreed that any supply agent who robbed 
the people from whom he was requisitioning was liable to 
execution. Any officers or soldiers who took the requisitioned 
subsistence for their own use instead of sending it on 
to the army depots were also to be punished by death.
He ordered his divisional generals to forbid their 
subordinated to forage on their own; they could requisition 
only on his personal order. There was nothing ideological 
about his willing employment of what in reality was national 
theft. He had no committment to the kind of war-on-the- 
chateaus policy espoused by doctrinaire Jacobins such as
57. A.G. B1 37 and Bl 38, Vaillant to Gillet, 8/12/94; 
Le Chef des Vivres a Vaillant, 8/29/94; Vaillant to Gillet, 
8/30/94.
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Robespierre and St. Just, and even Carnot. Requisitions 
were simply a necessary measure for keeping the army 
provisioned in the absence of an efficient supply system 
and a productive agriculture. When the Commune of Ath 
in Belgium responded to a requisition by accusing Jourdan 
of interfering with its individual and religious freedom, 
he angrily denied that he had any such intention —  he 
would respect the liberties of the c :vilians regardless of 
their political or economic standing.58
On the other hand, he certainly harbored no sympathy 
in his heart for the wealthy. When the Austrians opened 
what he considered a needless bombardment on the recently 
occupied (by the French) city of Liege, he informed the 
Austrian general that he would burn to the ground all 
emigre property in Brabant if he did not halt the cannonade. 
The general complied.59
That the work of Carnot, Prieur, Jourdan and 
their colleagues had borne fruit by the spring of 1794 is 
unquestionable. Their new strategy of mass and constant 
offensive, their new tactics of columns, skirmishers, 
squares, massed batteries and the like would not have been 
successful without the structural improvements in the
58. A.G. B1 33, Decree of 6/1.3/94. A.G. Bl 35,
Jourdan to General Dubois, 7/8/94; Jourdan to Kleber, 7/7/94.
59. A.G. mr 608-2, Jourdan to the Committee, 8/1/94.
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military system. No longer did the representatives write 
despairingly about the frightful, abysmal disorder in 
the army. Instead, they complained now about specific 
shortcomings in specific units. "I have been satisfied 
in general with the good bearing and discipline of the 
division commanded by Duhesme," reported Gillet after 
inspecting Kleber's corps. "That of Montaigu is equally 
good. But the third contrasts strikingly with the first two. 
The service there is bad, the soldiers are ignorant, no 
precautions taken against the enemy." In 1793 the third 
would have been no different from the first two. Late 
September saw an outbreak of pillage, but by early October 
the representatives reported that the pillaging had been 
dealt with, and the culprits placed under rigorous arrest.
When Kleber's corps besieged Maastricht, Gillet reported 
admiringly, "one could not, it would seem, put more 
activity into the operation.
The improved supply situation enhanced the performance 
of the army as well. Provisions were supplied regularly 
from both the magazines and the requisitions, the latter 
making up for the deficiencies of the former. The requisitions 
were carried out "in the strictest order."®^ While the
60. Le Comte Pajol, Kleber; sa vie et correspondence 
(three volumes; Paris, 1877TT T7 P- 109. Recueil des Actes, 
XVII, pp. 90-1, 267-69; Bellegarde and Lacombe to the 
Committee, 10/6/94; Gillet to the Committee, 9/26/94.
61. Jomini, oja cit, VI, pp. 15-16.
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soldiers still- slept out in the open due to the lact of 
tents, the complaints of denument had almost entirely 
ceased. No longer were new conscripts being sent home 
because there were no weapons to arm them. The Terror had 
reduced the confusion in the army's logistical system to 
manageable proportions. When ammunition ran low after a 
battle, Levasseur admitted that the shortage was due to 
the constant fighting —  not due to malevolence in the 
supply administration. Moreover, this happy state of affairs 
continued through the winter. Although there were several 
food shortages and a good deal of sickness because the 
troops were constantly exposed to the e l e m e n t s t h e r e  
was nothing comparable to the distress of the winter of 
1793-94, or of 1795-96.62
It is interesting, and significant, that some 
officers of the Sambre et Meuse —  officers who later 
campaigned with Napoleon over much of Europe —  looked 
back upon the campaign of 1794 with a kind of nostalgia.
The improvement in the army and the resulting victories 
of the summer had filled the army with enthusiasm, good 
feeling, and comradeship. Generals prefaced their letters 
to one another with "my good friend," or "my dear comrade," 
and even the usually reticent Jourdan began to address his
62. A.G. B1 32, Levasseur to the Committee, 5/26/94. 
Pajol, 0 £  cit, I, pp. 105-112.
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generals in these terms. Because the Terror was only
marginally relaxed for many months after the 9th of Thermidor,
the fall of Robespierre and his associates could only have
been partly responsible for this general buoyancy.
"This was the epoch during the wars when there was the most
virtue among the troops," recalled Soult, not the most
sentimental of men. Officers shared the hardships of their
men, carrying their knapsacks on their backs and standing
in line for the distribution of food and equipment like
everyone else. When one officer distinguished himself,
the others "sought to surpass him by their talent or courage."
The soldiers possessed the same spirit of self-sacrifice.
Often they refused extra "distributions" (of brandy)
before battle, crying "after the victory you can give them
to us! Discipline did not suffer the slightest tarnish.
Never were the armies more obedient, nor filled with more 
„63
ardor.
III. The Advance To The Rhine.
The government received the news of the victory 
of Fleurus with jubilation. "The armies concentrated 
on the Sambre have covered themselves with glory," Carnot 
congratulated Jourdan. "The Committee is happy to have found
63. Soult, Memoires, I, p. 198.
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in you a leader-worthy of commanding them." The Allies in
contrast were depressed. They had been grievously damaged —
more grievously than Jourdan realized. The dissension among
the Allied officers broke out afresh. Beaulieu violently
criticized Coburg for his tactics during the battle,
and several others asked to be relieved of their commands.
Their mercenaries deserted in increasing number —  400 in
one day alone. The officers could persuade those who remained
64
to march only with blows from their batons.
The Allied army thus seemed ripe for the annihilating 
pursuit to the death so often called for by the Jacobins. 
Hindsight reveals that such a pursuit may well have destroyed 
Coburg's army. There was no killing pursuit, however, and 
consequently the Allied army recovered to fight another day.
After the battle Jourdan was not sure in which 
direction to advance. He believed the enemy army to be 
intact and capable of launching another offensive in spite 
of its defeat. He suggested two alternative courses of 
action. He could advance up the Sambre towards Maubeuge and 
attempt to trap the enemy forces there between himself and 
Pichegru. Or he could continue to press the enemy on his 
eastern flank by marching on Namur, the capture of which 
would offer "the greatest advantages." Carnot's reply 
revealed that at times a sizeable gap still existed between
64. A.G. Bl 34 and B1 35, Carnot to Jourdan, 6/29/94; 
Hatry to Jourdan, 7/8/94. Champj.onnet, op cit, p. 76.
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his theories of war "a l'outrance" and their actual execution.
He instructed Jourdan to divide his forces, one corps to advance 
on Namur, and another to march in the opposite direction and 
capture Mons. The largest corps was to pursue Coburg's center 
towards Brussels, while the remainder were to rest in reserve. 
Jourdan was to put Belgium under contribution, seeing to it 
that the "contributions" fell solely upon the rich and upon 
those hostile to France. Carnot hoped that as Jourdan thrust 
northward and westward, Pichegru would push eastward from 
Courtrai and Ypres, and the two French armies could then 
destroy the Allied army caught between them. Carnot then 
added a personal wrinkle; he ordered Pichegru to detach
65
15,000 men to capture the British army's base as Ostende.
This was a return to cordon warfare. Jourdan 
was not pleased with this strategy, especially when Pichegru 
decided to take the 15,000 men for the Ostende operation from 
the Sambre et Meuse. He argued that the directive did not 
enable him effectively to follow up his victory, and that 
it overly dispersed his army from Mons to Namur in front of 
an enemy who could yet concentrate his own forces. "My position, 
he wrote, "does not permit me to try anything of consequence." 
This was dangerous because, thanks to a lack of cavalry and 
spies, he was not sure of the Allies' whereabouts. He had
65. A.G. mr 608-2, Jourdan to the Committee, 6/27/94. 
A.G. Bl 34, Carnot to Jourdan, 6/29/94. Reinhard, o£ cit, 
II, pp. 131-32.
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his own ideas but he was too circumspect to present them 
directly to Carnot, since they contradicted Carnot's strategy 
top to bottom. Instead, he proposed them through the medium 
of representative Gillet. The Austrians, Gillet (Jourdan) 
warned, could overwhelm the corps detached towards Mons.
Thus Pichegru should advance and defeat the enemy in the Tournai 
area so this would not occur. Meanwhile Jourdan would con­
centrate 80,000 men, and initiate a general offensive towards 
Namur and the left flank of the Allied army. Then Gillet 
went so far as provisionally to countermand Pichegru's order
directing Jourdan to provide the 15,000 men for the Ostende 
66
operation.
Carnot's reaction to all this was quite curious, 
he evidently was nettled by Jourdan's and Gillet's tacit 
rejection of his strategy. In a letter to the representatives 
he sharply criticized them and Jourdan for failing to pursue 
the enemy more vigorously immediately after Fleurus. Had 
they pursued, they would not have had to worry about another 
enemy counteroffensive. Furthermore, he considered their 
anxieties about an enemy attack against their left unfounded.
Yet in his response to Jourdan on the same day, there was
66. A.G. mr 608-2, Jourdan to Carnot (2 letters),
7/2/94. A.G. Bl 35, Gillet to the Committee, 7/2/94. One 
is hard pressed to believe that the strategic ideas contained 
in this letter were Gillet's. Gillet had no military experience 
of any kind; furthermore the concentration towards Namur had 
been suggested by Jourdan on the 27th.
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
246
no hint of his irritation. He agreed to the Namur operation, 
while stipulating that a sizeable portion of the army be left 
to cut off the Allied forces in the Maubeuge-Tournai area.
He agreed that it was likely that the Austrians would offer 
battle again to avenge Fleurus, indeed writing St. Just to 
the same effect. He assured Jourdan that he had left Pichegru 
"leeway" to take the 15,000 men from his own army. Carnot then 
ordered Pichegru not to take the 15,000 from the Sambre et 
Meuse and urged him to attack the enemy in the Tournai area.
He still hoped to trap Coburg near Brussels. "If we put some 
speed into our march, and the enemy does not hasten to evacuate 
Brussels, he will find himself trapped on the left bank of 
the Meuse, and pressed on both flanks by the two Republican 
..67armies.
Once again Carnot modified, albeit reluctantly, 
a plan in accordance with Jourdan's suggestions. Nevertheless 
the French had lost a precious week during which the Allies 
had time to regroup. The Sambre et Meuse was still too 
widely scattered to be able to overwhelm the Allies at any 
single point. And both Carnot and Jourdan based their strategy 
upon the false supposition that the enemy intended to fight 
another battle. As a result, their dispositions were prudent 
rather than daring, cautious rather than aggressive. There
67. A.G. Bl 35, Carnot to the Representatives, 7/4/94. 
Corr., IV, pp. 462-65, Carnot to Jourdan, 7/4/94; Carnot to 
Pichegru, 7/4/94.
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was no all-out pursuit aimed at hounding the enemy to his 
destruction.
The Sambre et Meuse resumed its advance on July 5. 
Coburg had evacuated Mons, and had deployed his army in a 
cordon from Hal through Mont St. Jean and Sombreffe to Namur. 
Kleber attacked the Prince of Orange at Mont St. Jean, and 
after a sharp struggle routed him, inflicting almost 2,000 
casualties. At Sombreffe Championnet and Hatry had a more 
difficult time with Beaulieu, but after two days of fighting, 
they also were victorious. Beaulieu retreated towards the 
Meuse having lost 2,000 casualties and 600 prisoners. Jourdan 
now had use of the 30,000 soldiers whom St. Just had kept 
on the upper Sambre. These occupied Mons, then turned west 
to recapture the lost French fortresses of Valenciennes,
Conde, Landrecies, and Le Quesnoy. Pichegru too was 
advancing, although not as swiftly as desired. On July .11, 
his and Jourdan's forces met at Brussels. Unfortunately 
they were too late; the enemy had escaped the envelopment 
and were fleeing towards the Meuse. Jourdan persisted in 
his belief that the enemy would not evacuate Belgium without 
a fight. He again complained that his forces were too 
scattered, and on one occasion mistook the retreat of an 
enemy force as a maneuver leading to a counterattack.
68. A.G. Bl 35, Jourdan to the Committee, 7/7/94;
Jourdan to Pichegru, 7/7/94. A.G. mr 608-2, Memoires de 1794.
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Although Carnot repeatedly urged Pichegru and Jourdan 
to crush the Allies as they crossed the Meuse, the French 
were unable to do so. Jourdan blamed the slowness of Pichegru's 
advance, which compelled him to delay his lest a gap develop 
between their armies. He easily captured Namur, the forti­
fications of which Carnot ordered razed to the ground, but he 
was too late to intercept the enemy retreat. With the Allies 
safe on the far side of the Meuse, Carnot suddenly decided 
to suspend the advance until the French had recaptured 
the four lost fortresses and until Pichegru had advanced 
far enough to permit Jourdan to attack across the Meuse 
without worrying about his northern flank. Once again the 
pursuit to the death was s u s p e n d e d .
As Jourdan deployed the army along the Meuse, he 
learned of the 9th of Thermidor. His initial reaction to 
the news was typical; he wrote to reassure the Committee of 
his continued loyalty. "Be calm, citizen representatives, 
we know that our task is to exterminate all the Republic's 
enemies, and we will fulfill it with all the more confidence 
now that we know ... that all those who seek to use the 
services which they would have rendered (sic) to the country 
to replunge the people into irons, will perish like the 
scoundrels Robespierre, St. Just and company. We are the
69. Ibid. Corr., IV, pp. 476-77, Carnot to the 
Representatives with the Sambre et Meuse, 7/11/94.
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children of the- people, we fight for its liberty, and we 
never will be the tools of a tyrant." This was mild compared 
to what was flowing from the pens of Pichegru and the rep­
resentatives. As their bitter denunciations of the "trium­
virate" appeared in the newspapers, Jourdan worried that 
perhaps his statement was not strong enough. Even so, he 
did not c.dd his denunciation to theirs. Instead, he informed 
the Committee that he had seen "with pleasure" the letters 
of the others on the "Robespierre conspiracy" in the public 
papers, but he feared that his army might be "surprised at 
not seeing anything by me on the subject [for army one might 
substitute 'government']. Nevertheless ... I think my 
letter of the 14th [above] containes sufficient expressions of 
Republicanism, and I think what I write. I do not desire 
to make a name for myself. If I can serve my country without 
having my name known, I shall do it readily." Still he was 
not sure what to do. "I submit my reflexions; you do ... 
that which you believe to be the most appropriate."70
His reaction to Thermidor is revealing. It demon­
strated his basic conviction that a general should keep out 
of politics because his business was war and the welfare of 
his troops. He could not have felt any remorse at the fates 
of Robespierre, St. Just, and their colleagues. He was not
70. A.G. Bl 37, Jourdan to the Committee, 8/1/94, 8/12/94.
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fond of the Terror, because he felt that it placed 
unnecessarily intense pressure on its servants. He was even 
less fond of the radicals of the Terror whom he blamed for 
its extremities, and the evidence suggests that he placed 
Robespierre and company in this category. Nevertheless, 
he did not give way to the violent ascerbic denunciations 
of these new "traitors" that so many others gave way to; his 
language was subdued when compared to that of the representa­
tives —  several of whom had been quite friendly with St. Just.71 
A general did 1 >t criticize his political superiors any more 
than a soldier criticized his generals. A general could 
advise and suggest, and then with circumspection; his primary 
duty was to obey his government's orders. Jourdan was one 
general who could never be mistaken for a militarist.
Furthermore, he realized that in a revolution today's political 
victors might well become tomorrow's villains, and today's 
punished tomorrow's martyrs. Perhaps he did not desire 
to make statements that another change of government might 
cause to come back and haunt him.
As the corps of General Barthelmy Scherer moved to 
recapture the four fortresses, Jourdan was faced with an 
extremely vexing problem. In early July the Committee had
71. Both Gillet and Guyton were on excellent terms with 
St. Just while he was with the Sambre et Meuse during the 
Fleurus campaign.
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menacingly decreed that any enemy garrison which did not 
surrender within twenty-four hours of being summoned to do 
so was to be executed upon capture. Their purpose was to 
avoid long, time-consuming sieges by terrorizing the enemy into 
swift, premature capitulations. Such a decree violated 
every contemporary rule of warfare. To execute unarmed 
soldiers after they had ceased resistance was as much a war 
crime then as it is today. The twenty-four hour decree put 
Jourdan and his generals on the horns of a miserable dilemma. 
Should the enemy refuse to surrender within the alloted time, 
they were the ones who would have to carry out the executions. 
If they disobeyed the decree and spared their prisoners, 
they could expect the most rigorous punishment for insubordi­
nation.
Jourdan and the representatives attempted to feign 
a willingness to execute the decree, while at the same time 
they tried to avoid be i ng placed in a position where they might 
have to carry it out. Jourdan instructed Scherer not to 
summon all four fortresses at once, but to summon each 
successively as he placed it under siege. Furthermore 
Scherer was not to summon the garrison until all parallels 
were dug and preparations for storming completed —  in other 
words when its fall was imminent anyway. Meanwhile they 
sought loopholes in the decree. They asked the Committee 
what they should do if the garrison was ignorant of the decree 
owing to the efforts of their officers, or ii the officers 
forced the soldiers to resist beyond the time limit. If the
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Committee admitted that such an occurrence exempted the 
garrison from the rigors of the decree, the French commanders 
would have a potential escape —  they could always argue 
that the garrison prolonged their resistance out of ignorance 
or compulsion, and thus should not be executed.^2
Their strategem worked to perfection at Landrecies, 
the first city to be besieged and taken. However at Le 
Quesnoy they encountered trouble. The garrison resisted 
strenuously causing the siege to drag on, and the Committee 
ordered that the defenders be summoned. Jourdan assured the 
Committee that he was implementing the decree "literally." 
Nevertheless, he hoped that the defenders surrendered within 
the prescribed time limit; otherwise the lives of many 
brave Republicans might be lost —  possibly in having to 
storm the place. If the Committee decided to change their 
instructions, he urged them to notify him as soon as possible. 
But the Committee remained adamant. Scherer duly summoned 
the garrison to surrender, but it refused. Gillet and 
Duquesnoy wrote worriedly to the government that they agreed 
with the decree in principle, but executing it at Le Quesnoy 
might drive the other garrisons to desperation and cause 
them to resist longer and harder than otherwise. The issue 
came to a head when Le Quesnoy finally agreed to capitulate. 
According to the decree, Scherer now had to execute the
72. A.G. mr 608-2, Memoires de 1794. A.G. Bi 37, 
Scherer to the Committee," 8/5/94..
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entire garrison-. Horrified, he asked Jourdan and Gillet for 
instructions; they, equally horrified, told him to ask the 
Committee. In a letter to the latter, Gillet admitted 
that Scherer's questions were "embarrassing."7 -^
In fact he, Jourdan, and Scherer —  not to mention 
the soldiers who would have had to make up the firing squads —  
were perilously close to having to commit an atrocity of 
major proportions. Fortunately their efforts to shift the 
responsibility for executing the decree squarely onto the 
shoulders of the government bore fruit at the eleventh hour.
In an official order to Scherer, the Committee instructed that 
the decree be carried out. However, in a letter to 
Duquesnoy, Carnot permitted Scherer to accept the garrison's 
surrender on the grounds that the officers may have kept 
their men ignorant of the decree. In a second letter he 
stated that Scherer did not have to carry out the decree 
immediately, since it did not specify when the executions 
were to take place. Besides, something might persuade the 
"Convention" to modify the decree in the interim. Nonetheless 
officially the decree remained in effect, and Carnot rather 
curtly ordered Scherer to be sure to carry it out with the 
remaining fortresses. Fortunately both Conde and Valen­
ciennes surrendered within the prescribed twenty-four
73. A.G. Bl 37, Jourdan to the Committee, 8/5/94;
Gillet to the Committee, 8/8/94; Duquesnoy to the Committee, 
8/12/94. See also Scherer's letters during this time.
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hours.74
With their rear now secured, the French made pre­
parations to renew the offensive. The Austrian army, now under 
General Clerfayt, numbered 90,000 men deployed in a 40-mile 
cordon along the Meuse and Ourthe Rivers from Roermonde to 
the vicinity of Luxemburg. Carnot overruled Jourdan*s 
objections and ordered him to make his next effort south of 
the Meuse in the tangled forests of the Ardennes, while 
Kleber's corps was detached to besiege the important Dutch 
fortress of Maastricht. Carnot hoped to trap the Allies 
between the Sambre et Meuse and the Army of the Moselle 
in the Luxemburg region. This meant that Jourdan had to 
defeat the enemy positioned along the Ourthe. At first 
glance, this seemed to be a formidable task. The Ourthe 
flowed north through rugged hills and deep ravines: "its 
banks are either very high hills or immense precipitous rocks 
which only leave very narrow passages between them." In 
short, it was an excellent defensive position. But the 
Ourthe position was too long —  too long to be adequately 
covered by the 40,000 Austrians detailed for the job.7^
74. Corr., IV, pp. 565-7 3, The Committee to Scherer, 
8/12/94; Carrot to Duquesnoy, 8/12/94; Carnot to the Repre­
sentatives with the Sambre et Meuse, 8/17/94. Carnot's 
letter to Scherer of the 17th condemned him strongly for his 
handling of the situation. What Carnot's motives —  or the 
Committee's —  were here is unknown; certainly Scherer was 
not to blame.
75. A.G. mr 608-2, Jourdan to the Committee, 8/20/94; 
Carnot to Jourdan, 9/4/94. Phipps, 0£  cit, II, pp. 179-83.
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Jourdan had shifted two thirds of his army south of 
the Meuse. His army, too, was extended over 40 miles of 
front, but since it now numbered about 120,000 men, it ran 
no undue danger. Jourdan began the operation by sending 
Kleber against Maastricht. This feint completely fooled 
Clerfayt into shifting his reserves north to that sector.
Then Jourdan attacked. The French stormed across the 
Ourthe at three points, and seized the high ground on the far 
side from the outnumbered defenders. There were acts of 
heroism. At Ayewalle in the center the passage was a narrow 
bridge covered by two twelve-pound cannon, with enemy artillery 
blanketing the treacherous fords above and below the bridge.
But the French infantry braved the case shot whipping along 
the length of the bridge as well as the plunging fire from 
the heights; they stormed across the bridge, scaled the 
heights and took them. Once on the high ground across the 
river, the French could penetrate into the rear of the 
Austrians long before the latter could muster their 
scattered forces. Clerfayt pulled his army back to Lhe 
Roer River.
The Austrian position behind the Roer close.! y 
resembled that of the Ourthe. The Roer also flowed through 
broken, wooded country, its rapid current washing steep, 
rocky banks. The Austrians broke all the bridges, fortified
76. Ibid. Jomini, 0 £  cit, VI, pp. 28-29.
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all the fords, and crowned the heights with artillery and 
fieldwords- But they repeated their earlier mistake; they 
attempted to cover the entire length of the river. Since 
they had about 90,000 soldiers to defend over 40 miles of 
front, their cordon once again was dangerously thin. Thus 
Jourdan's task, as at the Ourthe, was to find the most 
accessible passages across the river, mass his forces 
at those points, and break the enemy l i n e . ^
Jourdan's first step was to get Carnot to agree to 
a temporary suspension of the siege of Maastricht, so that 
he could bring half of Kleber's corps south to join the attack. 
This agreed to, he planned to assault across the Roer at 
four points: Rathem, Linnich, Aldenhoven (where the enemy
held a bridgehead) and Duren. For this strategy he has been 
criticized by several commentators who argue that he should 
have massed his forces on his right to roll up the enemy 
flank, rather than dispersing them in four separate columns.^8 
His critics have ignored the nature of the terrain. Due 
to the primitive *.oads, it would have been impossible for the 
French to move fast enough to make such a flank attack 
successfully. Furthermore, Jourdan believed Clerfayt's 
forces to be too widely dispersed to resist effectively,
77. Phipps, o£ cit, II, pp. 183-88. Jomini, ibid, pp. 30-35.
78. Jomini, Phipps, T. A. Dodge, and other Jomini 
disciples all believed that Jourdan erred in not concentrating 
a mass of maneuver on his right.
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for the lack of- lateral communications through the thickly 
wooded Ardennes made it impossible for the different sectors 
of the Austrian defenses to come to each others' support. 
Jourdan ordered attacks which would bring the maximum number 
of men to bear on the thin enemy cordon in the least amount of 
time. Had the Austrians been in a position to offer stern 
resistance, he would not have attacked on the right because 
this would have pulled his army too far away from Pichegru. 
Instead, he would have attempted to break the enemy cordon 
on the left near the Meuse. If Jourdan's critics found 
fault with his strategy, Carnot did not. He approved it, 
writing that "the attack you propose ... is one of the 
most decisive and the most delicate which has ever taken 
place."79
Jourdan's soldiers advanced quietly to their jump-off 
positions near the river. He had ordered a silent approach 
without skirmishing in order to allow the enemy as little 
advance warning as possible. When the Sambre et Meuse 
deployed the next morning, it did so impressively. "Nothing 
was more majestic to see than, in an immense plain, the army 
advancing at an even pace, in the greatest order without the 
slightest confusion. The columns arrived in the position
79. A.G. mr 608-2, Memoires de 1794. Corr., IV, pp. 
678-79, Carnot to Gillet, 10/2/94.
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where they had to join battle, deployed calmly under the 
fire of the enemy batteries; the alignment formed on the 
guides as in training camp." The improvement in the army 
from the previous summer was striking. At Hondschoote it 
fought uncertainly, at times in incoherent confusion; 
on the Roer it demonstrated the control and ensemble 
of a professional army.®^
The battle itself was anticlimactic to this grand 
beginning. A heavy rainstorm delayed matters, making the bad 
roads worse, and the worse roads impassible. Scherer's 
attack on the right was delayed, and his division, which was 
to make the longest march, never did get into action.
Scherer's troops waded the river under fire and took the enemy 
positions at bayonet point. Then Marceau stormed Duren, 
a town surrounded by a palisade and a water-filled ditch, 
and held it against several feeble counterattacks. In the 
center, Championnet defeated the Austrians in the bridgehead 
on the Aldenhoven plateau. In a sharp cavalry action he broke 
an Austrian counterattack and chased the enemy across the 
river into Juliers, but he never crossed the river himself. 
Lefebvre stormed Linnich, only to find that the rain had 
made the fords there too swollen to use. On the left at 
Rathem, Kleber also found the fords flooded, so when his men
80. Championnet, Souvenirs, p. 84.
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braved plunging- fire from the heights opposite to try to 
throw a prefabricated bridge across the water, they discovered 
that it was too short. Kleber persisted, dragging artillery 
right up to the riverbank and blasting away, while Bernadotte 
led a demi-brigade into the river. Half wading, half swimming, 
these men crossed and had secured a precarious bridgehead 
when night ended the fighting.81
When morning dawned, the French must have been 
astonished to see that the Austrians had withdrawn. Clerfayt's 
line had been breached only in two places, but his troops 
were so dispersed that the French could enlarge these breaches 
long before he could repair them; so he retreated.
The Battle of the Roer is generally acclaimed as 
Jourdan's finest achievement. This is odd because Jourdan 
himself did not consider the battle either a particularly 
difficult or successful one. Due to the bad weather, the 
French attacks did not reach their assigned objectives; the 
enemy position was weak, and its resistance halfhearted.
The French inflicted a moderate 3,800 casualties on the 
Austrians at a cost of 1,500 of their own. Basically Jourdan 
did nothing more than make use of his superior numbers to 
punch holes in the enemy defenses. Certainly the difficulty 
encountered did not match Fleurus. In any case, the Roer 
was the final action of the campaign. Clerfayt retreated
81. Jomini, ojd cit, VI, pp. 35-43. A.G. mr 608-2, 
Memoires de 1794.
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
260
across the Rhine, abandoning the west bank completely. The 
Sambre et Meuse occupied Krefeld, Bonn, and Cologne without 
bloodshed, and then moved south to help the Army of the 
Moselle expel the enemy from the Moselle valley. The Allies 
did not await the entrapment battle that Carnot planned, 
for they fled here also. Jourdan deployed the army along the 
Rhine in winter cantonments, while Kleber's corps reinvested 
Maastricht, and after a short siege, took it in early November.
The amazing triumps of the campaign swept the enthusiasm 
in the officer corps to dizzying heights. As Soult recalled, 
never had the soldiers shown more obedience and order, nor 
the generals more cooperation and skill. And never was 
Jourdan to be so esteemed by his fellow generals. When 
Scherer and Kleber received promotions to take independent 
commands, both sorrowfully wrote Jourdan bemoaning their 
departures from the army. "To tell you that I regret no 
longer serving in the army you command," Scherer wrote,
"i.< to prove to you that since I have known you, I have loved 
and esteemed the brave general to whom the country owes 
gratitude for one of the most glorious campaigns cited in 
the world's triumphs." And Kleber wrote: "It would be
necessary, dear comrade, that you know all the esteem and 
sincere attachment I have vowed to you to understand the pain 
I have felt at receiving the order to leave the victorious 
army you command." That both men wrote sincerely there is 
no doubt. When Jourdan fell sick during the next spring,
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
261
Kleber wrote in- similar language anxiously inquiring about 
his health. It is an interesting commentary upon Jourdan's 
reticence and inhibitions that he never was able to express 
himself with the effusiveness of his colleagues. Even so he 
certainly was gratified by these expressions of friendship.
The officer corps of the Sambre et Meuse was a band of brothers 
in the springtime of their success; it was unfortunate that 
the grim campaigns of 1795 and 1796 were to take the bloom 
off their comradeship. 82
By the end of 1794, Jourdan stood at the summit 
of his career. He was, in his colleagues' eyes, at the height 
of his profession, probably the most respected general in 
the Republic. He had conducted a campaign which was indeed 
unparalleled in the annals of French history. Never before 
had a French army swept the entire Pays Bas —  the 
notorious "cockpit of Europe" with its innumerable fortresses 
and waterways —  clear of an enemy in a single campaign.
82. A.G. mr 608-2, Scherer to Jourdan, 10/9/94; 
Kleber to Jourdan 11/2 3/94.
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VI. LIMITED WAR: THE CAMPAIGN OF 1795
I. The Mayence Campaign
While the French armies drove the forces of the 
Coalition back across the Rhine, the revolutionary government 
was undergoing profound change. The fall of Robespierre,
St. Just and their colleagues, and their replacement by a 
more moderate faction of the Jacobins, had resulted in a 
stage-by-stage dismantling of the Terror. This process, 
begun in the French government and economy in 1794, had by 
the spring of 1795 spread to the firing line. The 
Thermidorians, in their eagerness to erase every vestige 
of the Terror from the face of the country, turned against 
its policy of total war and against national economic 
mobilization which is the logical concomitant of total war.
They removed from the Committee the three key figures in the 
war effort: Carnot, Lindet and Prieur (de la Cote d'Or)
and replaced them with men who did not possess either 
their intelligence, their energy, or their commitment to 
the defeat of the enemy. Since they no longer faced a 
situation in which they had to kill or be killed, the 
Thermidorians fought only to secure what they believed to 
be an advantageous peace.
The Republic's war aims were now limited: the 
occupation of the Rhine valley, perhaps the seizure of Franconia 
and Swabia, and generally the conquest of enough territory 
262
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to pay for the war. These goals did not require "war a 
l'outrance" for their attainment. Consequently, by the spring 
of 1795 the Republic was no longer waging war with the energy, 
ferocity or determination that it employed in the year II. 
Jourdan and his fellow generals thus had to adapt to the 
new state of affairs. The pressures of the Terror were gone,
and this was welcome. But as the Thermidorians returned to
normalcy, new pressures every bit as severe and far more 
crippling replaced the old —  pressures brought about 
by negligence and corruption rather than by fanaticism and 
ruthlessness.
Jourdan had spent a tranquil winter and spring.
He had gone on leave in late March to Limoges to visit his 
wife and family and to take care of his health1 —  
probably his stomach ailment. His army, aside from the 
periodic shortages that plagued all pre-industrial armies, 
had survived the winter in relative comfort. Its task
during these months was simple enough —  to capture the
fortress city of Luxemburg and prevent the Allies from 
marching to its relief. The Allies remained inactive, leaving 
the city to its fate, and Jourdan had little out of the ordinary 
to do, save to negotiate with the Prussian Marshal Mollendorf 
the line of demarcation once Prussia had made peace. The
1. A.G. mr 608-6, Kleber to Jourdan, 4/7/95, 4/10/95.
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imminence of Prussia's departure from the Coalition had 
paralyzed the Allied forces, which now declined to move until
2
the diplomatic picture became clearer.
While the peace negotiations at Basle dragged on, 
Jourdan, Pichegru (now commander of the Army of the Rhine 
et Moselle), and the government began a three-way discussion 
of plans of campaign when hostilities resumed in earnest.
The Thermidorians had not replaced Carnot with another 
military "expert," preferring instead to direct the national 
defense collectively. As a result, each army commander was 
left largely on his own to direct his army as he saw fit; 
indeed the generals advised the government on strategy 
rather than vice-versa. After some written discussion,
Jourdan and Pichegru advised that once Luxemburg had capitulated, 
their armies should open an offensive across the upper and 
lower Rhine, always endeavoring to operate on the outside 
flanks of the enemy armies. The government responded to 
their suggestions by ordering that their armies cross 
successively rather than simultaneously, and that Jourdan 
effect his passage at Rhinefels, a town in the Taunus 
mountains near Coblenz.3
Jourdan quickly protested. He did not like the idea
2. A.G. mr 608-6, Jourdan's Memoires Militaires sur 
la Campagne de 1795.
3. A.G. mr 608-6, Jourdan to Pichegru, 5/2/95, 5/8/95; 
Pichegru to Jourdan, 5/9/9 5.
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of having the armies cross successively, and he was even 
less enthused by the choice of Rhinefels, which was a dangerous 
place to cross. The Austrians had a sizeable force positioned 
there. Moreover, the terrain was totally unsuitable, since 
the hills, ravines and defiles on either bank of the river 
were so difficult that by local estimates an army of 30,000 
would require nineteen days to cross with all its baggage. 
Furthermore, the bridging equipment had to be transported 
through the wilds of the Hundsruck —  the wooded, hilly area 
south of the Moselle. Jourdan considered this "difficult if 
not impossible" because of the region's poor roads. Clearly 
the army could not mount an effective attack under such 
conditions. Fortunately the Committee took his advice.
They agreed to let him choose his own crossing point and 
also decided that he was to make the primary, and Pichegru 
the secondary, crossing. Once they had driven the enemy 
from the entire east bank of the Rhine, their objective was 
no less than an occupation of all of southwest Germany as 
far as the Danube River.^
The government expected Jourdan and Pichegru to begin 
the offensive by mid-June at the very latest. They were soon 
disappointed. When Jourdan finally crossed the Rhine, it 
was on September 5. The problem was not the resistance of
4. A.G. mr 608-6, Jourdan to Gillet, 5/10/95; the Committee 
to Jourdan, 6/12/95.
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the enemy, but the paralysis of logistics. The severe 
shortages of every kind which had so grievously crippled the 
Republican armies in 179 3 had returned with a vengeance; 
these rather than the enemy were the cause of the three- 
month delay.
To begin, Jourdan needed bridging equipment. The 
enemy had not been so kind as to leave any bridges across 
the Rhine standing for his convenience. But the government 
had done nothing to provide the necessary timber, cordage, 
nails and pontoons required for a temporary heavy-duty 
bridge. Indeed it had dismantled those bridges which the 
Sambre et Meuse had used in 1794. Jourdan had retained 
a couple constructed across the Meuse, but these had to be 
taken down and hauled across country to the Rhine, and he had 
insufficient transport to do this quickly. The government 
had furnished the army with cash to purchase the needed 
materiel; unfortunately all that cash bought from the 
contractors was promises. They failed to supply what they 
had been paid for. Most occupied territories did not 
possess the required items in sufficient quantities, and those 
areas that did were reluctant to sell them.^
It was not long before Jourdan decided that he 
might never secure the equipment through conventional channels.
5. A.G. mr 608-6, Memoires de 1795. Henri Jomini, 
Histoire Critique et Militaire ... , VII, pp. 57-9.
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General Bonnard, then procuring materiel along the Rhine 
valley, advised him that force might be necessary. Jourdan 
suggested to representative Dubois that they no longer depend 
upon the contractors to furnish the needed supplies, since 
these were obviously not doing the job. Instead they should 
requisition it. Jourdan asked the government for broad 
and sweeping powers of requisition in the Rhineland, and 
even in eastern France. On his own he ordered his officers 
to seize all boats on the Waal and Meuse Rivers which could 
be used as pontoons. Reluctantly the government agreed to 
his request in early June. But limited requisitioning did 
not solve the problem. The army was so desperately short of 
horses that it could not carry what it requisitioned to the 
front with any dispatch. Claude Petiet, the quartermaster, 
estimated that the army lacked a staggering 34,870 horses, 
not to mention over 3,000 wagons.^
From early June the government, with increasing 
sharpness, attempted to prod Jourdan into motion. This was 
useless. As Jourdan rather uncomfortably admitted on 
July 13, he was utterly powerless to accelerate the construction 
of the bridges any more than he already had. Earlier Dubois 
had confirmed that Jourdan was ready to begin operations 
except for the bridge problem. How insoluble it was appears
6. A.G. B1 55 and B1 56, Jourdan to Dubois, 6/26/95; 
the Committee to Jourdan, 6/7/95; Petiet to Jourdan 6/21/95.
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in the minutes of a conference between Jourdan, his staff, 
and representative Dubois. The crux of the problem was that 
to build bridges they needed more large boats. But, to 
requisition craft along the Meuse was impractical because 
they were too small to withstand the Rhine's current. To 
purchase boats from private firms was inadvisable because 
they all had other "engagements." To transport some craft 
found in eastern France would not help much, because those 
of the needed length (thirty-five feet) were very difficult 
to haul overland, and besides France could provide only 
two thirds of the number required. It was judged too dangerous 
to cross in boats and on the one light bridge already on 
hand, seize a bridgehead, and then wait for reinforcements. 
Ultimately Jourdan managed to borrow the necessary equipment 
from a reluctant Army of the Nord in Holland, but for a 
number of reasons, transporting the equipment was also a 
time-consuming process.®
Finally, at the end of July everything was ready: 
bridges, materiel, soldiers and generals. The weather, 
however, was not. For a week heavy rains fell, flooding the 
Rhine so extensively that Jourdan dared not risk his makeshift 
bridges on the swollen current. He had to wait two weeks 
for the river to go down, and by then the enemy had discovered
8. A.G. B1 56, Precis of a council of Jourdan's staff 
with Dubois to discuss various proposals suggested by Jourdan 
to accelerate the passage of the Rhine.
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where he intended to cross. They poured troops into that 
sector, and a rueful Jourdan had to inform the government 
that once more he was postponing the offensive. "Unfortunately," 
he apologized, "these (difficulties) are not of a nature to 
be overcome by good will and courage."9
Strategically he had to start over. He now had his 
bridging equipment, but he had no crossing point at which to 
employ it. Then at last, he was favored by a stroke of luck. 
Several Rhenish princes had joined Prussia in withdrawing 
from the war, and one of them, the Elector Palatine, controlled 
a parcel of land along the Rhine just north of Dusseldorf.
By the terms of the Treaty of Basle, the territories of all 
signitories were neutralized and the contending armies 
forbidden to campaign on them. Nonetheless this particular 
area was ideal for a crossing point, so much so that Jourdan 
asked the government if there was some way he could make use 
of it. The government discovered —  or claimed to have 
discovered —  that the Elector had not withdrawn all his 
troops from the Allied Army. Thus technically he was still 
a belligerent and his land subject to invasion. On this 
pretext the government authorized Jourdan to attack as he 
desired.10
With this advantage in hand Jourdan devised his
9. A.G. mr 608-6, Jourdan to the Committee, 8/4/95, 
8/13/95.
10. Jomini, 0£  cit, VII, pp. 181-82.
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strategy. The task was more formidable than is generally 
recognized. To cross the Rhine in the face of the enemy 
was to launch an amphibious operation, far more difficult to 
effect in 1795 than in 1945 owing to the primitiveness of 
the means employed. His plan of attack was a triumph of 
careful foresight and detailed preparation rather than of 
boldness and imagination; it was based not upon the calculated 
risk but upon the elimination of every uncertainty altogether.
Jourdan took advantage of the fact that the Austrians 
still expected him to cross where he had first planned, 
at Neuweid. He ordered Hatry to begin preparations for a 
passage there: to construct batteries, prepare a floating 
bridge, and spread rumors of an impending attack all over 
Coblenz. In general he was to do everything he could to 
distract the enemy's attention from the real point of attack: 
the area north of Dusseldorf. Here Kleber was to cross with 
four divisions: two directly into the "neutral" territory, 
one into the adjacent area, and one directly into Dusseldorf 
which would be terrorized into a quick surrender. The 
operation was to take place at night. Kleber was to collect 
the required boats and construct the necessary batteries; 
his troops were to approach the river in complete silence and 
cross in the same manner. Once bridgeheads were established, 
the engineers were to build permanent bridges across the river.
11. A.G. Bl 59, Jourdan to Hatry, 8/22/95. Le Comte 
Pajol, Kleber, I, pp. 157-58. Jpmini, ibid.
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A glance at Jourdan's orders to two of Kleber's 
divisional generals reveals the incredible amount of planning 
and detail which went into this operation. He ordered 
Lefebvre to discover the best spot in the neutral territory 
to cross. Then he was to make his preparations: rehearse
his troops in their duties, assemble boats to carry 3,000 to
4,000 men across the river, and conceal his preparations 
from the enemy all the while. He was to arrange with his 
officers the exact boats which each unit was to use, and to 
make sure that they took the current into account when 
they crossed. His most intelligent chasseurs were to lead 
the assault and penetraLe inland. These were to be followed 
by sappers who would dig entranchments and gun emplacements 
to cover the bridgehead. Guides were to direct each wave of 
troops to their positions. Lefebvre was to insure that his 
soldiers maintained absolute silence throughout the passage, 
even to the extent that they not bang their arms and 
accouterments together. Jourdan ordered Championnet to follow 
much the same procedure. In addition, Championnet was to 
prevent anyone from going near the river without a personal 
order from him, and he was not to allow anyone into the 
church steeples along the river. When the attack began 
the troops were not to fire, but to seize the enemy positions 
with the bayonet. All concerned were to hold themselves 
ready; final attack orders were to be issued two hours in ad- 
vance. ‘
12. A.G. Bl 60, Instructions of the general-in-chief to 
General Lefebvre, n.d. Jean Championnet, Souvenirs, pp. 101-07.
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Unfortunately the government had not been nearly so 
thorough, especially in the measures it took to supply the 
army. Jourdan confessed that he did not know how the army 
was to subsist while on the march. The provisioning service 
was in such disarray that he doubted there would be enough 
food convoys to keep the men from starving. The transport 
service lacked wagons, and its horses were dying of hunger 
due to a lack of fodder. He wondered whether he could requi­
sition on the east bank or would be compelled to purchase 
everything —  and in the latter case could he do so with 
assignats. He had received no instructions on how to treat 
the various neutral German duchies which were within the 
army's line of march. Quartermaster Blanchard reported that 
the firm contracted to supply wagons to the army had failed 
to deliver a single one. The cavalry was understrength 
owing to a shortage of horses, the 800 a decade which the 
government had promised in June had not yet arrived. The 
bread was so bad that many soldiers had dysentery, and 
those that could were taking out their frustrations by 
pillaging. Worse, the government was weakening the army 
by allowing extended leaves to the men without sending 
replacements —  this on the eve of a major offensive. The 
government responded to his complaints by vaguely promising 
remedies in the indeterminate future. Meanwhile he was 
to proceed with the attack and do the best he could with
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the means at hand.1^
The assault was set for eight p.m. on September 5.
While Hatry demonstrated at Neuweid, the rest of the army
silently assembled along the banks of the river. Lefebvre put
3,000 men in boats, crossed into the neutral territory,
and disembarked; his officers announced to the astonished
sentries that the treaty had been violated and was no longer
in effect, and that they ought to go home. They did.
Quickly Lefebvre's men and those of the second division
deployed and attacked the Austrians resisting the passage
of Grenier's division at Urdingen. After a brief struggle
they routed them. Championnet landed outside Dusseldorf
in total silence; his elite grenadiers bayoneted the defenders,
and by mid-morning he had Dusseldorf at his mercy. The
city's burghers meekly surrendered. The Austrian sector
14commander ordered an immediate retreat south.
The passage of the Rhine went amazingly well.
Not only were casualties minimal, but also nothing serious 
had gone wrong. The precision of thij operation testified 
to the quality of the planning that Jourdan put into it.
With the major obstacle overcome Jourdan proceeded 
to the next step in the campaign —  the capture of the key 
fortress city of Mayence. He put his army on the roads
13. A.G. mr 608-6, Jourdan to the Committee, 7/29/95, 
8/30/95.
14. Pajol, op cit, I, pp. 179-81. Jomini, op cit, VII, 
pp. 183-87. ~
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to the Main Valley. The march to the Main was like a training 
exercise, for the French encountered virtually no resistance.
By September 20, the Sambre et Meuse was blockading the north 
and east walls of the city, and awaiting the arrival of 
Pichegru to complete the investment south of the river.
The ease of the army's advance was deceptive, 
especially to the Committee who already considered the 
campaign won. Actually the army's problems were just beginning. 
Jourdan had scarcely crossed the river when his ill-fed 
troops exploded in an orgy of pillaging. Angrily Jourdan 
explained one of the causes: There existed only one military
tribunal to handle all the army's breaches of discipline, 
and it was on the far side of the Rhine at Aix-La-Chapelle,
"able to judge very slowly ... crimes very numerous."
It was of little use in curbing indiscipline "because if 
one sent there all those who were guilty of pillage ... a 
third of the army would be at Aix-La-Chapelle ... and another 
third would be employed in escorting those guilty. Laws 
are necessary in an army which punish those guilty severely 
and at once; by this means a small number of punishments 
will make the majority do their duty." He recommended that 
tribunals be established to cashier negligent non-commissioned 
officers on the spot. The government's response was to send 
him a high sounding note ordering him to restore discipline 
and criticizing the lack of energy of his officers in this 
regard. This irritated him even more, for the tribunal at
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Aix had just freed a gang of looters who had threatened to 
kill their officers when the latter attempted to restore 
discipline. He offered to resign if discipline were not 
restored to the government's satisfaction. -1-5
But discipline would not be restored until some way 
was found to feed the army adequately. Jourdan complained 
again of his soldiers marching without regular food 
distributions, thereby causing them to forage for subsistence 
on their own. His excitable quartermaster, Blanchard, sent 
in his resignation because of his frustration at the supply 
problems. The army needed horses and wagons to haul provisions, 
but of the 34,000 horses requested the government had 
furnished only 500.16 The plight of the men was desperate.
The 59th and 66th demi-brigades went so far as to send 
deputations to army headquarters with letters denouncing both 
their generals and the government for negligence in feeding 
the army. Jourdan had to tell the protesters that the generals 
were doing everything in their power to solve the subsistence 
problem and that similar protests would only allow "royalists" 
and "anarchists" the chance to "trouble public tranquility."
15. A.G. B1 60, Jourdan to the Committee, 9/9/95;
the Committee to Jourdan, 9/15/95; Jourdan to Gillet, 9/14/95. 
Jourdan told Gillet that in the case of the liberated looters 
he could cite 300 similar judgments of the tribunal.
16. A.G. Bl 60 and B1 61, Jourdan to the Committee, 
9/19/95; Blanchard to Jourdan, 9/15/95.
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He then condemned the leaders of the two deputations to 
nineteen and twenty-five days in prison; this was a irere slap 
on the wrist. He knew that imprisoning hungry soldiers would 
not prevent them from expressing discontent at their hunger.
As one soldier wrote Gillet, the indiscipline was atrocious 
and deplorable, but the "inexactitude of the distributions 
and the indulgence of the laws" were its primary causes.
And these Jourdan was powerless to affect.17
Be that as it may, Jourdan's immediate task was to 
capture Mayence. To accomplish this he needed the cooperation 
of both the government and the Army of the Rhine. Neither 
was forthcoming. The Committee had finally decided that it 
needed real military expertise to aid in the direction of 
operations, and so invited Emmanuel Letourner into its 
ranks. Like Carnot, Letourner was a former army engineer 
and representative on mission to the armies, but aside 
from this his qualifications were limited. Letourner only 
marginally improved the strategic direction of the campaign.
He failed totally to get Pichegru to carry out his part of 
the offensive. Pichegru was supposed to cross the Rhine and 
attack Mayence from the south, but he had sent barely 15,000 
of his 95,000 men across the river. Relations between him
17. A.G. B1 61, Championnet to Jourdan, 9/ /95. A.G. 
Bl 62, Jourdan to the Committee, 10/1/95. A.G. B1 60, 
Delbrel-Casse, soldier, to Gillet, 9/10/95. The evidence 
suggests that the 59th and 66th demi-brigades were not the 
only protesters.
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and Jourdan were strained. Although he was the senior general, 
he did not communicate with Jourdan for days at a stretch, 
and so the Committee had to order him to keep Jourdan better 
informed. Indeed, it had to remind both men that harmony and 
cooperation must reign between them for the campaign to 
succeed.^
Jourdan believed that Pichegru's lack of cooperation 
resulted from the latter's bad faith. He could not have known 
that Pichegru's actions were not due to ill-will, but to 
treason. Exactly what Pichegru's commitment to the Allies 
was is still not clear. At this time he was negotiating with 
them to open the upper Rhine to their armies as a preliminary 
step to a march on Paris and a coup against the government. 
Hence his failure to carry out his part of the offensive was, 
in all likelihood, deliberate. Certainly he could not have 
wished to contribute to the defeat of an army which shortly 
was to become his ally. Thus, in one way or another he had 
to see to it that the southern jaw of the French vise never 
closed around Mayence. This would doom the offensive 
to failure, for he well knew that Jourdan could not take 
Mayence unaided in the face of an enemy army numbering 100,000 
men. Pichegru thus determined to resist any attempt to get
18. A.G. mr 608-6, e.g. the Committee to Jourdan, 
9/24/95, 9/29/95. The Committee to Pichegru, 9/20/95.
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him to advance.-
The government was quite unaware of Pichegru's 
treason. Confident of success it sent to both generals, on 
September 24 and 26, instructions on how to bring the campaign 
to a victorious conclusion. In essence it ordered them 
to continue to advance and endeavor to trap the Austrians in 
the watery triangle formed by the Rhine, Main, and Neckar 
Rivers (map number 7). Once the enemy saw themselves 
threatened on both flanks, the government believed they would 
retreat. The French should then complete the capture of Mayence, 
and then advance to occupy all of southwest Germany up to the 
Danube. The new attitude of the Thermidorians towards the 
war was evident in this directive. Jourdan was no longer 
to make the enemy army his objective; he was to besiege 
fortresses, occupy terrain, and drive back the enemy by 
threatening his flank. In a remarkable paragraph the govern­
ment decreed that the two generals were "limited to enfainishing 
the Allies in this region and giving them no alternative 
but to capitulate or perish of starvation. It is indeed of 
the greatest importance not to hazard any combat. The 
impetuosity of the French, their impatience for victory,
19. For Pichegru's treason see R. Phipps, The Armies 
of the First French Republic, II, pp. 261-67; John Hall,
General Pichegru's Treason, (London, 1915). Much about 
Pichegru's treason remains unclear: for example, did he ever 
finalize his deal with the Austrians to link up with them 
on the upper Rhine? Or were his hesitant moves due to vacillation, 
as he tried to make up his mind when to complete his treason, 
or indeed whether to commit treason at all?
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make it a duty for the Committee to insist particularly upon 
this disposition. The battles of Poitiers and Agincourt 
... are deadly examples of the danger there would be if 
contrary measures are a d o p t e d .
This directive complete contradicted the spirit of 
"querre a l'outrance." The government did not bother to 
tell Jourdan what he was to do if the Austrians decided to 
fight rather than retreat. They also failed to explain how 
the Sambre et Meuse v/as to subsist with its chaotic logistics 
while it "enfamisJied" its foes. Most importantly, the govern­
ment f-.iled to compel Pichegru to advance, in spite of the
fact that if he did not advance, their plan was only so much 
21unworkable rhetoric.
A week passed. Jourdan remained before Mayence, 
waiting for Pichegru to join him as ordered. He grew 
increasingly worried that the Austrians would enter the 
Prussian-controlled territory to the east —  neutral territory 
which he was forbidden to enter —  and take him in flank.
As for Pichegru, he limited himself to launching a weak 
offensive with two divisions towards the Neckar. The Austrians
20. A.G. mr 608-6, the Committee to generals-in- 
chief Jourdan and Pichegru, 9/24/95, 9/26/95. The italics 
are the author 1s .
21. Ibid. Jomini bitterly criticized Letourner as 
inept because he kept the two French armies separated, 
instead of concentrating them in a single mass. It is, there­
fore, ironic that Letourner instructed Jourdan and Pichegru 
that if the enemy concentrated in Franconia, a junction
of their two armies would then become indispensable. Here is 
Jomini's mass of maneuver!
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
280
routed it. With help from Pichegru still not forthcoming
and with rumors of an impending Austrian offensive
through the neutral territory rampant, Jourdan again asked
22the government for instructions.
The Committee's response was not to respond at all —  
at least with concrete instructions. It agreed with every 
objection and every complaint that Jourdan had raised since 
the outset of the campaign. Yes, Mayence was too large for 
one army to besiega successfully. Yes, the supply situation 
was atrocious. It had no more instructions to issue on the 
passage of the Main since the subsistence problem and the lack 
of transport obviously made a crossing impossible. True, 
Pichegru had been dragging his heels; nonetheless the 
Committee did not care how he and Pichegru arranged matters 
so long as they captured Mayence. Even so, it was confident 
that Jourdan would continue his "ardor" until he saw the 
opportunity to strike some blows "as certain as decisive."
In short, the government evaded every issue. It effectively 
abdicated its responsibility to offer Jourdan suggestions 
on how to remedy the situation. Letourner and his colleagues 
quite clearly did not know how to proceed, so they shifted 
the burden to Jourdan. They had placed him in a corner, and 
it was up to him to find his way out.
22. A.G. mr 608-6, Memoj res de 1795.
23. A.G. Bl 62, the Committee to Jourdan, 10/4/95.
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Desperate now to end the paralysis into which the
offensive had degenerated, the four representatives on mission
with the two armies called a council of war for October 4
to resolve how to capture Mayence in the absence of any
direction from the government. According to Jourdan, he
offered to march against the Austrian field aimy while Pichegru
undertook the siege. This plan was rejected. He then
offered to undertake the siege himself and reinforce Pichegru
with 20,000 men if Pichegru would oppose the Austrian field
army. Pichegru rejected this plan too. He then suggested
a joint operation against Mayence with the armies combined
under a single commander. When Pichegru also refused this
suggestion, he threw up his hands. If Jourdan's version of
the meeting was accurate, Pichegru had no intention of
advancing; indeed Pichegru argued that t.o advance would pull
trcops away from the upper Rhine where the enemy was
threatening an invasion of Alsace. This is the area where
Pichegru hoped to join forces with the Allies when he believed
the time ripe. Thus any combination was impossible.
Clearly the representatives should have ordered Pichegru
either to advance or to submit his resignation; instead they
avoided making any decision by writing back to Paris for
instructions. Since the demise of the Terror, the time
24for disobedience had evidently returned.
24. A.G. mr 608-6, Memoires de 1795; Jourdan to the 
Committee, 10/9/95. Phipps, op git, II, pp. 268-74.
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From this point on the campaign was inevitably 
doomed. The government balked at initiating the only measures 
that might have put the campaign back on to the path to 
victory. They were unwilling to force Pichegru to advance,25 
and they neglected to procure for Jourdan the supplies and 
equipment that would give him even a chance of defeating the 
Austrian army. The Sambre et Meuse could not mask Mayence 
and march against the enemy because it had no pontoons with 
which to bridge the Main, no horses to haul supplies for a 
further advance, and insufficient food to feed the men. It 
was reduced to immobility, pinned helplessly on the banks 
of the Main until either dearth or the enemy forced it to 
retreat.26
A letter from Kleber to Jourdan revealed the atmosphere 
of frustration in which the generals labored. The council 
of war had entrusted Kleber with the command of all the 
siege forces —  including four of Pichegru's divisions which 
were blockading that part of Mayence on the west bank of 
the Rhine. In four days the administrative problems of 
commanding this force had driven Kleber to despair. "I swear
25. The government was also unwilling to replace him.
At one point they offered his command to Kleber; however 
when Kleber refused to take it, they neither offered it to 
anyone else, nor coerced Kleber to do his duty and accept it.
26. A.G. B1 62, Jourdan to the Committee, 10/6/95; 
Joubert to the Committee, 10/6/95.
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
283
to you, my dear' friend, that it is only out of friendship 
for you that I accepted this miserable, wretched command ... 
and because I hoped that under your orders I would not suffer 
any of the miserable screw-ups [tracasseries] that we 
have ever encountered. Mistaken in my expectations, I must 
declare that should I be arrested, bound, gagged, or even 
guillotined, I will not continue to command the four divisions 
of the Rhine et Moselle."27 In spite of Kleber's black 
portrayal of his problems, he could not have been facing 
anything more severe than Jourdan was —  or Scherer was in 
Italy, or Hoche in the West. And for how long had Jourdan 
.sturggled with the same difficulties that were now causing 
Kleber to despair
On October 11, the Austrians broke the deadlock.
The army of General Francois Clerfayt had been reinforced 
by 25,000 men from Wurmser's army on the Upper Rhine, and 
Clerfayt now planned to maneuver the French away from the 
walls of Mayence. Clerfayt was a Belgian in the Hapsburgs' 
service, a careful, deliberate commander in the traditional 
style. Sixty-two years old in 1795, he had become overly 
cautious owing to his long years of experience, his advanced 
age, and his health. He was suffering from skin ulcers and 
an unhealed wound in one arm. "Ah ... I am only the shadow
27. A. G. mr 608-6, Kleber to Jourdan, 10/8/95
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of a man" he exclaimed after Fleurus. But he was still able 
to take advantage of the excellent opportunity which the 
indecision of the French offered him. As had been rumored 
for weeks, indeed, as Jourdan had warned the government since 
late September, Clerfayt intended to flank the Sambre et 
Meuse out of its position by marching through the neutral 
territory to the east. It is possible that Allied agents had 
assured him that Pichegru would remain inactive while he 
attacked Jourdan. On the 11th Clerfayt crossed the Main.28
It was what Jourdan expected. When he first learned 
of the advance he boldly prepared to fight, taking up a 
position on the Nidda facing east with five divisions and the 
cavalry reserve. This was a mistake, as he later admitted; 
had Clerfayt been in a pugnacious mood he could have thrown 
nearly twice Jourdan's numbers against the Sambre et Meuse 
which, crippled by supply shortages and the Rhine at its 
back, would have been hard pressed to accomplish anything.
But aggressiveness was not Clerfayt's style; he merely 
maneuvereu towards Jourdan's communications with the lower 
Rhine and waited for dearth to compel the French to retreat. 
Jourdan was checkmated and he knew it. lie ordered a retreat 
northward. Informing the Committee of the Austrian advance 
he bluntly blamed the government for the situation. Had it 
taken his warnings seriously or followed through on any of
28. A.G. B. 62, Jourdan to the Committee, 10/6/95, 
10/8/95. Phipps, o£ cit, II, p.. 174.
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
285
his plans, things might have ended differently. Such a letter
would have been unthinkable during the Terror. Nothing more
strikingly reveals the depths to which the authority of the
Thermidorians had plunged than the diffident Jourdan's
criticism of them. Because they were not firmly exercising
29
their authority, Jourdan ceased to respect them.
The campaign literally was making Jourdan sick.
His intestinal ailment had flared up again, and he was suffering 
from incessant diarrhea brought on by the "shaking" and 
"jerking" of riding horseback —  quite possibly also brought 
on by the wretched food and the pressures of command. His 
physician informed the government that he considered Jourdan's 
health too precarious to sustain further hardships of war.
To the physician's report Jourdan added that the recent 
exertions had made the ailment incapacitating; he did not 
want to abandon his post, but he might have to.30 The 
Committee was concerned. With the situation deteriorating 
it did not want to lose its best general. It also may 
have felt that motives other than diarrhea were causing 
him to request leave. While they expressed solicitude for 
his health, they kept him in command.3'1'
29. A.G. mr 608-6, Memoires de 1795; Jourdan to the 
Committee, 10/11/95.
30. A.G. B1 62, Certificate de visite (medical 
report) concerning Jourdan's state of health, 10/6/95.
Jourdan to the Committee, 10/11/9 5.
31. A.G. mr 608-6, CaffereJ.li to Jourdan, 10/20/95; the 
Committee to Jourdan, 10/16/95.
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The Sambre et Meuse retreated north, harassed by 
famine and indiscipline. On the Lahn Jourdan called a meeting 
and asked his officers whether they should turn and attack. 
Their response was unanimous: there were not enough rations 
or horses to launch an effective attack. So Jourdan sent 
Hatry with four divisions to Dusseldorf, while Kleber marched 
to Neuweid. The withdrawal would have gone without a hitch 
had not Marceau committed an unbelievable blunder.
Ordered to collect all the boats on the river near Coblenz 
so that the enemy could not use them, Marceau decided to 
burn them —  upstream from the Neuweid bridge. The burning 
boats drifted downstream and incinerated Kleber's only line 
of retreat. It was fortunate that Clerfayt was not pressing 
the French withdrawal. While Kleber dug in on the east 
bank and Marceau vowed suicide, engineers constructed a new 
bridge and Kleber got his men to safety on the west bank.32
The French defeat before Mayence forced the government 
to abandon its hopes of conquering the entire Rhine Valley.
It ordered Jourdan to cordon his army along the west bank 
from Mayence to Dusseldorf. The latter place Jourdan was 
converting into a strongpoint on his own for future offensives 
into Germany. The government toyed with the idea of launching
32. A.G. mr 608-6, Memoires de 1795; Kleber to Jourdan, 
10/17/95. It is a testimony to Marceau's popularity —  and 
Jourdan's tolerance —  that Marceau was forgiven for what 
could have been a very lethal error.
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a new offensive■from Mannheim, but when Kleber refused to 
command it, the plan was abandoned. The government was still 
operating in a mood of embarrassment and excuse-making.
It informed Jourdan that it had not been surprised by the
results of the campaign, it had expected the enemy to violate
the line of neutrality, and it had never expected to take a 
place as important as Mayence without waging a great battle. 
Perhaps that great battle would have been waged before their 
dispatch arrived. At any rate Jourdan must now make a 
"supreme effort" to snatch victory from the jaws of defeat 
in spite of everything. The government would not tell him how 
to accomplish this since it had full confidence m  his
abilities. As for his ailment, "Maurice de Saxe conquered
at Fontenoy and the victory restored him to health."33
As Jourdan tried to decide how to make a supreme effort 
without supplies, Clerfayt transferred the bulk of his army 
to the west bank of the Rhine at Mayence and defeated Pichegru's 
four divisions on the Pfrimm River outride the city. The 
enemy now could sever all communications between the two 
French armies. The government regarded this latest defeat 
as a major crisis. Jourdan thought that he should either 
recross the Rhine and march against Clerfayt's communications 
or march upstream against Clerfayt's flank. The Committee
33. A.G. B1 63, the Committee to Jourdan, 10/19/95, 
10/20/95. The italics are the author's.
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suggested that he attempt both maneuvers. Jourdan was not 
sufficiently supplied to attempt even one with any great hope 
of success and he had no hope of any help from Pichegru.
In obeying the directive he resolved to "act with prudence."
He ordered Marceau, whose 15,000 men were already in the 
area, to seize and hold the defiles through the Hundsruck 
west of Mayence. He was to prevent the enemy from breaking 
out any further westward, and to try to reestablish communications 
with Pichegru. Hatry at Dusseldorf was to demonstrate towards 
Clerfayt's communications on the east bank, while Jourdan 
assembled the rest of the army on the Nahe River as the 
preliminary step in an offensive against Clerfayt's northern 
flank.34
This was sound and necessary strategy; unfortunately 
the army lacked the means to execute it properly. The government 
was as far from solving the logistics problem as ever, 
especially in the furnishing of horses. The shortage of 
transport hindered every facet of the army's operations. The 
army could not haul enough food to the front to feed the troops 
because there were no horses to pull all the wagons. Whole 
squadrons of cavalry were dismounted, and six battalions 
were fighting without their cannon because there were no 
horses to pull them. Until more were sent, the
34. A.G. mr 608-6, Memoires de 1795. A . G . Bl 64, 
Jourdan to Marceau, 11/1/95; Carnot to Jourdan, 11/3/95.
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army could carry only enough ammunition for six hours of 
combat. Jourdan was forced to keep an inordinately large 
force at Dusseldorf so that they would be near the food 
convoys from Holland which in turn could not march farther 
for lack of horses. The supply system was laced with 
corruption and inefficiency, displaying "neither energy 
nor zeal in supplying the troops" and thus perpetuating their 
starvation and denument. "There is not one commune in the 
conquered territories which, at one time or another, has not 
given money to these employees in order not to place their 
produce in the magazines of the army," Jourdan complained.^  
The dearth of supplies was causing terrible 
suffering among the soldiers. It was now mid-November, and 
the wet, bitter late autumn weather added to their misery. 
Many pillaged in order to obtain the food and clothing that 
their supply sustem was not furnishing. Marceau, facing the 
Austrians in the barrens of the Hundsruck, wrote that his 
men were fighting in mud and slush up to their knees, 
without bread or shoes, and as a result indiscipline was 
increasing so rapidly that he feared he could not count on 
his men in a serious engagement. Marceau was so distraught 
that only his sense of honor kept him at his post. He 
preferred to die and be buried in the snow than endure such
35. A.G. mr 608-6, Jourdan to the Directory, 11/23/95, 
11/24/95, 11/29/95.
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indiscipline. Jourdan laconically told the government 
that the men were sleeping uncovered in the snow without 
bread or brandy "as usual." The starvation and cold were 
sending hundreds to the hospitals and hundreds more were 
deserting. Many received letters from home urging them to 
escape their sufferings and come home, while others disappeared 
when sent on foraging expeditions. Sickness and desertion 
eroded the army's strength. When Jourdan assembled his 
sixty battalions and thirteen regiments of cavalry designated 
for the Nahe offensive, he found that instead of an 
anticipated 40,000 men he had 35,000.36
Pressed by the government to move swiftly, Jourdan 
opened a limited offensive along the Nahe on November 30.
His plan was to turn the enemy's eastern flank and threaten 
its line of retreat to Mayence. While Marceau held the enemy 
on the right, Jourdan attacked them at Kreuznach with two 
divisions. The Austrians would have repulsed the attack had 
not Jourdan and Bernadotte personally rallied the shivering 
soldiers and led them forward in a second assault which 
took the village. The army continued to advance, but its 
deprivations slowed its impetus. Furthermore, the enemy 
had intercepted a courier from Pichegru with the French plans, 
and had published them in a German newspaper. Consequently
36. A.G. B1 65 and B1 66, Marceau to Jourdan, 12/1/95; 
Jourdan to Marceau, 11/1/95; Carnot to Jourdan, 11/3/95.
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Clerfayt would soon be shifting reserves to the Nahe, and 
when they arrived he could turn both of Jourdan's flanks.37
The government's grasp of the reality at the front 
was uncertain, and consequently the gap between its 
expectations and Jourdan's ability to execute them remained 
substantial. As the Sambre et Meuse struggled in the snow, 
the Directory3** urged Jourdan to penetrate between the 
enemy's army and Mayence in order to cut Clerfayt's line 
of retreat. He was to avoid a major battle while 
persuading Clerfayt that he desired to fight one and annoy 
the enemy without becoming involved in a full-scale conflict. 
Patiently Jourdan replied that he could not penetrate behind 
the Austrian army because this would risk bringing on the 
battle that he was not supposed to fight. Moreover the army 
did not possess the mobility for such an operation due to 
the weather and its lack of horses and transport —  besides 
he was outnumbered. The best strategy to follow, he argued, 
was to stand fast on the Nahe.39
37. A.G. mr 608-6, Jourdan to the Directory, 12/3/95; 
Memoires de 1795. That the French plans should be captured 
on one of Pichegru's couriers was indeed fortunate. There 
was a serious information leak to the enemy, so much so that 
even the government became suspicious; it instructed both 
Jourdan and Pichegru to be sure to keep the contents of its 
directives to them secret.
38. The Directory assumed power on October 31, at 
which point Carnot, who had been elected as one of the five 
Directors, took over the operational control of the French 
armies.
39. A.G. B1 66, the Directory to Jourdan, 12/3/95; 
Jourdan to the. Directory, 12/3/95, 12/12/95.
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The Directory responded by urging him to do his best
to prevent any further advance by the Austrians, leaving the
specific tactics he employed up to him. As Carnot wrote
this, the Austrians were driving Marceau's outnumbered troops
back across the Nahe on the right. Marceau described his
division as on the verge of disintegration; Jourdan told him
not to take his setback so seriously because help was on
the way. He was determined to hold the Austrians on the Nahe.
He sent Poncet's division and part of Bernadotte's to
Marceau's aid. While Marceau occupied the enemy frontally,
Poncet stormed a wooded ridge on the enemy's right overlooking
Sulzback, lost it, then retook it in a second attack. The
40
Austrian force retreated across the Nahe.
But this was the army's last gasp. The soldiers 
were on the verge of collapse. The indiscipline, desertion, 
starvation and lack of clothing had reduced the army to the 
point that one severe shock might shatter it. Poncet's 
division, previously 10,000 men strong, was below 5,000. 
Jourdan believed that the only measure which might improve 
matters was to attach Marceau with 20,000 men to the left 
wing of the Rhine et Moselle at Kaiserslautern to prevent 
a resumption of the enemy's advance westward, while he 
concentrated the rest of the Sambre et Meuse behind the
40. A.G. B1 66, the Directory to Jourdan, 12/12/95; 
Marceau to Jourdan, 12/8/95; Jourdan to Marceau, 12/9/95, 
12/12/95. A.G. Bl 67, Poncet to Jourdan, 12/18/95.
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Moselle near Coblenz. This would pull together its somewhat 
scattered forces, offer it a strong line of defense, and 
pull it out of the foodless barrens of the Hundsruck. If 
this was not done, the enemy might attack and force him 
into the battle that he could ill afford to fight —  that he 
was ordered not to fight. Worse, the Austrians had captured 
Neuweid and were threatening to break out westward; if this 
occurred his Nahe force would be cut off. Jourdan's mood 
was as fatalistic as at any time in the war. He wrote 
Ernouf that he was now paying dearly for the honor of supreme 
command and the glory of his past victories. When General 
Paul Grenier warned of an impending enemy attack, Jourdan 
dryly told him to fight hard; he would recommend him to the 
good saint "Frappefort."
Thus when on December 19, Clerfayt proposed a truce, 
Jourdan must have thought it an act of divine intervention.
The Austrians, even with the superior experience and organization 
of their supply service, were finding it difficult to live 
in the Hundsruck. So Clerfayt, via an emissary to Marceau, 
proposed an "arrangement" by which hostilities would cease 
and discussions be held to arrange a truce. The entire 
French officer corps was for this solution. Marceau's 
troops had been without bread for three days and the other
41. A.G. B1 66 and Bl 67, Jourdan to the Directory, 
12/18/95; Jourdan to Ernouf, 12/13/95; Jourdan to Grenier, 
12/18/95.
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divisions were scarcely better off. Jourdan's initial response
to Marceau's news of the proposal was: "could Clerfayt
be seeking winter quarters." He agreed to hold talks, and
in a second parley it was agreed that hostilities would cease
for a month and that the truce could be renewed at that time.
A cease-fire line was then drawn up. Jourdan had to await
Pichegru's agreement, but Pichegru was as eager for a truce
as Jourdan and immediately consented. The two sides signed
an agreement which brought hostilities to an end all along
the Rhine Valley. For the Sambre et Meuse it was a godsend.
Jourdan pulled it back behind the Moselle where provisions
were more plentiful and where it could recuperate unmolested
by the enemy. As he wrote, it was beyond its power to 
4 2attempt anything more.
That Jourdan would take such a step without the prior
approval of the Directory testifies to his desperation.
Despite his later protests of ignorance of the Constitution,
he must have realized that he did not have the legal authority
43
to conclude an armistice with an opposing power on his own.
The Directory's initial impulse was to annul the truce and 
remove Jourdan from command for his cavalier disregard of 
their authority. They also felt that a cessation of hostilities
42. A.G. Bl 67, Jourdan to the Directory, 12/21/95; 
Marceau to Jourdan, 12/19/9 5; Jourdan to Poncet, 12/19/95; 
Joubert to Garrau, 12/20/95.
43. A.G. Bl 68, Jourdan to the Directory, 1/8/96; 
Joubert to the Directory, 1/9/96.
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would irritate public opinion, harm army morale, and
prevent draftees and deserters from joining the army because
it was uselessly inactive. The last two reasons were
utterly fantastic. They wrote a letter ordering him to
cancel the agreement, but the realities of the situation
persuaded them to withhold it. Since both armies remained
as destitute of everything as ever and since Pichegru had
agreed to the truce, the Directory realized that a resumption
of Hostilities was impossible. So the Directory, in order
to confirm its authority over the military, annulled the
truce in principle only. It rendered justice "to the good
intentions" which caused Jourdan to conclude the cease-fire
but stated that, without the participation of the Directory
itself, such an arrangement was unconstitutional. At the
same time, it authorized its commissioners at the front to
conclude a similar agreement with the Austrians if they saw
fit to do so. They, of course, immediately legalized 
44
the armistice.
So the campaign of 1795 ended as an unqualified 
failure. The conservatives in the government criticized Jourdan's 
generalship. Barras wrote that the Sambre et Meuse would have 
been more successful if its commander had possessed his 
daring of former days —  daring produced perhaps by the
44. A.G. Bl 68, the Directory to Jourdan, 1/1/96.
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Terror's placing its generals between "the guillotine and 
victory." The left defended him, Carnot and Letourner arguing 
that if the government had provided Jourdan the means to 
cross the Rhine in the spring, the campaign would have 
succeeded. Indeed the criticism of the right was unfounded. 
Jourdan did everything in his power to accomplish his task.
All the daring and strategic genius in the world could not 
have overcome the difficulties under which he labored:
Pichegru*s treason, the poor strategic direction of the 
government, and above all the crippling lack of provisions, 
supplies, and horses. Joubert was closest to the truth 
when he reported that "the dearth of horses is the principal 
cause of the reverses which we have suffered." It is to the 
causes of this dearth that we must now turn.45
II. War and Depression
"The monetary disaster," argued Georges Lefebvre,
"was the major event of the period." It was the principal 
factor in the disastrous economic crash that so dangerously 
sapped the life of the revolution during 1795 and 1795 and 
which left its armies in a state of destitution and near 
famine during the same period. Lefebvre was not the first to 
recognize this fact; Jourdan1s quartermaster-general, Blanchard, 
recognized it in the autumn of 1795. Blanchard blamed the
45. M. Reinhard, Le Grand Carnot, II, pp. 165-66. 
Paul Barras, Memo ires, II, p. 19,.
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logistical shambles of the campaign squarely upon the 
depreciation of the assignat. Without stable, available 
currency he could not purchase the army its bread and meat or 
buy the horses necessary to bring provisions and other supplies 
to the army while it was in the field. He had attempted 
to furnish what the army required via contracts. However, 
the depreciation of the assignat to four pennies to the franc 
and the absolute lack of hard currency in the army treasury, 
combined with the demands of the contractors for hard cash 
before they fulfilled their contracts, all prevented Blanchard 
from purchasing the army its necessities.46
The monetary disaster was caused by the Thermidorians' 
decision to return to economic normalcy —  to a free market 
economy —  before they terminated the war. To do this they 
had to dismantle the national economy with its requisitioning 
and wage and price controls. "Price limitation, since it 
limits profit, comes up against the producer's passive 
resistance, and is ineffective ..." unless accompanied 
by the coercive force of the state. But force and mobilization 
for ends other than profit were incompatible with free 
enterprise. The dismantling process began gradually.
At first the Thermidorians simply neglected to enforce the 
maximum, while at the same time they allowed requisitioning 
to ease off. Foodstuffs and goods began to be sold again
46. Georges Lefebvre, The Thermidorians, (New York,
1964), p. 83. A.G. Bl 62, Blanqjiard to the Committee, 10/15/95.
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in the marketplace, and the peasants withheld their produce
to drive up prices. Then the government established a
maximum based upon the 1790 price index increased by two thirds
to be enforced by each department. Finally price controls
were abolished altogether. In December, under pressure from
private enterprise, the Thermidorians began closing down the
state-operated clothing and munitions workshops, as well as
the arsenals, powder mills, and saltpeter mines run by
C. A. Prieur. The commission of trade and supplies was
abolished. Both Prieur and Robert Lindet were eased out
of the government. Requisitioning was gradually abandoned
as the peasants sold their produce for as much as they could
get. The provision of food, clothing and armaments to the
armies was taken over by private firms. By March, 1795, the
4 7entire national economy had been liquidated.
The return to economic liberty was disastrous to the 
war effort. The assignat depreciated with frightening speed 
as the government printed more and more of them, and financiers 
and businessmen speculated on those in circulation. By 
the end of 1794 the assignat had fallen to 20% of its 
original value, by April, 1795 it was down to 8%, by 
August 4%. And the Thermidorians expected their armies to 
conduct business with assignats! Worse, as the assignat
47. Lefebvre, ibid, pp. 85-96;. 99-391? 159-163.
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shrank in value-, as the peasants reacted to the depreciation
by hoarding or by selling to the wealthy who alone possessed
hard money, the price of food and other essentials
skyrocketed. When the maximum was abolished, the price of
meat stood at forty sous a pound; by April, 1795 it was
up to seven francs, by September twenty francs. Bread prices
for the same period rose from five sous to twenty sous a pound
while the Thermidorians" belated establishment of grain
controls in late 1795 to halt this price rise were poorly
enforced and thus ineffective. During the summer of 1795
wood rose from 500 to 800 francs a cord, and shoes from 200 to
250 francs a pair. All of these items were necessities to
the army, and yet Blanchard could not furnish them to his
soldiers. Tho aveiage soldier's daily ration was
reduced from twenty-eight to twenty-four ounces, and "the
soldier who received a pound could consider himself lucky."
If he tried to s\;pplement his meager diet by buying food
from the local populace, he found that his pay bought 
4 8virtually nothing.
In spite of the fact that the summer months were 
normally a time of relative plenty, the soldiers were suffering 
in the summer of 1795. The veterans of the Sambre et Meuse, 
accustomed to the regular food distributions and stable 
currency of 1794, were unwilling to accept meekly the return
48. Ibid.
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to hard times. A rash of mutinies and disturbances spread 
through the army, with the cause of each outbreak the same: 
insufficient food and the worthlessness of the pay. When 
the local populace refused to accept assignats for food, 
the soldiers of the 59th demi-brigade began to take the food 
by force, roughing up some of the civilians in the process. 
Order was restored only after the soldiers had suffered 
several casualties. At Aix-la-Chapelle the lack of food 
forced representative Meynard to reduce the garrison's 
rations, which led to a mutiny and the demand that the 
reduction be rescinded. When Meynard refused, the troops 
rioted and rampaged through the city breaking into stores and 
houses and stealing every morsel of food they could lay their 
hands on. It took Meynard two days to restore order at 
gunpoint. Other units sent petitions to Jourdan begging him 
to do something about their worthless pay. Uselessly he 
warned the government of the outbreaks, emphasizing that he 
could not count on his officers to maintain order because 
many, destitute themselves, sympathized with their men.49
The Thermidorians' decision to rely upon private 
enterprise to supply the armies also proved disastrous to 
the troops. The government contracted with various companies 
for them to furnish the armies with various necessities:
49. A.G. Bl 56, Jourdan to the Committee, 7/15/95. 
Recueil des Actes, XXVI, pp. 99-103, Meynard to the Committee, 
8/1/95.
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grain, fodder, shoes, and horses. In theory contracts 
were to be awarded to those firms which agreed to supply 
a given item at the lowest cost to the government. In 
practice, contracts were awarded in the secrecy of government 
offices to political cronies, or to those firms which 
contributed the sweetest bribes —  pots de vin in the language 
of the day —  to the politicians awarding them. Frequently 
the companies were without ready cash and when this occurred 
either the government itself had to purchase the items which 
were to be supplied or it had to advance the company enough 
money so that it could make the purchase. Thus in reality 
the company contracted only to deliver the supplies, not 
to procure them. The defects of this system during a time 
of economic disorder were many. The companies frequently 
defaulted on their contracts, pocketing the advance without 
supplying anything to the army. Others profiteered. Cerf 
Berr, hired to provide horses to Jourdan's army which the 
government acquired for him for 600 francs a head, resold 
them to the army for 1,500 francs a head. The inflation 
wreaked its havoc here also. The contractors covered 
themselves against the depreciation of the currency by 
inflating their prices, which in turn further exacerbated 
the depreciation.5^
50. Lefebvre, o£ cit, pp. 159-16 3. Lefebvre, The 
Directory (New York, 1964), pp. 289-92.
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The Thermidorians attempted to alleviate the situation 
by authorizing their armies to make partial "requisitions" 
in their sectors. However, since the supplies "requisitioned" 
had to be paid for with worthless or nonexistent currency 
out of the army treasuries, the armies were back where they 
started. In the Sambre et Meuse frustration with the contractors 
increased throughout 1795. Representative Rene Gillet, 
who operated out of army headquarters and was Jourdan's 
closest collaborator, translated this frustration into 
increasingly sharply worded complaints about the worsening
logistical situation. "I warn you __  that the Army of the
Sambre et Meuse is always in the same poverty of horses.
The contractor of wagons makes new promises every day and 
has not kept one. Lanchere has received the order to send 
to the army 3,000 horses which he said were in Holland; not 
a one has arrived. I invite you to examine attentively if 
this contractor will finally execute his contract, or if he 
will wait until the end of the war." Vainly he and Jourdan 
requested broader powers of requisition, but not until late 
autumn did the government allow them to overstep the limits 
of the marketplace to any great extent. Gillet sarcastically 
evaluated the regime's policy in the Rhineland as one of never 
having a fixed plan for anything; "a decision taken yesterday 
has already been changed by tomorrow ... everything is
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arbitrary."51
Such conditions readily explain the paralysis of 
the Sambre et Meuse on the Rhine throughout the summer.
Without food, horses, and bridging equipment, it could not 
march. And Jourdan did not have the power to force the 
contractors to supply them, the cash to purchase them, or 
the authority to requisition them.
Jourdan could no longer rely upon the representatives 
on mission to bear the brunt of the logistical burden.
The Thermidorians decided that in a republic returning to 
normal political activity, government proconsuls were out 
of place. So they began to reduce the number of representatives. 
They recalled all those who had been on mission for over six 
months and did not bother to replace eleven of them. Worse, 
the authority of those representatives who remained was 
weakened. The Thermidorians deprived them of their powers 
of law enforcement and promotion: all suspensions and
arrests, as well as promotions, were provisional only until 
the government approved them. The representatives henceforth 
had to send all decrees to the Convention for approval 
within twenty-four hours, and they also were deprived of the
51. Recueil des Actes, XXVI, p. 244, Gillet to the 
Committee, 8/6/95, 8/11/95. The increasingly critical and 
didactic language which Gillet used towards the government 
during the summer testifies to the decreasing respect in 
which it was held at army headquarters.
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unlimited funding which they enjoyed under the Terror. By 
1795 they were reduced to playing the roles of relatively 
powerless, overworked supervisors and advisors. By August 
there were only two with each army, and obviously these 
could not begin to duplicate the volume of work that their 
more numerous and powerful predecessors had accomplished.52
The endless frustration and strain, overwork and 
overexertion broke Jourdan's colleague Gillet. By September 
his health was so ruined that he had to take to his bed; 
by December he was dead —  at the age of thirty-three. His 
loss was a severe blow both to Jourdan and to his army. 
Jourdan needed his energy and toughness at a time when 
indiscipline and supply deficiencies were increasing 
dangerously; he also needed his blunt, no-nonsense approach 
when he explained the army's problems to the government and 
demanded that they be rectified. Gillet got results from 
the government, from the bureaucracy, and from the officials 
in the occupied territories that Jourdan by himself could 
not hope to obtain. Moreover, Gillet's absence from the 
council of war on October 4 was crucial to the rest of the 
campaign. He alone of the representatives might have 
induced the council to take the tough decisions necessary to 
capture Mayence; he alone might have forced the others to 
adopt one of Jourdan's plans and to relieve Pichegru of his
52. Jacques Godechot, Les Commissaires aux armees 
sous le Directoire (Paris, 1941;, 2 volumes), pp. 20-54.
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command if Pichegru failed to cooperate. The qualities which 
Gillet took with him to the grave were qualities which Jourdan 
and the French armies could ill afford to lose.
The Directory perpetuated the state of affairs.
It assigned "commissioners" to supervise each army, but their 
powers were every bit as limited as the representatives' 
had been. Their primary responsibility was to assure that 
the generals observed the government's authority, not to 
insure that their armies were receiving enough food and 
supplies. Since there was only one commissioner per army, 
they could scarcely affect the mountain of logistical and 
disciplinary problems plaguing the French forces. As a result, 
more and more of the logistical work fell into the laps of 
Jourdan, his quartermaster-general, and their unreliable 
supply and transport services.
The army's supply administration had, by 1795, 
reverted back to the inefficiency and disorganization of 
1793. There was little Jourdan or his quartermaster could 
do to correct this, because they had been deprived of their 
most effective weapons against the inept and negligent 
officials who caused it. They no longer had representatives 
to arrest malefactors or military tribunals to convict them 
on the spot. The penchant for corruption and profiteering, 
so epidemic among the contractors, had spread to the 
bureaucrats. Commission Haussmann described them as 
throwing themselves after the subsistence of the soldiers 
"like birds of. prey; they traffic in their bread and clothing,
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leaving them in- the most pitiful abandon when they are sick, 
sending them insolently away when they justly complain.
In a word, their wrongdoings affect and touch everything; 
since these monsters can satisfy their cupidity ... and 
enrich themselves at the expense of the people, this.is all 
they desire." The relaxation of the Terror meant that 
there was nothing to deter them, hence they stole with 
impunity, administering "neither the inhabitants nor the 
soldiers nor the treasury."53
If Jourdan, with quite limited effectiveness, was 
able to insure that his quartermaster curbed the "frightful 
disorganization" and corruption in his own supply services, 
he could do nothing to police the various agents subordinated 
directly to the government. His complaints about their 
abuses were acknowledged by the regime, but that was as 
far as matters went. Indeed the abuses by supply officials 
of every kind became so outrageous that Jourdan's generals 
began taking the law into their own hands, arbitrarily 
arresting and punishing any supply agent whom they believed 
guilty of an offense. Under pressure from the Directory 
Jourdan was forced to order his generals to cease and
53. Haussmann to the Committee, 1/12/95 (96?),
Edmund Eonnal de Gauges, Les Representants en mission ... , 
IV, pp. 132-33. “
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desist and allow the culprits to be prosecuted in the 
military courts.54
The supply shortages which resulted both from the 
depression and the logistical chaos caused by the depression 
were catastrophic. On November 4, 1755, the army lacked
23,000 coats, 10,000 trousers, 5,000 hats, 40,000 pairs of 
shoes, 10,000 pantaloons, 5,000 tents, and 100,000 sets of 
horseshc ;s and nails. The 40,000 men whom Jourdan concentrated 
on the Nahe required 18,750 quintals of bread a month, but 
there were only 12,000 available. Meat was even scarcer, and 
the army needed 380,000 francs to make up a deficit in meat 
"almost absolute." This same force needed 4,000 more horses 
for the transportation of provisions, and 8,000 more to pull 
the artillery. It suffered from a severe shortage of wagons 
and a complete absence of bridging equipment. To pay the 
contractors who might be able to supply the necessary 
provisions and materiel, the army possessed insufficient 
money.55
The effects of these shortages on the officers and 
men of the S ambre et Meuse were devastating. For the men on 
the Nahe they meant sleeping uncovered in the snow without
54. A. Debidour ed., Recueil des Actes du Directoire 
Executif (Paris, 1910; 4 volumes), I, pp. 275-79. A.G.
Bl 68, Jourdan to his generals of division, 1/10/96.
55. A.G. Bl 64, Report of the chiefs of the administrations 
of the Sambre et Meuse to Jourdan, 11/4/95. The report does
not mention how short of horses was the cavalry; whole squadrons 
were dismounted due to the lack pf mounts.
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provisions "as usual." For Marceau's soldiers they meant 
fighting the battle of Sulzbach after having gone three days 
without bread. For thousands they meant slogging through 
the miid and snow in bare feet without overcoats, with 
influenza and pneumonia as their reward. Famine stalked 
the army the entire time it campaigned on the east bank 
of the R h i n e . G u n n e r  Bricard recalled that "the rations 
were of poor quality, the provisions were very expensive, 
and we had almost no money because our assignats had lost 
ninety-five percent. The soldiers were obliged to cut plants, 
to kill cats .. to subsist." The bread was made of bad 
flour, the meat was scarcely sufficient for soup, and the 
green peas produced dysentery. And all the while skin 
disease ravaged the troops. The officers were hardly better 
off than their men. Kleber found several literally in rags, 
wearing greasy caps instead of hats worthy of their rank, and 
with no money to buy better clothing. Thousands shared 
their plight. When the generals complained about the 
terrible condition of their men, it was like "speaking to 
the deaf." Championnet recalled that he "asked for shoes 
from the representatives and no one responds ... I beg you 
to tell the Commissary general to send me some or I will
56. A.G. Bl 66 and Bl 67, Jourdan to the Directory, 
11/29/95. See Marceau's letters to Jourdan during December 
for graphic descriptions of the utter destitution of the 
soldiers.
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
309
be obliged to make more than 3,000 men march with bare 
feet."57
The soldiers reacted to their misery by deserting 
and pillaging. The entire Republican army, 1,100,000 men 
strong at the end of 1794, had shrunk to 454,000 by the winter 
of 1795. Poncet's division, 10,000 strong on paper, was 
below 5,000 in December, and it had fought in exactly one 
engagement. Yet the depletion of strength in his division 
was average for the rest of the army. Kleber recalled that, 
during one two-day period, 4 00 men deserted from two demi- 
brigades.5® Those who remained looted and stole in order 
to find food and clothing. The government blamed Jourdan and 
his generals for the indiscipline and ordered them to work 
miracles to stop it. Uselessly Jourdan explained that 
"discipline would depend upon the measures which the 
government took to ameliorate the lot of the officers."
The officers received a bare eight francs a month in hard 
cash; the rest of their pay was in assignats. They had to 
scrounge for their food, clothing, and equipment just like 
their men. Under such conditions it is hardly surprising
57. Bricard, Journal, pp. 162-63. Joliclerc, Lettres, 
pp. 212-14. Championnet, Souvenirs, pp. 92-4. Phipps, op cit, 
II, pp. 251-52.
58. Lefebvre, The Thermidorians, p. 163. A.G. Bl 67, 
Poncet to Jourdan, 12718/95. Phipps, ibid. Desertion was 
even worse in the other armies; the Army of the Alps lost 
1,000-2,000 men every ten days.
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that they had difficulty enforcing discipline, or indeed 
that they felt little inclination to enforce it at all.
The government's unwillingness to allow them to requisition 
aggravated their frustration; Jourdan repeatedly had to order 
that only authorized supply agents were allowed to 
requisition. To restore discipline, Jourdan took it upon 
himself to demote to the ranks on the spot any grenadier 
or non-commissioned officer who behaved badly, thereby 
bypassing the military courts, but he admitted that "all 
this is useless." Morale among the officers reached rock 
bottom. During a party thrown for some of them by the 
representatives, angry officers started a brawl.59
Jourdan thus was not defeated by the Austrians; he 
was defeated by the consequences of economic depression.
The Sambre et Meuse was incapable of fighting the enemy on 
equal terms as long as the indiscipline and desertion 
continued unchecked. Until additional rations, clothing 
and equipment were furnished, the officers could not hope 
to restore order among their hungry, ill-clad men. As 
long as the depression persisted, the lack of supplies 
persisted. And the depression was destined to continue
59. A.G. Bl 65, Jourdan to the Directory, 11/23/95. 
Godechot, o£ cit, I, pp. 152-5 3. And yet as bad as the 
situation was in the Sambre et Meuse, it was even worse in 
the other armies. Perhaps the comradeship which reigned 
among Jourdan's officers helped keep morale higher than 
elsewhere; perhaps Jourdan's leadership helped too.
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because the government had no intention of taking the only 
measures which might help bring it to an end. To solve the 
logistical problems, the Thermidorians would have had to 
abandon free enterprise and return to a controlled national 
economy geared towards war production and fixed prices.
But because the government was committed to a policy of 
political normalcy and free enterprise, they could not return 
to authoritarian rule. So the supply shortages continued.
In early January, 1796, Jourdan traveled to Paris, 
both to recover his health and to meet with the Directory.
The Directory gave him a flattering reception; it wined and 
dined him and presented him with a set of weapons from the 
"renowned" arms manufacturers of Versailles. He was the first 
army commander whom the new government had received, and perhaps 
it wished to impress the military by impressing him. But 
Jourdan had not traveled to the capital merely to be feted; 
he went to hold a series of conversations with Carnot on how 
to restore the army to fighting trim so that it could avoid 
the setbacks of the 1795 campaign.60
The measures which Jourdan proposed during these 
discussions revealed that he understood the economic roots 
of the army's problems no better than did the government.
The army, he believed, had to rest and reorganize before
60. Phipps, Q£ cit, II, pp. 258-59.
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anything else. . Thus the first order of business was to put 
it into winter quarters. During the period of recuperation, 
the economy could stabilize and the government could accumulate 
enough cash to be able to increase the trickle of supplies 
flowing to the army to a flood. Meanwhile he suggested a 
government sponsored program of constructing additional 
depots,workshops for the manufacture of shoes, uniforms, 
and weapons, and repair shops for the artillery, all as 
close to the front as possible. This would both increase 
the amount of clothing and other effects available to the 
soldiers and at the same time place less pressure on the army's 
weak transport service, since these items would not have to 
be shipped a great distance.*^
When the government had insured that an adequate 
flow of supplies to the front would be maintained, Jourdan 
proposed that a formidable army under a single commander 
invade Germany. This army should follow essentially the same 
strategy as in 1795; it should endeavor always to operate 
on the flanks of the enemy army. Because it might not be 
possible to maintain effective communications with Fiance, and 
since Jourdan distrusted the ability of the transport service
61. A.G. Bl 63, unfinished note of Jourdan on the situation 
of the army, 10/22/95. Representative Garrau showed this 
note to the government. There is no reason to believe that 
Jourdan's ideas on the forthcoming campaign changed to any 
extent between October and his meeting with Carnot in 
January.
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to keep the army supplied while on the march, the army 
could subsist by placing all of western Germany under 
requisition. The general-in-chief should be granted sweeping 
powers to levy all contributions and establish all regulations 
necessary to nourish and maintain the army on the spot. 
Previously, supply agents under the loose control of the 
minister of war handled all requisitions, but this did not 
work well because these men tended to steal to their heart's 
content. The general-in-chief should direct all requisitions, 
and his own officers and subordinates should carry them out. 
These "contributions" should mainly be in hard currency, 
and once collected should pass under the control of the army’s 
quartermaster, who would use them to purchase, "on the spot," 
the army's necessities from private companies.62
The: Directory's eventual plan of campaign owed much 
to Jourdan's suggestions. The Directory ultimately decided 
that in the spring of 1796, the French should invade Germany 
once more, always operating on the outside flanks of their 
foes and depending upon the resources of Germany to subsist.
Thus conquering and placing as much of west Germany under 
contribution as possible became the key to the campaign.
The alternative was to bind the army to the Republic's depressed 
economy and inefficient logistics and allow for the possibility 
of another Mayence. However, the Directory omitted two
62. Ibid.
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crucial parts of Jourdan's program. They did not grant the 
general-in-chief unlimited powers to levy contributions and 
spend the proceeds in any way he saw fit. This would have 
enabled him to provision and supply the army more efficiently 
and honestly, but it also would have made him a veritable 
Julius Caesar, and for political reasons the Directory 
could not allow this. Instead, the Directory continued 
the wasteful system of requiring all contributions to be sent 
to the Ministry of Finance before they were spent; and it 
placed the army's logistics, as well as the levying of 
contributions, under the overburdened supervision of the army 
commissioner. Thus the army remained at the mercy of a 
bureaucracy. Secondly, the Directory did not unite the French 
forces in Germany under a single commander but left them 
divided in two independent armies, which were only loosely 
controlled from Paris.
From January until May of 1796 the Sambre et Meuse 
rested and reorganized while Jourdan, quartermaster Blanchard, 
and army commissioner Joubert did their best to restore it 
to health. They stockpiled provisions and supplies, often 
scouring the occupied territories for whatever they needed. 
They attempted to alleviate the plight of their destitute 
officers. Commissioner Pflieger, an ex-Jacobin deputy on 
mission, attacked the critical shortage of horses. He 
fixed an adequate ration for all army horses, had additional 
stables built, sold those animals which were broken down,
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urged the Directory to sever all relations with those 
contractors who had defaulted on their contracts, and finally 
demanded a lev^e of horses from the interior of France.
By April his energetic efforts had reduced the horse 
deficit to about 7,000 for both armies on the Rhine.63
But by April it was also evident that the reliance upon 
the workings of the marketplace to solve the army's logistical 
problems was not bearing fruit. The Directory's ill-advised 
experiment with the mandats merely perpetuated the monetary 
crisis; the army remained as short of hard currency as ever.
The grain contractors defaulted on their agreement to furnish 
the army with bread due to a "lack of funds" while the 
Lanctifere company defaulted on a contract for transport for the 
same reason. The Fockday company agreed to deliver grain 
to the army in April but it did not do so until June and 
then it sold the grain to the army for 24 livres a quintal 
although the market price was 16 livres. The Directory left 
the horse lev^e demanded Ly Pflieger up to each department 
so that of the 4 0,000 horses expected the armies received 
20,000. When Pflieger requested the passage of a forced 
loan to purchase more, the Directory refused. The transport 
service remained destitute of wagons and wagon drivers 
until Jourdan requisitioned both from the Rhineland.64 But
63. Godechot, 0 £  cit, I, pp. 97-100.
64. Ibid, pp. 97-100, 143-44. Godechot cites letters 
from both Blanchard and Commissipner Joubert which reported 
the repeated failures of the contractors to fulfill their 
contracts.
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Jourdan could do little to assist events other than to call 
Joubert's and Blanchard's attention to specific problems; 
he was not authorized to requisition anything that he deemed 
necessary. So slow was progress that Joubert felt obliged 
to go to Paris to inform the government personally of the 
"critical condition of the army," and to ask for help.65
On the eve of the opening of the campaign, it was 
obvious that the Sambre et Meuse was not ready to resume 
operations. "The magazines for food rations and the parks 
for animals were absolutely empty; the occupied territory 
did not provide the requisitions they were supposed to and the 
non-incorporated territories were incapable of furnishing 
anything; the army did not have any money, its equipment was 
in bad condition, the clothing magazines were empty at a 
time when the soldiers were badly dressed and lacked shirts, 
pants and shoes; the territorial mandats were not accepted ..." 
The manpower losses from the preceding campaign had not been 
made good, and desertion still 1 cthered the army somewhat.
Even so the government was not conscripting any additional 
soldiers. When Jourdan and Joubert requested reinforcements 
the Directory proposed to raise troops from the conquered 
territories by drafting 3,000 Belgians whom it supposed would 
be silling to "sacrifice to maintain the glory and liberty
65. Ibid, Jourdan to the Directory, 4/26/96. Jourdan 
wrote in support of one of Joubert's complaints that Joubert 
"knew the conditions he was talking about."
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common to both them and the Republic." It further proposed 
to form battalions of loyal troops out of vagabonds and 
Austrian deserters! Both of these proposals were ridiculous. 
But to Jourdan and Jouberts' complaints that the army was 
not yet in a condition to advance, the Directory turned 
a deaf ear.66
Thus Jourdan began the campaign of 1796 handicapped 
by many of the same problems which had caused the campaign of 
1795 to collapse in defeat: a depressed economy, a demobilized
war effort, a divided supreme command, and a chaotic logistical 
system. As a result the entire campaign hinged upon the 
ability of the French armies to loot Germany as quickly, 
thoroughly, and efficiently as possible, for without Germany's 
wealth and resources they could not live. One historian 
argued that the French should have remained on the defensive 
until the Directory's provisioning and resupplying had 
been completed. It would have been better still if the 
government had made a decision, either to mobilize the 
country to support the war or to declare for peace.67
66. Ibid., decree of Jourdan and Joubert of 5/24/96.
67. Ibid. Godechot, who is generally hostile to the 
French military, admits that of the three major armies the 
Sambre et Meuse had enjoyed the best job of resupplying and 
reorganization —  a tribute to both Jourdan's and Joubert's 
energy and application.
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VII. THE CAMPAIGN OF 1796
I. The Advance
The Campaign of 17 96 was the turning point in 
Jourdan's military career. In 1796 he suffered his first 
unquestionable defeat as an army commander and as a result 
his reputation as one of revolutionary France's foremost 
military leaders suffered a blow from which it never 
recovered. Writers have traditionally viewed the defeat 
as the result of faulty strategy and faulty tactics: the
French adopted the antiquated method of cperating their two 
armies in Germany separately on exterior lines. Consequently 
the Austrians were able to remain concentrated between them 
and defeat both in detail. So Jourdan lost because his 
opponent employed a more adept strategy than he and his col­
leagues. As will be seen, this is a greatly oversimplified 
explanation of what went wrong in 17 96. In reality, the ma­
jor cause of Jourdan's —  and France's -- defeat was not faulty 
strategy, but faulty preparation and faulty logistics.'1'
Viewed in comparison with his triumph in 1794, Jour- 
dan’s failure in 1796 seems to be a paradox. In 1794, 
with a largely semi-disciplined army under largely untried 
young officers Jourdan blasted his opponents entirely out
1. For example, see Henri Jomini, Histoire Critique et 
Militaire ... vol. VIII. T. A. Dodge, Napoleon; the Art of 
War (Boston, 1907), vol. I. Most modern writers have essen­
tially adhered to Jomini's views when discussing the campaign.
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of the Low Countries; in 1796, with a veteran, disciplined 
army under seasoned and skilled officers he went down to 
defeat. The solution to this paradox lay in Paris. In 
1794, the Committee saw to it that Jourdan's army was properly 
supported: it provided Jourdan with the means to feed, clothe, 
equip, discipline, and reinforce his battalions. In 1796 
the Directory provided him with insufficient means to 
accomplish any of these things. As in 1795, the Directory 
embarked upon an ambitious offensive only vaguely realizing 
the difficulties involved, and as a result it did not 
properly prepare its armies. If the Committee obtained 
results by putting its generals between the guillotine and 
victory, it also afforded its generals the means to avoid 
the guillotine and carry out their tasks. The Directory 
failed miserably in both of these respects.
* * * * *
When Jourdan received his orders to resume 
operations late in May, he was still laboring to reorganize 
his supply services and to accumulate enough provisions for 
the campaign. His and Joubert's complaints had not convinced 
the Directory that logistically the Sambre et Meuse was 
far from ready. It remained short of shoes, blankets, 
uniforms and horses. The transport services, so crucial 
to the program of requisitioning which was supposed to enable 
the army to live, was in dire need of everything from 
drivers to horses.
As in 1795, Jourdan was to advance against an enemy
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equal, if not superior, in numbers. Because of the heavy 
desertion during the winter and the failure of the government 
to take measures either to halt the desertion or replace 
those who fled, the Sambre et Meuse was understrength.
It numbered 77,792 effectives, as opposed to the 93,778 
Austrian soldiers of the army of the Archduke Karl. Of the 
total number of soldiers in Germany at the outset of the 
campaign, the Austrians outnumbered the two French armies 
176,554 men to 157,788. The detachment of 25,000 Austrians 
to Italy to reinforce the army attempting to contain 
Bonaparte and the defection of many of the west German 
troops eventually brought Austrian numbers to a point where 
the French had a slight numerical superiority. But this 
would be negated by the fact that as the French advanced 
farther from their bases they had to detail men to guard 
their lines of communication, while the Austrians neared
2
their home and its ready supply of reinforcements.
More serious was Jourdan's deficiency in cavalry.
The French began the campaign with about 18,000 poorly mounted 
troopers in all Germany to oppose 4 3,000 well mounted 
Austrians. The reason for this weakness was the government's 
unwillingness to supply their armies with a sufficient
2. J. B. Jourdan, Memoires pour servir a 3 'histoire 
de la campagne de 1796 (Paris, 1818)’,' p. ITT The Archduke 
Karl Hapsburg, La Campagne de 1796 en Allemagne (Vienna, 
1817; 3 volumes), I, pp. 26-7.
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number of horses. Jourdan commanded between 10,000 and
11,000 horsemen against twice as many Austrians, and in 
the kind of offensive campaign which he was about to wage, 
this shortage of cavalry was crucial. "A strong superiority 
in cavalry is of great importance in covering retreats ...
The superiority of this arm gives to the rear guards 
the means to hold firm without fear and to assure retreats 
in good order which the enemy will not know how to interrupt. 
The corps of Wartensleben and Latour ... were saved only by 
the deployment of their numerous squadrons."3 The Austrians' 
superiority in cavalry also enabled them to make regular 
communications between Jourdan and the Army of the Rhine 
under Moreau all but impossible. Marauding enemy squadrons 
intercepted French couriers with such ease that Jourdan and 
Moreau each operated for days without knowing what the 
other was doing.
In their conference in January, Carnot and Jourdan 
had agreed in principle that the French should operated on 
the outer flanks of the enemy army. In his directive of 
April 10 v/hich outlined the strategy for the offensive,
Carnot affirmed this plan, ordering Jourdan always to operate 
on the outside flank of his foe since this allows the 
aggressor to "constrict all fthe enemy's] movements and
3. Henry Jomini, 0 £  cit, VIII, pp. 170-7 3.
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force him to take positions which expose him to complete 
defeat." Carnot, however, added a few new touches that he 
and Jourdan apparently had not discussed. Jourdan was to 
cross the Rhine, attack the Austrian right, and attract the 
enemy's reserves, while General Jean Moreau was to mount 
a similar feint with his army on the middle Rhine. Once 
the enemy had reacted to these diversions, Marceau with 25,000 
men was to march clear across the rear of Moreau's army 
and cross the Rhine above Strasbourg.^ Both Jourdan and 
Moreau felt that Carnot's plan was needlessly complex.
In a joint letter they proposed that Marceau be left with 
the Sambre et Meuse, lest Jourdan have to face the Archduke 
Karl's entire army with but 45,000 men, that the plan be 
simplified to allow Moreau to attack across the upper Rhine, 
and that they be allowed to operate as they saw fit should 
the enemy seize the offensive first. Carnot agreed, but 
the basic strategy of operating on exterior lines remained 
in effect.5
Jourdan thus began the campaign laboring under several 
distinct disadvantages. His army was deficient in provisions 
and supplies, men and horses. Jt was expected to live off
4. Carnot's directive of 4/10/96, Jourdan, 0 £  cit,
pp. 222-31. Marcel Reinhard, Le Grand Carnot, II, pp. 205-06.
5. Jourdan and Moreau to Carnot, 5/7/96, Jourdan, 
ibid, pp. 232-39.
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the country with insufficient transport to carry what was 
requisitirned. Furthermore, the plan of campaign limited 
Jourdan's freedom of maneuver. He was reduced either to 
defeating the enemy head on, or enveloping him by his outside 
flank. He could not, if he so desired, maneuver in a way 
to join his army with Moreau’s.
These fundamental weaknesses were not felt immediately. 
The Austrian army also had its problems. Its position 
astride the Rhine with its flanks on the east bank and its 
center on the west bank covering Mayence, was a poor one.
Both flanks were vulnerable to precisely the sort of movement 
that Carnot planned. When the Archduke Karl suggested that 
the Mayence salient be abandoned, the Austrian War Council 
refused. So when Jourdan began the offensive by ordering 
Kleher with two divisions to advance south from Dusseldorf 
towards the Austrians' communications, everything went as 
planned. Kleber attacked and defeated an enemy detachment 
on the Sieg on May 31, then outflanked and defeated another 
enemy force near Altenkirchen four days later. The Austrians 
retreated to the Lahn River with Kleber in pursuit. Jourdan 
rapidly crossed the Rhine at Neuweid and brought three more 
divisions to Kleber's aid. His thrust had its desired 
effect. Karl abandoned the Mayence salient, shifted his 
reserves north, and began to build up his forces on the 
Lahn opposite the Sambre et Meuse.®
6. Jourdan to Kleber, 5/16>96, ibid, pp. 239-45, 29-38.
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The detachment of General Wurmser with 25,000 men 
to fight Bonaparte in Italy left the Archduke in sole command 
of the Hapsburg Empire's forces in Germany. Karl was not 
only the Empire's foremost soldier, he was also one of the 
most talented commanders in all of Europe. He was a man 
of unusual intelligence, with an excellent grasp of the 
fundamentals of strategy and tactics which, in his writings, 
he reduced to a geometric science. If Karl was never able 
to overcome the basic inability of the Austrian army to move 
and to strike rapidly —  a failing that many writers blame 
on him rather than the Austrian system —  he never made the 
mistakes which a good opponent could use to seize a decisive 
advantage. The Duke of Wellington, judging by Karl's 
books and plans of campaign, believed that the Archduke's 
military contemporaries were "unworthy to fasten the 
latchet of his shoes." His major weakness was his health: 
Karl was an epileptic. The disease tended to make him moody 
and hesitant, at times incapacitating him altogether and 
thereby leaving his army without a commander. Nevertheless, 
he was a large step up in talent from Coburg and Clerfayt and 
the toughest opponent Jourdan had yet faced.^
7. R. Phipps, The Armies of the First French Republic,
II, p. 49. F. Lorraine Petre, Napoleon and the Archduke 
Charles (London, 1909), pp. 35-39. Napoleon owed, in part, 
his victory at Eckmuhl in 1809 to the fact that on the day 
Napoleon's army was most vulnerable, the Archduke was in the 
grips of a seizure, unable to direct his army —  and launch 
his attack.
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By June- 15, Karl had concentrated on the Lahn a force 
superior to Jourdan's. The line of the Lahn was longer than 
Jourdan could comfortably defend, and Karl used his manpower 
advantage deftly to outflank the Sambre et Meuse on the 
left near Wetzlar, roughly handling General Lefebvre's 
division in the process. With the enemy closer to his 
communications than he was himself, and with orders to maneuver 
rather than fight, Jourdan quickly ordered a retreat. The 
French avoided the Austrian envelopment by the simple process 
of outmarching their foes. Jourdan sent Kleber back to 
Dusseldorf while he recrossed the Rhine with the rest of 
his army. Carnot approved the retreat without comment, 
and the withdrawal would have gone without incident had not 
Kleber decided to surprise the pursuing Austrians. In a 
sharp little engagement near Ukerath Kleber received a 
repulse for his efforts. When Jourdan heard of Kleber's 
action he reproved him, evidently with some sternness, for 
involving himself in an entirely needless action. It is 
possible that the sensitive Kleber resented it, and that the 
later falling out between the two men had its origin in 
this incident.8
8. Jourdan, 0 £  cit, pp. 39-43, 245-47. The Archduke 
Karl, ojd cit, II, pp. 71-2, 96-7.
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Jourdan's thrust achieved its purpose, for it drew 
the majority of the Austrian army northward and away from 
the upper Rhine where Moreau was to cross. By June 16 some
17,000 badly led Austrians without any hope of immediate 
reinforcement were all that opposed the Army of the Rhine. 
Unfortunately the Directory let Moreau cross at his own 
pace, and the commander delayed the passage until June 24.
Then, once across he proceeded to linger near Rastadt until 
July 4, allowing Karl time to march south with his army to 
confront him. Karl later wrote that "it is astonishing that 
Moreau’did not profit from all his advantages with more 
activity," instead of permitting his enemy time to recover. 
Moreau's delay lost the French an opportunity that they were
9
not to have again.
With the greater part of the Austrian army having 
marched south to face Moreau, Carnot ordered Jourdan to resume 
the offensive. He was to advance against that portion of 
the enemy forces facing him, force it into a decisive engagement, 
and destroy it. He was to move with speed, avoid sieges, 
avoid the defensive, and above all avoid taking up positions 
perpendicular to the Rhine since the enemy could always turn 
them. Carnot believed that Jourdan should have little 
trouble overwhelming the Austrian force which Carnot
9. Archduke Karl, ibid, II, pp. 124-26. Phipps, op 
cit, II, p. 290.
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believed to be far inferior in numbers to the Sambre et 
Meuse. Carnot was mistaken. The Austrian army of Count 
Wartensleben numbered upward of 38,000 men. Once Jourdan 
had detached Marceau with 20,000 men to blockade Mayence 
and its large (fifteen to twenty-thousand man) garrison, 
he would have about 46,000 soldiers to defeat Wartensleben -- 
a slender advantage of 8,000 men. And in the all-important 
cavalry arm, he was outnumbered by about two to one.10
For the third time in less than a year the Sambre et 
Meuse crossed the Rhine and marched southwest towards the 
valley of the Main. As Kleber advanced again from Dusseldorf, 
Jourdan recrossed the river at Neuweid and united their 
forces. After several skirmishes Jourdan caught Wartensleben 
with his army divided, some on the Lahn, and some en route 
from the Main trying to join the former part. For a number 
of reasons Jourdan failed to capitalize on the best opportunity 
to destroy Wartensleben during the entire campaign. According 
to one source, Jourdan delayed his attack a full day in order 
to bring up much needed provisions and supplies, which 
allowed Wartensleben to concentrate his forces and avoid having 
his army broken in two "for the rest of the campaign."
According to Jourdan, Lefebvre attacked and routed an 
Austrian detachment, thereby frightening Wartensleben into
10. Jourdan, 0£  cit, pp. 257-63.
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retreating before the rest of the French army could come to 
grips. Whatever the reasons, the chance was missed.^1
Jourdan continued to pursue the enemy and caught him 
again on July 9. The Austrians were in position along a range 
of wooded hills overlooking the villages of Bauernheim and 
Offenheim. This time Kleber became prematurely engaged 
with the enemy rear guard before Jourdan could deploy the 
rest of the army for a decisive encounter. Again the enemy 
evaded the decisive battle that Jourdan desired; after some 
sharp fighting they fled, suffering 1,200 killed and wounded 
and 600 prisoners. Jourdan paused for a day to allow his 
supply trains to catch up, and then he continued the 
advance on into the Main Valley. By July 16 he had put 
Mayence under blockade and he had captured Frankfort, but 
he had not inflicted serious damage upon the enemy a r m y . ^
As the Sambre et Meuse advanced, Jourdan and Joubert 
began levying the "contributions" which, in theory, would 
provide the army with its provisions and supplies and enable 
the Directory to pay for the campaign. Their usual procedure 
upon entering a given area was to impose a contribution based 
upon the amount of wealth which they believed to be present. 
These contributions were mainly in hard currency, but 
usually they also included different quantities of foodstuffs 
and effects such as shoes, pants, blankets, and horses.
]1. Jomini, op cit, VIII, p. 269. Jourdan, ibid, pp. 55-63.
12. Jourdan, ibid, pp. 67-75. Phipps, 0 £  cit, II, pp. 
290-96.
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Various government bureaucrats under the supervision of 
Joubert and quartermaster-general Dubreton would then 
actually collect the contributions; they would ship the 
currency back to Paris, while they stored the provisions 
and effects in army magazines until they could be 
distributed to the troops.
Usually Jourdan set the contributions at too low 
a figure. He initially imposed a one-million-livre contribution 
on the area between the Sieg and Lahn Rivers, but Joubert 
increased it to three million since the area was fertile 
and had not been ravaged by French stragglers, whose conduct 
had been better than usual. The original assessment for 
Frankfort was six million; Joubert raised it to eight 
million, a figure that the Directory later hiked to ten 
million. One is tempted to believe that Jourdan imposed 
light contributions in order to show leniency to the luckless 
inhabitants of the areas in the path of the French army, and 
certainly he received numerous requests from various German 
magistrates to go easy on their little states. However, 
it is more likely that he merely underestimated the wealth 
and resources in given areas. After Ernouf had imposed 
an eight-million-livre contribution on all of Franconia —  
evidently at the request of the Franconian magistrates —
Joubert convinced Jourdan that Franconia could easily 
contribute twelve million. Jourdan then wrote Ernouf that 
the Franconian deputies were taking advantage of "our good
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faith," and could indeed pay twelve million. In certain 
instances he authorized quartermaster Dubreton to take hostages 
until contributions were paid in full. Jourdan was a 
proponent of requisitioning; he would hardly be inclined 
to hesitate deliberately in the confiscation of wealth and
resources which he believed to be essential to the survival
* u- 13of his army.
The dividing line between requisitioning and outright 
theft was a very .'ine one, and one not always observed by 
the government. On July 20, the Directory instructed Jourdan 
on how he was to handle the wealth of the city of Frankfort.
He was to impose a ten-million-livre contribution —  an increase 
of two million over Joubert's suggested figure, and to confiscate 
all materiel and provisions useful to the army, as well as 
any property which might have belonged to the departed 
Austrians. Jourdan was not to allow himself to be "dazzled" 
by the protests of the citizens that they had legitimately 
purchased the property in question; he was to confiscate it 
anyway. But this was not all. Jourdan was told that 
"the Directory, always envious of assembling on the 
territory of the Republic some masterpieces of art," invited 
him to list all art objects which might appear with 
"brilliance" in French museums. He was to be sure to include 
the painting of "the 'Twelve Apostles' of Piazetta," as
13. A . G . B1 76, Jourdan to the Directory, 7/16/96. 
A.G. B1 77, Joubert to the Directory, 8/12/96; Jourdan to 
Ernouf, 8/10/96.
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well as all the- remaining crown jewels of the Holy Roman 
Emperors! Then, as if to reassure Jourdan of their sincerity 
and integrity, the Directors ordered him to prevent any 
"dilapidations" which might add to the burden of the 
unfortunate Frankforters!14
Jourdan may have been a harsh conqueror; but he was 
no thief. He acquiesced to the delaying tactics of the 
Frankfort government, which ultimately contributed only 
four million of the ten million livres levied. He left the 
rest of the decree to be executed by his overworked quarter­
master and,one wonders if the crown jewels ever found their 
way to a French museum. When the government decreed that 
its agents and officials could force the Frankforters to 
accept mandats for hard cash —  at one thousand percent of 
the mandats' market value —  Jourdan, on the advice of 
Joubert, tried to prevent the inevitable rash of speculation 
by prohibiting any soldier or administrator from entering 
Frankfort except on official business. He further declared 
that the mandats could be exchanged only at their market 
value —  in other words for whatever price the inhabitants 
were willing to give for them. These measures were a 
testimony to Jourdan's honesty at a time when the representatives 
of the French government in non-French territory were all too
14. The Directory to Jourdan, 7/29/96, Jourdan, 
op cit, pp. 265-75.
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often stealing everything that was not fastened down. They 
also may have been the beginning of his unpopularity with 
the Directory. At a time when Jourdan had barely collected 
four million livres from Germany, Bonaparte had already 
sent the government thirty-two million from Italy.15
As Jourdan continued his pursuit of the Austrians 
up the Main Valley, the government gave in to a veritable 
orgy of unwarranted optimism. On July 20, the Directory 
again ordered him to turn the outer flank of the enemy, 
whom it mistakenly believed still to be near Mayence. The 
Austrians could not menace Jourdan's own flank as he made 
this maneuver because "according to our calculations the 
enemy can scarcely oppose to either you or General Moreau 
more than 50,000 men." Subsequent orders urged Jourdan 
to hasten his advance and bring Wartensleben to battle; he 
should have little difficulty in defeating Wartensleben 
since "he is quite weak and should be easy to overwhelm." 
Afterwards Jourdan could detach a division towards Bohemia 
to watch Wartensleben's remnants while the rest of the army 
marched to Ratisbon and united with Moreau.15 The 
Directory was encouraged in its optimism by Joubert.
15. Jacques Godechot, Les Commissaires aux armees sous 
le Directoire, I, pp. 319-21. Jourdan, ibid.
16. The Directory to Jourdan, orders of 7/20/96 and 
7/31/96, ibid, pp. 265-75. As of July 31, Director
La Revelliere-Lepeaux took over the government's correspondence 
with Jourdan.
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The commissioner jubilantly reported that the enemy army 
was near collapse, that it could no longer stand up to the 
French soldiers, and that it was disintegrating through 
desertion. The French soldiers were advancing enthusiastically, 
believing, as Joubert obviously did, that peace was just 
around the next bend. "The debris of the Austrian army ... 
hurries to unite with that of Prince Charles, to retreat to 
defend the territories of the House of Austria."17
It is not clear what prompted Joubert to be so over­
confident. To be sure, desertion from Wartensleben's army 
was substantial; moreover some of Jourdan's advance guard 
commanders were reporting grossly inflated enemy losses 
after the various rear-guard combats. But if Jourdan and 
his divisional generals did not believe that such questionable 
evidence indicated the imminent collapse of the enemy army, 
one wonders why Joubert did. Perhaps Joubert believed that 
the enemy's continuous retreat meant that they were incapable 
of further resistance. He should have known better. He 
was a veteran commissioner; he had served on mission with 
the army in 1795. But if he was conscientious enough in his 
political duties, he was utterly incapable of recognizing 
the military realities of the campaign. He allowed himself 
to be completely misled by the apparent ease with which the 
Sambre et Meuse was driving back its foes. When Jourdan
17. A.G, B1 76, Joubert to the Directory, 7/19/96, 
7/31/96.
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protested that Wartensleben's army was far from collapse,
Joubert brushed aside Jourdan's complaints as overly pessi­
mistic. Indeed, when Jourdan continued to complain that the 
campaign was far from won, Joubert wrote the Directory 
attributing Jourdan's complaints to his stomach ailment and 
the pressures of his command. Perhaps Jourdan would see 
things more optimistically if the Directory wrote expressing 
its confidence in him; "some expression of affection would 
contribute not a little to sustain him and infuse into his 
spirits some calmness and satisfaction in his difficult 
task." And then Joubert again described the strategic situation 
as better than e v e r . ^
Incredibly the Directory believed Joubert instead 
of Jourdan. That it took the strategic advice of a civilian 
over that of a soldier was inexcusable, . withstanding 
Jourdan's tendency towards pessimism. It is likely that 
Joubert's carefree reports were what the Directors —
Carnot included —  wanted to believe. In any case, Jourdan's 
attempts to counteract such overconfidence were futile.
He assured the Directory that, in spite of reports to the 
contrary, Wartensleben's army numbered at least 30,000 men,
18. Joubert to the Directory, 7/31/96. Inflated reports 
of enemy losses were a standard feature of warfare in the 18th 
century —  as they are today. With a year's experience as 
an army commissioner behind him Joubert should have 
realized this. Why he considered Jourdan's warnings 
exaggerated is a mystery.
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that the bulk of the Austrian forces were with the
Archduke, and that annihilating Wartensleben was not going
to be so easy; his advice fell upon deaf ears. Indeed, the
Directory's optimism was completely misplaced. The Austrians
still had well over 100,000 men in Germany, and Wartensleben
still commanded at least 35,000, including a sizeable
cavalry force. His reluctance to fight was not because he
was too weak to offer resistance, but because the Archduke
had ordered him to fall back slowly towards the upper Danube,
delaying Jourdan's advance as much as possible while
avoiding a full-scale battle. Karl had decided to retire
towards the Danube until an opportunity presented itself
for him to defeat the two French armies in detail. Far from
being a sign of collapse, the Austrian retreat was the
19consequence of sound strategic considerations.
The story of the next month was one of constant and 
futile pursuit, of innumerable forced marches and rear-guard 
actions as Jourdan vainly attempted to bring the Austrians 
to battle. The Sambre et Meuse pursued the enemy up the 
wooded, hilly Main Valley. On August 1 it was near Schweinfurt 
where it halted to rest and reprovision. From there it 
pursued Wartensleben via Wurzburg and Bamburg to Nuremberg,
19. A . G . B1 77, Jourdan to the Directory, 8/5/96. 
The Archduke Karl, op cit, II, pp. 195-96. Wartensleben 
may indeed have been suffering losses, but he was also 
receiving reinforcements.
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always in contact with the Austrian rear guard. On repeated 
occasions Jourdan deployed in the hope of forcing a battle 
with the Austrians, but each time the Austrians withdrew, 
covering their retreat with their powerful cavalry. Once 
Jourdan even deviated from the strategy of always maneuvering 
by his outside flank and attempted to turn the enemy left 
on the Regnitz, but the attempt ended without results.
On another occasion Jourdan ordered a silent advance through 
densely wooded country, hoping to surprise the enemy in their 
positions before they could fall back. He had earlier issued 
orders to the advance-guard commanders not to "compromise" 
themselves if they met a superior force and to "await the 
arrival of the entire army" before they attacked. Nevertheless 
the future Marshal Michael Ney impetuously assaulted 
one of the enemy's posts and became so heavily engaged 
that Jourdan had to attack prematurely to relieve him. 
Forewarned, the Austrians again fled, eliminating any 
chance of a decisive engagement.
That Wartensleben was under heavy pressure there 
can be no doubt. His casualties were considerable and he 
was not delaying Jourdan's advance in the least. The Archduke 
was quite displeased by his rapid retreat, and on two 
occasions ordered him to slow Jourdan down. But Wartensleben
20. A.G. B1 77, general order of 8/10/96; Jourdan to 
Moreau, 8/12/96. Jourdan, op cit, pp. 102-10.
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was unable to do s o . ^
A glimpse of Jourdan going about his daily work is
provided by a Prussian officer who had some business with him
during the advance. "General Jourdan arrived at six p.m.
at Erlangen where he placed his headquarters. Shutting
himself up with some of his aides, the government commissioner
[Joubert], the intendant of provisions [probably Dubreton],
several officers and heads of departments, he at once drew up
the orders for the operations of the following day ...
At nine p.m. all the business was finished, and the orderly
officers were on their way to their different divisions.
Each general of division received information on the general
aim of the movements, and in particular on what concerns
his division. It is for him afterwards to regulate the
details of the work assigned to him. I could only admire
the order which reigns on this point." During the day
Jourdan was on horseback, frequently right up with the
advanced guards, and on two occasions he was nearly
2 2taken by the enemy while reconnoitering.
Yet it would be wrong to allow this picture of energy 
and order blind us to Jourdan's being under considerable 
emotional stress. Twice he fell victim to his chronic 
stomach complaint, and once he was so ill that he had to turn
21. Archduke Karl, 0 £  cit, II, pp. 247-50.
22. Phipps, op cit, II, pp. 304-05.
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the command of .the army over to Kleber for several days.
Joubert described the illness as a "bilious colic" brought
on by the indiscipline of the army, the logistical problems,
and the pressure from the Directory to make the campaign more
successful —  and profitable. Indeed Joubert at one point
informed the government that Jourdan was very concerned that
the Directory would blame him for the shortcomings of the
23advance and remove him from command.
The advance had failed to achieve its primary objective 
—  the destruction of Wartensleben's army. Jourdan was 
unable to destroy it because he was unable to bring it to 
battle, and he was unable to bring it to battle for several 
reasons. One was a lack of information. Because southwest 
Germany was hostile to the French, it was difficult to obtain 
news of the enemy from the population. In addition, the 
Directory had neglected to furnish the army with decent maps 
so that often Jourdan had a very poor knowledge of the terrain. 
As a result he had to move cautiously at times. The shortage 
of intelligence could have been overcome had the French 
possessed a numerous, aggressive cavalry that could have hung 
on the heels of the enemy and reported his every move, 
but the French cavalry was poorly mounted, outnumbered, and 
consequently not very active. It was unable either to collect
23. A .G . Bl 76, Joubert to the Directory, 7/31/96.
A .G . mr 298, Precis de la campagne de 1796 de Adj.-General 
Ducheron.
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enough information, or to apply the relentless pressure that 
often turns a retreat into a rout. As long as the Austrian 
cavalry could prevent the French from penetrating its protective 
screen, the rest of the army could safely avoid the clutches 
of its pursuers. Thirdly, the French were hampered by 
the terrain: rolling, wooded country with countless streams 
and small rivers meandering at the bottom of deep gullies 
bordered by steep slopes. There were but two roads running 
in the southwest direction of Jourdan's advance, and 
lateral communications were difficult. Such terrain was 
ideal for the Austrian rear guards, for one well positioned 
behind a stream or on top of a wooded ridge commanding one of 
the main roads could hold up the advance for hours. For the 
French merely to flank a holding force out of its position 
was difficult and time-consuming.24
Jourdan also was forced to march with his divisions 
more widely scattered than he would otherwise have desired.
The terrain and lack of roads was one reason for this and 
subsistence was another. The army was depending heavily upon 
requisitions from the immediate area for its food, so unless 
the troops were well spread out, they could not cover enough 
territory to gather provisions for their needs. Requisitioning 
was hindering the pursuit in another way too, because it
24. Jourdan, o£ cit, pp. 109-14.
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caused many soldiers to be absent from the ranks at times 
when they were needed to attack the enemy. The episodic 
food shortages induced others to leave the ranks and forage 
on their own. These descended upon neighboring villages 
and pillaged them, and when their officers attempted to 
force them to return to their units, the stragglers often 
thrust bayonets at them and sometimes shot at them. So 
many men were straggling that divisions were arriving in camp 
at night with only a third or a quarter of their men present 
for duty. The others would wander in at all hours. Jourdan 
would order attacks which required . division, only to find 
a mere brigade available. With the army strung out in a 
long cordon, the men often dispersed in requisitioning details 
(or looting), Jourdan was unable, if an opportunity presented 
itself, to concentrate his forces for an a ttack.^
Jourdan thus was facing obstacles that tactics could 
do little to overcome. Wartensleben could stand his ground 
until there was danger of a battle; then he could retreat, 
protected by the terrain and his powerful cavalry. "A 
more accelerated advance would have produced no other 
results than to hasten the retreat of the Austrians.1,26
Jourdan has been criticized for not sidestepping 
Wartensleben's army to the right and marching straight
25. Ibid. A.G. Bl 76, Colaud to Kleber, 7/24/96. 
A.G. mr 287, Journal du general Marescot.
26. Jourdan, ibid. v
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for the Danube and a rendezvous with More a u . ^  By 
neglecting to do so, Jourdan perpetuated the faulty strategy 
of operating on exterior lines and failing to unite the two 
French armies into a single Napoleonic mass of maneuver, 
and thus contributed significantly to the ultimate failure 
of the campaign. This is a case of the proposed cure being 
worse than the disease. Had Jourdan marched south for Ratisbon 
he would have placed his dwindling army between two fires -—  
the Archduke's to the south, Wartensleben's to the north.
It would not have sufficed to mask Wartensleben with a small 
portion of the army while the rest marched for the Danube, 
because Wartensleben was almost as strong as the entire 
Sambre et Meuse. Once on the Danube, Jourdan would have had 
to stand by helplessly and await Moreau's arrival. He had 
no bridges with which to cross the river, and no clear 
knowledge of Moreau's whereabouts —  indeed at the time,
Moreau was maneuvering away from the Sambre et Meuse rather 
than towards it.28
A proper concentration of the two armies required 
the orders of the Directory. But the Directory needed swift, 
regular communication with its armies to order such a
27. See for example, Jomini, 0 £  cit, VIII; Phipps, 
op cit, II; Hippolyte Carnot, Memoires sur Carnot II:
T. A. Dodge, Napoleon and the Art of War (4 volumes; Boston, 
1907); not to mention the 19th century French historians 
such as Michelet and Thiers.
28. Jourdan, o£ c i t , pp. 109-14.
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concentration: it needed to know where they were, and to be 
able to get in touch with them within a day's notice. But 
swift communications were lacking entirely. There were only 
two bad roads leading from the front in the Main Valley to 
the nearest bridge over the Rhine at Neuweid; from there it 
was another two-hundred-fifty-odd miles to Paris. A dispatch 
could reach Paris only as fast as a horse could cover this 
vast distance over the poor roads of the era. Thus 
communications between Paris and the front took between seven 
and ten days one way. This time lag often rendered the 
Directory's orders useless, since, by the time it reacted 
to the news from the front and issued its orders, the situation 
had changed. The weakness in the strategy pursued was not 
that exterior lines were inherently deficient; the weakness 
was structural. The Directory was too far away, given the 
primitive communications of 1796, to coordinate the movements 
of the two armies properly from a desk in Paris. As Jourdan 
had foreseen, a single commander for both armies was needed 
in Germany, able to direct operations on the spot. Communications 
between Jourdan and Moreau were equally bad. The lack of 
French cavalry allowed Austrian hussars to blanket the area 
between the two armies unchallenged, intercepting all of the 
French messengers. Jourdan had to send his couriers to 
Moreau by way of the west bank of the Rhine in order to insure 
that his dispatches got through. For nine and ten days
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in succession Jourdan received no news from Moreau at all.
On August 8, when Jourdan confidently expected Moreau to be 
about two days' march away, he was shocked to learn 
that Moreau was actually miles in the rear held up on the 
Neckar River.29 These were difficulties which only modern 
technology could have overcome; unfortunately there were 
no telephones nor telegraphs in west Germany in 1796.
It is unlikely that the Directory would have united 
the two armies even if it. had been in closer touch with 
them. By August it believed that the campaign had been won. 
On July 31, Director La Revelliere-Lepeaux instructed Jourdan 
to consider sending a division to Bohemia to levy contribu­
tions, now that Wartensleben was able to oppose his advance 
with only a thin "screen" of troops. In subsequent letters, 
La Revelliere-Lepeaux drifted even further from reality; 
he suggested that Jourdan detach a part of his force to 
Saxony to pressure that state into signing a peace more 
advantageous to France, and further requested that 
Jourdan detach troops to escort a convoy of French 
merchandise to the Leipzig fair! Jourdan's protests that 
the campaign was not yet won went unheeded. So overconfident 
was the government that it ordered Moreau to operate on the 
south bank of the Danube, v/ith a view towards eventually
29. A.G. B1 76 and 77, Jourdan to the Directory, 
7/23/96, 8/3/96, 8/8/96.
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lending a helping hand to Bonaparte through the Tyrol and 
harrassing the rear of the Austrian army in Italy. "Prince 
Charles, reduced to half his forces by losses and garrisons 
detached ... takes the road down the Danube. Moreau and 
Jourdan press it with energy on both flanks. The campaign 
appears to already be beyond any unfortunate reversal."
Such overconfidence, even considering the ebullient reports 
from Joubert, was disastrous. For Jourdan to have taken 
it upon himself to march south to join Moreau, precisely 
when the Directory was ordering Moreau to march south to 
aid Bonaparte, would have been the height of folly.30
On August 19, Jourdan had reached the Naab River in the 
hills southeast of Nuremberg, some twenty-one miles from 
Ratisbon. The day began as if it was going to be a carbon 
copy of the day before, and the day before that. The advanced 
guards —  light infantry and cavalry under Ney and Mortier —  
began to fight with the Austrian rear guards. Jourdan brought 
up reinforcements to help Ney and Mortier cross the stream.
But after they had seized several bridgeheads, resistance 
stiffened. Wartensleben reinforced his defenders and 
checked the French advance. To the right Grenier attempted 
to flank the Austrian defenders who were holding the
30. A. G. Bl 76 and B. 77, the Directory to Jourdan, 
7/31/96, 8/4/96, 8/10/96. Carnot to Bonaparte, 7/25/96, 
Hippolyte Carnot, o£ cit, II, p. 60. Carnot must bear a 
full share of the blame for this unrestrained overconfidence.
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advanced guards-. His division had to cross a marsh and take 
two hamlets to do it, and in sharp fighting during which 
one hamlet burned to the ground, he also was held.^"L
At first it appeared to be a temporary delay. The 
Austrian flanks were somewhat exposed, and Jourdan was sure 
that they would retreat as soon as he launched a serious 
assault. But the Austrians did not retreat; they redeployed 
themselves in a very formidable position. The French remained 
on the Naab, excepting Bernadotte's division which was 
detached to the southeast in hopes of establishing communication 
with Moreau. As Jourdan rested and reprovisioned his tired 
soldiers while he tried to decide what to do next, he did 
not know that the Naab was to be the zenith of his army's 
advance. The Archduke had determined that the time had 
come to execute his strategy of counterattacking and defeating 
the French armies in detail. He had marked the Sambre et 
Meuse as his first victim.
Gunner Bricard vividly described the growing anxiety 
in the French army on August 22, as the increasing number of 
campfires on the hills across the Naab made it clear that the 
enemy was being reinforced. Then came orders for all 
supply personnel to head to the rear. "There reigned a 
deep silence in camp, and the majority of us experienced
31. A.G. mr 298, Precis of Adj.-General Ducheron.
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great uneasiness." Then the soldiers heard cannonfire on 
their right; and as it drew closer they were ordered to 
form line of battle and begin to retreat. "Never had we 
heard a cannonade like this one which rumbled on our right; 
it was a continuous thundering, and with pain we observed 
that the firing was advancing behind us. The weather 
was calm and the sky crimson with flame and smoke." As 
the troops moved out they maintained the most "gloomy" 
silence. The Naab was not only the turning point in the 
campaign, it was the turning point in Jourdan's career as 
well.32
II. The Retreat
The logistical deficiencies of the campaign were, 
by midsummer, hurting the Sambre et Meuse and hurting it 
badly. The lack of maps and bridging equipment were minor 
inconveniences compared to the continuous dearth of everything 
from food to footwear. As in 1795, the army existed on a 
day-to-day basis. The soldiers were perpetually hungry and 
their clothing and equipment became more threadbare and 
battered as the campaign wore on and no replacements 
arrived. While exact statistics are lacking, it is possible 
that without the munitions captured from enemy magazines
32. Bricard, Journal, pp. 225-26.
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during the advance the artillery might have run cut of 
ammunition during the retreat. A lack of statistics also 
makes it impossible to measure exactly how much, in terms 
of stamina and fighting ability, the supply shortages cost 
the army.
By August the army, as planned, was depending almost 
entirely upon requisitioned food and effects for its 
existence. Yet living at the expense of the enemy was not 
improving the lot of the soldiers markedly over that of 1795. 
The Directory had forgotten that it was not sufficient merely 
to order a given area to hand over its wealth and resources. 
The contributions had to be collected from the inhabitants, 
transported to the army —  or to Paris in the case of the 
currency —  and distributed to the troops. There was a 
considerable interval between the time when the contributions 
were levied, and the time at which they actually 
benefited the troops. In the interim the men had to shiit 
for themselves as best they could, and since the traditional 
methods of supplying them had almost completely broken down, 
the army suffered until the requisitions reached it.
Requisitioning, like everything else, required 
personnel, materiel, and organization. Unfortunately the 
Directory had been negligent in each of these areas. Joubert 
complained incessantly that he did not have enough men to 
cover the vast stretches of southwest Germany where the 
army was requisitioning; as a result collecting the
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contributions was being endlessly delayed. A greater
obstacle was a critical lack of transport. The transport
problem was one which the French were never able to solve.
Its causes were obvious: there were insufficient wagons,
wagon drivers, and especially horses, to cart the contributions
from the countryside to the army's depots. Jourdan
complained that the army periodically ran short of bread
because there was no means available to bring requisitioned
grain from the surrounding farms to the troops, and the same
problem was preventing him from utilizing the contents of 
3 3the captured enemy magazines. The solution, however, 
was not so obvious. Jourdan tried to solve it by requisitioning 
more horses and wagons, even by using the horses taken from 
the enemy. He encountered difficulty here too, and not 
only from the resistance of the population. When he ordered, 
through Joubert, a 1Rv4e of wagons from the Cleves district, 
the transport chief, Dilean, and the chief of the wagon park 
allowed the inhabitants to escape the ]evee for a bribe of 
400 couronnes The captured horses were bought up by 
suttlers and supply agents who then sold them for hard 
currence at tid y .profits; the soldiers could not buy the 
animals because their mandats were worthless. Jourdan issued 
orders that this practice was to cease, but it is doubtful
33. A.G. B1 76, Jourdan to the Directory, 7/23/96.
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that they produced much of an effect.^
A second problem was that certain areas had been 
so devastated that they were physically unable to provide the 
army with anything. The Rhine Valley had been fought over 
so much that there was little left of value, and the area 
on the east bank between Dusseldorf and the Main Valley was 
absolutely desolate due to the extensive campaigning that 
had taken place there. "We had to live on the resources 
of the place where we happened to be," Soult recalled, "and 
these were soon exhausted because the armies passed and 
repassed over these same districts." The Sambre et Meuse had 
to draw upon Belgium and Holland for much of its provisions.
In Belgium the population was so incensed at the requisitions 
that they openly resisted them, and the Army of the North had 
to send in 4,000 soldiers to quell the disturbances and permit 
the supply personnel to carry out the requisitions.35
The contributions in hard currency being levied all 
over Germany were not producing the desired results. Very 
little of the huge sums of money demanded ever benefited 
the army. For example, it is doubtful that much, if any, of 
the twelve million livres demanded from Franconia was ever 
collected. Whole convoys of captured currency en route 
to the treasury were pillaged by gangs of marauding peasants
34. A.G. Bl 76, Jourdan to Petiet (war minister),
7/11/96. Godechot, op cit, I, pp. 312-13.
35. Charles Alexander, Fragments de Memoires d 1un 
representant en mission (Paris, 1937), p. 44. Soult, Memoires, 
I, pp. 322-26, cited in Phipps, op cit, II, pp. 395-96.
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in the Taunus mountains north of the Main Valley. The 
currency which did reach Paris all too often disappeared 
into the pockets of the contractors. For example, the Directory 
ordered that the four million livres collected from Frankfort 
be advance to the contractor Lamotze, a man of exceedingly 
dubious reputation who, in spite of a previous contract, had 
yet to deliver anything of substance to the Sambre et 
Meuse. Lamotze proceeded to install himself in Frankfort 
in oriental splendor while his contract went unfulfilled 
and the army suffered. Joubert finally complained about 
Lamctze to the Directory. By the time the Directory authorized 
him to look into the matter, it was too late. The army 
was in full retreat to the Rhine and the Austrians had 
reoccupied Frankfort. Lamotze kept the four million. ^
Corruption was a major obstacle. It was a disease 
which obstructed the arteries and ate away the vitals of the 
supply system. It was relatively easy for dishonest transport 
and depot personnel to steal the requisitions and either to 
sell them or to keep them for themselves. Contractors 
complained of having supplies they had purchased disappear 
from the magazines long before they could be delivered.
36. A.G. Bl 79, Joubert to the Directory, 9/6/96. 
Godechot, 0 £  cit, I, pp. 319-23. This was precisely what 
Jourdan wished to avoid by entrusting all monetary 
contributions to his quartermaster, and allowing him to 
dispense them for the army immediately.
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One Lolliot, in charge of the army's finances, absconded with
25,000 francs. Soult recalled the the officials "who should 
have been feeding the troops, followed fifteen leagues in 
rear and gathered what the poor soldiers had harvested.
They were as opulent as the men were wretched.
As always there was a real question as to how corrupt
the supply administrations actually were. Charles Alexander,
Joubert's successor as commissioner and a source who admittedly
must be taken with a grain of salt, claimed that graft was
rampant —  that Lolliot's activities were merely the tip
of an iceberg of corruption. Alexander recalled that the
chief of provisions for the army told him that the army 
\
required 1,800 quintals of food a day to live, despite the 
fact that 'better' opinion told Alexander that 1,400 quintals 
a day sufficed. Thus some 400 quintals a day were subject 
to pillage or wastage. When the Directory confronted 
Joubert with this figure, he was of a different opinion. 
"Citizen Alexander has set way too low the figure for those 
consuming provisions in this army." Alexander forgot that 
the hospital, depot, auxiliary and garrison personnel all 
had to eat too, as well as the work crews who were hired 
from time to time to construct fortifications. Joubert 
admitted that extensive corruption existed but believed
37. Alexander, o£ cit, pp. 99-101, 131-32. Soult, 
op cit, I, pp. 322-26.
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Alexander's suspicions too extreme to be correct. The 
matter was never settled. Perhaps thievery in the administra­
tions was not the major cause of the dearth in the army as 
Alexander believed, but certainly it was a contributing 
factor.38
It is possible that the corruption reached all the 
way to Jourdan's staff. Alexander described Jourdan's 
quartermaster, Dubreton, as "roguish" and "ignorant," inept 
enough to plunge the entire administration of the Sambre 
et Meuse into confusion. Dubreton's alleged misdeeds were 
extensive. He took a 1,500 livre bribe from the municipality 
of Schweinfurt in return for delaying the contributions there 
and accepted similar "gifts" from the municipalities of 
Frankfort, Amburg, and several other towns for the same 
considerations. He embezzled 8,000 livre from the treasury 
of the paymaster of provisions and kept twenty army horses 
for his personal use, feeding them with army fodder. Joubert 
believed Dubreton to be at least hardworking and honest, 
but as Dubreton assured the government that the army was 
well provisioned, the minister of way urged him to crack 
down on the "dilapidateurs" in his administration. Meanwhile
38. A.G. B1 76, Joubert to the Directory, 9/11/96. 
Alexander to the minister of war, 8/26/96. ibid. Alexander 
was an unquestionably biased source. He bore a noticeable 
grudge against the hierarchy of the Sambre et Meuse because 
they had dismissed him from his post as army quartermaster 
for insubordination and incompetence in the spring of 1795.
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Jourdan complained of an officer and several men dying of 
malnutrition and exhaustion due to their exertions on empty 
stomachs. Alexander also suggested that Jourdan's chief of 
staff, Ernouf, was corrupt, and told of French customs 
agents intercepting one of his carriages containing some
180,000 francs.3^ If Alexander were only partially correct 
in his accusations. Jourdan had to shoulder a portion of the 
blame for such thievery, because all of his staff officers were, 
at the very least, approved by him. His poor judgment in 
Dubreton's case may have been especially damaging. Dubreton 
was the second most important man in the supply system after 
Joubert, since he commanded the army's entire supply 
bureaucracy. Its efficiency and honesty depended greatly 
upon how competent and honest Dubreton was.
Finally, living at the expense of the enemy contributed 
to the rampant depredations that so marked the French presence 
in Germany. Requisitioning was a sword with a double edge.
In the short run it allowed the army to subsist, but in the 
long run it increased indiscipline and corruption. As 
authorized requisitions failed to alleviate the army's misery 
to any degree, Jourdan's officers and soldiers felt 
justified to requisition on their own. The results were
39. Ibid, pp. 131-33, 135, 154. Again the source must 
be considered. In Ernouf's case the Minister of War told 
Alexander either to produce solid evidence of Ernouf's 
depredations, or make a formal retraction of his accusations. 
No more was heard of Ernouf's alleged corruption after that. 
See also A. G. B1 76, Jourdan tq, the Directory, 7/17/96 
for Dubreton's.credibility.
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ruinous. Many pillaged under the pretext that they were 
requisitioning. This system of "organized plunder ... 
raised the whole population against us and destroyed the 
discipline of the troops." Repeated orders from Jourdan and 
Joubert against unauthorized requisitioning went unheeded, 
and indeed there was little they could do to enforce them.
When Alexander later prohibited all requisitioning by the 
Sambre et Meuse's officers and forbade all local authorities 
to respond to such requisitions, he inspired a near 
mutiny. Kleber angrily told Grenier that if the officers 
could not requisition, the army would collapse. He was 
probably right. Kleber later refused command of the army 
largely because he could not tolerate either Alexander or his 
policies.40
Requisitioning thus did not prove to be the panacea
that everyone expected. It enabled the army to survive
from day to day; it did not eliminate any of its chronic
shortages in provisions and supplies. It aggravated the
discipline problem as much as it alleviated it. It also 
affected strategy. When Jourdan wanted to shift his line 
of communications from Dusseldorf to Strasbourg —  a line 
both shorter and safer —  the Directory refused. It deemed 
the resources of the Rhine and Main Valleys too essential
40. Ibid, p. 135. Godechot, 0£  cit, pp. 319-334.
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to the war effort to allow Jourdan's troops to leave 
41the area.
The effect of these logistical deficiencies upon the 
army was disastrous. The continuous shortages demoralized the 
men more and more with each passing day. As in 1795 straggling 
and desertion were severe problems. Bricard recalled that 
"the inhabitants always took flight at our approach; their 
absence combined with the lack of rations caused our soldiers 
more and more to become pillagers. Many, under the pretext 
of going to search for food, took some booty and other 
valuables, while some others dishonored the French army by 
every crime possible. The state of distress which the army 
found itself in often prevented the pillage from stopping, 
because the soldiers did not receive any food most of the 
time, and were obliged to go searching in the villages; 
little by little they became familiar with theft ... Even 
during [ the battle of.] Wurzburg a number of the men were 
scattered among the houses, staving in wine casks and 
violating women."42 The French marauding got so out of 
hand that during the retreat the entire countryside rose up 
against them, killing stragglers and couriers and assaulting
41. Jourdan, op cit, pp 118-19.
42. Bricard, 0 £  cit, pp. 207-08, 214-15. No volume
of official complaints can match the stark description of
the gradual demoralization of the army as told by this
simple, sans-culotte gunner.
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convoys and requisition squads. Jourdan ordered "terrible 
examples" to be made to halt the disorders: villages protecting 
insurrectionary peasants were burned and peasants taken 
with weapons in their hands were shot. But all this only 
exacerbated the problem, since the soldiers rather than the 
peasants were the ones causing it. Jourdan ruefully 
admitted to the government that the army was "dishonoring 
itself."43
There were limits to what Jourdan could do to halt 
the indiscipline. He did, as all generals do, issue orders 
against it. After praising the soldiers for their bravery 
and endurance, he criticized them for their repeated marauding 
and brigandage. Officers were to see to it that their 
men abstained from straggling and pillage. They were to take 
frequent roll calls, both on the march and in camp, and all 
those absent without leave were to be assembled upon their 
return, searched for plunder, and punished. The names of 
the guilty along with their crimes were published in the 
orders of the day. Deserters and looters were to receive 
severe penalties. But orders alone were not enough. With 
the military police not numerous enough to enforce them, as 
long as the men's pay remained worthless and the inhabitants 
refused to accept it, the requisitioning —  and stealing —
43. A.G. B1 77, Jourdan to the. Directory, 7/31/96. 
Godechot, 0£  cit, I, p. 324.
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continued. The orders were "good;" but "in order that they 
properly be put into effect, it was necessary that the army 
receive some rations."44 Then, too, Jourdan's orders were 
ineffective because of the military councils.
The military councils were the government's solution 
to the problem of maintaining discipline. They were ad hoc 
courts called to judge breaches of discipline. The problem 
was that they included enlisted men and non-commissioned 
officers as well as officers. If a private was arrested 
for theft, three privates, three sergeants, and three officers, 
all usually from his unit, tried him. The government's 
reasons for establishing the military councils are unknown, 
but perhaps they wished to transform military discipline as 
far as possible from its draconian nature under the now 
hated Terror. The military councils aggravated the problem 
they were established to ameliorate. During the course of 
a rapidly moving campaign, it was often physically impossible 
to summon a council to try an accused offender. The soldiers 
on the councils tended to be quite lenient on their fellows. 
They hesitated to punish comrades, and besides the judges of 
today could well be the accused of tomorrow, so it made sense 
to be lenient since a favor given was often a favor returned. 
Worse, the officer who made the accusation was often made to
44. Bricard, Journal, p. 210. Godechot, op cit, I, 
pp. 324-25.
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look ridiculous- by hostile councils which acquitted the man
he was trying to discipline. This practice in turn eroded
the authority of the officers. The inspector-general of the
Sambre et Meuse, Dumuy, told the government that, because
of the "laws," Jourdan had been turned into a powerless
"spectator" to the indiscipline of the army. Dumuy urged
4 5immediate remedies; the government failed to act.
Such was the state of the Sambre et Meuse when the 
Archduke Karl launched his counteroffensive. Karl had been 
at grips with Moreau throughout: the summer. However, after 
an indecisive engagement near the village of Neresheim,
Moreau halted his advance to regroup, allowing the Archduke 
to break all contact with his army and fall back to Ingolstadt. 
Karl's chance to execute his concentration with Wartensleben 
and fall upon Jourdan's army had come. On August 19, he 
marched north with some 28,000 men aiming for Nuremberg 
and the right rear of the Sambre et Meuse. He picked the 
right moment. Moreau remained inactive until the 19th, 
completely ignorant of the whereabouts of Karl's army.
Then, upon receipt of orders from the Directory to operate 
on the south bank of the Danube, Moreau backtracked to 
Dillingen where he crossed the river; this maneuver increased 
the distance between his army and the Archduke's. When
45. A.G. Bl 77, Dumuy to the Directory, 8/3/96. 
A.G. Bl 79, the Generals of the Sambre et Meuse to the 
Directory, 9/11/96.
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Moreau finally regained contact with the enemy, the force 
facing him was an army of 30,000 men under Latour, with 
orders to occupy Moreau for as long as it took for Karl to 
annihilate Jourdan's army; Karl was already launching his 
first attacks against Jourdan.46
Jourdan first learned of Karl's march on August 21.
He was not alarmed at first; according to the last dispatch 
from Moreau, the Army of the Rhine was still on the north bank 
of the Danube and could intercept such a march. Jourdan 
ordered Bernadotte on his far right at Teining to move a bit 
further south to try to communicate with Moreau. Should he 
be attacked by superior forces, he was to retire. Jourdan's 
confidence was reinforced by a note from Moreau on the 22nd. 
For the first time he learned that Moreau's army was south 
of the Danube, but the rest of the note assured him that 
the enemy force heading north was merely a reinforcement for 
Nauendorf's division operating between the two French 
armies. Moreau promised to give no "rest to Prince Charles, 
and he will not be able to escape me" should he try to advance 
against the Sambre et Meuse.4^
Jourdan's trust in Moreau cost him a precious 
twenty-four hours. As he read the note, the Austrians were 
attacking Bernadotte's isolated division on the right. With
46. Archduke Karl, oja cit, III, pp. 22-25. Jomini, 
o£  cit, VIII, p. 258.
47. Moreau to Jourdan, 8/30/96, Jourdan, op cit, 
pp. 120-22, 312-13.
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great skill and- tenacity Bernadotte held off three times
his own number long enough to extricate his division and
escape northward. Karl sent a gruppe under General David
Hotze after Bernadotte while he turned with the rest of his
army against Jourdan. When Jourdan finally learned the true
situation from Bernadotte and ordered a retreat, it was
eleven p.m. By then the Austrians were practically in his
rear, within striking distance of the main road leading 
48
northwest to the Mciin Valley.
Jourdan reached Amberg on the morning of August 24.
He deployed his army on the wooded heights northwest of that 
town. He was in as difficult a tactical position as at any 
time in his career, with superior enemy forces closing in on 
him from two sides. Yet the Archduke failed completely to take 
advantage of his opportunity. He launched his main effort 
against Jourdan's right, attempting to cut the French line 
of retreat. With between 60,000 to 65,000 soldiers against 
at most 36,000, he had every hope of success. His principal 
attack was slowed by the cavalry reserve under General Bonnaud. 
Bonnaud fought a tough, intelligent rear-guard action, 
falling back from position to position in the broken, wooded 
terrain, cannonading the advancing enemy with his light 
artillery and falling upon them with his cavalry whenever
48. Ibid, pp. 122-23. Archduke Karl, 0 £  cit, III, p. 35.
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they pressed too close. Beside him Championnet's division 
repulsed several attacks on the level ground behind Amberg, 
then made its retreat in good order. Colaud's division was 
the last to retreat and in fighting Wartensleben1s troops,
Ney received his baptism of fire as a rear-guard commander.
By nightfall he was almost completely surrounded; his survivors 
had to cut their way out. Two battalions were entirely 
destroyed before they could escape. Yet two battalions were 
a small price to pay to save an entire army. Karl should 
have decisively defeated the Sambre et Meuse; in reality 
he only damaged it slightly.^
For the moment Karl hesitated. Amberg was to have 
been the decisive battle, and Jourdan was to have been crippled, 
if not destroyed. Instead, Jourdan had escaped the trap, 
his army as much of a threat, in Karl's mind, as ever.
Moreover, Moreau remained a worry. If the French armies 
were working together the way they should be, the Archduke 
could expect Moreau to advance against him shortly, and then 
he would be in the jaws of the pincers. He did not know that 
all communication between the two armies had broken down.
When it seemed clear that Moreau would stay in Bavaria,
Karl hesitated no longer; he marched in pursuit of
49. A.G. mr 298, Precis of Adj. General Ducheron. 
Archduke Karl, ibid, pp. 46-8. Jourdan, ibid, pp. 122-23.
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Jourdan.50
For the next seven days Jourdan struggled to escape 
his pursuers. Not only had the Austrians severed the best 
road leading northwest into the Main Valley, they also were 
in a position to cut Jourdan off entirely if they moved 
quickly. Jourdan was obliged to order long forced marches, 
and sometimes night marches, through the wilds north of 
Nuremberg over roads which were narrow and slippery. One 
defile, which a staff officer had assured Jourdan ./as wide 
enough for the supply train, was not, and much of it had to 
be abandoned. The superior Austrian cavalry harrassed the 
army mercilessly. At one point it cut Kleber's two divisions 
off from the rest of the army completely, and on another 
occasionHungarian hussars raided army headquarters and came 
perilously close to capturing Jourdan himself in a wild 
sabre-swinging melee with Jourdan's staff. Jourdan himself 
appeared thoughtful and depressed during these difficult 
days. When a dispatch from Bernadotte reached him, "in 
order that he might read it an artillery officer lit a 
torch by the smoky glare of which Jourdan glanced over
50. Archduke Karl, 0 £  cit, III, pp. 49-51. Karl is 
quite critical of his operations, admitting that he was 
needlessly slow and hesitant, unsure whether to continue 
after Jourdan or turn and face Moreau since his initial 
stroke had failed. Of course, had Moreau acted as he 
promised, Karl would have had to halt his pursuit? his 
counteroffensive would have ended right there.
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what must have been bad news, for he carried his hand to 
his face with a grieved air, and then went aside to give 
his orders."51
Such a precipitous retreat further weakened an army 
already short of supplies —  and discipline. "The French 
army, harrassed ceaselessly on its flanks by the enemy and 
by armed civilians lacked subsistence; most of the time the 
troops only had some potatoes dug up from the vicinity of 
their bivouacs for nourishment. These deprevations, combined 
with the long and continuous marches, had weakened their 
strength." The columns plodded in disorder most of the 
time. Looting increased dramatically. Stragglers looking 
for their units late at night caused momentary panics —  
French soldiers stampeding in confusion through the darkness 
firing at each other. Overexertion and malnourishment 
discouraged the entire army. Bricard recalled that at times 
no one in his unit believed they would ever see the Rhine 
again, "without clothing, without rations, forced to fight 
daily, to march at night, without hope of saving the wounded." 
The rigors of the retreat took its toll in casualties.
By August 31 the army numbered only 30,000, if that many.
Yet all things considered, it is a testimony to Jourdan's 
leadership and to the endurance of his men that the Sambre
51. A.G. mr 298, Precis of Adj.-General Ducheron. 
Bricard, op cit, p. 226.
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52
et Meuse did not suffer far worse than it actually did.
The forced marches and Jourdan's tactic of deploying 
one division on his right to hold off the enemy while the 
rest of the army retreated behind its protective shield kept 
the Sambre et Meuse one step ahead of its foes. Indeed, 
on the 29th Jourdan felt bold enough to attempt a blow against 
the enemy advanced guard under Hotze, which had become 
separated from the rest of the Archduke's army. Unfortunately 
his thrust misfired completely. The exhausted troops failed 
to reach their jumping off points in time, and the bridges 
constructed across the Regnitz river were too weak to support 
artillery. When Austrian cavalry once again cut the main 
road farther to the west, Jourdan called off the attack, 
erroneously believing that he was facing the entire enemy 
army rather than Hotze alone. In fact Hotze was still by 
himself, so Jourdan missed an excellent chance to cripple 
the Austrian pursuit by defeating a portion of Karl's army 
in detail.53
While Jourdan struggled against superior forces, 
Moreau dallied in Bavaria against an army half the size of 
his own. It took him four days to drive Latour's force 
from the Lech. On August 26 a dispatch from Jourdan finally 
got through, advising him that Jourdan now faced the bulk
52. Jourdan, op cit, p. 151. Bricard, op cit, pp. 
229-31. A.G. mr 298, Precis of Adj.-General Ducheron.
53. Archduke Karl, op cit. III, pp. 69-70. Jourdan, 
ibid, pp. 139-42, 146.
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of the Austrian.army. Moreau remained unconvinced that this
was the case, and when General Gouvion St. Cyr suggested that
Moreau march to Jourdan's aid, Moreau refused. Jourdan, he
felt, was about to stand and give battle to his pursuers who
had lost their superiority over him by returning Nauendorf's
division to the D a n u b e . A s  for the Archduke, he was still
at Ingolstadt. Moreau wrote to Jourdan that his own
continued advance against Latour was the best way to force
Karl to recall whatever forces he had sent against the Sambre
et Meuse. Indeed Moreau felt bound to stay in Bavaria because
of the orders of the government. "The march back which I
would have to make on Ingolstadt ... would not disengage you
as effectively as the one I have made across the Lech, all
the more so since I have positive orders from the Directory."
Moreau may have had positive orders, but the evidence
suggests that he was encouraging the Directory in its faulty
strategy by misleading them about the true whereabouts
of the enemy army. In any case, Moreau had no intention
55
of marching north to Jourdan's aid.
54. Gouvion St. Cyr, L 'armee du Rhin (4 volumes; Paris, 
1829), III, pp. 247-49. It is doubtful that Nauendorf was 
even included in the 28,000 men that Karl marched with to 
begin with I
55. A.G. mr 608-6, Moreau to Jourdan, 8/16/96. Phipps, 
op cit, II, pp. 334-35. St. Cyr, and Phipps, believed that 
Moreau acted in bad faith; that in fact he did realize that the 
bulk of the P. istrian army was attacking Jourdan, but that
for his own selfish reasons he preferred to remain in Bavaria. 
The problem is: whcit would have been his motives? It is more 
likely that he simply misjudged the situation; after all Moreau 
was as capable of poor generals'hip as anyone else.
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Thus Jourdan had to depend upon his own resources. 
After the missed opportunity on the Regnitz, he made a detour 
to the north, thereby putting his army beyond the reach 
of his pursuers who continued to advance along the main 
road to Wurzburg. He managed to give the army a short day 
of rest while he pondered what to do. His decision was to 
attempt once more to seize the initiative away from the 
Archduke. Considering the weakened state of the army it 
was a curious choice. It is possible that Moreau's 
assurances contributed to it; it is more likely that 
he was under heavy pressure from Joubert to halt the retreat 
and initiate some kind of offensive. But his principal 
motive, as he himself admitted, was personal; he simply did 
not want to retreat any further without a fight. The campaign 
had gone sour, and his stock with the government had fallen 
low —  why not make one more effort to reverse the tide of 
the campaign. It was one of the very few instances in his 
career when he allowed emotion to dictate a tactical decision. 
He came to regret it.56
His decision touched off a conflagration, the embers 
for which had been smouldering among the generals of the 
army for some time. The pressures and disappointments of
56. A.G. B1 77, Joubert to the Directory, 8/31/96. 
Jourdan, op cit, pp. 156-59. Joubert took Moreau's assurances 
at face value and urged Jourdan to take advantage of Moreau's 
"successes" in Bavaria to resume the offensive.
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the retreat had strained the nerves of the officers to the
breaking point. Several had fallen ill, including Jourdan's
good friend Kleber. On September 1, the day after Jourdan
had decided to renew the offensive, he ordered Kleber to
reverse his march west, and head for Schweinfurt as the
preliminary step in the proposed counterstroke. Kleber had
just begun to execute Jourdan's orders to continue the
retreat. It was not the first time that Jourdan had hastily
countermanded orders to Kleber, for he had done so on
several occasions during the retreat. Overwrought, suffering
from a chest ailment, angered by yet another unannounced change
in orders, Kleber blew up. Apparently he stormed over to
Jourdan's headquarters and accused Jourdan of mismanaging
the entire campaign —  of ignoring the health of the soldiers
by allowing them no rest, and of uselessly marching them
back and forth. Kleber possibly had the support of some of
the other officers who opposed Jourdan's planned counterstroke.
Jourdan angrily denied Kieber's accusations, and the two
former comrades engaged in a violent argument with Jourdan
57calling Kleber to order ;everal tim^s.
How the argument ended we do not know. But we do 
know its result. That same evening both Jourdan and Joubert 
tendered their resignations to the Directory. It is clear
57. Jourdan, ibid. Phipps, oj> cit, II, p. 349. Pajol, 
Kleber, I, p. 240.
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that the argument had upset Jourdan greatly, for dissension 
among his fellow officers was one difficulty that he was 
not prepared to handle. He was quite frank in his letter 
as to his motives. "I must warn you that the good of the 
service requires that I should cease to command the army of 
the Sambre et Meuse, because I have lost the confidence 
of the generals, who doubtlessly do not believe me capable 
of being their chief. I think, however, that they will 
render justice to my good will, my probity, and my zeal ...
You will sense, Citizen Directors, that having lost the 
confidence of the generals, I shall lose that of individual 
officers and then that of the soldiers; it is urgent then 
that you should recall me." He wrote a personal note to 
Carnot, asking him to support his request to be relieved 
of the burdens of command with the other Directors. Jourdan's 
patience had finally snapped. It is possible that he 
tendered his resignation in the heat of the moment, profoundly 
discouranged by this latest problem, but it is more likely 
that, since he never tried to retract his request, the ever 
accumulating difficulties of the campaign finally became 
too much for him to b e a r . 58
Jourdan was not the only one to have become discouraged. 
Joubert also resigned due to his friendship and esteem for 
Jourdan; he felt "pained" to see the fruits of victory
58. A.G. B1 79, Jourdan to the Directory, 9/1/96; 
Jourdan to Carnot, 9/1/96. «.
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taken from a man "as pure and honest as General Jourdan" 
because of the "brigandage" among the troops. Kleber resigned 
due to ill-health; before doing so, he apologized to 
Jourdan for his criticism of Jourdan's marching orders.
Among the divisional commanders, General Colaud resigned, 
and Bernadotte went on sick leave. He was not too sick, 
however, to write to Director Letourner, urging him to 
protect Jourdan from those who would slander his name due 
to the setbacks which he suffered. It is unfortunate that 
Jourdan believed the unrest among his officers to be directed 
against him when in reality it was directed at the 
government. When Jourdan offered the command of the army 
to his harshest critic, Kleber, the latter refused, unwilling 
to struggle with the insoluble logistical problems bequeathed 
him by the government.^9
Meanwhile, Jourdan persisted with his counterstroke.
With no more than 27,000 troops he marched for Wurzburg, a 
sizeable town and center of communications astride the main 
road leading back to the Rhine. On the afternoon of 
September 2, the French advance guards encountered enemy 
troops who had just occupied the city. After a brief skirmish, 
they drove the enemy back. Jourdan deployed in a semi-circle 
just north of Wurzburg at nightfall. He again believed
59. A.G. B1 79, Joubert to the Directory, 9/1/96; 
Kleber to Jourdan 9/1/96, 9/2/96; Bernadotte to Letourner, 
9/1/96.
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that he was facing the Austrian advance guard only, and his 
intention was to overwhelm it before the Archduke could 
bring up the rest of his army. There were two things wrong 
with this plan. One was that the Austrian army was not as 
dispersed as Jourdan believed, although it was more spread 
out than Karl desired. The Archduke ordered his rearmost 
troops to accelerate their march when he learned of Jourdan's 
advance. The other was that Jourdan erred in leaving 
Lefebvre's 8,000 man division to guard his line of retreat 
via Schweinfurt against what turned out to be a negligible 
enemy force. Lefebvre's soldiers might have meant all 
the difference in the first four hours of the battle.
Heavy rain slowed the French as they attacked early 
on September 3. Nevertheless in the center and on the left 
the attack made progress. Championnet and Grenier pushed 
Hotze's Austrians steadily back through a woods, eventually 
storming the village of Euerfeld within sight of the Main.
The French infantry, considering their privations, fought 
surprisingly well, even repulsing several enemy cavalry attacks. 
But the initial successes of the attack did not lead to more 
substantial results. The Austrians' stubborn resistance caused 
the French advance to take time, and time was one thing 
Jourdan did not have. By mid-morning the rest of Karl's
60. Jourdan, o£ cit, pp. 161-66. Archduke Karl, 
op cit, III, pp. 112-16.
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army had arrived. As a force under General Paul Kray turned 
Jourdan's left, Karl personally led his reserves against the 
French advance and brought it to a halt. Superior numbers 
determined the outcome; the French were inexorably driven 
back despite their best efforts, while Kray simply overlapped 
Grenier's outnumbered defenders and rolled him up, his 
cavalry raiding deep into Grenier's rear.
Too late did Jourdan attempt to summon Lefebvre; 
the Austrian cavalry had cut the road to Schweinfurt. 
Stubbornly Jourdan persisted, collecting every cavalryman 
he had and throwing them against the advancing enemy. 
Unfortunately the Austrians had three cavalrymen to every 
Frenchman. In a confused melee of hooves and sabres into 
which Jourdan personally plunged to hold his outnumbered 
troopers to their task, the superior Austrian cavalry 
gradually forced the French horse from the field. Only 
then did Jourdan order a retreat. The Sambre et Meuse 
withdrew in good order. It had suffered about 4,000 
casualties, while inflicting an equal number on the enemy. 
Tactically Wurzburg changed little, for Jourdan was as 
compelled to retire before superior numbers after the 
battle as before it.^1
The Sambre et Meuse made its disorderly way back 
to the Rhine, leaving a swath of destruction in its wake.
61. Ibid. Jomini, Phipps, T.A. Dodge and several 
19th century French historians all have described this 
battle in some, detail.
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Desperate to end the indiscipline, Joubert decided to override 
the existing disciplinary laws, which had not been done earlier 
owing to the "timid circumspection" of Jourdan, who refused 
to act without the Directory's approval. Supported by 
Bernadotte and Bonnaud, he suggested to Jourdan that they 
take some action on their own authority. Jourdan agreed.
The same day he issued a proclamation recalling the soldiers 
to their duty, and ordering the officers to crack down on 
all looters. If the military councils were unable to 
"agree" on a penalty for an obvious offender, the councils 
were to inform him of the fact and Jourdan would place the 
accused under indefinite arrest. Jourdan also stated that 
he believed the disciplinary laws —  i.e. the military 
councils —  too complicated and ineffective, and urged the 
government to make the laws more simple and rigorous.
This action Jourdan should have taken earlier, but his 
habitu.il diffidence towards the government inhibited him 
from attempting such a step until it was too l a t e . 62
What was required to reverse the tide of the campaign 
was not within Jourdan's power to bring about. It was necessary 
for Moreau to march from Bavaria against Karl's flank and 
rear. But such a maneuver was not forthcoming. Moreau 
remained convinced that he, not Jourdan, faced the bulk
62. A.G. B1 79, Joubert to the Directory, 9/10/96; 
Proclamation of Jourdan to the army, 9/10/96; the Generals 
of the Sambre et Meuse to the Directory, 9/10/9 6; Jourdan 
to the Directory, 9/11/96. *
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of the Austrian-army; worse, he convinced the Directory that 
he, not Jourdan, had correctly evaluated the situation.
Thus the government continued to order Jourdan to halt the 
enemy advance. On September 9, the Directory momentarily 
decided that Jourdan's warnings were not groundless after 
all and it at long l^st instructed Moreau to march against 
the Archduke. But on the 15th, on the advice of Moreau, 
it reverted back to its original strategy, since the forces 
opposite Jourdan were *"equal to his own.1' One wonders why 
the Directory, Carnot {included, chose to beli*eve Moreau 
instead of Jourdan. A i  that its obstinate insistence upon
b
the demonstrably useless tactic of forcing the Archduke 
f,
to retreat by attacking his flank in Bavaria accomplished 
was to complete the .failure of the campaign.^3
Jourdan retreated back to the Lahn River. Here he 
could expect a brief respite to rest his tired army, for 
the posd Lion was formidable with wooded ridges overlooking 
a fairly deep river. Marceau's corps from Mayence, plus 
belated reinforcements of 6,000 men under General Castleverd, 
had brought his army back above 50,000 effectives. Yet the 
Sambre et Meuse was far from being on safe ground. The Lahn 
position, while strong, was too long to guard properly; the 
two main passages at Limburg and Wetzlar were widely
63. A.G. Bl 79', Moreau to Jourdan, 9/2/96; the Directory 
to Jourdan, 9/9/96, 9/15/96.
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^eparatecT and it was essential to cover both. Thus Jourdan 
cordoned his army along the entire river, deploying most 
of his troops at. L*lmbu^g and Wetzlar, while keeping Bernadotte’s 
division in reserve. ' Furthermore, if Jourdan was reinforced, 
so was Karl; he now added, to his army the 20,000-man 
garrison of Mayence. Finally, confident as always, the 
Directory sent him their latest out-of-date instructions 
to attack, before he retired to the Lahn164
Karl reached the Lahn on September 12. For the next 
three days he probed the French defenses, especially^the 
left flank at Wetzlar. This latter activity convinced 
Jourdan that the Austrians were about to turn his left 
for the third striight time, and he began to shift reserves 
in that direction. But the enemy thrusts were only feints.
When Karl attacked on the 16th, his main assault was against 
the French position under Marceau at Limburg. Kray's 
secondary attack was met on the hills behind Wetzlar by 
three French divisions and roughly thrown back across the 
Lahn. But the decisive struggle was at Limburg. Karl 
attacked with a two to one superiority, clearing the French 
from the heights south of the Lahn, and penetrating into 
the villages of Limburg and Dietz. At Dietz, the 
Mayence troops under General Neu in heavy fighting seized
64. A.G. Bl 79, the Directory to Jourdan, 9/15/96; 
Dubreton to Petiet, 9/10/96. Dubreton assured the government 
that the army could not subsist unless it resumed the 
offensive.
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
375
a tiny foothold- on the hills from Castleverd's men. But 
at Limburg Marceau performed wonders. Twice his gallant 
defenders expelled the Austrians from Limburg in savage 
fighting, and when the enemy finally captured it, the French 
defenders on the hills above the river prevented them 
from debouching.66
By nightfall the Archduke faced defeat. Jourdan's 
worn-out soldiers had repulsed him completely, and Jourdan, 
at the eleventh hour, had recognized that the main threat 
was downstream at Limburg. He ordered Bernadotte to counter­
march his division and go to Marceau's aid, and told Marceau 
to hold the crossing at all hazards until help arrived. 
Unfortunately Castleverd, a coward and an incompetent, 
had other ideas. In spite of emphatic orders from Marceau 
to hold his ground, ^Castleverd abandoned his position and 
headed straight for the bridges across the Rhine. Karl, 
on the verge of giving up the attack, took courage from what 
he believed to be a failure of Jourdan's nerve, and 
advanced. When Marceau awoke to find the enemy where Castleverd 
was supposed to be, he had to retreat. Bernadotte arrived 
in time to check the enemy long enough for the rest of the
65. Jourdan, op cit, pp. 184-86. Archduke Karl, 
op cit, III, pp. 169-74.
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army to withdraw from a now-untenable position.^
The Lahn was Jourdan's last chance to win back a
measure of respect for himself; it in no way could have
decisively affected the outcome of the campaign. The Sambre
et Meuse retreated to Dusseldorf and Neuweid, during
which a final rear-guard combat cost young Marceau his life.
At Dusseldorf Jourdan turned the command over to
Beurnonville,, and went home. His usefulness had ended and
he know it. La Rev.elliere considered him inept, and even
Carnot seemed to have lost confidence in him. Joubert
reinforced their opinion by nastily asserting that Jourdan
had lost his head during the retreat. Perhaps he worried
that the government might ask him about his exaggerated
predictions of success which had so affected its strategy.
The campaign came,to a close, with Beurnonville remaining
inactive, and Moreau retreating back across the Rhine
after finally discovering that the Archduke was, indeed,
67
not at Ingolstadt.
66. A.G. Bl 79, Marceau to Jourdan, 9/16/96; Jourdan's 
orders, 9/16/96. Castleverd gallantly excused himself of 
all blame, saying that Jourdan's officers simply wished to 
make him the scapegoat, and suggesting that they all go and 
get "buggered." Castleverd never saw active duty again.
67. M. Reinhard, o£ cit, I, pp. 209-10. Carnot argued 
before the Directory that Jourdan's —  and Joubert's —  
resignations be accepted. However, he might have done so 
because Jourdan had asked him to (9/1/96), not because he 
doubted his ability.
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There is an initial temptation to exonerate Jourdan 
of all blame for the failures of the 1796 campaign. It is 
a temptation that must be resisted. Jourdan was partly 
responsible for the campaign plans to operate on exterior 
lines and subsist at the expense of the enemy, neither of 
which proved successful in the end. Unwilling to operate 
independently of the directives of the government, he remained 
"too docile to the orders emanating from the Luxembourg 
three hundred leagues away," despite the fact that these 
orders were usually out of date by the time they reached him. 
He remained too closely chained to his orders always to 
operate on the enemy's outside flank. A less predictable 
strategy probably would not have forced Wartensleben to 
battle, but it might have. He delayed too long in 
overriding the Directory's laws concerning the military 
councils. He bowed to government pressure and attacked 
rashly at Wurzburg, then committed tactical errors which 
contributed to his defeat. Most importantly, had Jourdan 
followed his earlier inclination and kept control of all the 
monetary contributions regardless of the government —  as 
Bonaparte did in Italy —  he could have caused his 
quartermaster to distribute them directly to his destitute 
officers and soldiers instead of sending them back to Paris 
to be squandered. Available hard cash would have curbed 
the indiscipline and disorders, the army would have 
fought better, and Jourdan, as he later realized, "would
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have made some .friends."^
Nonetheless one cannot deny that Jourdan was far 
more the one sinned against than the sinner. He was not given 
enough cavalry, either to overwhelm the rear-guards of 
Wartensleben's army or to maintain the regular communications 
with Moreau that were so essential to the campaign on exterior 
lines that the French were waging. The Directory failed to 
provide him with the essentials which could have caused 
requisitioning to succeed: the personnel, the horses and 
wagons, the military police, and above all the authority for 
Jourdan to dispense the contributed money on the spot. The 
breakdown in the army's supply system caused the breakdown 
in discipline that was so ruinous to the army. When 
Jourdan attempted to reestablish discipline, he was hindered 
in his efforts by the hopelessly ineffective military 
councils. These basic weaknesses prevented Jourdan from 
being strong enough to execute the task which was the key 
to his campaign —  the destruction of Wartensleben's 
army. Then too, both the Directory and Moreau committed 
costly strategic errors. The Directory tried to run the 
campaign from too far away considering the primitive 
communications of 1796 and as a result it was in no 
position to judge that Joubert's optimism during the advance
68. Jomini, op cit, VIII, pp. 175-76. Godechot, op cit,
I, pp. 325-27.
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was misplaced/ and that Moreau's vision in Bavaria was 
faulty. Moreau blundered badly in Bavaria, leaving Jourdan 
alone to absorb the Archduke's counteroffensive.
The campaign of 1796 was not a failure mainly 
because, as Jomini and so many others argue, the French 
strategy was intrinsically wrong. The campaign failed 
because the material deficiencies of the armies were such 
that generalship could not overcome them. Indeed, one 
can argue that the failure occurred, not because the 
French erroneously chose to operate on exterior lines, 
but because they failed to operate on exterior lines 
properly. And the responsibility for the logistical short­
comings which so sabotaged the campaign must be shouldered 
by the government. As Kleber wrote, "[the army's] reverses 
can be attributed to the battles it has delivered, but 
naked and unfed, what can the bravest men do?"
69. Reinhard, op cit, II, p. 210, admits that Carnot 
failed to coordinate the operations of the two armies 
properly.
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Vlir. JACOBIN POLITICIAN: 1797-1799
I. Councilor In The "500"
After turning command of the Sambre et Meuse over 
to General Pierre do Beurnonville, Jourdan returned home 
to his wife and family in Limoges. It does not seem that 
he again sought to become the unassuming private citizen and 
shopkeeper, as in 1794. Instead, after a brief period of 
rest, he re-entered the political life of the town. Once 
again his difficulties as a general had not lost him 
popularity with his fellow citizens. He was elected president 
of the electoral college of the Haute Vienne, a body chosen 
by the citizens to select deputies for the national 
legislature from the department. With such popular support, 
it was logical that he should become one of the Haute Vienne's 
candidates for election to the Countil of 500; his fellow 
electors reflected his popularity by making him a deputy 
by the lopsided vote of 195 to 7.1
Jourdan sat on the left in the Council of 500.
The Republican left comprised the remnants of the old Jacobin 
party of the year II. These were the most ardent and radical 
Republicans in the "500," men whose views were more in line 
with the policies of the revolutionary Montagnards than
1. Rene Valentin, Le Marechal Jourdan, pp. 157-58. 
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with those of the business-as-usual Thermidorians. Jourdan
gravitaged towards these men because he was a fervent
republican himself and because he had worked with many of them
previously. Among these "N.-o-Jacobins" were a mixed
assortment of former Montaguards from the Convention, many
of whom had been representatives on mission and some to
armies which Jourdan had commanded. Among these were his
former colleagues Delbrel, Laurent, and Levasseur from the
'Nord," and Talot and Joubert from the Sambre et Meuse.
In addition, the Neo-Jacobins included several generals such
as Pierre Augereau and Bernadotte and a scattering of new
men such as Francois Lamarque and Jourdan’s fellow deputy
2
from the Haute Vienne, Gay-Vernon.
These Neo-Jacobins were still a small, ill-formed 
group of like-minded deputies in 1797; they were not even 
a faction much less a coherent party. Their politics were 
not yet clearly distinguishable from those of the more 
moderate deputies of the center. Basically they supported 
the Constitution of the Year III, although they wished to 
add to it some of the ideas of the unfinished constitution 
of 179 3. They were wedded to the principles of representative 
government, public spiritedness or civisme, and active
2. This Gay-Vernon was the brother of Houchard's chief 
of staff in 1793, the man whose eyes had so displeased 
Duquesnoy, but who had survived the Terror even so, to soon 
become president of the Ecole Polytechnique.
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
382
democracy, particularly at the local level in clubs and 
political societies. They shared with the moderates a healthy 
suspicion of the conservative right in the Councils, who 
they believed to be royalist, Catholic, and possibly plotting 
to overthrow the Republic. In spirit they favored economic 
leveling —  policies which would eliminate the very rich 
and the very poor, especially the former. However they had 
few concrete ideas on how to achieve this goal. Their more 
specific programs, such as educational reform to provide 
free education for poor children, a public works program 
for the unemployed, a progressive tax weighing most heavily 
upon the rich, and a retirement bonus for discharged veterans, 
had probably not yet been formulated as a coherent platform 
in 1797. Nor did they yet demonstrate the bitter hostility 
to the Directory that so characterized their movement in 
1799. In general they were men who wished to protect the 
little man against privileged government and big business.3
Jourdan's political ideas were generally similar to 
those of his colleagues and in most cases equally vague.
He too was a convinced republican in the sense that he believed 
in liberty, equality of opportunity, representative
3. A definitive work on the Neo-Jacobin movement during 
the Directory needs to be written. The best, so far, is 
Isser Woloch, Jacobin Legacy (Princeton, 1970). However, 
Woloch concentrates upon the revival of the popular clubs 
at the expense of the Neo-Jacobins' politics in the government 
itself.
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government, and the other basic ideals of republicanism, 
although he had few specific ideas on how best to put them 
into practice. He believed in free enterprise and private 
property but became increasingly convinced that most of the 
fortunes amassed by the entrepreneurs were amassed 
dishonestly. He wished to eradicate all extremes of wealth, 
although he had no clear plans for bringing this about.
He favored government intervention in the economy, more to 
strengthen the war effort than to produce social harmony.
In spite of, or because of, his boyhood with his uncle, the 
Abbd^Jourdan, he was quite anti-clerical. His first speech 
in the "500" was directed against the Catholic clergy, 
whom he accused of preaching the virtues of monarchism from 
their pulpits.4 Although hard evidence is lacking, there is 
no reason to suspect that he differed from the Neo-Jacobins 
in any of their other aims. Where he did differ slightly 
was in his ardent belief in fraternite; he was, in other 
words, a nationalist. He thought that the duty of every 
citizen was first and fo: emost to serve the "fatherland,1 
and he supported local democracy in the political societies 
because he believed it increased public spiritedness and 
civisme, which in turn led to a more patriotic, united 
citizenry —  a citizenry which would put the welfare of the
4. Valentin, op cit, pp. 175-58.
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nation ahead of their own selfish interests, and would keep
5
the fatherland vital and virtuous.
His views of the Directory and its politicians were 
sharper and more easily definable. He had definite reservations 
about both; while he supported the constitution, he did not 
like its servants. He believed that there were far too many 
long-winded orators in the Councils —  men who deliberated 
when they should have acted. Too many of the deputies were 
mere time-serving careerists, men "who had no other care 
than to demand positions for their parents and friends, and 
who believed that everything would go marvelously when they 
had obtained them."6 Like so many soldiers, he viewed 
parliamentary politics and politicians with a certain 
contempt, which grew stronger as the Thermidorian majority 
cynically violated the Constitution to perpetuate itself 
in power. As for the government itself, he believed that 
its basic failing was its weakness. The Directory's 
powers were too limited, and the endless deliberations of 
the Councils further "enfeebled [them] each day on the 
pretext of ensuring public liberty." In addition, there
5. See Paul Barras, Memoires, III, pp. 405-10. In
a single short paragraph, Jourdan used the word "fatherland" 
no less than nine times.
6. J. B. Jourdan, Notice sur le Dix-Huit Brumaire, 
published in he Carnot Historique (February, 1901), p. 164. 
Jourdan appears to have written the "notice" some time in 1800.
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were no clear lines of authority and responsibility governing 
the expenditure of funds by the bureaucracy. The Councils 
could never obtain from the ministries "exact accounting 
of the employment of funds which it [sicj allocated for the 
different sectors of the public services." This lack of 
clear accounting allowed graft and waste to persist, because 
the legislators concerned could never tell whether the 
money was being legitimately spent or stolen. It also, he 
felt, was behind the huge fortunes amassed by the 
speculateurs, as well as the constant logistical shortcomings 
of the army.7 *
The Directory, in short, did not provide the strong, 
efficient, responsible rule that a soldier like Jourdan 
expected from a government. Jourdan never considered 
authoritarian rule incompatible with republicanism. As a 
result inefficiency and neglect went unchecked, corruption 
and theft went unpunished. While soldiers and civilians 
suffered, the politicians debated constitutional niceties.
"In Rome in similar circumstances they would have named 
a Dictator; in France they debated the limits of the authority 
of each power."8
It was a simplistic view of a complex situation, 
but one nevertheless containing a good deal of truth. If the
7. J. B. Jourdan, Precis des operations de 1 'armee du 
Danube, (Paris, 1800), pp. 12-15. J. B. Jourdan, La Campagne 
de 1796, p. 12.
8. Jourdan, La Campagne de 1796, p. 12.
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financial chaos- of the government was due in large part to 
the complicated economic problems it faced, its finances 
were very loosely controlled, and much graft and inefficiency 
did result. And if the deputies in the Councils moved slowly 
and discussed extensively because of the immensities of their 
problems, rather than because of any unnatural taste for 
oratory, there were far too many untalented careerists in 
the government interested more in self-advancement than in 
the public welfare.
It is doubtful that Jourdan felt so critical of the 
Directory in the first year of his legislative career. 
Outwardly at least he was content to remain in the background 
and to play the political game as a loyal republican. He 
dutifully joined his colleagues in their attacks against the 
conservatives. When the right nominated his old nemesis, 
Pichegru, as its candidate for the presidency of the "500", 
the left retaliated by nominating him to oppose Pichegru. 
Perhaps they felt that the best way to defeat a famous 
general was to run another famous general against him, for 
certainly they did not select Jourdan because of his political 
experience. The conservatives' majority in the "500" 
enabled Pichegru to win the election decisively. All the 
same, Jourdan soon enjoyed his revenge. When the Directory 
initiated the coup of the 18th Fructidor, it purged all the 
most pronounced conservatives —  including Carnot —  from 
the government and arrested Pichegru for conspiring against
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the Republic. Jourdan warmly supported the coup as a 
necessary blow against the counterrevolution.9
Meanwhile Jourdan apparently was on quite friendly 
terms with the dominant figure in the Directory, Paul Barras. 
How close this friendship was is debatable; Barras tended to 
exaggerate the warmth of his relations with most of his 
contemporaries. Barras claimed that he was Jourdan's 
patron in the Directory. According to him, "Jourdan 
introduced into our relationship more personal attentions 
than were consistent with his generally reserved and 
circumspect character." On occasion he sent Barras presents 
of game which he had shot while hunting, and at other times 
he sounded Barras out on proposed military plans and requested 
personal favors. On one occasion, when the Directory toyed 
with the idea of sending an expedition to India to support 
Tipoo-Sahib in his war with the British, Jourdan asked 
Barras if he could command it. Evidently he had become 
bored with politics and longed for a return to action.
Jourdan's friendship —  if that is what it was —  with this 
clever, cynical, disillusioned ex-aristocrat seems 
inconsistent. Certainly he must not have realized at first 
how deeply Barras was involved in the jobbery and corruption 
of Directorial politics. Perhaps he felt a certain affinity 
for a fellow ex-Montagnard, or perhaps he was doing no more
9. Valentin, op cit, pp. 158-60.
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than keeping on good terms with the most influential and 
powerful man in the government.10
Jourdan's loyalty both to his fellow republicans 
and to the Directory was rewarded several months after the 
Fructidor coup. He was elected president of the "500" 
by an overwhelming majority. It was the first of two terms 
which he served at the head of that body. As a staunch 
republican and noted war hero, he was an ideal choice for 
that prestigious but largely powerless post.
His loyalty to the regime received its first severe 
P shock the following year. During the month of Floreal the 
Directory made known its intention to invalidate the recent 
elections to the Councils of some one hundred and six left- 
leaning republicans who, the Directory feared, would be in 
instruments of "anarchism" and "terrorism" within the 
government. The Directory's motive for this new coup was 
actually more sordid; it feared that the new deputies would be 
less docile to its will than the centrist Thermidorians who 
heretofore had dominated the Councils. The Floreal coup not 
only offended Jourdan's sense of justice and fair play, 
it struck him close to home since it invalidated the election 
of his colleague from the Haute Vienne, Gay-Vernon. He
10. Barras, Memoires, III, pp. 103-05. Barras also 
claimed that he championed Jourdan against Carnot while the 
latter was on the Directory. Here he was almost certainly 
exaggerating; there is no evidence that Jourdan ever needed 
championing against Carnot.
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joined the other deputies of the left in opposing the exclusions. 
When they were first announced, he argued before the "500" 
that duly elected deputies could be excluded from their 
seats for two reasons only: for fraudulent election, or for 
conspiring against the government. Because the government 
was arguing the latter case, Jourdan denied that the excluded 
deputies were conspirators. Furthermore, "if they [the 
Directory] wish to transform the Council into a jury without 
the customary forms of liberty, they misunderstand the 
Constitution and the sovereignity of the people." He then 
pleaded that the Council consider each case on its own merits.
The Thermidorians did not misunderstand the 
Constitution, they merely considered legality unimportant 
in the present circumstances. They insisted that the exclusions 
be adopted en masse rather than be debated separately.
Jourdan again joined the protests. He pointed out the obvious 
inconsistencies in the exclusions, and argued that those who 
described the proscribed deputies as intriguers and agitators 
desirous of reviving the Terror "were creating phantoms." Since 
the proscriptions were "the work of the Directory," the 
latter was infringing upon the prerogatives of the legislature. 
"If such a process is introduced in France, there will be
11. P. Buchez and Roux, eds., Histoire Parliamentaire 
de la. Revolution francaise, (40 volumes, Paris, 1838), 
XXXVII, pp. 50 3-05.
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liberty, no guarantee for the representatives of the people; 
they will begin by excluding dangerous men, and end by 
excluding those who, due to an energetic character, express 
in their discourse the sentiments of free men." But his 
protest was unaviling; his adversaries urged the "500" to 
"bar the way to the Terror" and exclude the deputies, and it 
was in vain that Jourdan denied he was a defender of anarchists. 
On the 22 Floreal (May, 1798) the invalidated elections 
were agreed upon."^”'
The Floreal^coup almost certainly initiated Jourdan's 
crisis of confidence in the regime. The proscribed deputies 
were opponents of the Directory rather than conspirators. 
Jourdan surely realized this fact and, as a firm proponent 
of constitutional rule, was revolted by it. Although he 
was reelected president of the "500" shortly afterwards, 
his determination to leave politics and resume his military 
career quite possibly originated with this incident.
Jourdan was most active as head of the military 
commission of the "500," a sub-committee involved with all 
problems related to the French army. Unfortunately, evidence 
for the actual workings of this committee is lacking.
However, we do know of the most important legislation that 
Jourdan dealt with. He proposed a bill suspending the
12. Ibid. Lefebvre, The Directory, pp. 380-81.
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appointment of any new staff officers or supply officials, 
the number of which had expanded from 8,000 to 25,000 over 
the preceding two years, gravely eating into the budget.
In the same bill he proposed that the number of officers 
per staff be fixed at a given level to prevent superfluous 
aides from being promoted. The bill appears to have been 
passed since there was no further discussion on the subject. 
He also supported the agitation for a severance bonus for all 
veterans upon their retirement from the army. The Directory 
had promised that such a bonus would be paid, but only when 
hostilities had definitely ceased. The left wanted the bonus 
paid immediately, since most retired veterans hailed from 
poor families and needed the money. Jourdan asserted that 
the bonus was not a "degrading salary" like the bounty then 
paid to volunteers, but a "just reward" for their good 
services. He further urged that the indigent families of 
dead or disabled soldiers receive some kind of pension.'*'3 
But it was in the promulgation of a comprehensive 
conscription law that Jourdan provided his most important 
service. Since the levee en masse in 179 3 the government 
had enacteci no legislation to provide the army with 
recruits nor had they bothered to draft additional 
men to replace those killed or crippled, or those who had
13. Valentin, op cit, pp. 159-60. Le Moniteur,
6 Thermicor, l'an VI (7/24/98).
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deserted. As a result the army had shrunk from over
1,000,000 men in 1794 to 454,000 in 1796, mostly due to
desertion, and declined even more following the Treaty of
Luneville in 1797. Most replacements were volunteers induced
to enlist for a bounty, and these were few enough. As the
diplomatic situation deteriorated in the summer of 1798,
the feebleness of the army became a subject of concern.
Jourdan's initial proposal for strengthening the military
was to establish an auxiliary army of 100,000 men, its soldiers
chosen from the citizenry by ballot. The Councils rejected
14
this on the grounds that it was "unequal."
Obviously some form of conscription was necessary, 
no matter how distasteful this was to many of the Thermidorians. 
The alternatives were either to reestablish a professional 
army of paid mercenaries or to resort to the levee en masse 
in times of national crisis. The first was impossible because 
it smacked of the recruiting gangs and tyranny of the 
monarchy;the second was unpopular because it had been a measure 
of the Terror. Yet the left believed that the Republic dared 
not attempt to get by with a skeleton army. As Jourdan 
argued when proposing his conscription bill, "the too 
voluminous history of warfare has taught us that treaties 
of peace ought to be considered only as truces ... It is said,
14. Lefebvre, ojd c it, p. 421.
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with reason, that to keep the peace it is necessary to be in 
a condition to make war. But if this maxim is applicable 
to all governments, it is even more applicable to a nation 
which has just overthrown the throne under which it has groaned 
for so many centuries." Only a powerful army could deter 
the monarchies of the rest of Europe from attempting to 
overturn the verdict of 1794.15
On July 20, 1798, Jourdan proposed a bill that would 
draft a contingent of young men into the army on a yearly 
basis. The justification for the conscription was that all 
Frenchmen capable of bearing arms were responsible for the 
defense of their nation. The Revolution had granted them 
liberty, equality and full citizenship, and it was their duty 
to serve as soldiers to protect it. Jourdan argued that the 
alternative was a professional army, and that both the Roman 
Empire and the French Monarchy had demonstrated the dangers 
of dividing society into separate military and civilian 
castes. Should national security be turned over to professionals, 
not only would the citizens be at the mercy of a contemporary 
praetorian guard, they also would become prey to effeteness 
and degeneracy. "The base greed for money will replace 
the noble passion for glory; self love, love of nation: riches 
will become more important than virtue; and the Nation, 
enervated by luxury, will be prey to every ravisher." Like
15. Le Moniteur, 2 Thermidor, 1 'an VI (7/20/98).
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most career soldiers Jourdan considered military service 
beneficial, a strengthener of character, an instiller of 
discipline in young men. A defender of one's country, 
a soldier of liberty, was a man to be respected and admired 
by family and relatives, neighbors and fellow citizens.
He instilled vigor into a society that might otherwise 
become soft and degenerate.
The provisions of Jourdan's conscription law 
declared that all able bodied French males between the ages 
of twenty and twenty-five, except those married before 
January 12, 1798, were subject to military service. They 
were to be registered according to their ages in five 
classes. The legislature would decide at a given time how 
many conscripts were required, and the Minister of War would 
then call the necessary number to the colors beginning with 
the youngest class —  those twenty years old. Jourdan argued 
that the youngest class should be called first because most 
would have completed their education or apprenticeships, 
but would not yet be involved with a family or career.
Besides men at that age were best suited to bear the physical
16. Ibid. At the end of his speech Jourdan romantically 
described the soldier-conscript returning home covered with 
glory, greeted by the tears of his family, the awe of his 
friends, and the respect of his fellow citizens as he recounted 
tales of his heroism. As a pure romantic Jourdan gave 
away nothing in spirit to men like Mickiewicz and Lamartine.
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hardships of wair. Each conscript was to serve five years, 
although chances were that he would not have to serve his 
fifth year. Each new class of men twenty years old was to 
replace those having finished their service. The municipal 
authorities of each arrondisement were to draw up draft lists 
of their citizens, while the war ministry compiled a master 
list, coordinated the other details of registration, and 
handled the actual call-up of the draftees. The conscripts 
were to be incorporated into veteran units as replacements —  
the amalgame perpetuated. Although volunteers were still 
to be accepted, Jourdan urged that the incentive bounty be 
done away with lest conscripts be tempted to enlist prior 
to receiving their draft notices in order to collect the 
bounty; volunteers should enlist out of patriotism, or 
out of a desire to pursue a military career. All draft 
evaders were to be treated as deserters, deprived of their 
civic rights, and subjected to arrest.'''7
In spite of the Thermidorians' commitment to normalcy, 
the bill met with surprisingly light opposition. Much of it 
was directed at the provisions of the bill depriving draft 
evaders of their civic rights which opponents claimed 
were unconstitutional. But when it was made clear that all 
accused draft evaders would face a trial, this objection was 
rejected. Opponents also objected to the provision which
17. Le Moniteur, 23 Fructidor, an V I .
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called the youngest class to the colors first and proposed 
in addition that anyone of draft age who had already seen 
military service be granted a complete exemption. Both of 
these were rejected also. It was also proposed that conscripts 
who had completed a certain amount of schooling be granted 
priority in gaining officer status, but instead a provision 
was added requiring that all officer candidates have a minimum 
of three years' experience in the ranks. The entire thrust 
of the law was to ensure that everyone of draft age, regardless 
of their social standing, serve in the army under equal 
conditions, and possibly the Thermidorians felt it impolitic 
to oppose this outright. After a little further debate the 
bill was made law on the 19th Fructidor (September 5, 1798).18
In spirit the bill seemed to accomplish all that its 
authors desired. But in its execution it possessed flaws —  
flaws for which Jourdan was partly responsible. When the 
government fixed the first draft at 200,000 men, it was 
discovered that the registration details left much to be 
desired. Permitting the local authorities to draw up the 
draft lists proved to be a mistake; these men placed local 
imperatives ahead of the national interest as usual and 
performed their tasks unsatisfactorily. Some localities 
refused outright to implement the conscription, and their
18. Ibid, 1 - 6  Fructidor, an VI (August 17-22, 1798).
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obstruction and negligence prevented the war ministry from
compiling an accurate national draft list. Furthermore,
no provisions had been made for determining those physically
unfit. Local ad hoc boards, composed of the fathers of many
of the conscripts, were hastily formed to give medical
examinations, and all too often fathers fraudulently declared
19their sons medically unfit to serve. But the worst problems 
arose, not from the shortcomings of the law, but from the 
inefficiency of the war bureaucracy. The latter took no 
measures to feed and equip the conscripts once they joined 
the army. Draftees lacked pay, provisions, uniforms and 
weapons. At Belfort, where the war ministry sent many of 
the recruits destined for the Rhineland, there were no 
officers to train them and no barracks or other facilities 
to house them. Jourdan, when he took command of the Rhine 
forces, had to incorporate them untrained into his veteran 
units. Even then the war ministry neglected to send the 
conscripts their pay or provisions for months afterwards. 
Disgusted by such colossal neglect, many draftees deserted 
almost as soon as they had joined their u n its.^
The result was that the conscripts did not flow 
into the army, but arrived in driblets. Of the 203,000 men
19. Lefebvre, o£ cit, p. 422. Albert Vandal,
L 1Avenement de Bonaparte (2 volumes, Paris, 1899), I, p. 49.
20. A. G. B2* 260, Jourdan to the Minister of War, 
11/19/98, 1/8/99.
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registered on the first lists, 60,000 were "found" unfit 
for duty. Only 97,000 men actually obeyed their call-up, and 
since these were marched to the front in isolated detachments, 
a practice which facilitated desertion, only 74,000 men actually 
joined their units. In December, when the government confidently 
expected the army to be augmented by 150,000 men, only 23,899 
had arrived. The Councils reacted predictably to this huge 
wastage: faced with such widespread disobedience, they 
blamed it on the harshness of the law rather than the slackness 
of its execution, and so they allowed those who did not want 
to serve the opportunity not to. They permitted reluctant 
draftees to find volunteers, or substitutes, to replace them. 
This, of course, mainly benefited the wealthy who could now 
escape the draft by hiring substitutes. These new provisions 
did not appreciably improve the situation, but, because Jourdan 
was then at the front, he could not object to these new
21
provisions which robbed his law of its spirit of equality.
Nonetheless, for all of its inadequacies, the Jourdan 
conscription law marked a watershed in military history.
It was the first modern draft law ever enacted; this fact 
alone explains its many rough edges. Its content and philosophy 
forshadowed the modern age, for the concept of obligatory 
military service for a nation's young men, so basic to the
21. Lefebvre, 0 £  cit, p. 422. Vandal, o£ cit., I, p. 49.
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mass armies of -the nineteenth and twentieth centuries, was 
first articulated in the Jourdan law. Indeed, the arguments 
which he used to defend the bill, that defense of one's 
country was the duty of every citizen, that a professional 
army allowed a nation’s manhood to go soft and thus was 
dangerous ’to liberty, and that young men were physically and 
mentally best suited to undergo the rigors of military duty, 
can be found in any modern brochure defending the men its of 
conscription. The French theory of the nation in arms 
originated here. The Jourdan law has remained the basis 
for French conscription to the present day, and if the law 
has changed in particulars over the years, the fundamental 
fact of compulsory military service has remained in effectf 
since 1872.22
Early in October, 1798, Jourdan resigned his chair 
as president of the "500" in order to assume command of the 
Army of Mayence. He resigned amidst general acclaim: in 
a laudatory farewell speech Lucien Bonaparte announced that 
the Council was losing "an estimable colleague."23 But 
if his political associates esteemed him, and most seemed 
to, Jourdan apparently did not esteem his associates. Thus,
22. For a discussion of the subsequent history of 
French Conscription, see Richard Challener, The French 
Theory of the Nation in Arms; 1866-1939 (Columbia, 1955).
23. Phipps, The Armies of the First French Republic, 
V, p. 24.
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he was willing to abandon prestige and comfort as a legislator 
for hardships and danger as the commander of a neglected 
and ill-equipped army. Like so many soldiers he felt enchained 
by the oratory, compromise, intrigue and hypocrisy of 
parliamentary politics, a feeling which the Floreal coup 
could not have ameliorated. Combat became more attractive 
than debate. The command in the Rhineland offered him the 
chance to escape the miasma of Directorial politics, and 
an opportunity to refurbish his military reputation, so 
tarnished by the debacle of 1796.
II. Stockach
The Army of Mayence was an occupation force of some
47,000 soldiers. Its troops were scattered in garrisons
up and down the Rhine Valley from Dusseldorf to Brisach,
some located as far west as Luxemburg where peasant unrest
was keeping them occupied. The army was totally incapable
of taking the field should hostilities break out. While
the men were comfortable enough quartered in German
villages, living at the expense of the inhabitants, they had
24
no logistics system to support them once they marched.
Jourdan's job was to put the army on a war footing.
To do this, he first had to provide it with a supply system.
24. A. G. B2* 260, see Jourdan's letters to the Minister 
of War of November, 179 8 to February, 1799 for the sorry 
condition of the Army of Mayence.
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He had to start virtually from scratch. He drew up plans for 
.supplying the soldiers when hostilities resumed and they took 
the field, assembled food reserves for a campaign, and 
>constructed magazines on both sides of the Rhine. He harrassed 
the war ministry until it took steps to train and provision 
some of the conscripts at least. He waged relentless war upon 
the peculation of the contractors. He was heartily sick 
of their graft and broken promises; if he still favored 
free enterprise, he distrusted its entrepreneurs. He accused 
the Bernard Company of having defaulted on a contract to 
supply the army with fodder. Of the horse contractors, the 
Victor Company had agreed to supply 4,800 horses and had 
delivered 3,213, the Schunk Company only 687 out of 1,220, and 
a third firm not a single horse. By January he was objecting 
to having private firms supply the army at all, a practice 
that always "turns entirely to the benefit of the contractors" 
who did not do their jobs.25
He proposed instead that the Directory adopt his 
suggested program of 1796, the program which Bonaparte 
employed in Italy with such success. The government should 
allow the army quartermaster to control all monetary contri­
butions, as well as all requisitioned subsistence and effects. 
The quartermaster, instead of sending the money to Paris where
25. A . G . B2* 260, Jourdan to the Minister of War, 
e.g., 11/13/98, 11/30/93, 12/1/98, 1/23/99.
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it disappeared, would use it to purchase the army's needs on 
the spot. Ke could place the requisitions in army magazines 
until hostilities resumed, at which point he could distribute 
the materiel directly to the soldiers. Jourdan lobbied for 
this solution ceaselessly, so ceaselessly that he must have 
ruffled some feathers in Paris. The Minister of War 
peevishly wrote that he should restrain his "solicitude" 
over the supply situation "within the proper boundaries."
Jourdan exploded. Had it not been for him, he angrily 
replied, the entire right bank of the Rhine would have been 
without a supply administration. He alone had insured 
that the Rhineland contributions entered the coffers of 
the Republic, rather than serving "to enrich the Companies
which are busier purchasing themselves --- wealth than
seeing to the needs of the army." If he had not overstepped 
his proper boundaries, nothing would have been done. This 
was hardly the diffident Jourdan of 179 3-94, but then 
this regime was not the Committee of Public Safety.^
The Directory based its strategy for the forthcoming 
campaign upon a memorandum submitted by Jourdan, evidently 
while he was head of the military committee in the "500."
Like all of his strategies, this one was simple, direct, 
unremarkable. He supposed that when hostilities resumed,
26. Ibid. See also his letter to the Minister of War 
of 1/12/99.
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Austria would be France's principal opponent. Austria probably 
would make her main thrusts in Italy and Switzerland, so to 
counter this, 40,000 Frenchmen should defend Switzerland, 
while 60,000 should garrison the peninsula of Italy. France 
in turn should make its main efforts with two armies of 80,000 
men each, one in Bavaria and one in northern Italy. These 
should advance, pinching the enemy between them as the latter 
invaded Switzerland, and eventually uniting in the area of 
Klagenfurt to march on Vienna. A further 40,000 men should 
cover the Rhine from Holland to Strasbourg. Jourdan considered 
this strategy entirely consistent with the means at the 
government's disposal. The Councils had voted funds for 
over 400,000 men and the conscription should furnish the 
necessary manpower. The Directory "only needed to profit 
from the resources which the corps legislatif put into its 
hands ... A great effort of genius was not necessary for 
such operations."2^
The key to this strategy was manpower. Jourdan believed 
that with superior manpower and battlefield performance, the 
French could simply overwhelm their foes, gathering momentum 
as they advanced as in 1794. He expected the government to 
provide the necessary manpower; he remarked to his officers 
that "if the Minister keeps his word, I shall be at Vienna."
27. Jourdan, Precis des operations ... , pp. 9-11.
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But Jourdan's trust in the government's promises was misplaced, 
perhaps naive. By February, 1799, he commanded 46,000 men, 
not 80,000. The other armies were no better off: the Army 
of Switzerland numbered but 30,000 men, the Army of Italy,
50.000. When Bernadotte took command of the "Army of
Observation" along the Rhine, he found not 40,000 men but 
28
8.000.
Nonetheless the Directory insisted that its armies 
assume the offensive. When it asked Jourdan for an offensive 
plan for his army, Jourdan replied that his army was so small 
that he could not suggest ond. He must instead wait and 
see what the enemy intended to do. He judged it impossible 
to act offensively and protect the Rhine Valley simultaneously 
as the Directory desired. The Directory responded by ordering^ 
him to advance as soon as the enemy crossed the neutrality 
line in Swabia; he could count on reinforcements in the near 
future. Jourdan replied that by the time he learned of the 
enemy advance, they would have several days' advantage over 
him. He urged that he be allowed to anticipate the beginning 
of hostilities, advance to the reverse slope of the Black 
Forest, and take up a strong position. "The surest method 
of fighting will be to hold the army concentrated in order 
to be able to send it successively against each portion of
28. Ibid, pp. 11-13. Phipps, o£ cit, V, pp. 21-25.
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the enemy forces, which will surely be divided into several 
corps ... " And then he noted that surely his orders assumed 
the presence of an army larger than the 46,000 men whom he 
then led.29
It was doubtful that the Directory so assumed. The 
alliances being formed by the members of the Second Coalition 
and the murder of two government plenipotentiaries at Rastadt 
by unknown assassins were stampeding it into a war that it 
was ill prepared to fight. The Directory should have 
negotiated, playing for time to strengthen its armies.
I n s t e p  it deceived its generals and forced them to open the 
campaign with insufficient forces. It did not make sure 
that the conscription was actually working, and kept 
valuable soldiers at home to "preserve law and order" during 
the elections, promising to send these men to Jourdan 
as soon as the elections were over. It swore that the Army 
of Observation numbered 47,000 men. Instead of beguiling 
the enemy, the Directory beguiled its own generals. Indeed 
Director Jean Reubell had the temerity to announce publicly 
that never had France put such grand forces into the field 
before; one wonders how he mouthed that lie with a straight 
face. His propaganda was so convincing that Jourdan's
29. A.G. B2* 260, Jourdan to the Minister of War, 
1/17/99, 2/17/99.
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friends in Paris were congratulating him on being able to 
open the campaign with 150,000 men I30
When the Directory ordered General Andre Massena to 
open hostilities in Switzerland, thereby forcing Jourdan to 
begin his own advance to conform with Massena's movement, 
Jourdan marched with a grand total of 38,26 3 soldiers.
"One can scarcely conceive," observed St. Cyr, then a 
divisional commander in Jourdan's army, "that the Directory ... 
would embark upon a campaign with means so inferior to 
those of the enemy." Jourdan's opponent, his old adversary 
the Archduke Karl, commanded 78,000 men. It is hard not to 
agree with St. C y r 's trenchant remark that "from the opening 
of the campaign, it was easy to foresee to outcome."'*'*'
Even so Jourdan bowed to the will of his cynical 
superiors and advanced. Certainly he could have resigned 
his command rather than face such long odds with so little
30. A.G. B2*262, Jourdan to the Directory, 3/5/99. 
Precis des operations ... , pp. 11-13. As usual it is im­
possible to ascertain where the fault lay for the incredible 
gap between anticipated and actual manpower. The Councils 
blamed the Directory; the Directory blamed the war minister, 
Scherer, who became something of a scapegoat for all the 
army's problems. It appears that while Scherer was partly 
responsible, he could not control the local obstruction
to the conscription —  or the Contractors.
31. Gouvion St. Cyr, Memoires (Paris, 1831; 4 volumes), 
I, pp. 99-101, 331. Karl also had 13,500 men facing 
Bernadotte's "army," 24,000 facing Massena, plus another
30,000 in southern Switzerland. The Archduke Karl, La 
Campagne de 1799 (Vienna, 1820; 2 volumes), I, pp. 140-42.
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support from his own government, or at the very least he 
could have stood fast in the Black Forest and left Massena 
to his own devices. But this was not his way; when his 
goverhment issued orders, he obeyed them. Moreover, there 
may have been other motives involved. It is suggested that 
Jourdan badly wanted to face the Archduke again in order to 
take revenge for his defeat in 1796. Edmund Dubois-Craned, 
Jourdan's colleague on the military commission in the "500," 
and then inspector-general of the army, claimed that Jourdan 
was eager to begin regardless of Karl's superior numbers.
"You will be beaten," Dubois warned, "you will not be long 
in returning to Strasbourg, crestfallen, after having cracked 
your whip so much, having sacrificed yourself by your 
obstinacy." Evidently Jourdan burned to redeem his reputation 
so much that he was willing to compromise his usual prudence. 
Even so, how Jourdan was to ignore direct orders to advance, 
Dubois-Craned did not say.32
On March 5, Jourdan crossed the Rhine and marched 
to take up a strong position in the Black Forest. Contrary 
to Dubois-Craned's fears, this was only a precautionary step. 
With war imminent, Jourdan wanted his army concentrated in 
as advantageous a position as possible. It was here that he 
learned of Massena's advance. Officially he exercised authority
32. Phipps, o£ cit, V, pp. 30-1.
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over both Massena and Bernadotte. Although their forces 
were separate, the Directory had told him to consider them 
"as two great wings of your army ... the Directory will suffer 
no disobedience to your orders from one or the other."
In reality the government was acting with as much bad faith 
in this as in everything else. The Minister of War simultaneously 
assured Massena that he was absolutely independent of Jourdan, 
but must appear deferential to him in order to please the 
Directory. It was in vain that Jourdan complained of Massena's 
refusal either to communicate with him or to follow orders 
without a corresponding directive from the government.
So when the Directory ordered Massena to advance, Jourdan 
was powerless to force him to stand fast. Instead, in 
order to prevent the Austrians from throwing superior 
force's against Massena, "I thought that I indeed should 
act," and march to his support.^
Jourdan's army, now styled the Army of the Danube, 
marched southeast towards the headwaters of the Danube.
He ordered Bernadotte to besiege Phillipsburg with the Army 
of Observation. Bernadotte protested that he had no 
soldiers, which was true, but the Directory had assured 
Jourdan that Bernadotte was being reinforced, which was 
false. An exchange of nasty letters succeeded only in 
irritating the two generals; it did not lead to Phillipsburg's
33. A.G. B2* 262, Jourdan to the Directory, 3/1/99, 
3/8/99, 3/12/99.
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investment. As Jourdan crossed the Danube, he proceeded more 
cautiously. He was now in the wooded, hilly country between 
the Danube and Lake Constance where it was difficult to 
obtain information. But with Massena operating on the other 
side of the lake, Jourdan was obliged to take this route if 
he wished to support him. He did not know that he was on 
a collision course with Karl's army. The Archduke's spy 
service in southwest Germany had kept him informed of every 
move that Jourdan had made since he crossed the Rhine.
Karl left Bavaria, crossing the Lech on March 9, and took 
the shortest route towards Jourdan's advance. He desired 
a battle. He wanted to make.use of his numerical
superiority to defeat Jourdan before Jourdan could unite with
34Massena.
Jourdan marched with his army in a diamond-shaped 
formation: Lefebvre with the advanced guard at the point,
Ferino and St. Cyr's divisions on either wing, Souham's 
division and d'Hautpoul's cavalry in the rear within supporting 
distance of any point on the diamond. As an added precaution, 
he detached Vandairmc with a mixed force of 3,500 men north of 
the Danube to guard against any attempt by the enemy to turn 
the army from that direction. Each division was expected 
to sustain an enemy attack long enough for the others to come
34. St. Cyr, 0 £  c it, I, pp. 114-18. The Archduke Karl, 
op cit, I, pp. 140-42.
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
410
to its aid. The diamond probably extended over too great
a distance, but as usual Jourdan judged being overlapped and
enveloped by the Austrians' superior numbers as the greater
evil. Jourdan's diamond wa s r'nothing less than a preview 
1
of Napoleon's much acclaimed • "battalion carre!" ^
On March 20, Jourdan encountered the Archduke near the 
village of Ostrach. So confused was the Directory's 
diplomacy that only then did hostilities officially begin 
between France and Austria. Lefebvre's division was deployed 
around Ostrach in depth: his first line positioned in the village 
and along a stream, a second line in the woods and on the 
hills behind the village, and a battery covering the road 
exiting from Ostrach. St. Cyr and Ferino were similarly 
deployed on the left and right, with Souham and d'Hautpoul 
in reserve. Jourdan was awaiting events; Karl intended to 
attack. He sent a force of eleven battalions and twenty 
squadrons to keep St. Cyr busy, while he deployed two 
massive columns totaling thirty-seven battalions and ninety- 
two squadrons to crush Jourdan's center at Ostrach. He had 
a four to one superiority over Lefebvre.36
35. A.G. itir 367, J. R. Jourdan, Journal de 1 'ouverture 
de la Campagne de 1'an V I I . '.Henri Jomini acclaimed the 
battalion carre as one of the keys to Napoleon's amazing 
military success. What are we to conclude: that Jourdan, by 
anticipating this formation, placed himself at a level of 
strategic ability with Napoleon —  or that the battalion carre* 
was not the military breakthrough that Jomini and others 
believed?
36. St. Cyr, Memoires, I,1 pp. 118-124. The Archduke 
Karl, 0 £  cit, I, pp. 150-58.
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At two a.m. on March 21 Karl set his army in motion.
Twelve thousand soldiers under his best general, Nauendorf,
began the attack by assaulting Ostrach. The French fought
back amidst a violent rainstorm with high easterly winds
that blew the gunsmoke back into the faces of the defenders.
But if the French could not see, the Austrians could not
generate any momentum in the pouring rain. Lefebvre hung
on grimly, losing and retaking Ostrach several times. Karl
fed more and more men into the fray, but this produced
little effect other than to congest the battlefield. Jourdan
and Lefebvre fought in the front lines. In Jourdan's
case this was as much to discern the enemy's movements as
to encourage his men,- the visibility being so poor that
he could not see how overwhelming were the odds he was facing.
Consequently he only reinforced Lefebvre with one demi-
37brigade from Souham's division.
But when the storm abated at noon, the weakness of his 
French position became clear. The Austrians were seeping 
into the gaps between Lefebvre, aud St. Cyrand Ferino on 
either wing. Their superior numbers finally drove the 
French out of Ostrach, in spite of a vicious counterattack 
led by Soult that temporarily halted them. Lefebvre was 
shot through the arm and had to leave the field. Jourdan
37. A.G. mr 367, Journal de 1799. Phipps, op cit, 
V, pp. 36-38.
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was violently thrown to the ground when his horse was 
killed under him; he recalled later with great pleasure that 
his men expressed joy and relief when he got to his feet 
unhurt. On the left St. Cyr initiated local attacks as soon 
as he heard the roar of the fighting at Ostrach. These 
drew some of the enemy towards him, but by mid-afternoon 
he too had his hands full. Jourdan had no option but to 
order a retreat. Lefebvre's men, now under Soult, fought 
their way out, losing many killed and wounded, but few 
prisoners. By nightfall the army had escaped the Archduke's 
clutches.38
For the Austrians Ostrach was a tactical success
but a strategic setback. The Archduke had set out to
destroy his smaller adversary; he succeeded only in driving
him back. The French lost 2,200 men, but the Austrians
39
lost 3,000 and had little to show for their efforts.
Jourdan did not retreat far. He fell back to a line 
running from the shore of Lake Constance through Engen to 
Emmingen-ob-Eck on his left. He made good his losses by 
recalling Vandamme from north of the Danube. Karl followed, 
but cautiously, being puzzled by the vigorous resistance of 
the French and the quickness of their movements. He desired
38. Ibid. St. Cyr, o£ cit, I, pp. 118-24.
39. Phipps, ibid, pp. 36-38.
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to move around their southern flank and cut Jourdan off from
Massena in Switzerland, but he was afraid to attempt this
until he was sure of Jourdan's dispositions. When his
advanced guard came off second best in a series of skirmishes
with St. Cyr's division on the 24th, he became even more
cautious. He halted his army near the village of Stockach
and ordered reconnaissances in all directions. His position
was poorly chosen. Stockach was situated on low ground
dominated by hills to the west, and Karl's flanks rested on
relatively flat terrain where thick woods left his troops
without clear fields of fire. Only two roads crossed the
marshy stream which flowed through a ravine behind the army.
The Austrians thus had a tenuous escape route in case of
defeat. Clearly Karl did not expect to fight a defensive
40
action on this difficult battlefield.
But Jourdan intended differently. Unquestionably 
he still hoped to devise some way to halt the Austrian 
advance. One source described him as being in a state of 
high excitement during these difficult days, refusing to eat, 
constantly on the move to check every detail personally.
And at some point on March 24 he decided to throw caution 
to the winds and hurl his 38,000 men against Karl's
78,000 men.
40. St. Cyr, op cit, I, pp. 133-34. The Archduke Karl, 
op cit, I, pp. 173-79.
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The decision is surprising. The planned attack 
involved high risk totally inconsistent with his usual 
prudence. It also, at first glance, seemed unnecessary. 
Jourdan could have harrassed Karl indefinitely, hanging on 
his flank and bothering him with small actions while he waited 
for the Directory to provide him with reinforcements. If 
the Directory did not, he had still done his duty. One 
impetus to attack came from St. Cyr, who reported that 
he believed Karl to be shifting troops to Switzerland while 
Jourdan remained inactive. "I believe ... that we are dupes 
to the movements of the enemy. I am convinced that we have 
encountered only a body of troops which has advanced to mask 
a movement towards Switzerland." St. Cyr then urged Jourdan 
to return to the attack to defeat at least a portion of 
Karl's army, and force him to halt his movement. A second 
incentive came from Massena. Long mute, he broke his 
silence on March 2 3 to complain that Jourdan's withdrawal 
after Ostrach left him facing +-be entire Austrian army, 
including the Archduke. "If you have not been able to resist 
this last, how can I do so?" These two letters apparently 
convinced Jourdan that for the moment the Archduke had 
transferred his attentions from Jourdan Lo Massena. To 
save Massena from being overwhelmed, he felt compelled 
to attack. Unfortunately both St. Cyr and Massena had 
totally misread Karl's intentions; Karl's entire army was
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41
still directed against Jourdan1s.
Jourdan planned his attack under the mistaken impression 
that he would be assailing an army reduced in numbers.
From the wording of his orders, he evidently expected the enemy 
force remaining before him to continue a slow advance westward. 
He ordered a concentric advance upon Stockach: Souham from 
Engen, and Soult from Emmingen "will continually annoy the 
enemy ... until the enemy will be forced to retire by the 
movements which will be executed by the two wings of the 
army." The two wings were to be Ferino on the right and 
St. Cyr, reinforced by Vandamme, on the left. Jourdan thus 
planned to overwhelm whatever was in front of him by his 
favorite tactic; as it turned out he was facing the entire 
Austrian army. It was a bold, even reckless strategy, 
given the limited information at his disposal; yet within 
limits it could wreak havoc upon an unsuspecting enemy.
It was a strategy which, if successful, made its general 
a genius; if unsuccessful, damned him as a fool.^2
41. St. Cyr to Jourdan, 3/22/99, St. Cyr, Memoires, I 
pp. 318-19. A.G. mr 367, Journal de 1799. Phipps, op cit,
V, p. 81.
42. Jourdan to St. Cyr, 3/24/99, St. Cyr, ibid, pp. 
320-21. A.G. mr 367, Journal de 1799. Jourdan was silent as. 
to his reasons for these dispositions. Nonetheless, 
considering his past record, it is inconceivable that
he premeditatedly set out to double-envelop an army twice 
his size. See also A.G. mr 608-6,
Soult's official report (n.d.).
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For the- first few hours of March 25, Jourdan was a 
genius. His attack caught the Austrians completely unawares, 
especially their right flank under Meerfeld. Soult drove 
Meerfeld's troops back towards Liptingen while St. Cyi and 
Vandamme began to envelop his flank; Meerfeld hastily tried 
to organize a defense around Liptingen, but the French moved 
too swiftly for him. Vandamme, with a series of cavalry 
charges, broke one flank, Soult drove in the other, and 
suddenly the Austrians fell apart. Of Meerfeld's 14,000 men,
4,000 remained on the field, most prisoners; the rest streamed 
back towards Stockach in wild rout. So feebly had they 
resisted that St. Cyr believed that Meerfeld had neglected 
to put his men into a state of defense. Jourdan enthusiastically 
pushed the attack forward; when the enemy attempted to make 
a stand in the woods south of Liptingen, the French threw 
them back again. Souham's and Ferino's attack had not gone 
as well, but by ten a.m. they had broken the enemy 
reconnaissance force on the Engen road and forced it to 
retreat.43
The attack had exceeded all expectations; Jourdan 
was within an ace of inflicting a smashing tactical defeat 
upon Karl's larger army. Unfortunately with victory within 
his grasp, Jourdan proceeded to fumble the battle back to
43. A.G. mr 608-6, Official reports of Generals Soult, 
Souham and Ferino, n.d.’, St. Cyr, op cit, I, pp. 139-44.
The Archduke Karl, o£ cit, I, pp. 184-85.
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the Archduke.
The sight of thousands of enemy soldiers fleeing in 
disorder, tumbling into the ravine pursued by French cavalry 
while thousands more laid down their weapons, destroyed 
Jourdan's equilibrium, whetting his appetite for greater 
triumphs. He could have been content with the complete 
defeat of the Austrian right flank; instead he attempted to 
destroy the entire enemy army. As Meerfeld's remnants fled 
towards Stockach, Jourdan ordered St. Cyr to make a long 
flank march around the enemy right to his rear and his 
tenuous line of retreat, while Soult pursued Meerfeld 
alone. If St. Cyr could cut the roads behind Karl's army 
while most of it was still around Stockach, the Austrians 
would be caught in the tangled woods and marshes along 
the shore of Lake Constance, without adequate roads on 
which to maneuver or retreat, their numbers compromised by 
nature. Jourdan later admitted that this maneuver would 
seem "rash" to military men; however it was the only way 
he believed that he could convert a partial triumph into a 
complete victory that would reverse the course of the campaign. 
One wonders if he would have tried it had he known that 
Karl's entire army was before him. The maneuver was too 
rash, too ambitious. St. Cyr had too far to march and too 
few troops to disrupt the retreat of an entire army. Nor 
had Karl determined on a retreat; he was organizing resistance 
around Stockach. St. Cyr protested that Jourdan was attempting
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too much, but Jourdan remained adamant and ordered the 
4 4fatal movement to begin.
Meanwhile Soult was encountering stiffening resistance 
on a wooded farm north of Stockach. Karl was shifting 
troops from his right and center to his left, and was 
rapidly constructing a new line of defense. Soult met the 
Austrian grenadiers under Wallis. He repulsed their first 
counterattack, and then attacked three times himself; on 
each occasion the ever-increasing numbers of the enemy 
repulsed him in savage fighting and finally began to force 
him back step by step. Jourdan waited for his other 
divisions to make their presence felt, but Ferino launched 
only two half-hearted attacks to the west of Stockach, and 
St. Cyr was still en route to the enemy r e a r . ^
As Soult was slowly overpowered, Jourdan saw the 
battle swing against him. Tra recalled Vandamme's small 
force and a demi-brigade of St. Cyr, but the Austrians
checked their advance on the far side of the ravine.
As a last resort Jourdan ordered d'Hautpoul with the cavalry 
to halt the enemy with a charge. Apparently d'liautpoul
bungled the job. He aligned his troopers in front of his
own artillery, masking its fire as well as the fire of
44. Jourdan, Precis des operations ... , p. 61. St.
Cyr, op cit, I, pp. 146-48.
45. Ibid. Ferino's most distinguished moment came in 
1796 when, as one of Moreau's generals he allowed his division 
to be surprised by the enemy — i while he had a friendly 
luncheon with the enemy commander!
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Soult's infantry which had rallied momentarily near Liptingen. 
When he charged, he charged late. The Austrian cavalry, 
always the elite of their forces, defeated d'Hautpoul after 
a violent struggle and drove him from the field. Vainly 
Jourdan threw himself into the melee, trying to arrest the 
retreat by sheer energy and exertion, but his army fell 
back, overwhelmed by superior numbers. Always fighting, 
the French retreated towards Tuttlingen and the Danube. St. 
Cyr, belatedly recalled from his fruitless march, arrived 
in time to cover the retreat.4(5
Jourdan's performance at Stockach was a paradox.
He inflicted 6,000 casualties on a vastly superior force 
at the cost of only 3,600 of his own, and he very nearly 
destroyed an entire wing of the enemy army. Yet he had 
thrown away his triumph by recklessly attempting to destroy 
Karl's whole army. He vacillated between inspired generalship 
at one moment, rash generalship the next. In some ways 
he was twice the strategist in 1799 that he was in 1793, or 
even 1794. His plan for throwing his small army upon the 
Austrians as they advanced and defeating them in detail 
was both sound and intelligent; had the Directory agreed 
to it, the campaign might have progressed quite differently. 
His tactics demonstrated a new daring and aggressiveness that 
were missing before. His resistance at Ostrach and his attack
46. A.G. mr 367, Journal de 1799. A.G. mr 608-6, 
Soult's official report. The Archduke Karl, op cit, I, 
pp. 180-91.
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at Stockach were the operations of a great general, but his 
rash decision to send St. Cyr on his long flank inarch was 
the decision of a poor one. But his most critical mistakes 
did not arise out of tactical miscalculations; they arose 
out of his determination to be the dutiful general. He 
could have evaded the Directory's instructions; instead he 
obeyed orders and advanced. He could have let Massena 
escape his difficulties as best he could but advanced to 
his aid and was beaten. Had he possessed a more selfish, 
insubordinate attitude, he might never have suffered defeat.
The rest of Jourdan's short tenure with the Army 
of the Danube can be briefly summarized. He retreated to 
the Black Forest where he took up a defensive position.
He did not attempt to join Massena because he hoped to draw 
Karl away from Switzerland by operating on his northern 
flank and because there was not enough subsistence in Switzerland 
to support both armies. Also, he must have wished to avoid the 
personal conflict that a junction with Massena would have 
involved. The Austrians pursued halfheartedly. While 
awaiting the Austrians in the Black Forest, Jourdan's health 
broke down completely. He retired to Strasbourg to recuperate, 
leaving the army in charge of Ernouf, a poor choice because 
Ernouf, although a loyal, efficient staff officer, was 
utterly incapable of commanding the army on his own. When 
the enemy made a local penetration in the French lines,
Ernouf mishandled the situation, panicked, and then retreated
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across the Rhine. This unnecessary retreat made Stockach
seem more damaging than it really was. The Directory relieved
Jourdan of his command on account of his "health," replacing
him with Massena. Although it suspected that he had lost
the confidence of the army, his departure in fact caused
an angry uproar among his soldiers. "He was ardently
missed. They [the troops] knew his great experience, his
objection to excesses, his extreme solicitude for the needs
of his men, and his love of order and discipline." They
also knew, as the Directory did not, that they had not been
defeated so much as they had yielded to superior numbers.
The uproar was not confined to the ranks. Bernadotte, Souham,
47
and St. Cyr all resigned rather than serve under Massena.
Jourdan returned to Paris to reoccupy his seat in 
the "500." The Councils had received the news of his setback 
calmly, for they well knew that he had been assigned a nearly 
impossible task —  besides, Massena and Scherer had also 
been defeated. The Directors blamed the defeat on "General 
Crawfish," as they named Jourdan; the Councils blamed it 
on the Directory. As for General Crawfish, he returned to 
politics with a mission: to rid the government of the
47. Phipps, o£ cit, V. pp. 57-61. St. Cyr, 0 £  cit, I, 
pp. 162-6 3. The quote is St. Cyr's . Such praise, coming 
as it did from the sharpest military critic in the 
Napoleonic Army, was high praise indeed.
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corrupt, negligent politicians who had been responsible
for his downfall. Henceforth he was no longer a loyal,
respectable Republican, but a convinced, bitter member 
48
of the opposition.
III. Towards Brumaire; The Failure Of The Jacobins
Jourdan rejoined the ranks of the Republican left 
upon his return to the Council of "500." He now became, 
in the eyes cf the moderates, one of the diverse collection 
of "demagogues, semi-anarchists, unreconstructed terrorists, 
discontented generals, and ambitious politicians" whom the 
moderates believed comprised the Neo-Jacobin faction. The 
Neo-Jacobins' membership may have been as diverse —  and 
tainted in part —  as their opponents alleged. Nevertheless 
all now shared a similar goal: the overthrow of the Directory 
and the Directorial party within the legislature. This 
community of purpose had welded them together into the 
beginnings of an opposition party. As the government 
had followed blunder with blunder and scandal with scandal, 
the Neo-Jacobins had increased their strength; in the elections 
of the First Prarial (May 19, 1799) they had campaigned
48. So outraged was Jourdan by the government's 
treatment of him that in his Precis des Operations, which he 
wrote in 1800, he went so far as to accuse his political 
enemies of deliberately sabotaging his campaign in order 
to ruin him personally, pp. 27-30.
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as defenders of liberty against the tyranny of the Directory 
and had won an increased number of seats.49
Jourdan became a convinced member of the opposition 
because he was "revolted by the incapacity of the Directory 
and the vexations and peculations of its agents." The 
survival of such a government, he felt, would be more than 
a guarantee of additional problems for the French nation; it 
would be a moral outrage. "What idea can [sic] one have of 
the patriotism, the morality, and the conscience of rulers 
capable of such combinations? Such abominable conceptions 
would have indeed escaped the liberty-killing genius of 
Machiavelli." Thus the overthrow of the Directory became 
a matter of patriotic necessity. "I shared the opinion of 
those who thought it necessary to drive away the men 
without talent and without morality and to carry out some 
modification of the Constitution of the Year III." Like 
his fellow Jacobins Jourdan wished to replace the greed, 
negligence, and "turpitude" of the Directory with a 
government both "violent and honest," a regime which, instead 
of supporting itself upon the profiteers and thieves within 
the bureaucracy, would wage merciless war upon t h e m . ^
The maneuvering and intrigue to this end began 
almost as soon as Jourdan resumed his seat in the "500."
49. Albert Vandal, L 1Avenement. de Bonaparte, I, pp. 70-75.
50. Ibid. Jourdan, Precis des Operations ... ,
pp. 12-13. Jourdan, Notice sur» le 18^  Brumaire, pp. 161-62.
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The Neo-Jacobins were not the only politicians interested 
in ousting the Directory, or at the very least in capturing 
it for their own ends. A growing faction of the tougher 
minded Thermidorians was coalescing around the Abbe^Joseph 
Siey^s, newly elected to the Directory to replace the 
departed Reubell. These men formed a kind of "party of 
order," opposed both to the ineptness and weakness of the 
Directory and to the demagoguery and "anarchism" of the left. 
To carry out his designs, Siey^s believed that he needed 
the support of the army and to win this support he had to 
capture the allegiance of one or more of its leaders. As 
one of the most influential generals in the army, Jourdan was 
one of Sieyes's prospects as a possible "sword" for his 
faction. Jourdan, Bernadotte, and General Barthelmy Joubert, 
late of the Army of Italy, had been charged with the task of 
drawing up a situation report on the French Army. When the 
three men met with Siey^s to discuss the report, in the 
course of the conversation Siey^s obliquely suggested a 
coup d'etat. Everyone recognized that the Constitution did 
not meet the present needs of France, he argued; why should 
they not work together to change it. But Jourdan and 
Bernadotte did not rise to the bait. Sieyes was quite vague 
on the type of government that would replace the Directory. 
Besides, they distrusted Sieyes's republicanism and with 
good reason; he was not a republican, but an ambitious
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opportunist hungry for power. They pretended not to 
understand his proposa!. Joubert alone was won over to 
his side.51
Oddly enough, Jourdan placed his hopes for an ally 
on the Directory itself upon Barras. It is strange that 
Jourdan still retained illusions about him; perhaps when 
compared to bitter personal enemies like La Revelliere-Lepeaux 
and Reubell, Barras appeared respectable. In any case,
Jourdan requested Barras's help in saving the "fatherland" 
in a private letter dated 1_3 Prarial. "If I have been 
mistaken as to your character and patriotism, I shall 
certainly be a victim of my zeal and confidence."52
The letter is an excellent capsule of Jourdan's 
views and motivation during this period. He began by 
describing the problem: a republic in decay with defeated armies, 
corrupt officials, unenforced laws, a renewal of royalist 
agitation, incivique citizens —  "all Frenchmen are groaning 
under the burden of oppression." Causing these problems 
was the "Directorial" faction, "composed of men who, lacking 
both character and loftiness of soul, would willingly bow
51. Vandal, ibid, I, pp. 94-95. Jourdan, Notice sur
le L8 Brumaire, pp. 161-62. Sieyes was in touch with various • 
emigres and other foes of the Republic including the Prussian 
government during this time. Barras was not the only Director 
whose conduct bordered on the treasonous.
52. Barras, Memoires, III, pp.. 405-410 .
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their heads under a despotic power provided such power 
gave them offices ... " The goal of this faction was to gain 
dictatorial power for itself. If such a measure would save 
France, Jourdan would support it. Yet such a measure would 
not save France, but substitute despotism for representative 
government, and history had shown that the former did not 
work. "The more authority has been limited to a few, the 
more has the public spirit been weakened, and the more have 
the means of action decreased." The government was made by 
the people for the people; now the people were in the process 
of losing control of their government. However, there existed 
another faction, the "Republican" faction, composed of men 
dedicated to reinvigorating representative government and 
reviving public spirit. It sought "to kindle in the people 
an enthusiasm whereby they will make great sacrifices to 
repair past mistakes." It desired to unify all republicans in 
a common program and make the Republic "one of men and not of 
words." Barras, Jourdan concluded, must unite with the 
latter faction, make his influence felt among the uncommitted 
and the wavering, and help lift it to power. If he did not, 
he would be counted among the ranks of the Directorials.
"Save the Fatherland," Jourdan urged, "it is within your 
power to do so."53
53. Ibid.
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This letter again demonstrated Jourdan's 
fundamental belief that representative government and strong, 
energetic rule were far from incompatible; a democratic 
society could be both free and disciplined at the same time.
His antidote for France's malaise was a national revival 
of energy, self-sacrifice, and if necessary, ruthlessness.
He desired a temporary suspension of business as usual in 
favor of national mobilization and discipline to meet the 
nation's crisis. In short, he proposed a mild revival of 
the Terror. If his program lacked sophistication, if he 
saw the problem in terms of the corrupt Directorial forces 
of evil opposing the patriotic republican forces of good, 
and if his suggested antidote of controlled Terror was 
"worn out," as Barras later argued, his assessment of the 
turpitude and moral bankruptcy of the Thermidorian establishment 
was accurate. The basic weakness in his, and indeed his 
fellow Jacobins', program was its commitment to a constitutional 
struggle. The Neo-Jacobins sought unconstitutional ends: 
the overthrow of the Directory and their Machiavellian 
allies, yet planned to achieve them within the boundaries of 
legality. The Directorials were not to be so finicky. In 
promising to play by the rules, the Jacobins sowed the 
seeds of their eventual defeat.
Jourdan of course was mistaken about Barras's 
character and patriotism; Barras was the most directorial
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of the Directorials. He remained uncommitted. The Jacobins 
therefore began their offensive without him. During the 
last week of Prarial, as the military situation further 
deteriorated and the Directory's credibility declined, they 
began to criticize the Directors: Treilhard for having been 
elected to the Directory illegally and Merlin (de Douay) 
and La Revelliere-Lepeaux for having publicly lied about 
the number of soldiers actually under arms. They were 
joined in their criticism by Sieyes's faction which, for its 
own reasons, also wanted the Directory purged. On the 28th 
Prarial (June 16), various deputies called for the resignations 
of the three. When they refused, the "500" declared itself 
in permanent session until the impasse was resolved.
On the motion of Boulay (de la Meurthe) it also established 
a committee of eleven deputies to take the place of the 
assembled committees and handle whatever "diverse propositions" 
that the situation might require.
The Committee of Eleven has been all to little 
studied. Apparently it was a kind of steering committee 
aimed at ramming through necessary legislation over 
Directorial opposition. Its charge to handle all "diverse 
propositions" attested to its flexibility, and its task
54. Le Moniteur, 1 Messidor, an V I I . Vandal, o£ cit, I, 
pp. 80-97. Lefebvre, The Directory, pp. 435-42.
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of ending all illegal and unconstitutional acts by the
executive attested to its purpose. However its exact
responsibilities are hard to establish. From its dominant
role in the passage of legislation over the next two months,
its creators may have intended it as a kind of quasi-executive
within the "500" —  the ghost of the Committee of Public
Safety. Certainly the charge to block all illegality on the
part of the Directory indicates that the Jacobins intended it
55
to usurp some of the Directory’s executive authority.
Jourdan was one of the first deputies selected to 
this committee. Joining him from the ranks of the left 
were Talot, Joubert (the former commissioner) and Quirot. 
Representing Sieyes's faction were Boulay, Lucien Bonaparte, 
and Francois de Nantes. Also selected were Bergoing, a 
moderate of uncertain leanings, and Petiet, Jourdan's 
former quartermaster who evidently leaned towards Siey^s. 
Because the committee seemed to be weighted in favor of 
the party of order, Jourdan proposed that two more men be 
added to it: Poulain-Grandprey and General Augereau,
both sympathetic to the Jacobins. From the outset Jourdan 
and Lucien Bonaparte were the respective spokesmen for the 
two groups. This was a contest in which Jourdan was at a 
disadvantage; his prestige and honesty were overmatched
55. Le Moniteur, 2 Messidor, ari V I I . Vandal, ibid. 
Lefebvre, ibid. Unfortunately Jourdan was silent on his 
work as a member of the Committee of Bleven in his Notice.
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by Lucien's skillful oratory. The Committee of Eleven thus 
possessed a nearly equal balance between moderates and 
Jacobins, and in this lay its weakness. Its purpose was to 
establish swift, energetic government, but its equally 
balanced rival factions produced dissension which later made 
vigorous action impossible.^
Initially, however, uhe two groups were able to 
cooperate. They were the driving force behind what has been 
called the coup of the 30th Prarial (June 18, 1799). The 
coup purged the Directory of La Revelliere-Lepeaux, Merlin, 
and Treilhard, all of whom resigned under pressure. The 
Councils replaced them with two leftist nonentities —
Louis Gohier and General Moulins —  and an equally 
undistinguished Sieyes client —  Roger Ducos. The coup 
also rid the ministries of careerists like Ramel and 
Talleyrand and replaced them with men who approached their 
jobs with a more forceful and ruthless attitude. Bernadotte 
took over the war ministry, Nicholas Quinette the interior, 
and General Antoine Marbot the important Paris military 
district. Completing the left's domination of the ministries 
as Minister of Finance was a name from the great Committee —  
Robert Lindet. These men were specifically selected to root 
out the corruption and untangle the red tape and confused
56. Histoire Parliamentaire, XXXVIII, pp. 66-7. Albert 
Ollivier, Le Dix-Huit Brumaire (Paris, 1959), p. 119.
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lines of authority ruining the bureaucracy. The predominantly 
leftist flavor of these appointees indicated that for the moment 
the Jacobins held the ascendency both in the "500" and on 
the Committee of Eleven.57
Jourdan's exact role in the coup and the resulting 
Jacobin resurgence is unclear. There were no specific leaders 
in the faction; as in 179 3 the Jacobins operated collectively.
It seems clear that he was one of the dominant figures, 
being the Jacobins' most frequent spokesman in the "500."
However this does not mean that he was the dominant figure 
behind their political program; certainly he never so claimed 
in his memoires . Doubtlessly the Jacobins assembled their 
platform as a team in the Montagnard tradition. If Jourdan 
masterminded the military legislation, the political and 
financial planks were the work of other veteran Jacobin 
leaders.
Over the course of the next month the Committee 
of Eleven initiated its program for saving the Republic from 
the internal and external threats that menaced it. On 
June 27, Jourdan proposed, on behalf of the Committee, that a 
forced loan of one hundred million francs be levied, especially 
upon the rich. This measure would at once help finance 
the war and limit the extreme wealth among the newly rich
57. Vandal, 0 £  cit, I, pp. 97-110. Lefebvre, op cit, 
pp. 435-42.
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which the left detested. Later the Committee proposed that 
the government be empowered to take hostages from the 
families of aristocrats or emiqres in those departments 
troubled by royalist agitation. It also proposed to proh bit 
any deputy from becoming a Director until a year after his 
legislative term had expired and to allow the political 
clubs to reopen and operate freely. Jourdan defended these 
motions by arguing that while the dangers were great,
France's resources were immense. "It is necessary to deploy 
them, it is necessary that the French people recapture that 
fiery attitude which made liberty respected; Republicans must 
reunite everywhere and oppose the brigands with a sacred 
battalion which will put them to flight: the youth of France 
must arm itself and fly to the combat; citizens whose property 
is menaced must pay from their savings." All of these 
motions became laws over the course of the summer.^
The deteriorating military situation was the major 
caxise of the crisis and the major factor in bringing the 
Jacobins to power. Therefore, it was essential that they 
reorganize and reinvigorate the army. Here Jourdan's 
influence was evident. He initially believed that no new
58. Histoire Parliamentaire, XXXVITI, pp. 67-8, 79. 
Lefebvre, ibid. The law of hostages was aimed at halting the 
depredations of gangs of royalists who were terrorizing 
parts of southern France. These were the "brigands" whom 
Jourdan referred to in his speech.
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levy of recruits would be needed to reinforce the army and
that the strict enforcement of the existing conscription
laws was sufficient to raise the number of soldiers to
500,000. However, he soon changed his mind. On June 27,
he proposed that all five classes of those men then eligible
for the draft be called up at once. No replacements were
allowed, and all leaves were to be reviewed and most cancelled.
This was a revival of the famous levee of 179 3. He also
proposed the creation of an auxiliary army of 100,000 men
whose purpose was both to insure internal tranquility and to
provide reinforcements into the field forces. He treated
the problem of desertion with a mixture of honey and vinegar.
All current deserters were to be pardoned if they rejoined
their units within twenty days, alternatively they could
join the auxiliary army where it was easier to feed and clothe
them than at the front; at the same time all future deserters
were to be executed. The following month he caused the
national guard to be augmented. In conjunction with Bernadotte
he secured the release of their old colleague, Championnet,
from prison, where he had been confined for exceeding his
authority in Naple by turning that kingdom into a republic.
They gave him command of the Army of the Alps, and appointed
59
Sieyes's protege, Joubert, commander of the Army of Italy.
59. Le Moniteur, 7-15 Messidor, an VII. Lefebvre, ibid. 
Louis Gohier, Memoires (Paris, 1824; 2 volumes), I, pp. 80-110.
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Most historians either have agreed with Barras that 
the Jacobins' measures were outdated, overly harsh, and 
unnecessary, or have argued that they were poorly chosen, 
ineptly applied, and thus largely unproductive.^° It is true 
that the Jacobin program might have been better executed.
For example, the Committee of Eleven left the levying of the 
forced loan up to departmental "juries" of local citizens 
who decided how much each wealthy citizen within their 
department had to "loan" the government. The abuses and 
inequalities possible in such a system are obvious. On 
the other hand, the majority in the Councils shrank from 
employing the centralized force which would have insured 
efficiency. The men of Prarial were attempting strong 
government; yet strong government without coercion is 
impossible, and the majority were unwilling to employ coercion. 
But if some of these measures were inefficient, they were 
not unproductive. The appointments of Bernadotte, Lindet, 
and the others injected needed energy and honesty into the 
bureaucracy. The forced loan, however imperfect, raised 
considerable cash. The political clubs, though only a pale 
imitation of the clubs of 1793, stimulated public-spiritedness. 
Most importantly, the military reforms halted the army's
60. Historians favorable to Napoleon, like Vandal, 
particularly take the latter view, arguing that the only 
effective reforms were passed after Brumaire.
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drift towards disintegration. The new lev^e injected 161,000 
men into the ranks, the desertion rate was reduced, and a 
return to limited requisitioning within France produced 40,000 
horses to alleviate the army's chronic shortage of mounts. 
Jourdan's auxiliary armv produced the manpower for the famed 
Army of Reserve, which Bonaparte used to conquer his crown 
the following year at Ma r e n g o . ^
The Jacobins' program might have been more effective 
if they had been allowed to carry it out without opposition 
and interference. The Party of Order soon lost its taste 
for collaborating with demagogues and unreconstructed 
terrorists; the two factions, never really compatible, 
began to quarrel. This split was deadly to the Committee of 
Eleven. Its purpose was to expedite legislation and provide 
vigorous rule until the crisis was over, but the dissension 
between the two factions divided the Committee in half and 
made vigorous action impossible. Jourdan and Lucien 
Bonaparte became antagonists, both on the Committee and at 
the tribune. The dissension spread to the "500" where 
the seances became punctuated with violent arguments and 
near fistfights and then to the streets where right-wing gangs 
clashed with members of the political societies. On one such 
occasion a crowd of rightists surrounded Jacobin headquarters
61. Gohier, o£ cit, I, pp. 80-110. Lefebvre, 0 £  cit, 
pp. 435-42. Vandal, 0£ cit, I, pp. 196-201.
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at the Menage, and as the Jacobins emerged singing patriotic 
airs, the crown began to hoot and jeer, screaming "a has 
la guillotine, vive le R o i ." When their harrassment escalated 
to rock-throwing the Jacobins retaliated in kind, and the 
resulting full-scale riot had to be broken up by troops from 
the Councilor Guard.62
The right had no intention of resigning itself even 
to a mild revival of the Terror. The draft took its sons for 
the army and the forced loan took its profits for the war 
effort. The wealthy resisted both with every means at their 
disposal: they concealed their wealth, fled the country to 
Switzerland or Hamburg, or simply declared bankruptcy.
Others retrenched their businesses, laying off hundreds of 
workers, or defaulted anew on their contracts. More 
simply bribed the "juries" into low loan assessments, 01 
intimidated them into not collecting the money. Admittedly 
the loan was harsh: a wealthy man could be assessed three 
fourths of his income. The Jacobins had hoped to use such 
arbitrarily high assessments to ruin specific corrupt 
contractors who had enriched themselves fraudulently. In 
response, the wealthy threw their support behind Sieyes's 
faction, which joined the moderates in violent criticism of 
the Jacobins. All denounced the Jacobins as terrorists and
62. Vandal, 0 £  cit, I, pp. 161-67.
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anarchists whose goal was to overthrow the government and 
initiate a new Terror; in one such speech, Courtois hysterically 
warned that the Committee of Eleven was the elite of a conspiracy 
supported by "all Israel" intending the slaughter of two 
Directors and two hundred and fifty deputies before it 
reestablished the Monarchy. The left retaliated by branding 
their foes thieves and royalists. Jourdan was as implacable 
as the rest. At the Manege on Bastille Day he attacked 
the moderates and proposed a toast to "the resurrection of 
the pikes."63
As the struggle between the two factions dragged on 
through the summer, news of two more serious military defeats 
reached the country. On July 10 Joubert was bloodily defeated 
by the Russian general Suvorov, at the battle of Novi.
Joubert was killed and his army nearly annihilated. Scarcely 
two weeks later an Anglo-Russian army landed in Holland and 
captured the Dutch fleet at its berth. Once again France's 
defenses appeared on the verge of collapse. The renewed 
emergency bolstere1 the cause of the Jacobins at a time 
when they were beginning to lose popularity. To deal with 
this new crisis, they desired again to increase both energy 
and coercion —  indeed to proclaim, as had the Mountain in 
179 3, the country in danger, and establish emergency 
government for the duration of the crisis.
63. Gohier, 0£  cit, I, pp. 99-102. Lefebvre, 0£  cit, 
p. 440. i
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On September 8, Barras asked Jourdan to meet with
him. Evidently Barras had heard rumors of the Jacobins'
intentions. If Jourdan confirmed the rumors, possibly
Barras hoped to persuade him to get his colleagues to moderate
their plans. Jourdan agreed to a meeting but stipulated
that it be held secretly. He fear.ed that his colleagues,
violently hostile to Barras as they were, might misconstrue
64
his motives if he met with Barras publicly.
At six a.m. on the 9th Jourdan was admitted to 
Barras's office at the Luxenbourg. Barras asked Jourdan what 
his intentions were. Jourdan asserted that the country 
was in danger, and that strong measures were necessary. He 
asked Barras to support such a proclamation. Barras 
refused. Such an approach to the nation's problems was 
"worn out." Not only was the country in less danger than it 
appeared, but also it possessed adequate resources and 
organization to deal with the crisis without resorting to 
strong-arm tactics. The way to meet the crisis, Barras 
suggested, was simply to utilize existing resources and to 
call for the aid of all citizens "in a regu. ar way and 
without shock." Obviously Barras believed a return to 
coercion a cure worse than the disease. He then reproached 
Jourdan for voting with the men of "disorder and blood."
Jourdan replied that the men of disorder and blood voted
64. Jourdan, Notice sur le 18 Brumaire, pp. 16 3-64. 
Barras, Memo ires, III, pp. 568-,7 3.
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with the Jacobins, and that the latter could not prevent 
this. Jourdan then evidently suggested that certain Directors 
and their followers were not sincere republicans. Barras 
replied that "the whole Directorate is one in desiring the 
Republic." "And Sieyes," Jourdan asked, "is he what one 
calls a good republican?" There was no answer to this 
question. The conference ended in a stalemate: Barras
remained committed to the status quo and Jourdan stuck to 
his convictions. The gap between the two men —  a gap which 
was philosophical rather than ideological —  was unbridgeable.66
Jourdan was not blind to Barras's side of the 
argument. He well knew the dangers of a revived Terror, 
having been the near victim of the old one. Both he and 
his friends on the left realized that emergency government 
was a sword with a double edge. They expected to have to 
struggle against the "effervescence populaire," and realized 
that they might fall victim to it. But, like their Montagnard 
predecessors, they were willing to run the risk, rather than 
entrust the crisis to thieves, careerists, and politicians.^
On September 13, Jourdan addressed the "500." He 
described the evils that menaced the Republic: the succession 
of defeats suffered by her armies and the vast royalist 
conspiracy enveloping the nation in its web. The legislators,
65. Ibid.
66. Jourdan, ibid.
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instead of mobilizing the nation against the threat, decreed 
new taxes that were stolen before they reached the treasury 
by thieves who went unpunished. Worse, those who attempted 
to rouse the country against its enemies were criticized 
as counterrevolutionaries and conspirators, and thus had to 
keep silent to avoid persecution. "This Machiavellian system 
has weakened all Republican energy." Moreover, "they fear 
terror and revolutionary committees; chimeric fears sustained 
by royalist: ;o prevent the harmony so necessary among
patriots." The Jacobins, he swore, were bending every effort 
to avoid the horrors of a new revolution, not to produce 
one. The solution, he concluded, was not to stifle republican 
energy, but to mobilize it, to employ it in destroying the 
true enemies, the thieves and the royalists, and in assembling 
all patriots to hasten en masse to the borders. "The country 
is in danger," Jourdan warned. "Let us proclaim that simple 
truth, and then a commission can present to you the energetic 
measures which will be a consequence of that proclamation."^7 
Jourdan’s speech was greeted by tumult. Deputies 
wrestled for possession of the tribune while others screamed 
at each other from their benches. They had good reason;
Jourdan's motion, if passed, would suspend politics and business 
as usual for the duration of the crisis. As calm was 
restored, the debate began. Chenier denied the country was
67. Histoire Parliamentaire, XXXVIII, pp. 121-23.
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danger, arguing- that the difference between 1793 and the present
was great, and that emergency measures would endanger order.
Lamarque disagreed, arguing that proclaiming the country in
danger in 179 3 had proven beneficial. Lucien Bonaparte
denied that extraordinary measures were needed and asserted
that Jourdan's motion would create discord and terror when
what was needed was calm and unity. Besides, he added,
a stronger executive would strengthen the hated Directory.
Quirot hotly labeled Lucien's last statement a fabrication;
the left well realized that the Directory was responsible
for the present impasse. And so it went, charge following
charge and denial following denial, until everyone retired
68
for the evening to rest and regroup.
The Jacobins fully hoped to carry the day on the
floor of the "500," but their opponents more sensibly decided
that the issue might be decided elsewhere. Siey^s and Barras,
temporarily united, realized that without troops the Jacobin
bid for power would lack a cutting edge. Hence they could
69
not be allowed to control the military. This meant that 
Bernadotte had to be eased out of the war ministry. They 
summoned him to the Luxembourg the next morning and told him 
that his presence as war minister was creating dissension 
in the government —  it was not his fault, but perhaps he should
68. Ibid, pp. 125-36.
69. There is no evidence tc suggest that the Jacobins 
had a coup d'etat in mind. *
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resign. Bernadotte, no revolutionary, played into their 
hands. He made the grand gesture as expected and resigned; 
much to his chagrin it was accepted. Simultaneously Sieyes 
and Bcirras replaced the commander of the Paris district,
Marbot, with General Lefebvre, who was loyal to whoever issued 
him orders. This insured that the left would not be able to 
use the Paris garrison to overthrow the regime should Jourdan's 
motion be rejected; likewise the Directory could use the 
troops against the Jacobins should the proclamation pass.
Barras's and Sieybs's sleight of hand doomed the left's bid 
for power. Their action probably rendered the outcome of 
the debate in the "500" irrelevant.^0
As debate was resumed that afternoon, the news of 
Bernadotte's resignation and Marbot's dismissal reached the 
"500." Again the seance dissolved into a chaotic uproar 
as the Jacobins howled about a possible conspracy. Jourdan 
seized the tribune and praised both men as good republicans:
"I would like to believe that the Directory has had the intention 
of utilizing the talents of these two soldiers in placing 
them in other posts. But if this act is only the prelude to 
a coup d 'etat ... " The moderates retaliated by accusing 
the left of plotting to overthrow the government. Jourdan 
hotly denied it, calling the accusation a "perfidious tactic."
70. Vandal, o£ cit, I, pp. 189-90. D. Plunkett Barton, 
Bernadotte (2 volumes; London, 1914), I, pp. 395-405.
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Yet the two dismissals were not crucial to the final outcome 
of the debate, unless the knowledge that the Directory 
controlled the army discouraged some from voting with the 
left. With the Terror so fresh in everyone's mind, the 
majority did not feel that the crisis warranted a return to 
even a limited version of it. When Jourdan's motion finally 
came to a vote, moderates and conservatives allied to defeat 
it 245-171.71
It was a serious setback for the Jacobins. It did 
not end their resurgence because they remained an influential 
and vociferous faction right up until Brumaire, but it did 
deprive them of their best chance to seize undisputed power 
constitutionally. During the course of the next month, 
the Republic's defenses were stabilized. The Coalition 
divided over the proper strategy to pursue and then resolved 
its differences by trying to pursue several separate objec­
tives at once. As a result the Coalition dispersed its 
forces. Massena defeated the Russians at Zurich and chased 
them from Switzerland, while Brune, one of Bouchotte's for­
mer commissaires, overcame the Anglo-Russians in Holland and 
forced them to evacuate that country. In Italy and on the 
Rhine the Austrian advances ground to a halt. The gradual 
improvement of the military situation made the Jacobins'
71. Histoire Parliamentaire, XXXVIII, p. 136. 01-
livier, op cit, p. 142.
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
444
program seem all the more unnecessary and thus left them fur­
ther from power than ever. Indeed, their various reforms 
passed after Prarial were paradoxically working to their 
disadvantage. As more conscripts joined the army, as more 
money flowed into the treasury, and as patriotism revived, 
the moderates' policy of handling the crisis in a regular 
way seemed justified.
The defeat of Jourdan's motion also caused the 
Jacobins to realize belatedly that they would have to act 
outside the Constitution if they ever hoped to oust the 
Directory. They now recognized that they needed military 
support. But to gain that support they needed a leader, 
a man on horseback who could rally the army to their side 
in case of emergency. Because the left was largely com­
posed of unknown politicians, it lacked such a leader, al­
though efforts were made to find one. The Jacobins' initial 
choice for their "sword" was Bernadotte: he was a staunch
republican, a man of charisma and intelligence, and at that 
time minister of war and so in a position to control the 
military. Jourdan sounded him out, asking him if he would 
lead a coup against Sieyes and Barras. According to Berna­
dotte, he flatly refused. According to Jourdan, Bernadotte 
was "ready to take his place in our ranks and to use his 
influence over the troops, but that before doing anything, 
he would have to give up his portfolio, not wishing to 
abuse the confidence of the Directory for the purpose of
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overthrowing it."72
A more obvious choice as the left's sword was Jour­
dan. On the surface he seemed ideal: he was a convinced
Jacobin well liked by the faction's politicians, and at the 
same time he was an ex-soldier and revolutionary hero, 
popular with the army. But for a number of reasons he was 
unsuited for the role. He did not possess the political 
experience, acumen, or charisma to become a revolutionary 
leader, and he was well aware of it. Moreover, to lead a 
coup, he would have to act independently and shoulder an 
immense responsibility. His entire experience lay in operat­
ing as part of a team in which responsibility was shared; 
he shrank from the intense pressure that leading a coup would 
involve. He was accustomed to offering advice and sharing 
authority as the obedient soldier; he would have made a pa­
thetic dictator. If the Jacobins ever did suggest that he 
lead t h e m —  and nowhere did he claim that they so suggested - 
he undoubtedly turned them d o w n . 72
By late October the Jacobins had turned their eyes 
toward Bonaparte. Napoleon was their newest candidate for 
two reasons: his victories in Italy and Egypt made him
72. Jourdan, Notice sur le 18 Brumaire, pp. 154-65. 
Barton, 0 £  cit, I, pp. 409-10.
73. Unfortunately Jourdan, again, wrote nothing on 
the workings of the Jacobin leadership during the critical 
months preceeding Brumaire.
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France's most prestigious and popular general, and, if they 
could not win him over to their side, the party of order 
would assuredly use him against them. Furthermore, his 
politics at first seemed to be politics which the Jacobins 
could live with. He spoke of restoring law, order, honesty 
and unity to the country —  goals that were fundamental to 
their movement. They must have realized that they were 
playing with dynamite. Intelligent people realized, Jourdan 
later wrote, that if presented the opportunity, Bonaparte 
would not hesitate to take over the government. Neverthe­
less, the Jacobins would have run greater risk in trying 
to seize power without him; Bonaparte was far more dangerous 
as an opponent than as an ambitious colleague. Besides, 
no one, including Sieyes and Barras, realized that his 
capacity for handling power was as immense as history has 
revealed it to have been.74
In late October the question of Bonaparte was raised 
at a Jacobin meeting at Bernadotte's house. Jourdan pro­
posed that they offer to place Bonaparte at the head of the 
executive branch of the government, provided that "liberty 
and representative government were guaranteed by good insti­
tutions". His suggestion met with opposition, some of it 
violent. Augereau growled that the only reason he would
74. Jourdan, ibid.
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go to see Bonaparte would be to put his foot up the latter's 
backside. But the majority agreed with Jourdan. In fact, 
some already had been in touch with Bonaparte and were im­
pressed by his vow to reconquer Italy and revive patriotism. 
They delegated Jourdan to meet with him and to offer him, 
in effect, the leadership of their movement. On the 10th 
of Brumaire, Jourdan went to Bonaparte's house and asked to 
see him; Bonaparte's aide, Duroc, replied that Bonaparte 
would be happy to talk with him at dinner on the 16th (No­
vember 7, 1799).75
The dinner at Bonaparte's house was a quiet one. 
Jourdan made his proposal: the safety of the Republic could
be despaired of if the Directory was not ousted immediately, 
but representative government had to be preserved, no matter 
what other modifications were made in the Constitution.
The Jacobins were ready to throw their support behind Bona­
parte if he were willing to fall in line with their plans and 
preserve the republican ideals which they believed so essen­
tial to the revolution, Bonaparte quite candidly refused.
"I cannot do anything with you and your friends," he said, 
"you do not have the majority. You have frightened the 
Councils by your proposition to declare the country in 
danger, and you have some men among you who dishonor your 
ranks." Here he was referring to the Jacobins' connections
75. Ibid. Valentin., op cit, p. 194. Vandal, op cit, 
I, pp. 243-44. f
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with the radicals of the rejuvenated political societies. 
Bonaparte turned Jourdan down because he believed the Jaco­
bins too weak and too unpopular with the monied interests 
with whom he was in concert, not because he disliked Ja­
cobinism. In the course of further discussion he assured 
Jourdan that the Jacobins had nothing to fear from him, 
"everything", he promised, "will be done in the interest of 
the Republic.
It is generally believed that Jourdan left the din­
ner having determined upon inactivity, either duped by 
Bonaparte's promises that everything would be done in the 
interest of the Republic, or assured by Bonaparte that he 
would be "satisfied" if he made no effort to prevent the 
coup. The evidence suggests otherwise. First, in his 
memoires Jourdan did not admit to being lulled into inacti­
vity. Secondly, his actions during the coup prove otherwise; 
after all he and his colleagues did attempt, however inept­
ly, to prevent the coup. Furthermore, if he made a personal 
deal with Bonaparte to stand aside during the coup in return 
for some unspecified guarantee of "personal satisfaction", 
why did Bonaparte outlaw him after the takeover was accom­
plished? To be placed on a proscription list was poor reward
76. Jourdan, ibid. Admittedly Jourdan is the only 
source for the content of this conversation. Yet even Vandal, 
who was hostile to the Jacobins, believed in Jourdan's vera­
city. Certainly the account is inconsistent neither with the 
course of events nor with the characters of those involved.
The italics are the author's. t
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for tacit cooperation in a coup d 'etat, and even Bonaparte 
was not so cynical to proscribe a man who had done his 
bidding. Jourdan had indeed "gotten the warning" when he 
left the dinner. He most probably remained ignorant of 
Bonaparte's exact plans, but he was aware that the chances 
of a rapprochement between Bonaparte and him and his fellow 
Jacobins were nonexistent.^7
On the 18th Brumaire (November 9), two days later, 
Bonaparte set the machinery of the conspiracy in motion, 
maneuvering the Councils out of friendly Paris to relatively 
isolated St. Cloud. His move caught the Jacobins by sur­
prise. Like everyone in Paris they expected an eventual 
coup; they did not anticipate that he would launch it so 
soon. Consequently they did not know what to do. They 
were also at a disadvantage in that Bonaparte's partisans
controlled the all-important Paris military district, as 
/
well as the police (Fouche) and the Ministry of justice 
(Cambaceres). Should the Jacobins decide to fight back, 
they commanded no forces with which to initiate the combat.
At first the Jacobins may not have been sure that 
the move of the Councils to St. Cloud was the prelude to a 
coup. Jourdan described their position as "embarrassing", 
ignorant as they were of Bonaparte's intentions. Apparently'
77. Vandal, o£> cit, argued that Jourdan had advanced 
warning of the coup and agreed to stand aside. Phipps, o d  
cit, V, argued that Bonaparte duped Jourdan with his promi­
ses to preserve the Republic. Most historians tend! ■ follow 
Vandal.
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they met at the houses of several of the leaders —  including 
Jourdan —  to try to map out a strategy. A portion of them —  
Delbrel, Talot, Destrem, and several others —  wished to ini­
tiate some sort of action, but were uncertain what it should 
be. They were not yet sure of what they were facing. Possibly 
Bonaparte was only going to purge the Directory of Sieyes and 
Barras, and they were all for that. They shrank from mustering 
the popular societies and opposing Bonaparte's forces with the 
people, for the people were the more dangerous. But the major­
ity finally decided that Bonaparte must be stopped. During a 
meeting at Jourdan's house they decided that they would pro­
claim Bonaparte an outlaw on the floor of the "500" if he was 
in.fact attempting to take over the government. They would ap­
point Bernadotte commander of the Council Guard, and, with him 
leading the way, they would arrest Bonaparte and launch a 
counter-coup of their own at the appeal of the legislature.7S
This strategy was consistent both with the Jacobins' 
desire to act constitutionally and with their reluctance to 
initiate any revolutionary activity on their own. It was 
a poor strategy for both these reasons —  the best way to 
fight fire is with fire. Worse, the plan placed the bur­
den of responsibility on Bernadotte, who was a poor choice.
He was an opportunist who avoided risks, an "ambitieux" 
both violent and timid, whose Jacobinism was probably no 
more than skin deep. Furthermore, he had already promised.
78. Jourdan, o£ cit, pp. 167-68. Barton, 0 £  cit, I, 
pp. 454-56. Vandal, op cit, I, pp. 340-43.
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Bonaparte that, he would not intervene, unless summoned to 
do so by the government. When at five a.m. on the 19th Jour­
dan and his colleagues requested his aid, he repeated to them 
what he told Bonaparte: he would act only if officially
ordered to do so by the "500". Evidently the Jacobins 
consented to Bernadotte's stipulation. Thus, instead of 
anticipating events the Jacobins awaited them, they counted 
upon political action within the "500" to halt Bonaparte.
They forgot that political action had failed completely 
during the 'country in danger' controversy, and was unlikely 
to prove more successful this time. Yet, in view of their 
determination to act legally if possible, it was the logical 
strategy to follow.7^
The Jacobins, of course, failed on the 19th Brumaire. 
Bonaparte made his hostility to them clear from the outset.
In the Council of Ancients he accused them of desiring to 
restore the Convention, the scaffolds, and the revolutionary 
committees, and declared that their menace was partly 
responsible for his decision to reorganize the government.
As for Jourdan, Boneparte described him as one of the lead­
ers of these "terrorists", accusing him in the "500" of 
having prepared to march to St. Cloud with the "people of 
the Faubourgs", complete with prescription lists, with the 
intention of establishing a revolutionary government "more
79. Barton, ibid. Jourdan, Notice sur le 18 Brumaire, 
pp. 167-69. Vandal, ibid. Barton claims that~the Corsican 
deputy, Saliceti, immediately betrayed the Jacobins' plans to 
Bonaparte.
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frightful than 1793".®^ In fact Jourdan and Augereau arrived 
at St. Cloud alone, and not until about four p:m. according 
to Jourdan. There, wearing uniforms under street clothes 
according to some sources, they awaited the signal from the 
"500" to muster the Council Guard and stop Bonaparte. In 
the interim Jourdan mingled with the soldiers, talked to 
them, tried to gauge whether they would march against Bona­
parte if the time came to do so. But the time never came.
The "500" debated when it should have acted and wasted 
precious hours swearing useless oaths of allegiance to the 
Constitution when it could have decided upon a plan of ac­
tion. The Jacobins' lone act of energy was the eject Bona­
parte from the Council chamber when he entered to announce 
that he was overthrowing the Directory. Then they fell 
into hopeless disagreement, partly because Lucien Bonaparte 
skillfully delayed a vote on the question of outlawing his 
brother and partly because they still were but a minority 
in the Council. Perhaps they hoped Jourdan and Augereau 
would take the initiative; Jourdan and Augereau in turn await­
ed the "500's" orders. In the end it was Bonaparte who 
acted. He took command of the guard, marched it into the 
"500", and dispersed the deputies at bayonet p o i n t . ^
30. Jourdan, ibid., pp. 168-70.
81. For the events of the 19th Brumaire, see Vandal, 
op cit, I pp. 340-65. J. B. Morton, Brumaire; The Rise of 
Bonaparte (London, 194S), pp. 240-56. Valentin, op cit, pp, 
200-02, argues rather imaginatively that Jourdan played a
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Bonaparte proscribed about twenty of the most promi­
nent members of the Jacobins - including Jourdan. All had 
to go into temporary hiding until Bonaparte saw fit to 
pardon them. In many ways they had brought it upon them­
selves. They were the men advocating extraordinary measures 
to save the country, yet when such measures became necessary 
to stop Bonaparte, they could not bring themselves to vio­
late the Constitution. They had lacked decisive leadership 
throughout their bid for power. They were unable to resolve 
the basic contradiction of their program. They were revolu­
tionaries advocating policies of unity, self-sacrifice and 
national mobilization in the spirit of 1793, but they were 
simultaneously attempting to become a respectable opposition 
party - in a disreputable government unmatched for its in­
efficiency. For this failure Jourdan must share a part of 
the blame, since he shared his colleagues' goals and aspi­
rations. Yet to suggest, as his biographer does, that he 
could have changed history if he had only rallied the troops 
to the Jacobins on the 1 9 t h , i s to deal in illusions. If 
he could have done that, he would not have been Jourdan; he 
would have been another Bonaparte.
lone hand throughout, hoping to "pose as a mediator, to 
arbitrate a situation which in the end nr ght have changed 
to his advantage;" Thus his hesitation on the 19th. There is 
no evidence to suggest this.
82. Valentin, ibid. pp. 200-02.
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IX. EPILOGUE
The events of Brumaire did not end Jourdan's public 
life as it did the careers of so many of the other Jacobins. 
Shortly after Bonaparte rescinded Jourdan's proscription, 
Jourdan made his peace with the new ruler of France, and 
he evidently agreed not to combat the regime overtly. Per­
haps he felt that avoiding a lonely, penniless exile with 
a wife and children to care for was worth compromising his 
republican principles. Perhaps he realized that Bonaparte 
was achieving one of the two essential planks in the Jacobin 
platform: the restoration of law, order and efficiency in
government as a prerequisite to military victory. His com­
promise with Bonaparte provided worthwhile, for it enabled 
the former orphan boy to enjoy another thirty years of 
power and prestige, and ultimately a Peerage in 1819.
Immediately upon his return to favor, he served 
as special ambassador to Piedmont from 1800 to 1802, where 
he acted as a sort of military viceroy. From there he 
returned to France, and, after a brief tenure as a councilor 
of state and an unsuccessful candidature for the Senate, he 
was appointed commander of the Army of Italy. In 18 04 
Napoleon awarded him a marshal's baton - one of two given 
to former Jacobin generals (Brune received the other).
Even so, Bonaparte never really trusted Jourdan's loyalty, 
and never forgave him for his opposition during Brumaire.
When war was resumed in 1805, he replaced Jourdan as commander 
454
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of the Army o f .Italy with Massena. He never awarded Jourdan 
a title of nobility, as he did his other marshals. Napoleon 
was willing to provide him with employment to the extent 
that Jourdan did not rejoin the opposition, but he was not 
willing to admit him into the inner circle of the Empire's 
elite. In 1806 he sent Jourdan to Naples to become the mili­
tary advisor to Joseph Bonaparte, then King of Naples. When 
Joseph ascended the throne of Spain in 1808, Jourdan ac­
companied him to Madrid as his advisor and chief of staff.
It was a position for which Jourdan was ill-suited. 
Joseph required a general who would twist his arm and force 
him to make the tough strategic decisions which he habitually 
shrank from taking; Jourdan was a dutiful subordinate, not 
an arm-twister. Joseph also required a man who could coerce 
obedience from the assortment of prima-donna marshals who 
commanded his army, but Jourdan had neither the authority 
nor the personality for such a role. As an untitled marshal, 
he could not order around princes and dukes of the Empire, 
and as an outsider in the marshalate he could not cajole 
intimates of the Emperor to do his bidding. As a mere chief 
of staff, he could not command obedience unless officially 
supported by Joseph. Jourdan's stay in Spain was frustrating 
and unsuccessful. After the failure of the Talavera campaign 
in 1809, Napoleon relieved him of his duties. In 1812, 
after Wellington destroyed Marmont's army at Salamanca and 
threatened to expel the French from Spain entirely, Napoleon
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called Jourdan-out of "retirement" and sent him back to 
help Joseph save his throne. For the balance of the year, 
it appeared that he commanded Joseph’s attention. He 
persuaded the King to reduce the insubordinate Marshals 
Soult and Suchet to obedience. Then, in a masterful cam­
paign, he concentrated the widely.dispersed French forces, 
recaptured Madrid, maneuvered Wellington out of northern 
Spain and chased him back to Portugal. At one point he 
had a chance to inflict a serious defeat upon the Allied 
army, but Soult convinced Joseph that Jourdan's proposed 
tactics were too risky - which they were not - and Joseph 
vetoed them. This failure of nerve lost him his last chance 
to retain his throne. In 1813 Wellington threw the now weak­
ened French army out of Spain for good, and Jourdan received 
the blame for Joseph's defeat at Vitoria.
For the rest of his career Jourdan was a dutiful, 
apolitical public servant. At Napoleon's abdication he 
rallied to Louis XVIII, and at Louis' abdication during the 
Hundred Days, he patriotically offered his services to 
Bonaparte. This only temporarily placed him out of favor 
when Louis returned after Waterloo. By 1816 he was military 
governor of Grenoble, and in 1819 he joined the peerage. 
Clearly Jourdan's preoccupation during his advanced years 
was to hold on to what he had. He remained in the French 
Chamber of Peers until 1827, when he fell into disgrace 
for opposing Charles X's oppressive jury laws. As a result
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
457
he readily supported Louis Phillipe when the later assumed 
power after the July Revolution. He served as interim 
foreign minister, then as governor of Les Invalides. Jour­
dan now was an old man. In 1833 he died at Les Invalides 
as the result of a massive tumor in his chest.
* * * * *
There is no easy way to gather Jourdan's career 
into a neat, cohesive summary. His activities during the 
revolution were simply too multifaceted to permit this.
At first glance, his career falls within certain superficial 
patterns. He was a young, self-made officer who rose to 
army command, won a series of important victories with some 
tough, inspired leadership, enjoyed a brief moment of martial 
glory, and then fell from the limelight as his victories 
were replaced by defeats. He was a Jacobin who reached the 
zenith of his career thanks to his work during the most 
intense period of the revolution, and then, like so many 
other revolutionaries, faded into obscurity when the return 
to normalcy and tranquility caused his talents and ideas 
to become obsolete. Yet these patterns, when filled out 
with detail?:, only describe the "what" of Jourdan's career - 
and not all that accurately. But what Jourdan accomplished ' 
is not the only important issue to be dealt with; how and 
why he accomplished what he did should equally command our 
attention.
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Jourdan made his most important contributions to 
France's future— and reached his greatest success - as an 
army commander during the Terror. Yet his success was not 
merely because of his skill as a battle-captain, although 
this certainly was important; his success required addition­
al qualifications. Jourdan was able to withstand the intense 
pressures which the Jacobin dictatorship brought to bear 
upon all of its servants. His ability to work as part of a 
team effort enabled him to get along with the assortment of 
fanatics, radicals, and hardened revolutionaries with whom 
he labored. This ability more than anything enabled him to 
preserve his head. His cooperativeness encouraged him to 
make use of those key figures in the construction of the 
revolutionary a r m y — the representatives on mission. Unlike 
his Thermidorian superiors in 1795 and 1796, he realized 
how crucial their assistance was. He correctly realized that 
his role as a general was to subordinate himself completely 
to the civilian authorities—  to advise and suggest when ap­
propriate but always to obey in the end. Furthermore, he 
possessed the specific qualities so desperately needed in 
the chaotic revolutionary army of 1793. He was a tough 
disciplinarian, a stickler for detail, and an organizer.
He regarded personnel, administrative and logistical problems 
to be as serious as problems of strategy and tactics. In 
dealing with these problems he was a man of unusual patience. 
His years as a private in the Royal army taught him that the
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average soldier had to be fed and clothed before he could 
fight —  that his sufferings were not something to be taken 
lightly. His attention to organization caused him to recog­
nize the importance of the amalgame to the army, and to 
agitate for it until it was brought to reality. In short, 
Jourdan realized that the revolutionary army must win the 
war of preparation before it could win the war of campaigns 
and battles. Then too he was a good battle captain; he would 
not have retained his command if he had not been. While he 
possessed neither the strategic wizardry of Napoleon nor 
the encyclopaedic tactical knowledge of the Archduke Karl, 
he was good enough to overcome the myriad of diverse problems 
at Wattingnies and Fleurus and in both cases to come away 
the victor.
Paradoxically the qualities which served him so 
well during the Terror contributed to his setbacks during 
the Thermidorian era of the revolution. His dutiful sub­
ordination to the civilian authorities was of little use 
when the civilian authorities included lax, negligent in­
competents like Reubell, La-Revelliere-Lepeaux and the two 
Merlins. Such men required generals who would force solu­
tions upon them, not respectfully carry out their orders.
His team spirit was useless when the situation inevitably 
called for individualism and the ability to operate in the 
fashion of a feudal warlord —  as Bonaparte operated in Italy 
in 1796. His emphasis on discipline was ineffective given
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the weak system of military justice and the logistical 
inadequacies, and his integrity was relatively helpless in 
the corrupt atmosphere of contractors and "contributions". 
Indeed, his preference for collective leadership and shared 
authority contributed to his failure to preserve the Re­
public in 1799. And yet, without his patience, courage, at­
tention to logistics, and concern for his men, the defeats 
of 1795, 1796, and 1799 would have been far worse than they 
were. Finally, let us not forget that these failures were 
not so much failures of strategy and tactics as they were 
failures of preparation, direction and support—  failures 
in which the government was the principal culprit. Jourdan 
repeatedly received insufficient means to accomplish his 
assigned tasks. Bonaparte's victories do not prove that 
Jourdan could have achieved more had he been a better gene­
ral; they prove that Bonaparte's genius was required to 
overcome the obstacles and difficulties with which the 
Thermidorians enehained their generals.
Jourdan is described as a mediocre general, and when 
compared to Bonaparte, he was. Yet by any other standards, 
and given the unique difficulties under which he led, he was 
a first-rate leader - head and shoulders above such over­
rated beau sabres as Ney, Soult and Kleber. Jourdan reminds 
us; "One cannot make comparisons between commanders who 
did not have time to immerse themselves in the art of war 
and over whose heads the axe of the revolution was suspended,
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and a man all powerful, gifted with an extraordinary mili­
tary genius, not having to answer to anyone but himself. 
Without wishing to take away from Napoleon's glory, one can 
also remark that when he first took command, he found gene­
rals and officers who had learned how to make war, and 
soldiers who possessed the experience of several campaigns." 
One indeed should not be overcritical of the generals of the 
Republic, men who had to cope with Robespierre and St. Just 
as well as with the enemy, men who put their lives on the 
line "during the time of the greatest dang.
1. A.G. mr 608-2, J. B. Jourdan, Memoires militalres 
de la campagne de 1794.
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